Minority-friendly majority voting rights
Minority-friendly majority voting is the name of the model of a majority voting system proposed by the Graz political scientist Klaus Poier , which - in contrast to conventional majority voting systems - guarantees the representation of small parties (minority parties) at the same time. It stipulates that the party with the strongest vote automatically receives a majority of the seats (50% plus one seat) in parliament.
A minority-friendly majority voting system thus combines advantages of the majority with those of the proportional representation system by creating clear political relationships and at the same time promoting the plurality of the political system. The introduction of such a model has been discussed in Austria since the end of the 1990s and especially after the 2006 National Council election , in which there was a lack of alternatives to a grand coalition of the SPÖ and ÖVP.
A similar right to vote prevailed in the Italian House of Representatives until 2013, for example , in which the strongest party received a seat share corresponding to 54 percent of the vote.
Minority-friendly majority voting rights
The way in which minority-friendly majority voting works is extremely simple: the party that achieves the relative majority of votes receives half the seats plus one . The remaining mandates are distributed proportionally to the other parties, as in proportional representation (according to the D'Hondt procedure ). In order to prevent a fragmentation of the party landscape - as is often observed in proportional representation - a voting hurdle can be provided for small parties. The parties must therefore z. B. 4% (as currently in Austria) or 5% (as currently in Germany) of the votes cast in order to be able to enter parliament.
The victorious party receives a narrow majority in parliament, the other parties are proportionally represented. This increases the victor’s ability to act, making long coalition negotiations unnecessary. At the same time, the election winner can expand the narrow majority into a more stable one by entering into a coalition with one of the other parties represented in parliament. The possibility of a change of power is available at any time, the people can again express their confidence in the ruling party at the next election or turn to another party. The influence of the voter is increased in this sense - so the proponents -.
Alternatives to the basic model
Alternative variants were also proposed to the model of a minority-friendly majority voting system based on the basic idea presented. For example, Poier pointed out that the majority premium could also be set higher (half of the mandates plus two, three, four, etc.), which increases the stability of a one-party government, but on the other hand reduces the representation and the chances of smaller parties participating in government would.
The Austrian Federal Council President a. D. Herwig Hösele , on the other hand, proposed that the party with the strongest vote should be given half of the seats minus 1 , so that a coalition would remain necessary (which would be beneficial for the small parties), although the winning party would still have the option of representing each of the others in parliament Select parties.
Another suggestion - based on an idea by Styrian Provincial Councilor Kristina Edlinger-Ploder - is to combine a minority-friendly majority voting model with a “non-voter bonus”: the party with the relative majority of votes receives the fictitious votes of non-voters. The other mandates are then divided proportionally. The votes of the non-voters would not be "lost votes" but would automatically go to the victorious party. This would increase the incentive to vote, although this could - with a large number of abstentions - lead to a high majority bonus.
A further refined proposal is that of Richard Seyfried. His minority-friendly majority-building suffrage , like Herwig Hösele's model, aims more at a mandate result for the strongest party just below the absolute majority. The number of seats should be enough for this party to have many coalition options. A major innovation at Seyfried is the inclusion of an alternative voice (second preference). This “alternative vote” already used in London, for example, acts like a runoff between the parties with the highest number of votes. This prevents a party who is rejected by a majority from enjoying the bonus. At Seyfried, the exact amount of the bonus is calculated based on the number of first and second preference votes. These are added to the result of the party that wins in the jump-off as half votes.
With the help of the alternative vote, distortions caused by tactical voting are largely excluded; the possible effects of such a right to vote can therefore be at least approximately calculated using the last election results, cf. the calculation based on the Austrian National Council. The model can also be meaningfully applied to the political system in Germany. There, too, there have been considerable problems with forming a majority since the establishment of a 5- or 6-party system. B. in the state elections in Hesse in 2008 . According to the current calculation based on the 2005 Bundestag election, Seyfried's model would also lead to a significantly simplified majority formation there, without automatically creating absolute majorities.
Pros and cons, criticism
In traditional majority voting, such as in the USA or England, small parties and new groups hardly have the opportunity to win mandates. Most minorities are not represented in parliament and the votes for small parties often turn into so-called “paper basket votes”. The mandates are mainly filled by the two major parties.
The advantage of minority-friendly majority voting is that the party with the strongest vote has a majority in parliament and is therefore able to act alone. As in traditional majority voting, clear political relationships are created. At the same time, the votes cast for the small parties are not lost, as the minorities or small parties are also represented in parliament through the proportional distribution of the remaining mandates. Compared to proportional representation, the small parties would also lose some mandates in minority-friendly majority voting. A strong opposition as well as the plurality of the political system are nevertheless guaranteed. The party with the strongest vote can also bring a small party into the government for strategic reasons in order to develop the narrow majority into a more stable parliamentary majority. The low majority premium - half plus one mandate - makes coalitions very likely. This is not the case with the models of the model in France and Italy, however, as the majority premium is usually much higher there, e.g. B. two thirds of the seats for the strongest party.
The biggest disadvantage of the basic model is that a single party that unites less than 50% of the electorate, i.e. only represents a minority of the total population, has more than 50% of the mandates and can thus govern alone. In addition, the question arises as to whether small parties are still elected in minority-friendly majority voting, since they are no longer absolutely necessary for forming a majority: As in traditional majority voting, voters could tend to vote not to small parties, but only to Large parties to be awarded. Against this it is countered that the majority premium is not very high, only includes half of the mandates plus one: This usually does not result in an extreme over-representation of the party with the strongest vote. In extreme cases (German parliamentary elections 2002 and 2005), however, a few thousand votes from two almost equally strong parties can make the difference, which in parliament receives an absolute majority. Finally, the voter must also decide in the proportional representation system whether to vote for a large party or a smaller group with less chance of participating in government. This fundamental problem of majority voting thus remains. This is also one of the main reasons why there are already a number of revised alternative models. Hösele's model, but even more so, Seyfried's draft electoral law, already take this “injustice” towards small parties into account and give smaller parties a full and, in some cases, even stronger opportunity to participate in the majority formation than they do today.
With such a model, government relationships are likely to change only very rarely, as in most countries the specific percentages of the individual parties change, but not their order - for example, the SPD was only three times the strongest force in the German federal elections but six times the later head of government. Furthermore, a minority-friendly majority vote definitely increases the insignificance of smaller parties. Rather, a solution to the contrary would be required for this, which would even disproportionately increase the number of mandates from comparatively small parties.
outlook
In Austria, the discussion about a new right to vote recurs at regular intervals . Until the 1990s a two-party system was predominant, but now there is increasing fragmentation. The results of the National Council elections in 2006 showed only one possible coalition variant of two parties, that of a grand coalition of the SPÖ and ÖVP. The alternatives consisted of a shaky three-party coalition made up of parties with a wide variety of ideologies and a minority government, which in Austria is usually only considered a temporary solution. The proposal of a minority-friendly majority suffrage is a possibility of reform with the aim of loosening political events from their rigidity without at the same time destroying the pluralism of the political landscape.
An electoral reform in the sense of minority-friendly majority voting would in any case require a constitutional amendment, since the Austrian Federal Constitution in Articles 23a, 26, 95 and 117 prescribes the principle of proportional representation for elections to the European Parliament, the National Council and the state parliaments and municipal councils . It is controversial whether the democratic principle is touched on as a fundamental principle of the constitution and therefore a mandatory referendum would be necessary.
The discussion about minority-friendly majority voting has reached its peak since the summer of 2007. In addition to a number of journalists, Franz Vranitzky , Erhard Busek , Gerd Bacher , Norbert Leser , the well-known Austrian political scientist Wolfgang Mantl and, most recently, representatives of the ÖVP perspective group spoke out in favor of such a model .
Individual evidence
- ↑ Italy's complicated electoral system: They call it "mess" , Spiegel Online , February 25, 2013
- ↑ Minority- friendly majority-building suffrage , private website at chello.at
- ↑ National Council , private page on chello.at
- ↑ Bundestag , private website at chello.at
- ↑ Seyfried's draft electoral law , private page on chello.at
literature
- Klaus Poier: Minority-friendly majority voting rights. Legal and political-scientific considerations on questions of electoral law and the electoral system . Böhlau Verlag, Vienna 2001, ISBN 3-205-99338-1 .
- Alfred Payrleitner (Ed.): Departure from the solidification. New ways into Austrian politics . Molden Verlag, Vienna 1999, ISBN 3-85485-023-9 .