Mirage affair

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Mirage III

The Mirage affair was a political affair in Switzerland , which, based on the cost overruns for the procurement of a fighter aircraft, had far-reaching consequences for Swiss defense policy.

Parliament approved in 1961 870 million francs for the procurement of one hundred French Mirage III - combat aircraft . After massive budget overruns, only 57 units could be procured.

Starting position

In the 1950s, two Swiss projects ( N-20 and P-16 ) reached the prototype testing stage without a series order, however, after the crash of a prototype in Lake Constance on the occasion of a test flight, with the test pilot dealing with the Could save the ejection seat . From 1958 instead 152 British were Hunter - fighters put into operation.

Against the background of the worsening Cold War and the advancing mechanization and modernization of the European armed forces, a new, mobility-oriented troop order ( Army 61 ) was introduced in the Swiss army at the beginning of the 1960s , which was associated with extensive rearmament projects. In the army command, a school of thought dominated (temporarily) that was based on the organizational and technological development paths of the major European powers and, among other things, also called for Switzerland to be armed with nuclear weapons .

The "Army 61" model envisaged the creation of an air screen for the mechanized divisions operating over a wide area . In addition to the existing Vampires , Venom and Hunter , the Air Force was to receive a fleet of modern high-performance aircraft for this and also with regard to the nuclear option .

The selection process

Saab Draken
Mirage competitor Fiat G.91

The three-person "Working Group for Military Aircraft Procurement" (AGF) was set up to carry out the evaluation process . Chief of Staff Jakob Annasohn commissioned the commander of the air and anti-aircraft troops , division general Etienne Primault , to draw up a set of specifications, which, however, did not come into being. The following models were evaluated on the occasion of test flights: Saab 35 Draken , Lockheed Starfighter , Grumman Tiger , Mirage IIIC and Fiat G.91 .

The order

The AGF finally came out in favor of the Mirage IIIC . The Federal Council followed this recommendation and in 1961 applied for a loan of 871 million francs for a hundred machines of this type. Parliament agreed. The airframe and engine were to be manufactured under license in Switzerland. In contrast to the French original, the machines were to be equipped with American Taran electronics, a newer radar, a radar detector as well as chaff and flare projectors; In addition, the supporting structure had to be reinforced for JATO short starts.

Additional costs

PUK chairman Kurt Furgler

During the manufacturing phase, it became apparent that these custom-made products and the licensed construction resulted in massive budget overruns due to Swiss industry that was not prepared for such an order. Marcel Keizer, editor of Weltwoche , was the first to publish an explosive article that hit like a bomb - probably based on inside information. In 1964, the Federal Council had to apply to Parliament for an additional loan of 576 million francs, which it refused. Without this article, the project would have been carried out as originally planned.

Parliamentary commission of inquiry

Instead, a parliamentary commission of inquiry (PUK) was set up (for the first time in Switzerland ) to clarify the background. Three of its members should later be elected to the Federal Council, namely the chairman Kurt Furgler as well as Rudolf Gnägi and Pierre Graber . Among other things, the report of this commission concluded: "The message of 1961 was drafted in part biased, in part carelessly and in some places downright misleading." As a result, Chief of Aviation Primault was dismissed; Chief of Staff Annasohn and Federal Councilor Chaudet resigned. The EMD was reorganized, parliamentary control strengthened and the scope of delivery reduced from 100 to 57 machines. A second motion for an unavoidable supplementary loan of 150 million was approved by Parliament in 1965.

Swiss Mirage IIIRS (reconnaissance aircraft)

commitment

The Swiss Mirages were delivered from 1966 onwards and divided into a reconnaissance squadron (12 units), a training group (3) and two hunting squadrons (21 each). In 1969, 1971 and 1983 a total of four training aircraft were subsequently procured. Overall, the Mirage's service with the Swiss Air Force, which lasted until 2003, is rated a success.

Military strategic consequences

The operational doctrine was no longer practicable with the reduced Mirage fleet in its originally planned form and had to be limited to air-to-air defense and reconnaissance. As a result, the entire defense concept of "Army 61" was called into question. With this in mind, and also in view of the international tensions that had eased somewhat in the middle of the decade, Parliament, at the request of Schaffhausen Social Democrat Walter Bringolf, demanded that the Federal Council review the concept of overall defense , which ultimately aimed at a drastic change in military policy. Under the keyword "defense" a compromise emerged between the mobility-oriented paradigm of the "army 61", based on the strategies of the great powers, and alternative approaches, such as the concept of spatial defense .

Administrative consequences

As a consequence of the affair, the mixing of military leadership and purchasing power was abolished. The War Technical Department (KTA) was spun off from the army and the entire procurement and production of army material was transferred to the new Armaments Services Group (GRD). In 1994 the production companies were outsourced from the GRD and renamed the Armaments Group , which today is a pure procurement organization within the federal administration under Armasuisse .

See also

literature

  • Roman Schürmann: Helvetic hunters. Dramas and scandals in the military sky . Rotpunktverlag, Zurich 2009, ISBN 978-3-85869-406-5 .

Web links