Coercion (Germany)

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The constraint is a coercion that in German criminal in § 240 of the criminal code is controlled (CC). The property to be protected is the freedom to make decisions and to act against violence and threats .

The norm forbids forcing another to act, tolerate or omit by impairing his or her free will through the use of force or by threatening a sensitive evil.

Coercion can be punished with imprisonment of up to three years or a fine .

Normalization

Since its last amendment on November 10, 2016, Section 240 of the Criminal Code has read as follows:

“(1) Anyone who unlawfully compels a person to act, tolerate or omit to act, tolerate or omit by using force or threatening a sensitive evil, is punished with imprisonment for up to three years or with a fine.

(2) The act is unlawful if the use of force or the threat of evil for the intended purpose is to be regarded as reprehensible.

(3) The attempt is punishable.

(4) In particularly serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment from six months to five years. A particularly serious case is usually when the perpetrator

1. compels a pregnant woman to terminate the pregnancy or
2. Abuses his powers or his position as a public official. "

Because of the standard range of penalties of up to three years' imprisonment or a fine, coercion in accordance with Section 12 (2) StGB is an offense .

Section 240 of the Criminal Code serves to protect the freedom to form and exercise will, which is fundamentally protectedby Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG).

History of origin

In Roman law, coercion was understood as a violent crime ( crimen vis ). The offense was subsidiary to more specific offenses. It primarily served to protect public order.

In the teachings of natural law in the 18th century, the understanding of coercion changed to an offense to protect individual freedom of will. The coercion of the Prussian General Land Law of 1794 went in this direction .

The Reich Criminal Code of 1871 contained a provision in Section 240 that was a direct precursor to the modern state of coercion. According to this, anyone who unlawfully compelled another person to act, tolerate or omit an act, through violence or by threatening a crime or misdemeanor, made himself a criminal offense.

Under Nazi rule, Section 240 of the Criminal Code was tightened in 1943 so that any “sensitive evil” could be used as an object of threat. In addition, the illegality of the act had to be positively determined. Coercion was only considered illegal if it contradicted the “healthy public feeling”. The indeterminacy that was consciously introduced for the purpose of flexible application as possible still exists today. As a rule, the offender was punished with imprisonment or a fine, in serious cases with penitentiary or at least six months in prison.

The criminal law amendment law of 1953 determined the reprehensibility of the act as the measure of illegality. In addition, the sentence for the particularly serious case was limited to a maximum of ten years imprisonment. The penalties were reduced by the Penal Reform Act of 1969. In 1995, 1998 and 2005 the legislature specified the difficult case by adding standard examples . According to this, there was regularly a serious case if the perpetrator forced an abortion or a sexual act or if he abused his position as a public official. There was also a serious case between 2005 and 2011 when the perpetrator forced the victim to marry. 2011 was this a specific crime created § 237 of the Criminal Code. The standard example of coercion to perform a sexual act was deleted in 2016 because it overlapped with Section 177 of the Criminal Code.

Objective fact

Coercive act

The perpetrator can coerce his victim by using violence and threatening a sensitive evil.

violence

The most frequently discussed feature of Section 240 StGB is the coercive means of " violence ". In particular in connection with sit-downs , chaining actions by opponents of nuclear power , for example, or demonstrations in which the demonstrators blocked highways in order to bring traffic to a standstill, the distinction between unpunished and criminal behavior is regularly discussed. The interpretation of the term by the jurisprudence has changed over time and has also been the subject of decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court on several occasions . The decisive factor was the criminal prosecution of sit-ins and the question of whether the mere passive blocking of roads, rails and entrances already constitutes violence against those who want to use these routes.

Classic concept of violence

The Reichsgericht defined violence as a physical development of force that acts on the body of another and thereby creates a coercive effect that serves to remove an actual or expected resistance. In jurisprudence, this definition is called the classic concept of violence and is seen as the basis for the definition of violence.

Both vis absoluta and vis compulsiva are understood as violence . The former is overwhelming violence that is primarily induced physically. The latter is bending violence that goes in the direction of psychological compulsion.

Spiritualized concept of violence

The case law developed the classic concept of violence. In doing so, she increasingly distanced herself from the criterion of physical strength development. In contrast, she emphasized the constituent element of physical coercion and thereby brought the victim's perspective to the fore. The Federal Court of Justice ruled that, for example, the administration of a narcotic drug constituted violence because it affected the victim's body and could break his potential resistance. In later decisions, the criminal courts also judged those means of coercion as violence that had an effect that, from the point of view of the victim, had an effect comparable to that of physical coercion. As a result, a definition of violence emerged that is referred to as a spiritualized concept of violence in legal theory: In the Laepple decision of 1969, the Federal Court of Justice defined violence as a psychological or physical impact on the victim, which the victim perceived as a coercive effect of some significance. According to this, demonstrations in the form of sit-down blockades were also a criminal use of force.

In legal doctrine, the expansion of the concept of violence by the criminal courts was largely assessed critically. On the occasion of convictions for coercion, the Federal Constitutional Court dealt with the element of violence and its interpretation in several decisions. In a 1986 decision, it judged Section 240 of the Criminal Code to be constitutional, but was unable to agree on the interpretation by the criminal courts due to a tie. In 1995 the court finally declared this unconstitutional with five to three votes because of a violation of the legality principle guaranteed by Article 103, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law . This principle of certainty represents an expression of the rule of law guaranteed by Art. 20, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law and aims to provide comprehensive legal certainty . According to this, the citizen must be able to recognize the legal consequences for him of a behavior. The court no longer saw this as a given given the extremely broad interpretation of the concept of violence by the Federal Court of Justice. According to this, violence cannot be based on “not the use of physical strength, but a spiritual and emotional influence”. At best, this could represent a coercion through threat. So violence requires a minimum of strength development. This is lacking in the mere presence in a place, which is why this is only a psychological obstacle. However, as the special vote of the Federal Constitutional Court decision stated, the creation of a physical obstacle could also represent violence that disregards the fundamental rights of others and, in the case of sit-downs, can only be overcome with enormous effort.

Modern concept of violence

The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court meant that the criminal courts had to revise their previous definition of violence. As a result, they again requested physical restraint on the victim. This is where the modern concept of violence emerged. According to this, violence is a physical activity through which physical coercion is exerted in order to overcome resistance that has been offered or expected. The assessment thus shifts to the perpetrator perspective. According to this, violence is in particular the physical impact on the victim, such as physical abuse, the introduction of intoxicants and the creation of an obstacle which the victim cannot overcome without endangering himself.

Also on the basis of the modern concept of violence, the criminal courts judge sit-ins as the use of violence: the mere passive presence of the perpetrator does not constitute violence. However, if he forces a vehicle to stop through his presence, this represents an use of force against those who are forced to stop behind the vehicle because it blocks their way. It is therefore a coercion in indirect perpetration ( Section 25 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 Alternative 2 StGB). This line of reasoning is referred to in legal theory as the second-tier case law. Because of the contradiction to the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court, it was widely criticized. The Federal Constitutional Court, however, ruled them to be compatible with Article 103, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law.

However, the question of the interpretation of the concept of violence has still not been conclusively clarified, since liberal representatives of criminal law and constitutional law deny that it is an offense under Section 240 of the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, in addition to this criminal liability, there is often still the deprivation of liberty according to § 239 StGB, the dangerous interference with rail, ship and air traffic according to § 315 StGB, the dangerous interference with road traffic according to § 315b StGB and the endangerment of road traffic according to § 315c StGB .

Threat of a delicate evil

In the event of a threat, the perpetrator holds out the prospect of a future evil and pretends to have an influence on it. Neither the actual influence nor the seriousness of the threat from the perpetrator's point of view is important; what matters is the victim's perception. If the evil hits a third party, this is sufficient if the victim perceives the disadvantage of the third party as a burden on himself. A distinction must be made between the threat and the warning, in which the perpetrator merely points out a disadvantage, the occurrence of which he clearly cannot influence himself.

Any disadvantage, such as damage to an object ( Section 303 of the Criminal Code), can be considered an evil . Legal action can also be an evil, such as filing a lawsuit or filing a criminal complaint . The threat of the publication of dishonorable information can be a serious evil, but need not, if the information were true, arouse public interest, contain no reprehensible abusive criticism and be ascribed to the commercial sphere (see Chantage ).

Failure to do so can also be a serious evil. This is the case, for example, when the perpetrator threatens the victim with “announcing an omission” and claims that he can “intervene in an ongoing, disadvantageous causal process in his favor”. A threat based on the facts of the case comes into question in particular if the perpetrator announces that he will refrain from acting that is legally required. In this case, the victim has the right to have the perpetrator avert the evil, which is why the threat of failure to do so is an evil. It is controversial in jurisprudence whether the announcement of the omission of a legally not required action can be a sensitive evil. The jurisprudence affirms this, since the fact of coercion does not depend on what one can do or not do, but what one may threaten. It is of no importance in what way the characteristic feature of the sensitive evil is brought about. Another view objects that Section 240 of the Criminal Code only protects the freedom of decision-making and exercise of will, which the person concerned already has before the threat was made. For example, if the perpetrator threatens to omit an act to which he is not legally obliged, he does not restrict the existing freedom of the person concerned, which is why he does not commit an injustice worthy of punishment. Ultimately, the omission of prohibited trade is not a serious evil, since the victim cannot develop any trust worthy of protection in this regard.

Section 240 of the Criminal Code demands that the evil must be sensitive. An evil is sensitive if the disadvantage presented is so significant that its announcement is suitable to steer an average person in the interests of the perpetrator. Therefore, a sensitive evil is to be understood as "any loss of values ​​or the addition of disadvantages that goes beyond mere inconvenience".

Coercion success

At § 240 of the Criminal Code is a success offense. A criminal liability for completed coercion therefore presupposes that the coercion leads to a coercion result. Any act, tolerance or omission of the victim comes into question as such.

Subjective fact

Criminal liability under Section 240 (1) of the Criminal Code requires, in accordance with Section 15 of the Criminal Code, that the perpetrator acts with at least conditional intent with regard to the objective facts . To do this, he must recognize the circumstances of the offense and accept the realization of the facts.

It is controversial in jurisprudence whether a stricter standard should be applied with regard to the success of coercion. According to the prevailing view in the past, any form of intent was sufficient in this regard as well. The more recent case law, on the other hand, particularly in the case of the act of "violence", demands that the coercive behavior must not be merely an approved consequence, but must be aimed precisely at the coercive act. (Example: "Column jumper" on the country road does not aim to slow down the overtaken person when cutting in, this is a mere consequence, the purpose of the action is to avoid colliding with oncoming traffic, therefore no coercion). According to this, intent is required .

An elementary weakness of coercion is its scope, which must cover comparatively marginal acts and successes such as the most massive threats. The legal consequence (imprisonment of up to three years) can hardly compensate for this, even the introduction of the standard examples, § 240 StGB has changed little. In critical cases, the jurisprudence deviates to other facts (especially predatory extortion , § 255 StGB).

illegality

Basically, the illegality of a factual fulfillment is presumed. In the case of coercion, however, it is an open offense in which the illegality is not indicated by the fulfillment of the offense. It must therefore be determined separately.

According to Section 240 (2) of the Criminal Code, coercion is only illegal if it is reprehensible. The reprehensibility is judged according to the relation between coercion means and coercion goal. Means and ends can be reprehensible in and of themselves. But their connection can also be reprehensible.

If the behavior appears to be socially adequate, the act is not reprehensible. This applies, for example, if a creditor threatens to sue his debtor if he fails to perform the owed service. The reprehensibility, however, is usually given if the perpetrator disregards the state monopoly of force . For example, the creditor who uses physical coercion to assert a claim against his debtor acts reprehensibly. Also reprehensible can be anyone who forces to refrain from an as yet unlawful attack while deliberately eliminating state coercive means with prohibited means, for example in violation of the Weapons Act .

Sit blockade in Leipzig to prevent neo-Nazis from marching

The assessment of the reprehensibility of sit-ins is influenced by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of assembly ( Art. 8 GG). This protects peaceful and unarmed gatherings, which can also include sit-ins. If an assembly is protected by Art. 8 GG, the reprehensibility of the act is judged on the basis of a weighing of interests. Relevant factors in this context are, in particular, the extent and intensity of the impairment of the public, the prior notification of the action and the existence of a factual connection between the blockade and the blockade's goal.

Litigation and sentencing

The act is prosecuted ex officio as an official offense, so that the criminal complaint of the coerced person is not required for prosecution.

Section 240 (4) of the Criminal Code regulates the particularly serious case of coercion. Compared to simple coercion, this has a higher range of sentences of six months to five years imprisonment. The existence of a particularly serious case is indicated by several rule examples , in the case of which the law advises the judge to impose a higher sentence.

A particularly serious case is usually present if the perpetrator compels a pregnant woman to terminate the pregnancy or abuses his powers or his position as a public official .

Until November 10, 2016, Section 240, Paragraph 4, Number 1 of the Criminal Code contained the coercion of another person to perform a sexual act as a standard example for a severe case of coercion with increased sentencing . In the course of the changes in the context of the "No means No" debate, this example was deleted and the provisions in Section 177 (2) number 5 StGB were transferred.

The regulation, which was valid until 2016, was problematic because sexual coercion is a separate criminal offense. Here, however, a criminal liability loophole was closed for those cases in which the perpetrator, in the event of a threat with a sensitive evil that was not a threat with a current threat to life or limb, requested sexual acts or required sexual acts without physical contact.

However, Section 240 of the Criminal Code was mostly unsuitable as a catch-all offense for sexual acts not covered by the thirteenth section of the Criminal Code, which are punishable under Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention. The application of the non-system regulation of Section 240 (4) StGB was not checked in practice for many decisions. Due to the prevailing interpretation of coercion as a two-act offense linked to a means-end relationship, Section 240 of the Criminal Code was completely ruled out as a catch -all offense in many constellations, for example when a surprise element was exploited . In addition, the wording of Section 240, Paragraph 4, Sentence 2, Number 1 of the Criminal Code suggests that it only applies if the person concerned is compelled to engage in active sexual acts - and not if they are compelled to tolerate sexual acts. The possible remaining possibility of applying Section 240 Paragraph 1 StGB was often no longer comprehensible , also because of the very low range of punishments compared to Section 177 StGB.

Law competitions

If further offenses are committed in connection with an act according to Section 240 of the Criminal Code, these can be in legal competition for coercion .

Some facts contain the elements of coercion. This applies, for example, to robbery ( § 249 StGB) and extortion ( § 253 StGB). These facts suppress the coercion.

literature

  • Gerhard Altvater: § 240 . In: Hans Kudlich (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code . 12th edition. tape 7 , Part 2: Sections 232 to 241a. De Gruyter, Berlin 2015, ISBN 978-3-11-037497-1 .
  • Achim Bertuleit: Seated demonstrations between procedurally protected freedom of assembly and coercion based on administrative law. A contribution to the harmonization of Article 8 GG, 15 VersGG and 240 StGB , Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1994, ISBN 3-428-08184-6 (also Univ. Diss. Giessen 1993).
  • Albin Eser, Jörg Eisele: § 240 . In: Adolf Schönke, Horst Schröder, Albin Eser (eds.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 29th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-65226-4 .
  • Martin Heger: § 240. In: Kristian Kühl, Martin Heger: Criminal Code: Comment . 29th, revised edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-70029-3 .
  • Wilhelm Schluckebier: § 240 . In: Helmut Satzger, Wilhelm Schluckebier, Gunter Widmaier (Ed.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 3. Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28685-7 .
  • Arndt Sinn: § 240. In: Wolfgang Joecks, Klaus Miebach (Hrsg.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 2nd Edition. tape 5 : §§ 263–358 StGB. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-60290-0 .
  • Friedrich Toepel: § 240. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (Ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Friedrich Toepel: § 240 , Rn. 13 . In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  2. ↑ Friedrich Toepel: § 240 , Rn. 2a . In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  3. ^ Gerhard Altvater: § 240 , history of origin . In: Hans Kudlich (Ed.): Leipzig Commentary on the Criminal Code . 12th edition. tape 7 , Part 2: Sections 232 to 241a. De Gruyter, Berlin 2015, ISBN 978-3-11-037497-1 .
  4. ↑ Friedrich Toepel: § 240 , Rn. 3-4 . In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  5. ↑ Friedrich Toepel: § 240 , Rn. 7 . In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  6. ↑ Dagmar von Stralendorff: Nazi law still applies in the 21st century! One example is coercion clause 240 StGB. In: I am for it. February 17, 2016, accessed on April 16, 2019 (German).
  7. ↑ Friedrich Toepel: § 240 , Rn. 9-10. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  8. ↑ Friedrich Toepel: § 240 , Rn. 11. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  9. ^ Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Manfred Maiwald, Reinhart Maurach: criminal law, special part. Teilbd. 1. Offenses against personal and property rights . 10th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2009, ISBN 978-3-8114-9613-2 , § 13, Rn. 12.
  10. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 4th
  11. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 3.
  12. ↑ Mark Zöller: The concept of violence of coercion to the criminal liability of so-called sit-ins . In: Goltdammer's Archive for Criminal Law 2004, p. 147.
  13. ↑ Arndt Sinn: The compulsion . In: Juristische Schulung 2009, p. 577 (580–581).
  14. ↑ BGHSt 1, 145 (147).
  15. ↑ a b BGHSt 23, 46 (54).
  16. ↑ BGHSt 37, 350 .
  17. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Sit-in before the Federal Constitutional Court . In: criminal defense lawyer 1987, p. 122.
  18. ↑ Harro Otto: Seated demonstrations and criminal coercion from a criminal law perspective . In: New Journal for Criminal Law 1987, p. 212.
  19. ↑ Jürgen Wolter: Use of force and violence . In: New Journal for Criminal Law 1985, p. 193.
  20. ↑ BVerfGE 73, 206 : Sit-In Blockades I.
  21. ↑ BVerfGE 92, 1 : Sit-ins II.
  22. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 17th
  23. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 23.
  24. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 24-26.
  25. ↑ BGHSt 41, 182 .
  26. ↑ BGH, judgment of July 27, 1995, 1 StR 327/95 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, p. 2862.
  27. ↑ Arndt Sinn: § 240 , Rn. 44-45 . In: Wolfgang Joecks, Klaus Miebach (Hrsg.): Munich Commentary on the Criminal Code . 2nd Edition. tape 5 : §§ 263–358 StGB. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-60290-0 .
  28. ↑ BVerfG, decision of October 24, 2001, 1 BvR 1190/90, 1 BvR 2173/93, 1 BvR 433/96 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2002, p. 1031.
  29. ↑ BVerfGK 18, 365 .
  30. ↑ Friedrich Toepel: § 240 , Rn. 94. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (Ed.): Criminal Code . 5th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017, ISBN 978-3-8487-3106-0 .
  31. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 39.
  32. ↑ BGHSt 38, 83 (86).
  33. ^ BGH, judgment of May 7, 1996, 4 StR 185/96 = New Journal for Criminal Law 1996, p. 435.
  34. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 46-48.
  35. ↑ Wessels / Hettinger, Criminal Law BT 1, No. 407
  36. ↑ BGHSt 31, 195 .
  37. ^ Wolfgang Joecks, Christian Jäger: Criminal Code: Study Commentary . 12th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-67338-2 , § 240 , Rn. 22-23.
  38. ^ Rudolf Rengier: Criminal Law Special Part II: Offenses against the person and the general public . 17th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-68815-7 , § 23, Rn. 48.
  39. ↑ BGHSt 31, 195 (201).
  40. ↑ OLG Karlsruhe, judgment of April 18, 1996, 3 Ss 138/95 = New Journal for Criminal Law 1996, p. 296.
  41. ^ Wolfgang Joecks, Christian Jäger: Criminal Code: Study Commentary . 12th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-67338-2 , § 240 , Rn. 21st
  42. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 5, Rn. 43.
  43. ↑ OLG Düsseldorf, decision of August 9, 2007, III-5 Ss 130/07 - 61/07 I = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2007, p. 3219.
  44. ↑ BGHSt 35, 270 (276).
  45. ↑ BGH, judgment of September 5, 2013, 1 StR 162/13 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2014, p. 401.
  46. ↑ BGHSt 39, 133 (137).
  47. ↑ BGHSt 39, 133 .
  48. ↑ BVerfGE 73, 206 (254) : Sit-In Blockades I.
  49. ↑ BVerfGE 76, 211 (217) : General Bastian.
  50. ↑ BVerfG, decision of March 7, 2011, 1 BvR 388/05 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2011, p. 3020 (3023).
  51. ^ Council of Europe : Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. ETS No. 210. ( Translations : de ) Istanbul, May 11, 2011
  52. ↑ a b Deutscher Juristinnenbund e. V. (djb): Opinion on the fundamental need to adapt sex criminal law (in particular Section 177 StGB) to the requirements of the Convention ... (Istanbul Convention) of 2011. ( Memento of the original from January 24, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: Der Archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.djb.deMay 9, 2014
  53. ↑ Katja Grieger, Christina Clemm, Anita Eckhardt, Anna Hartmann: Case analysis of existing protection gaps in the application of German sexual criminal law . (PDF; 0.6 MB) Berlin, July 2014
  54. ↑ Lara Blume, Kilian Wegner: Reform of § 177 StGB? - On the compatibility of the German sexual criminal law with Art. 36 of the "Istanbul Convention" In: HRRS Aug./Sept. 2014
  55. ↑ Tatjana Hörnle : Human rights obligations from the Istanbul Convention. An expert opinion on the reform of § 177 StGB . (PDF; 0.4 MB) German Institute for Human Rights, Berlin, January 2015