Operation Te and Operation Wa
Course of the fight on Leyte in December 1944
| date | December 5, 1944 to December 11, 1944 |
|---|---|
| place | Leyte , Philippines |
| output | Minor damage that was fixed after two days |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
| Approx. 500 in the jump area Approx. 10,000 in the vicinity |
516 paratroopers Approx. 500 infantry |
| losses | |
|
Minor losses |
Approx. 450 paratroopers dead |
Leyte - Operation Te and Operation Wa - Gulf of Leyte - Mindoro - Luzon - Manila - Palawan - Visayas - Mindanao
The operation Te and operation Wa were military operations in World War II , which from 5 to 11 December 1944 as part of the Pacific War by the Imperial Japanese army were executed. While Operation Te ( テ 号 作 戦 , Te-gō sakusen ) was a company of the parachute troops of the Imperial Japanese Army , Operation Wa ( ワ 号 作 戦 , Wa-gō sakusen ) was carried out by the army's ground forces . The aim was to recapture or destroy several airfields that had fallen into the hands of the American forces during the Battle of Leyte . The operations ended in failure, as the damage caused was repaired within two days.
Strategic importance of the Philippines
On October 17, 1944, American troops landed on Leyte and began to retake the Philippines . For the Japanese, keeping the Philippines under their control was crucial because American troops were able to isolate the Japanese units in the Pacific from the rest of the Imperial Japanese forces in China , Burma and Indochina . In the event of a later reconquest of Borneo or Singapore , the Philippines could be used by the Americans as an advanced base of operations and also serve as a base for air strikes. In addition, the archipelago was a very important source of supplies for the Japanese war industry, especially rubber and linen . Strategically, the Philippines were a key position for Japan on the sea routes from Borneo and Sumatra , on which the essential oil was transported to Japan. The Japanese were willing to accept immense losses in order to stop or delay the advance of US troops.
prehistory
Planning Operation Te
In November 1944, the Japanese launched Operation Gi , an airborne campaign against American-occupied airfields. The enterprise was a fiasco, but the next enterprise to attack enemy airfields should be done with larger associations and in better coordination. Even before Operation Gi , the 14th Regional Army and the 4th Air Army under General Tominaga Kyoji had started plans for the next attack. The plan was to carry out Operation Te (airborne attack) and Operation Wa (ground offensive) together. For this purpose, the 2nd Air Storm Brigade, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Air Storm Regiment, was founded in September 1944 under the command of Colonel Tokunaga Kenji . Its military code name was Takachiho (also Takachiho unit), named after a city in central Kyushu, which was said to have a mystical meaning in Shinto legend.
On October 25th, the Daihon'ei (Imperial General Headquarters) ordered the 2nd Air Storm Brigade to the Philippines. The 3rd Air Storm Regiment under Major Shirai Tsuneharu left Japan on October 30 on board the aircraft carrier Jun'yō to be protected from attacks by American submarines and airplanes , and arrived in Manila on Luzon on November 11 . The headquarters of the 2nd Air Storm Brigade arrived on the same day by air transport. The 4th Air Storm Regiment under Major Saida Chisaku left Japan on November 3, 1944 by the more dangerous sea route on the transport ship Akagisan Maru and arrived at San Fernando on Luzon on November 30 . The 2nd Air Storm Brigade finally assembled at Clark Air Base north of Manila, albeit without the 1st and 2nd Air Storm Flieger Regiments, which had remained on Formosa.
For Operation Te , the 3rd Air Storm Regiment and parts of the 4th Air Storm Regiment were divided into three, partly mixed, attack waves. The plan stipulated that Type 100 Helen bombers with the paratroopers on board should crash-land directly on the opposing airfields. After landing, the primary targets such as parked aircraft and supplies should be destroyed with explosive charges. More paratroopers should jump out of Topsy transporters and shut down the US troops and the air defense.
Breakdown of the troops for the objectives as follows:
1st wave of attack
- Burauen Süd airfield
- 204-260 men (3rd and 4th air storm regiments)
- 17 × type 100 Topsy
- Burauen Nord airfield
- 72 men (3rd Air Storm Regiment)
- 6 × Type 100 Topsy
- San Pablo Airfield
- 24-36 men (4th air storm regiment)
- 3 × Type 100 Topsy
- Dulag airfield
- 20 men (3rd air storm regiment)
- 84 men (4th Air Storm Regiment)
- 7 × Type 100 Topsy
- 2 × Type 100 bombers
- Tacloban Airfield
- 44 men (4th air storm regiment)
- 2 × Type 100 Topsy
- 2 × Type 100 bombers
2nd wave of attack
- 3rd Company (3rd Air Storm Regiment)
- Fire Support Company (3rd Air Storm Regiment)
- Signal unit (3rd air storm regiment)
3rd wave of attack
- 80 men (3rd air storm regiment)
Planning Operation Wa
The 14th Regional Army had assigned the 16th and 26th Divisions to support Operation Te with simultaneous attacks. The 26th Division was to attack Mahonag, while the 16th Division was to advance towards Burauen on the airfields there.
Course of battle
December 5th
The combined attack by the Japanese air and land forces was scheduled for December 5th, but bad weather over Leyte forced the transport planes to remain on the ground. The 16th and 26th Divisions had not been informed of the postponement of the start of the attack and began their attacks from the mountains towards evening.
6th of December
At 3:40 p.m. on December 6, 35 transport planes and 4 bombers took off from Clark Airfield. As soon as they reached Leyte, heavy anti-aircraft fire began, which confused the pilots who had headed for Burauen so much that they dropped the paratroopers over the San Pablo airfield instead. Only Major Shirai Tsuneharu and about 60 men jumped over Buri. The transporters that had flown to Dulag and Tacloban were all shot down.
The area around Burauen was defended by the 11th Airborne Division , which arrived on Leyte by sea on November 18. The American paratroopers had split up into many smaller units in order to be able to monitor the area assigned to them. They used 35 Piper L-4 courier planes to keep in touch with each other and to drop supplies from the air. Units of the 127th Engineer Battalion were positioned near the Bayug airfield, while the divisional headquarters were near San Pablo.
At 6:00 p.m. the Japanese transport planes appeared and soon white parachutes could be seen in the sky. At the same time, 300 men of the 16th Division attacked the north side of Buri, where they holed up.
"At first it sounded like a swarm of bees in the distance. Then it became clear. No one could mistake the drone of a formation of troop carrier aircraft. Some one outside shouted "Transports!" "Yep!" "Paratroopers!" The division staff dashed out of the mess tent looking skyward. By now a dozen parachutes had opened above us and everyone began firing at them I even emptied two clips from my .45 at the nearest parachutists. "
“At first it sounded like a distant swarm of bees. Then it became clear to us. Nobody can misinterpret the roar of a formation of transport aircraft. Outside someone shouted "Transporter!" "Japanese" "paratroopers". The division headquarters came running out of the mess tent and looked skyward. A dozen parachutes were overhead and everyone started shooting at them. I even emptied two magazines of my 45s for the next paratrooper. "
Some of the paratroopers were killed on landing, but the majority survived and immediately proceeded to destroy the Piper L-4s. Fuel tanks and storage facilities went up in flames. The Japanese, who meanwhile also used captured US weapons, asked the 60 US soldiers on the Bayug airfield to surrender, but they had holed up at the southern end and held out until the next morning. The Japanese had expected to have the element of surprise with the airborne attack, but the fact that the majority of their opponents were paratroopers themselves neutralized this effect. The men of the 11th Airborne knew the weaknesses and strengths of an airborne attack and gave the Japanese a bitter battle.
On the evening of December 6th, only 17 of the 35 Japanese transport aircraft had returned to Lipa airfield, all of which had been damaged by anti-aircraft fire.
December 7th
The Japanese second attack wave started on December 7th, but had to fly back via Leyte due to bad weather. No further attack attempts were made, as the American 1st Cavalry and 77th Infantry Division had advanced on Ormoc. After Major Shirai lost half of his men, he withdrew from Buri. His goal was to make his way to Bayug and join the paratroopers there.
During the day more and more American reinforcements arrived, tracking down and killing all Japanese paratroopers remaining on the airfields.
December 8th to 11th
Major Shirai and his men had reached Bayug, but found no more Japanese soldiers there. Then he returned to Buri, expecting that the second wave of attacks had meanwhile arrived. When he did not find this either, his troops fought westward to their own lines until they met forces from the Japanese 26th Division.
By December 11, US forces had also found the last hidden Japanese paratroopers. None of them had surrendered.
losses
Around 450 Japanese paratroopers and an undetermined number of Japanese infantrymen of the 16th Division died during the operation. The Americans suffered little loss of life. A total of 11 Piper L-4 courier planes were destroyed and some supplies destroyed. The US Army was able to replace both of these just a few days later. Overall, the 16th Division lost 18,028 of the 18,608 men deployed during the fighting on Leyte, including their general Shiro Makino . The 26th Division lost 13,778 soldiers, including their general Yamagata Kurihana, killed 13,158 .
consequences
The effect the attacks had on the Americans was minimal. Despite the poor result of the paratroopers deployed, the Japanese ordered more units to jump over Ormoc a few days later - there, however, to strengthen the troops on site.
literature
- Rottman & Takizawa: Japanese Paratroop Forces of World War II Osprey Publishing, UK, 2005, ISBN 978-1-8417-6903-5
Web links
PacificWrecks.com, Operation Te-Go