Yamashita Tomoyuki

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Yamashita Tomoyuki, late 1941

Yamashita Tomoyuki ( Japanese 山下 奉 文 ; born November 8, 1885 in Ōsugi , Japanese Empire ; † February 23, 1946 near Manila , Philippines ) was a Japanese general who was responsible for the rapid Japanese conquest of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore at the beginning of the Pacific War as well the defense of Luzon in the Philippines at the end of which gained notoriety. After the war, he was the first Japanese to be sentenced to death for war crimes and executed .

Life

Early years

Yamashita Tomoyuki was born on November 8, 1885 as the son of a village doctor in Ōsugi, now part of Ōtoyo in the prefecture of Kōchi on Shikoku . After attending several cadet institutions, he graduated from the Hiroshima Military Academy in June 1906 with the rank of lieutenant of the infantry. In 1914 he took part in the siege of Tsingtau with the rank of first lieutenant . After his return to Japan he went to the Army University , which he graduated in 1916 as the sixth best of his class. In the same year he married Nagayama Hisako. From 1919 to 1922, Yamashita, who was considered an expert on Germany and the German-speaking countries, worked first in Bern and then in Berlin as a deputy military attaché . On his return in February 1922 he was promoted to major and posted to the Army General Staff . During this time he developed a plan to downsize the Japanese armed forces, which, however, met with widespread opposition due to the current political opinion. In addition, Yamashita was very active politically at this time and belonged to the Kōdō-ha , a faction within the Japanese army that advocated a stronger role for the military in the state. This brought him, among other things, in conflict with Tōjō Hideki and other later very influential military, which hindered his ascent into the highest military circles.

From February 1927 to August 1929 Yamashita was deployed again in Europe, where he was military attaché in Austria and Hungary . After returning to Japan and being promoted to colonel, he served in the Information and Military Research Department until August 1930 before becoming commander of the prestigious 3rd Regiment of the Imperial Guard until April 1932 . He then served until August 1934 as head of the Army Affairs Department in the Military Affairs Office in the Army Ministry . After his promotion to major general in August 1934, he served again in the Army General Staff before taking over the military research department in the Army Ministry's office of the same name in March 1935.

Second Sino-Japanese War

In March 1936 he changed to the post of commanding general of the 40th Infantry Brigade stationed in Chosen . After the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War , he moved from August 1937 to July 1938 to the same post in the Mixed Garrison Brigade China . In exercising this command he was involved in the formation of the 27th Division , one of the first triangular divisions of the Imperial Japanese Army, and was promoted to Lieutenant General in November 1937 . During this time he repeatedly and publicly advocated that Japan should resolve the conflict with China as quickly as possible so as not to endanger good relations with the USA and Great Britain . After he continued to hold this view as Chief of Staff of the Northern China Regional Army , he was deported to the post of Commanding General of the 4th Division in September 1939 . This was stationed as a sub-unit of the Kwantung Army in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo and thus far away from the action.

From July to December 1940 Yamashita was briefly General Inspector of Army Aviation before he was transferred to the post of Chief of the Army Aviation Department in the Army Ministry. In June 1941 he was on the orders of the new Army Minister Tōjō Hideki head of a military mission to Germany and Italy , where he met, among others, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini . On his return from this trip he warned that Japan did not have sufficient and powerful enough combat armor and air units to be able to wage a war against the USA or the Soviet Union and that such a war should not be planned until the military had sufficient in this direction has been modernized. After a short time with the Supreme War Council until July 1941, he took over the post of Commander- in -Chief of the newly established Kwantung Defense Army until November of the same year . He also received this post on the orders of Army Minister Tōjō, who mistrusted Yamashita and wanted to keep him away from the political switching points of power in Japan with this overseas command.

Pacific War

Yamashita (seated, center) negotiates the terms of surrender of the Allied troops with Arthur E. Percival in Singapore, February 15, 1942.

In the run-up to the Pacific War , Yamashita was given supreme command of the 25th Army on November 6, 1941 , whose troops started the Japanese invasion of the Malay Peninsula from December 8, 1941 under his command from bases in Japanese-occupied French Indochina . This operation concluded on February 15, 1942 with the conquest of Singapore, which was considered impregnable . This success against a numerically superior opponent, as well as the high number of prisoners of war that fell into the hands of the Japanese, earned Yamashita the nickname Tiger of Malaya . During the operation and the subsequent occupation of Singapore , various war crimes occurred against both prisoners of war and the civilian population, including the Sook Ching massacre . It is not yet certain to what extent Yamashita can be held responsible for these atrocities of war, since he did not prevent them. However, he had an officer who had motivated the murder of patients and employees of the UK's Alexander Military Hospital, as well as some soldiers caught looting, executed for their actions and apologized to the surviving patients and employees of the Alexander Hospital.

In February he received the supreme command of the Japanese invasion of Sumatra and then served from March to July in both Malaya and Sumatra as a Gunseikan , which corresponds to a military governor . When rumors arose that Yamashita should be granted an audience with Tennō Hirohito for his successes so that he could personally report the events to the emperor, Prime Minister Tōjō personally ordered the transfer of Yamashita on July 17 to keep them away from Tokyo. As a pretext, he used a speech by Yamashita, which he gave in early 1942 to influential civilians in Singapore, in which he described them as citizens of the Japanese Empire. This was now taken as an affront to the Japanese government, as residents of occupied territories could not enjoy the same privileges as Japanese citizens. Yamashita was appointed with retroactive effect from July 1, 1942, as commander in chief of the newly established 1st Regional Army, which had its headquarters in Bontenko on the Manchurian-Soviet border. In this post he was promoted to full general in February 1943. After Tōjō's resignation as prime minister on July 22, 1944, Yamashita was first allowed to come to Tokyo again.

On September 26, 1944, Yamashita was given supreme command of the 14th Regional Army , which was stationed in the Philippines . He arrived in Manila on October 10th and was supposed to prepare the defense against a feared Allied invasion of the Philippines . Allied troops landed on Leyte on October 20th and attacked the Philippines. From the Allied landing on Mindoro , Yamashita concentrated purely on the defense of the main island of Luzon and left the defense of the remaining areas to subordinate officers. On Luzon, he divided the troops into three groups and took command of the Shōbu group, which was supposed to defend northern Luzon and with about 152,000 comprised by far the largest number of soldiers. Yamashita's command post was set up in Baguio City because Manila was considered to be exposed to too great an air raid threat. After the landing of Allied troops and their advance from the beginning of January 1945, Yamashita ordered the evacuation of Manila, which was originally supposed to be defended by around 80,000 soldiers, and the retreat to better defendable positions in the surrounding area. However, Vice Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji defied Yamashita's orders and defended the city with about 16,000 Marines and nearly 4,000 Army soldiers, leading to the Battle of Manila . Up to 100,000 Filipino civilians were also killed in these battles, many of whom were murdered by Japanese soldiers and on orders from Iwabuchi.

When the Allied troops began cleaning up the province of Baguio in April 1945, Yamashita withdrew with some troops to the mountains to the north on April 27 and gave orders that all Japanese soldiers on Luzon should do the same if possible. There Yamashita, using guerrilla tactics, ordered a delaying battle in which the Japanese troops should avoid a decisive battle and so wear out the Allied troops. As a result, the Japanese resistance could be maintained until mid-August 1945, but was increasingly felt to be pointless on the Japanese side. Yamashita therefore appeared under a white flag at Allied headquarters in Baguio on August 14 to negotiate the surrender of the remaining Japanese troops with Douglas MacArthur , Jonathan M. Wainwright and Arthur Percival , who was freed from Japanese prisoners of war during the Battle of Luzon . The following day the news reached that Tennō Hirohito had ordered all Japanese units to cease fighting as a result of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki , which is why a ceasefire was agreed with immediate effect, which, however, due to the lack of radio equipment, was not immediately passed on to all Japanese associations could be. In the following weeks, the formalities for handing over control in the occupied territories and for disarming the Japanese troops were clarified before Yamashita signed the surrender of the approximately 50,000 Japanese soldiers on Luzon on September 2, 1945, parallel to the official surrender of Japan . The surrender was officially made to Major General William H. Hill , the commanding general of the 32nd US Infantry Division. The present Arthur Percival, who had signed the surrender of Singapore to Yamashita in early 1942, refused to shake hands with Yamashita after the ceremony because of the bad treatment of prisoners of war under his orders. Yamashita then burst into tears. After the surrender, Yamashita was sent to Manila Bilibid Prison.

War crimes trial

Yamashita Tomoyuki (center) next to one of his advisors on the opening day of the war crimes trial against himself on October 29, 1945.

From October 29, 1945, Yamashita was charged as a war criminal by a military tribunal in Manila . In addition to the Manila massacre and the Sook Ching massacre, he was held responsible for a number of other atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers against prisoners of war and civilians in Singapore and the Philippines. Overall, according to the 123 points of the indictment, he should have been responsible for the deaths of around 57,000 people. The trial ended on December 7, 1945 with a guilty verdict and sentenced to death by hanging . This case, which was already controversially discussed during the trial, has since set the precedent for the superior responsibility of officers when war crimes are committed under their orders, even if they did not order them, and is now also known as the Yamashita Standard .

The process has been sharply criticized from the beginning and since then. Many of the American officers involved in the prosecution or conviction lacked front-line experience and they had received insufficient, if any, training in law beforehand. Yamashita's defense lawyers also complained that they had not been given enough time to prepare their client's defense and that requests to postpone the start of the trial were denied or ignored. The involvement of many Filippinos looking for revenge for the Japanese occupation, as well as the effects of longstanding inflammatory propaganda against Yamashita, heated up the mood during the trial to such an extent that the court's award is not considered objective. For example, since the conquest of Singapore, the British propaganda had excessively caricatured Yamashita as a barbaric ape . The process is often seen as a private feud of Douglas MacArthur, who wanted to take revenge for the Japanese occupation of "his" Philippines. He also demanded that an example be set in this first war crimes trial against a Japanese and serve as a model for a harsh treatise by other defendants in the upcoming Tokyo war crimes trials .

Critics of the trial continued to accuse the verdict of ignoring the fact that many of the crimes for which Yamashita was charged were committed prior to his arrival in the Philippines or by units that were no longer in contact during the Battle of Luzon with his command post. In addition, the naval units on Luzon did not have to submit to his command, but were pro forma only subordinate to the Supreme War Council in Tokyo. The Manila massacre happened after Yamashita's eviction order when the remaining troops in the city were under the command of Vice Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji. This later became clear in the Yokohama trial of Admiral Toyoda Soemu . In this it turned out that Iwabuchi were under his and not Yamashita's command. However, the trial ended in Toyoda acquittal .

Although the trial looked unfair on Yamashita, he was impressed with the performance and dedication of his American defenders to defend their former enemy. Especially the pleading of the chief defender Harry E. Clarke Sr. left a lasting impression on him. In this Clarke stated that Yamashita was not fully guilty or responsible for anything, but only partially. It would be inconceivable that a commander of the American occupation forces would be charged in Japan for breaking a law by a soldier serving under him. By this, Clarke was referring to the fact that Yamashita would only be convicted for having been in command and for having committed war crimes by troops that were actually or allegedly under his command.

execution

On the recommendation of the Supreme Court, a pardon was sent to US President Harry S. Truman after the verdict was pronounced . However, the latter refused to intervene in the event of a military court ruling and ordered the military to decide for themselves on this petition for clemency. Douglas MacArthur then ordered the immediate rejection of the request, which earned him further allegations and the demand that this be decided by a more neutral commander.

On February 23, 1946, the sentence was carried out in Los Baños Prison , 30 miles south of downtown Manila. After Yamashita climbed the gallows and was asked if he had any last words, he communicated the following to those present through a translator:

As I said in the Manila Supreme Court that I have done with my all capacity, so I don't ashame in front of the gods for what I have done when I have died. But if you say to me 'you do not have any ability to command the Japanese Army' I should say nothing for it, because it is my own nature. Now, our war criminal trial going on in Manila Supreme Court, so I wish to be justify under your kindness and right. I know that all your American and American military affairs always has tolerant and rightful judgment. When I have been investigated in Manila court I have had a good treatment, kindful attitude from your good natured officers who all the time protect me. I never forget for what they have done for me even if I had died. I don't blame my executioner. I'll pray the gods bless them. Please send my thankful word to Col. Clarke and Lt. Col. Feldhaus, Lt. Col. Hendrix, Maj. Guy, Capt. Sandburg, Capt. Reel, at Manila court, and Col. Arnard. I thank you.

“As I said before the Supreme Court in Manila that I did it with all my might so that I would not be ashamed of the gods when I die. But if you say to me, 'You have no skills in commanding the Japanese army,' I shouldn't say anything about it as this is my own nature. Now that our war crimes trial goes to the Supreme Court, I ask justice under their mercy and justice. I know that American military justice is tolerant and fair. When I was charged in Manila, I was treated fairly, especially by the officers who were protecting me. Even if I had died, I would never have forgotten them. I am not blaming my executioners. I pray to the gods that they will bless them. Please send my thanks to Col. Clarke and Lt. Col. Feldhaus, Lt. Col. Hendrix, Maj. Guy, Capt. Sandburg, Capt. Reel at the Manila Court of Justice and Col. Arnard. Thank you."

- Yamashita Tomoyuki

Yamashita's chief of staff during his time in the Philippines, Akira Mutō , was found guilty during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East also as a war criminal and December 23, 1948 Sugamo Prison in Tokyo executed .

literature

  • Richard Fuller: Japanese Generals. 1926-1945. Schiffer Publishing Ltd., Atglen PA 2011, ISBN 978-0-7643-3754-3 .
  • A. Frank Reel: The Case of General Yamashita. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL 1949.
  • Aubrey Saint Kenworthy: The Tiger of Malaya. The story of General Tomoyuki Yamashita and "Death March" General Masaharu Homma . Exposition Press, New York NY 1951.
  • Akashi Yoji: General Yamashita Tomoyuki: Commander of the 25th Army. In: Brian Farrell, Sandy Hunter: Sixty Years On. The Fall of Singapore Revisited. Eastern Universities Press, Singapore 2002, ISBN 981-210-202-7 , pp. 185-207.

Web links

Commons : Tomoyuki Yamashita  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d e f g h i j Richard Fuller: Japanese Generals. 1926-1945. 2011, pp. 243-244.
  2. John Toland : The Rising Sun. The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945. Random House, New York NY 1970, p. 677.
  3. ^ Max Markham: The Evolution of Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law , pdf, Penn State Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2011, p. 51
  4. ^ Ann Marie Prévost: Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. In: Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 14, No. 3, 1992, ISSN  0275-0392 , pp. 303-338, here p. 307.
  5. Jump up ↑ Laurie Barber: The Yamashita War Crimes Trial Revisited.
  6. US vs Toyoda LS Doc No. 101 H at 4 (judgment of September 6, 1949 IMTFE Yokohama )
  7. ^ Ann Marie Prévost: Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. In: Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 14, No. 3, 1992, ISSN  0275-0392 , pp. 303-338, here p. 330.
  8. a b Archive link ( Memento from October 7, 2008 in the Internet Archive )