Battle for the Visayas
| date | March 18, 1945 to July 30, 1945 |
|---|---|
| place | Visayas , Philippines |
| output | American victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| approx. 17,000 US soldiers and approx. 9,000 Filipino guerrillas | about 32,000 soldiers |
| losses | |
|
835 US dead, |
14,300 dead, |
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Leyte - Operation Te and Operation Wa - Gulf of Leyte - Mindoro - Luzon - Manila - Palawan - Visayas - Mindanao
The Battle of the Visayas was part of the reconquest of the Philippines during the Pacific War in World War II . The landings of the US forces on the main islands of Cebu , Bohol , Negros , Panay and Samar began on March 18, 1945, and the Visayas Islands were considered liberated from July 30.
background
The Visayas Islands, which had been under US control since 1898, were captured and occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Battle of the Philippines right at the start of Japanese operations in the Pacific region in early 1942 . When the Joint Chiefs of Staff had the first plans to recapture the Philippines drawn up under the code name Musketeer in 1943, after the first US wars , the main focus was on the two large islands of Leyte and Luzon . An attack on the Visayas was not mentioned until July 1944 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Douglas MacArthur , personally appointed Commander in Chief of Operation Musketeer by President Franklin D. Roosevelt , also asked the US staff to retake the Program Visayas Islands. Since the airfields there in Japanese hands were strategically extremely important for the later operations in Southeast Asia , an attack on the Visayas Islands was prepared and marked as Operation Musketeer: Victor . The plan was to begin the landings on the Visayas immediately after landing on the main island of the Philippines, Luzon . Operation Victor was divided into two phases: Victor I and Victor II . Victor I planned to take the islands of Panay and Negros from the day of landing. After the airfields located there were prepared for use, the islands of Cebu and Bohol were to be secured in the course of Operation Victor II . This final plan was cleared for implementation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early December 1944.
The commander of the two Victor operations was General Robert L. Eichelberger , who was under the command of MacArthur.
Victor I
Eichelberger was to have about 12,000 troops available for Operation Victor I on Panay and Negros, consisting of parts of the 40th US Infantry Division , a regiment of the California National Guard and two regiments of the 25th US Infantry Division from the Battle of Luzon were detached, passed.
Backup of Panay
On March 5, 1945, F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighter planes of Task Force 58 and B-25 Mitchell bombers, which took off from airfields in China, bombed the Japanese defenses on the coast of Panay Island. On March 17, 1945, Task Force 38 carried out the last scheduled air raid on Japanese bases. On the one hand, these attacks served the purpose of eliminating Japanese ground and air units on Panay and preparing for the landing, and interrupted communications with the 8,000-strong Japanese garrison. About 3,000 defenders withdrew to the town of Iloilo City , while the remaining troops took up positions on a defensive line on the Panay River . American land-based warplanes flew from bases on Leyte Island against other targets on Panay. In addition, a number of Japanese air force bases on the Visayas Islands were largely neutralized. On Negros in particular, more than 150 Japanese fighter planes and bombers, most of them still standing on the airfields, were destroyed or damaged.
That was the situation when, on the morning of March 18, the communications base on Negros issued a warning of an imminent enemy landing on the Panay coast. Intercepted American radio messages indicated a concentration of warships and transports leaving Leyte and Mindoro . In addition, a reconnaissance plane observed a large number of Amtracks on the decks of the transporters, which indicated that these units were ready for an invasion. A few hours later another machine announced the sighting of a large fleet about 22 miles off Panay, which consisted of 12 transports, two cruisers and six destroyers and was accompanied by four escort carriers. On the afternoon of March 18, the mission ships anchored with the landing units of the 40th Infantry Division under the command of Major Gen. Rapp Brush was standing about nine kilometers from Panay's western beaches. At around 11:00 a.m., the soldiers boarded the landing craft, which were heading for the designated landing points. At 11:30 a.m., the two light cruisers opened fire on the beaches for 30 minutes. Meanwhile, US destroyers were approaching the coast to fire on selected targets further inland. Several sea mines were removed by minesweepers , while the escort carriers' fighter planes bombed the few still intact Japanese fighter planes on the airfields. Since a Japanese resistance in the landing area was not expected, the further planned flight operations could be canceled.
When the first wave reached the beach, the Amtracks armed with heavy machine guns opened fire on the beach, but apart from a few isolated shots that were fired from some intact positions, there was no resistance from the Japanese side. The bunkers could be quickly identified and switched off by the destroyer escorts, so that there was only one dead and a few wounded among the landing forces on the American side. Within a short time three battalions of the 40th Division were ashore, as well as some units of the California National Guard. These troops secured the beachhead on the beach in all directions.
When General Eichelberger went ashore at 1:30 p.m. and had the situation explained to him, he changed the landing plans for the entire operation. He decided to take advantage of the weak resistance from the Japanese to secure Panay as soon as possible. That is why he set the priority target of Operation Victor I to capture Iloilo City. After the fall of the island's capital, the Japanese on Panay would flee to the mountains, where they could be crushed by Filipino guerrillas and American troops. Since the hinterland on the landing beach no. 1 allowed the fastest advance, a column of trucks was organized for the supplies from the other landing points, which took the stored goods to the landing beach no. 1 transported. The management staff under General Eichelberger initially decided to immediately disembark the supplies intended for the landing beaches for the third day of operation. During the expansion of the bridgehead on March 18, smaller units of the 40th Division had already advanced far in the direction of Iloilo City without encountering Japanese resistance. It was not until the following night, when the units were encamped, that a smaller group of Japanese attacked the right flank. These defenders were all killed. The following day, about 23,000 guerrilla fighters under Col. Macario Peralta joined the US troops.
The Japanese commander on the Visayas, General Suzuki, decided due to the hopeless defensive situation on Panay to withdraw with his main troops to the island of Negros in order to build up a strong defense there.
The American forces, which still assumed there were more than 4,000 Japanese defenders in the interior of Panay, were caught in heavy rains on March 19, which made advancing the narrow paths in the jungle even more difficult. In particular, the guns and the trucks that were to be brought into the front lines sank again and again in the deep morass of the Panay River, so that the schedule was mixed up. General Eichelberger therefore decided to rally the troops and make an advance against Iloilo City. Since the weather did not change the following day either, a supply flight from the air was initially out of the question. Despite these unplanned setbacks, the main force advanced behind the advance patrols towards the Japanese positions in Iloilo. The city was reached on March 21st. After known and suspected Japanese positions on the outskirts of the city were shot at with artillery, the advance stopped about 900 m from the city limits. Here there was a brief skirmish with Japanese soldiers who were well entrenched, but after the Americans had made the breakthrough, they were taken under fire from a hill. The Japanese position could be quickly explored and eliminated with mortar fire and grenades.
Meanwhile, the troop supply had to be organized from the coast by handcart, as bad weather continued to make it impossible to drive on the paths with vehicles. A supply from the air was still out of the question. Despite this disastrous supply situation and without supporting artillery in the first rows, Eichelberger decided to issue the order to advance further. This was not least due to the fact that he had received information that said the Japanese were moving away from the city. On the morning of March 22nd, the main American force occupied the city, which was finally secured on the 25th. About 5,000 Japanese had died on Panay, 1,800 of them in Iloilo City. About 200 resulted.
Securing Negros
On March 24, 1945, Task Force 58 began the planned attack on Negros. These air strikes achieved all the intended targets again because the last Japanese planes on Negros were eliminated and the defenses of the beaches were largely destroyed. From March 22nd, however, American land-based warplanes attacked the most important targets on the island, mainly bridges, depots or anti-aircraft positions, and long-range bombers from China also bombed the island, especially the city of Bacolod City . In addition, several Japanese cannon batteries were destroyed on Negros.
Japanese scouts observed a large number of enemy ships that had set course for the island, exchanged many tactical radio messages, and consisted of 20 transports, three cruisers and nine destroyers and were accompanied by four escort carriers. This fleet carried about 5,000 American soldiers from the 40th Division. The coast section of Pulupandan , in the northwest of Negros, on which you were supposed to go ashore, had been divided by the planners into two landing sections: N-Beach 1 and 2 . No serious Japanese resistance was expected in this operation either, but in order to prevent an enemy counterattack, a reinforced platoon of the 185th Infantry Regiment under Lieutenant Aaron H. Hanson was let ashore through an isolated amtrack on March 27 . These soldiers crossed enemy lines whose troops had been dispersed by the air raids, drew a detailed map of the northern section of Negros, and came to the steel bridge over the Bago River , which was the only way to cross this river. The American soldiers secured the bridge within a few minutes, killed the Japanese guards and mined the structure in order to blow up the entire bridge in the event of a reconquest by the Japanese.
The soldiers at the Bago River Bridge were relieved by the 40th Division at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of March 28th, after they went ashore on March 27th after a 30-minute artillery preparation by the light cruisers. Task Force 58 aircraft also bombed the beaches. There was no Japanese resistance during the bombing or the landings. All units reached the Pago River relatively quickly, established a bridgehead on the other bank , stopped the advance and waited there for the supplies to be unloaded. This began to arrive 45 minutes after landing and the US troops, supported by a tank brigade, continued the advance. South of the Bago River rose a range of hills, which was named Firing Ridge , because several Japanese artillery units opened fire from there, but the bridge remained intact. After the hills were secured in the late morning, the entire route of the 40th Division could be overlooked. With isolated Japanese rifle fire, the city of Bacolod was captured on March 30 at around 11 a.m.
At around 2:30 p.m. all districts in Bacolod were secured and in the northern part of Negros the American units had advanced up to 40 kilometers without encountering resistance. General Eichelberger decided not to take Talisay City , an important target of the operation, until the next day, as the Japanese lying there were to be taken under artillery fire first, as well as to facilitate their own advance and his troops, which were exhausted because of the forced march , to protect. The infantry attack began at 9:30 a.m. on April 1st. The Americans had completely taken Talisay around 7:00 p.m., but the Japanese resistance increased increasingly during the conquest of the city, so that the American troops had about 120 dead and a thousand wounded in the evening.
Meanwhile, the units that landed on N-Beach 2 were advancing inland to the mountains in Central Negros. Shortly after landing, they took over various bridges against light Japanese resistance. Towards evening, however, the resistance increased considerably. On April 6, at 9:00 a.m., the American units began their advance inland. Near the Bago River there was another skirmish with about 500 Japanese who launched a banzai attack on the advancing left flank of the Americans, but these enemy troops were repulsed by M4 Sherman tanks and machine-gun fire. Without further resistance worth mentioning, the Americans reached the vicinity of the San Jose Hacienda by afternoon, where dozens of men were booby- trapped. In the hacienda, where the US troops discovered a large storage and storage space for the Japanese, there were further fights with around 600 enemies who defended themselves with two cannons and a few mortars, and were protected from frontal attacks by a few small bunkers. Sergeant John. C. Sjogren, 160th Infantry Regiment, received the Medal of Honor for his conduct under fire. He killed 43 Japanese with his rifle and destroyed nine bunkers himself.
Since Japanese positions were suspected west of the hacienda, which was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance, Eichelberger requested an air strike and the American soldiers were instructed to hold their current position for the time being. When the attack took place around 11:00 a.m., all positions were destroyed, and several hundred Japanese were killed. Sporadic rifle fire still killed an American and wounded 12. Smaller Japanese groups repeatedly attacked the advancing units on the right flank, even under cover of darkness so that support for the soldiers lying in the front line was still a long time coming. In the course of the night the 160th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Division was shaken by another banzai attack, but it was able to repel the attackers. With the men now also available, the plan to completely secure the island of Negros was implemented on April 12th. The expected strong resistance of the Japanese in the mountains did not materialize, but artillery fire suddenly started on the marching troops and the advance came to a halt. The fire came on the one hand from the Japanese positions, which were hidden in the rock. Difficulties in communication meant that the enemy positions could not be dug until late in the evening.
However, by April 26, Negros was completely secured and Operation Victor I was over. The US troops had lost 370 men in the process, another 1,025 were wounded, and the Philippine guerrillas had lost around 400 men.
Victor II
Operation Victor II planned to take the islands of Cebu and Bohol. This task was assigned to the American Division , under the command of Maj. Gen. William Howard Arnold stood, who in turn was under the command of Eichelberger.
Securing Cebu
On the morning of April 22, the transport ships, which had not been spotted by any Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, anchored with the landing units of the Americal Division about nine kilometers off the Talisay coast, in the southeast of Cebu. At around 5 a.m., the 6,000 soldiers boarded the landing craft, which set course for the designated landing points on the bank. During these operations, air strikes were carried out by the machines of Task Force 58. These attacks again destroyed almost the entire line of defense that the Japanese defenders had built on the beach. The Imperial soldiers fled into the jungle, and at 5:10 a.m. the cruisers Phoenix , Boise and Hobart opened fire for the escort fleet for 90 minutes on the beaches to further hit the defenses. Meanwhile, the destroyers approached the coast within 800 meters in order to continue firing at suspected targets such as bunkers and rolls of barbed wire. Further fighter planes of Task Force 58 bombed the few still intact Japanese planes on the surrounding airfields at 6:00 a.m. and lost 8 planes in the process, but since Japanese resistance in the landing area was not expected after these attacks, the further planned flight operations could be canceled .
When the first wave of 15 landing craft reached the beach, the Amtracks armed with heavy machine guns also opened fire and approached the coast. But a few meters from the landing point, 9 of the 15 boats ran into Japanese sea mines: 49 Americans were killed. The remaining mines were quickly located by the minesweepers, but they were too close to the coast to be removed. Therefore, the Amtracks were steered to another landing area, which was considered mine-free. Within a short time three battalions went ashore and secured the bridgehead to the west and east. The Americal Division went ashore in full strength that day and therefore the command staff under General Eichelberger decided to prepare the supplies planned for the second day of the operation that were still on the troop transports for the landing beaches and to begin the advance towards the interior immediately.
Meanwhile, several platoons of US troops had advanced far inland without encountering any Japanese resistance. By the evening of March 26, the first American associations had already advanced within 20 kilometers of Cebu City . At 5:00 a.m. on March 27, units of the 182nd Infantry Regiment reached the city. When the first districts were reached, the shelling of the city center began as planned. However, it did not start at 6:00 a.m. as planned, but around 2 hours later. Due to the heavy morning fog and the Japanese fortifications burning under heavy smoke, the orientation of the artillery units was very difficult, so that destroyers had to intervene, who were anchored off the coast and the city was under heavy fire from the east. Since most of the Japanese occupiers of Cebu had withdrawn after the attack by the American naval artillery, air support had to be requested, which began at 12:00 and was delivered by the land-based aircraft on Leyte . After four hours, the bombardment stopped and the first units of the 182nd Regiment entered the city center without encountering significant resistance. Booby traps and gunfire killed some US soldiers, but at around 4 p.m. the city center was finally occupied. Some Japanese prisoners were taken in these operations and the landing forces were waiting for General Arnold's orders to advance west and secure the entire island of Cebu.
After the order to advance was given on March 28 at 10:30 a.m., it began at 11:00 a.m. Although the advance was slower than originally planned, the Lahug airfield was reached at 12:45 p.m. The American units, which still assumed there were more than 10,000 Japanese defenders on Cebu, got into fierce fighting on the tarmac, which made the advance even more difficult. General Eichelberger therefore decided to rally the troops to carry out a frontal attack and take the airfield. Around noon on March 29, it was possible to take some Japanese positions through artillery fire and flamethrower use , but the losses increased accordingly on the American side. Despite these unplanned setbacks, the main force continued to advance towards the Japanese positions behind the advance patrols. After they had fired at known and suspected Japanese positions with destroyer artillery, the advance was ordered. Resistance had been broken by the shelling and US troops could move forward quickly. Finally they were taken under fire from a hill, but the Japanese position was quickly identified and mortar fire eliminated. The airfield was in American hands. When night fell, its expansion could begin. By that time, 410 Americans had been killed and 1,700 wounded, while around 8,000 had contracted tropical diseases such as beriberi and malaria .
The island of Cebu was considered secure in early April, but 8,500 Japanese soldiers remained hidden in the mountains, where they were repeatedly attacked by Filipino guerrillas.
Securing Bohol
On April 11, a battalion of the 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division landed in the Tagbilaran coastal area on Bohol . The resistance of the 330-strong Japanese garrison, which had already been weakened by numerous American air strikes, was generally weak, and by April 16 most of the Japanese armed forces had dispersed on the island. The last 100 soldiers gathered in the mountains inland, where they were razed by Filipino guerrillas. So the island was completely secured on April 20th. Only 23 soldiers of the Americal Division and about 120 guerrillas died.
literature
- John N. Bradley: The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific . West Point Military History - Square One Publishers 2002, ISBN 978-0-7570-0162-8 .
- Saburō Ienaga: The Pacific War - World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945. Pantheon Books, New York 1978, ISBN 0-394-73496-3 .
- Bernard Millot: The Pacific War. BUR, Montreuil 1967.
- Samuel Eliot Morison : The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944-1945. Castle Books, 2001, ISBN 978-0-7858-1314-9 .
- Stanley Sandler: World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia. ( Military History of the United States. ), Taylor & Francis, ISBN 978-0-8153-1883-5 .
- Robert R. Smith: The War in the Pacific: The Approach to the Philippines. ( United States Army in World War II. ) United States Army Command of Military History, Washington DC 1953.
Web links
- US Army in WW2 - Approach to the Philippines
- World War II Medal of Honor Recipients MS , United States Army Center of Military History
Individual evidence
- ^ Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, p. 231
- ↑ a b Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, p. 232
- ^ Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, pp. 232–233
- ^ A b Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, p. 233
- ^ Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, p. 234
- ^ A b Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, p. 235
- ↑ Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, pp. 235–236
- ^ Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, p. 236
- ^ A b c Samuel E. Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944–1945 , 2001, p. 237