Plural suffrage
Plural suffrage is a right to vote that gives individual (or groups of) voters more votes (i.e. two or more) than other voters, i.e. gives them preference.
The term can therefore be largely equated with the term plural voting rights , ie the granting of several votes.
Basic types of plural voting rights
The concept of plural voting or voting rights can be divided into two major subgroups: on the one hand, the real plural voting rights, on the other hand, the false ones.
A true plural vote exists when one and the same person actually has two or more votes that other members of the electorate do not.
A false plural voting right is realized by the fact that although formally only one vote is cast per eligible voter, these votes are given different actual weight.
In the case of real plural suffrage, it is e.g. B. so that certain people or groups receive two, three or even more votes that they can cast. The additional influence of these people or groups on the election result thanks to their additional votes is obvious.
The real plural voting rights can also be differentiated according to whether the multiple votes can be decided individually, i.e. that it would be possible to vote for several people / lists, or whether they can only be submitted uniformly, i.e. the same person / list necessarily receives multiple votes from the same voter.
In the case of false plural voting, all votes are formally cast the same, but weighted differently, so that the actual count or success value of the votes is different. For example, the spurious plural voting rights include any form of class division of the electorate, which has the effect that different numbers of classes each have the same influence on the election result or that classes of the same size have different influence on the election result.
Examples of plural options
Real plural options
Historically, true plural voting rights are rare. During the transition between the period known as the Ancien Régime (up to around 1800) and the modern age, it happened again and again that additional votes were given for individual groups, for example for voters with the highest taxation. This was the case in some German states until 1918, e.g. B. in the Kingdom of Saxony (up to 4 additional votes) and in the Principality of Reuss younger line (up to 5 additional votes).
A well-known propagator of plural suffrage at the time was John Stuart Mill .
The fact that genuine plural vocal systems rarely occur historically is probably related to the fact that the different weighting of votes is obvious due to the open allocation of several votes and can therefore also be openly criticized. In addition, such a system can easily be attacked formally, since it treats voters unequally formally. According to the German Basic Law (as well as according to international standards) a plural vote system in today's democracies would violate the equality of choice.
Spurious plural choices
Forms of false plural voices occur much more frequently than true plural votes.
In Swiss company law , the votes are generally based on the amount attributable to the shares, e.g. B. one vote for every 100 francs. The shareholder who acquires a corresponding amount of shares also acquires the associated votes. As an exception to this, however, Swiss company law allows shareholders' voting rights to be calculated based on the number of shares rather than the amount of capital attributable to the shares. At the same time, it is also possible to create shares denominated in different capital amounts. A stock corporation can therefore issue a number of shares at CHF 1,000 plus shares at CHF 100, but assign the votes per share. This means that shareholders who only bought shares at 100 francs have the same voting weight per share as shareholders who bought shares at 1000 francs. For the same number of votes, one shareholders only have to invest 10% of the capital compared to the other shareholders. This indirectly increases the voting power of those shares that are denominated in smaller amounts; in fact, a plural voting right arises, i.e. a so-called fake plural voting right. However, Swiss company law limits the difference between such preferred shares and ordinary shares to a ratio of no more than 10: 1 and excludes the use of the calculation of the number of votes according to the number of shares for certain important decisions, the idea of equality of shareholders and the basis following the stock corporation as a corporation. The allocation of multiple votes to one share (real plural voting rights) is prohibited.
A corresponding allocation of voting rights in a modern constitutional state for political elections or votes would contradict the principle of equality of election, in particular the resulting principle of the equality of counting of all votes.
Well-known historical examples of spurious plural voting rights are different class voting rights , such as the Prussian three- class voting right . Class formation also existed in the ancient Roman Republic in all kinds of comitia and concilium plebis . Since each sub-department had one vote for one of these types of assembly, but within the departments different numbers of citizens voted, these were given very different weights. In the comitia centuriata , the heavily armed, ie at the same time rich, citizens originally had the majority of the departments for themselves, although they only formed a minority of all citizens. The departments of these heavily armed men were called classis as a whole , from which the term “class” is derived.
If z. If, for example, two classes are formed, one of which comprises 100 and the other 1000 voters, but both classes each determine half of those to be elected, this is equivalent to a solution that gives the members of the first class ten and the remaining voters only ten a voice approved.
Alternatives to plural voting rights
Historically, plural suffrage has seldom occurred. Most often the purpose of favoring certain groups has been better served by other means, the most important of which are:
Most of the states of the modern age, which can constitutionally be attributed to constitutionalism , knew bicameral parliaments, although the representative body was not opposed to a senate determined according to territorial aspects, but a mansion ; This mansion mostly belonged to the nobility, but also members of the ruling house, wealthy citizens and landowners, representatives of the government, administration and public institutions, etc. like.
Exclusions of entire classes from the right to vote were more effective than multiple votes, for example through a high electoral census (minimum wealth, minimum taxes), the requirement of real estate as a prerequisite for voting rights, exclusion because of dependent work (e.g. as a domestic worker) and the like. v. a. m.
The methods of constituency geometry ( Gerrymandering ) could also serve to maintain certain groups in control; as an example, reference should be made to the long-running dispute over the redistribution of constituencies in Great Britain during almost the entire 19th century, connected with the rotten boroughs (depopulated old constituencies).
Other, more radical measures consisted of blurring the boundaries between the institutions (contradicts the separation of powers ), for example by including the entire government, judges, high officials, etc. in parliaments, or by renouncing elections as exclusive or at least primary Appointment form of state bodies, for example by taking a seat ex officio (e.g. the government) or following an office (e.g. former presidents automatically become senators for life), through appointments (often of senators for life) or co-optation (Election of members by the relevant body itself).
Some of these methods have survived to this day, such as the British upper house , the Irish Senate, the inclusion of former presidents in the Constitutional Council (in France) or in the Senate (Italy), the appointment of senators for life (Italy) and the like. a. m.
Differentiation of confusion and pseudo forms
In contrast to forms of electoral law such as family suffrage , deputy suffrage , etc. In the case of plural voting rights, the additional votes are directly entitled to the person entitled in each case and are not transferred to the person exercising the right to vote by other persons (e.g. the persons represented, the family members).
The system of first and second votes in German electoral law also does not create plural voting rights, because every person entitled to vote is entitled to these two votes equally. By offsetting the direct mandates (first vote) with the results from the second votes ( list mandates ), it is also ensured that, as a rule, no voter has a double influence on the election result.
The widespread rule that in the event of a tie, the chairman's vote counts twice (i.e. the vote that has already been cast has the casting vote) or that he has the casting vote (which must be cast separately after the vote), does not constitute a plural vote, especially not if the chairman only has a casting vote if there is a tie, but the chairman does not otherwise vote (because then he only has one vote). These like other regulations are only intended to prevent a standstill in decisions, such as B. also the regulation that equally divided votes of a court are to be assessed as acquittal.
A seemingly genuine plural voting right occurs today mainly and in a largely pure form only in corporations , especially in stock corporations . A person has as many votes as the value of the shares they own. Instead of per capita, voting rights are calculated based on capital employed. However, corporations are significantly defined by the use of capital, not by the personal participation of the financier, so that the capital sums themselves form the decisive participation element, not the people. Therefore, the plural voting rights of the shareholders in accordance with their capital participation should not be regarded as actual plural voting rights, but rather as an expression of the capital-related nature of the company as such. Even with associations that have corporate bodies as members in addition to individuals, it is often provided that these corporate bodies are entitled to several votes, sometimes depending on their number of members; Even this is not a matter of plural voting in the strict sense, since the plurality of votes is covered by the plurality of people.
Effects similar to those in the false plural voting rights through class formation occur in every political system in which either different groups of voters are assigned the same number of MPs or equally large groups of voters are assigned different numbers of MPs. This applies e.g. B. for the classic two-chamber system of the American style with a House of Representatives appointed according to the size of the population and a Senate in which all territorial units are represented by an equal number of Senators. However, this only applies from a perspective based on the individual citizens. The purpose of such an institution as a Senate is supposed to be to represent the member states as such, so that from the point of view of equality between states there is precisely no right to plural elections.