Quota dispute

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Quota dispute or quota warfare is a term used in classic cartel theory for a special form of competition that occurred in cartels of the quota cartel or syndicate type .

Organizational requirements

In the course of the typical development of the cartels from mere assemblies to complex forms of organization, it became necessary to move from mere price fixing to controlling production quantities. One instrument for this was the quotation , i.e. the allocation of a certain share of the demand to be distributed to each cartel or syndicate member. As a rule, this share was proportional to the production capacity of these companies, i.e. it corresponded to their production strength within the cartel. However, compliance with the quotation had to be monitored and the specific production contingents determined centrally. This was mostly done by pooling the cartel members' sales in one central point of sale . The preliminary stage or alternative to this were agreements that gave the cartel bodies other means of controlling the sales of the individual cartel members.

Origin of the quota competition and its consequences

Because the carteled products were usually overpriced and therefore highly profitable, the member companies notoriously strived for the highest possible quota, i.e. a higher profit share than they were actually entitled to. Such demands regularly led to conflicts and quota fights in the cartel meetings . Association members who felt they were disadvantaged often chose the route of quota arming , a capacity expansion against the will of the other cartel companies, in order to enforce their quota claims in this way. Agreements to limit investments turned out to be unenforceable in the long term. Ultimately, there was considerable excess capacity in syndicated industries .

An example of regular quota fights well documented in cartel history is the Central German Brown Coal Syndicate , which broke up several times between 1909 and 1937 as a result of excessive demands from the mining companies involved. The so-called quota shafts of the potash industry , which were only sunk to increase the quota and then immediately shut down, had a particularly paradoxical effect . In syndicated coal mining, for example in the Ruhr area , there were also purely quota-motivated investments in mine systems, which were called syndicate shafts .

Examples of quota shafts and other 'quota operations'

Quota competition outside of business cartels

There are also numerous examples of quota competition in international organizations (which, according to the international cartel theory, are cartels). Depending on whether it is a burden or a benefit, the Member States tend to aim for low or as high as possible quotas. Within the framework of the European Union , one encounters:

The following are common beyond the EU:

literature

  • Holm Arno Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. Theory-historical studies , Hildesheim 2013.
  • Leopold Mayer, Cartels, cartel organization and cartel policy , Wiesbaden 1959.
  • Wolfgang Huber, The legal concept of the syndicate quota with special consideration of the conditions in the Rheinisch-Westfälischen coal syndicate, Münster 1938.
  • Arnold Wolfers: The Cartel Problem in the Light of German Cartel Literature . Munich 1931.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Leopold Mayer, Kartelle, Kartellorganisation und Kartellpolitik, Wiesbaden 1959, pp. 223–249.
  2. ^ Holm A. Leonhardt: Cartel theory and international relations. Theory-historical studies , Hildesheim 2013, pp. 94, 98, 249, 268.
  3. ^ Siegfried Tschierschky (Ed.): Kartell-Rundschau. Journal of Antitrust and Allied Matters. Volume 37. G. Braunsche Hofbuchdruckerei und Verlag, 1939, p. 179.
  4. ^ Ernst Ledermann: The organization of the Ruhr mining industry taking into account the relations to the iron industry, Berlin [among others], Gruyter 1927, pp. 135, 141.