Rational psychology

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Title page of Wolff "Latin logic", in which he defines rational psychology as a philosophical science of the soul

The expression rational psychology is primarily used to describe the philosophy of consciousness and the theory of the soul, especially of the continental philosophical rationalism (17th – 19th centuries). Rational psychology is a branch of traditional special metaphysics .

General

The term rational psychology goes back to the systematics of Christian Wolff (1679–1754). The term is introduced there as a counter-term to that of the psychologia empirica .

The basic idea of ​​a soul as res cogitans that exists beyond the physical world originates in its philosophical meaning from René Descartes and is part of his ontological dualism . The existence of a subject, who must be the bearer of ideas, is the consequence of his thought experiment of radical doubt in all truths (see also cogito, ergo sum and I ). This was followed by theologically relevant issues, in particular the question of the immortality of the soul and the question of how the soul and the physical world interact (see also psychophysical parallelism ). In addition to Descartes and Wolff, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz , Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche should be mentioned as representatives of a rational psychology.

Rational psychology is not to be understood in the sense of a thought psychology , rather it is an attempt to develop a rationalistic science with the soul as an object that does not require any experience. The distinction between introspective psychology and experimental psychology does not apply to rational psychology, since these are methodologies of empirical psychology.

The problem of the interaction between mind and world has, in part , been taken up again in modern philosophy of mind and action theory . In addition, various philosophical positions that reject the subject-object split have claimed the label of rational psychology. However, a joint research program linking the individual positions never came about.

Christian Wolff

The Leibnizian Christian Wolff defines psychology as that part of philosophy that deals with the human soul and its possibilities:

" Psychologiae definitio : Pars philosophiae, quae de anime agit, Psychologia a me appellari solet. Est itaque Psychologia scientia eorum, quae per animas humanas possibilia sunt. Ratio definitionis patet, ut ante. Est enim philosophia in genere scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt (§29). Quare cum Psychologia sit ea philosophiae pars, quae de anima agit; erit ea scientia eorum, quae per animam humanam possibilia sunt. " Definition of psychology : The part of philosophy that deals with the soul is what I usually call psychology. For psychology is the science of what is possible through human souls. The reason for this definition is clear from the preceding: for philosophy in general is the science of the possible, of what can be (§29). Now if psychology is that part of philosophy that deals with the soul; so it is the science of what is possible through the human soul. "

This definition is already the definition of rational psychology, since Wolff does not want empirical psychology to count as part of philosophy, because its observations do not have sufficient certainty for him. Only what can be inferred a priori from a simple concept of the soul that cannot be further analyzed can serve as a basis for other sciences, but above all for practical philosophy .

For Wolff, rational psychology is a fundamental component of a general system of philosophy. The traditional structure of rationalist textbooks goes back to him, according to which rational psychology is one of the four main areas of metaphysics alongside ontology , rational cosmology and rational theology .

Immanuel Kant

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant deals with rational psychology in the chapter on paralogisms of the Transcendental Dialectic . In the context of his critique of metaphysics , Kant rejects the idea of ​​a rational psychology as a metaphysical science. Its object, the cogito or “I think”, is reduced from a metaphysical substance to the only functionally determined transcendental subject within the framework of the transcendental philosophy he designed . The “I think” becomes the most general concept of the mind, which contains all conscious ideas among themselves.

1. The soul is
substance
2.
Simple in terms of quality .
3. According to the different times
in which it is there,
numerically identical, i. i.
Unity (not multiplicity).
4. In relation
to possible
objects in
space.
The Topic of the Rational Doctrine of the Soul. Immanuel Kant: AA III, 264– KrV B 402

In his criticism of rational psychology, which is initially directed against Wolff, but also in the second edition against the proof of the immortality of the soul by Moses Mendelssohn , Kant reconstructs rational psychology as follows: The idea of ​​an "I" as the subject of consciousness follows necessary from the presence of conscious ideas, i.e. inner perception as a mere "apperception" of an "I think". But as soon as "any particular perception of my inner state", such as pleasure or displeasure, is taken into account, the methodological program of rational psychology is violated; according to Kant, such a consideration would be part of empirical psychology. Kant now applies the categories to the a priori idea “I think” and thus gains the four principles for rational psychology (see illustration).

According to Kant, the central claims of rational psychology follow from these principles:

“All concepts of pure soul doctrine arise from these elements [...] This substance, merely as an object of the inner sense, gives the concept of immateriality; as a simple substance, of corruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives personality; all these three pieces together represent spirituality; the relationship to objects in space is given by commerce with bodies; consequently it presents the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, it as soul (anima) and as the ground of animality; limited by spirituality, immortality. "

- Immanuel Kant: AA III, 403 - KrV B 403

According to Kant, however, these results are the result of false conclusions which overlook the fact that the necessity of “I think” is only based on the fact that we ascribe our conscious ideas to ourselves (see first-person perspective ). From this, however, no general conclusions can be drawn for a res cogitans as an independent substance ; rather, “I think” is the most general mental function without its bearer being specifically recognizable.

Further reception

Despite Kant's fundamental criticism, the soul or consciousness is a central component of the philosophies of German idealism at the beginning of the 19th century. With the rise of psychologism in 19th century philosophy, the notion of psychology as an empirical science took hold. The philosophical debate in philosophy of mind , philosophy of life , phenomenology and existentialism is increasingly decoupled from the psychological one. In philosophy, following Kant, questions about the soul are shifted from ontology to its practical and epistemic functions. The critique of metaphysics after the linguistic turn and through positivism contributed not least to the implementation of this view . At the same time, psychology becomes a natural science modeled on physics (see also psychophysics ). When experimental psychology and behaviorism became dominant within the young discipline of psychology , there were defensive reactions. T. appeared under the name "Rational Psychology".

Looking back on the situation at the beginning of the 20th century, CG Jung reports:

“The situation of psychology can be compared with that of a psychic function which is inhibited on the part of consciousness. As is well known, only those parts of such a group are admitted as having a right to exist which coincide with the prevailing tendency in consciousness. What does not agree with it is even denied existence, in spite of and against the fact that numerous phenomena or symptoms are present that prove the opposite. Anyone who knows such psychological processes knows what excuses and self-deception maneuvers are used to bring about the separation of the unconventional. This is exactly how it works in empirical psychology: as a discipline of a general philosophical psychology, experimental psychology is permitted as a concession to natural scientific empiricism with abundant use of philosophical terminology. Psychopathology, however, remains in the medical faculty as a rare appendage of psychiatry. "Medical" psychology is completely given little or no consideration at universities. "

- CG Jung : Theoretical considerations on the essence of the psychic

As a legacy of traditional rational psychology, U. the humanities pedagogy of Eduard Spranger can be considered.

Edmund Husserl proposed a phenomenological re-establishment of rational psychology as a priori science, which, however, is difficult to distinguish from classical thought psychology , introspection or the language-analytical work of Gilbert Ryle . Husserl's approaches have received an independent continuation, especially in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty .

A reintegration of topics, which Wolff assigned to rational psychology, into the psychological mainstream took place through the cognitive turn and humanistic psychology . A fundamental criticism of the methods of psychology took place in the method dispute . Nevertheless, psychologists who mainly use qualitative methods are also empiricists .

Individual evidence

  1. Christian Wolff : Philosophia rationalis sive logica methodo scientifica pertractata et ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata. Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere. 1728; Google Buchsuche digitized version of the 3rd edition 1740. The latter edited and translated in: Günter Gawlick / Lothar Kreimendahl (eds.): Introductory treatise on philosophy in general (Discursus praeliminaris) , Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart 2006.
  2. Christian Wolff: Philosophia rationalis sive logica , ³1740, § 58, page 29 f.
  3. Christian Wolff: Philosophia rationalis sive logica , ³1740, § 112, page 51f. :

    " Psychologia rationalis quam dicatur :

    Postquam Psychologiam empiricam ab eam distinguere coepi philosophiae parte, quam supra (§58) sub Psychologiae nomine definivimus; huic noun Psychologiae rationalis imposui. Non igitur opus est, ut novam Psychologiae rationalis definitionem hic condamus.

    In Psychologia rationali ex unico animae humanae conceptu derivamus a priori omnia, quae eidem competere a posteriori observantur & ex quibus observatis deducuntur, quemadmodum decet Philosophum (§46). Novus eum sit ausus & praejudicatae opinione adversus, nova vero ab initio a plerisque aegre admittantur; praegnans maxima ratio fuit, cur Psychologiam rationalem ab empirica discernerem, ne psychologia promiscue rejicerentur. Etenim principiis psychologicis nititur theoria et praxis moralis, immo & politica & ex iis a nobis deducitur, qui methodi demonstrativae rationem habemus. Philosophia practica est maximi momenti; quae igitur maximi sunt momenti, istiusmodi principiis superstruere noluimus, quae in disceptationem vocantur. Ea de causa veritates philosophiae practicae non superstruimus nisi principiis, quae per experientiam in Psychologia evidenter stabiliunter. Praecipuum philosophiae fructum iudicamus virtutem sinceram. Cavemus itaque, ne fini a nobis intento obstacula ponamus. Nihil ommittimus, quod a nobis eo afferi podest, ut veritate sua constet evidentia. "

    " What is called Rational Psychology:

    After we have distinguished empirical psychology from rational psychology, this is the part of philosophy which we identified above (§58) under the name of psychology; We now attach the name of rational psychology to this. Therefore we are not required to establish a new definition of rational psychology here.

    In rational psychology we derive everything a priori from the concept of the human soul alone that can be observed a posteriori as belonging to it, and also that which is derived from observations [of the soul] - as befits the philosopher ( §46). This innovation is daring and contradicts the opinion of prejudice, but the new truth is often reluctant to endorse at the beginning; the main reason why rational psychology has been distinguished from empirical psychology is that psychology cannot be rejected indiscriminately. Indeed, the theory and practice of morality and even politics are based on psychological principles and are derived from these by us if we follow the reasoning method. Practical philosophy is of the utmost importance; therefore, what is most important, we do not want to build on principles that can be questioned. Therefore, we can only build truths of practical philosophy on principles if it is obviously supported by experience in psychology. In our judgment, the most excellent fruit of philosophy is certainty. Therefore, we should be careful not to obstruct ourselves from the goal we are striving for. We will not leave out anything that could enable us to achieve that their truth is evident. "

  4. Georgi Schischkoff , (Ed.): Keyword Rationale Psychologie. In: Philosophical Dictionary. Alfred Kröner-Verlag, Stuttgart 14th edition 1982, ISBN 3-520-01321-5 , page 568
  5. Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 264– KrV B 402 .
  6. “For inner experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relationship to other perception, without any particular difference or determination being empirically given, cannot be viewed and heard as empirical knowledge, but must as knowledge of the empirical in general to investigate the possibility of every experience, which is, however, transcendental. ”KrV, B 399 ff.
  7. Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 403– KrV B 403 .
  8. CG Jung: Theoretical considerations on the essence of the psychic. (1946) In: Collected Works. Walter-Verlag, Düsseldorf 1995, paperback, special edition, volume 8, The dynamics of the unconscious, ISBN 3-530-40083-1 , § 345-347, pages 186-188
  9. Edmund Husserl: The phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences in: Husserliana, Vol. 5; Meiner 1986, ISBN 3-7873-0686-2 , p. 39ff.
  10. ^ Edmund Husserl: Grundprobleme der Phenomenologie 1910/11 google-books
  11. See in particular Gilbert Ryle: The Concept of Mind , Chicago, 1949

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