Visit of the US President to Germany in 1982
In June 1982 US President Ronald Reagan undertook a 10-day trip to Europe in connection with the NATO ministerial conference on June 9 and 10, 1982 in Bonn. His last stop was West Berlin on June 11, 1982 . Reagan wanted to respond to the growing concern of Europeans over the massive armament of the US that made nuclear war confined to Europe seem possible. Resistance to his policies had also increased in the USA. Shortly before the visit, on May 25, 1982, the Soviet Union launched a surprise détente that threatened to remove even more ground from Reagan's tough course. For his part, the US President has now announced extensive negotiation offers, which he declared to be the “Berlin Initiative”. The peace movement responded to the visit with a mobilization on June 10 in Bonn and Berlin. On the day of the visit, June 11, there was violent street fighting in the 'walled city' due to a prohibited demonstration.
prehistory
The systemic conflict with the arms race between the USA and the Soviet Union that arose in the post-war period has been accompanied by arms control negotiations since the turn of the 1970s (see SALT ). This process became more and more differentiated due to new weapon systems, geopolitical conditions, new power factors - for example the People's Republic of China - and also intellectual and ideological changes (human rights issues in the CSCE in Helsinki).
US President Jimmy Carter (in office since 1977) had tried to demonstrate a moral superiority in addition to the qualitative superiority of the USA in weapons technology by addressing the human rights issue , on which the Soviet Union made significant concessions in the Helsinki Accords of August 1, 1975 had made, "the central instrument of the leadership of the Cold War" used. In this non-military way, in a climate of relative détente, he put the Soviet Union on the defensive by threatening its internal power structures and also caused the Soviet attitude to harden increasingly. In addition, under the pressure of the continued superior first strike capacity of the USA, the Soviet leadership then shifted to modernizing its medium-range missiles in Europe (replacement of the old SS-4 and SS-5 types by the SS-20 ), leaving a gap in the SALT -II Convention . In a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977, the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned that “the emerging Euro-strategic imbalance with simultaneous strategic parity would lead to the decoupling of Europe from the USA”. "With the stationing of these weapons, the USSR reversed the previous nuclear balance of power."
The European governments saw themselves taken hostage by this strategy and on December 12, 1979 they reached an agreement with the USA on the NATO double resolution , which in the event of a continuation of the Soviet missile modernization against the new SS-20 American nuclear weapons ( Pershing II , exclusively in Germany , as well as cruise missiles ). At the same time, however, the governments offered to refrain from stationing if the SS-20 withdrew. The Soviets, who did not understand this “dialectic of defense capabilities and willingness to relax”, interpreted this as a further threat and were no longer willing to “stand still politically”: At the end of December 1979, Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan to support the government there . In addition, there was the deployment of Cuban troops in Angola . Now Carter also tried to take a tougher stance, but he was increasingly considered to be 'luckless' and not up to the situation - also because of the unsuccessful liberation of the US hostages in Tehran by the military.
“In the US, news of the Soviet invasion [in Afghanistan] finally helped the new 'policy of strength' to break through […] The presidential elections in November 1980, Carter's Republican opponent Ronald Reagan, who had announced during the election campaign, won the SALT efforts to suspend once and for all until the US regains its lost strength. "
In 1981, in his first year in office, Reagan adopted a new armament measure: the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, also known as star wars ). The strategic aim was to intercept a first nuclear strike by the Soviet Union in the event of war and to achieve a “victory” in return ( Reagan doctrine ). The Reagan administration did not impose any restrictions with its military interventions in Central America ( El Salvador , Nicaragua ) and with the financing of suitable totalitarian regimes or insurgents like the mujahideen in Afghanistan.
Background of the visit
With his policy, which also ignored the general consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and seemed ready to sacrifice Western Europe, Reagan came into lasting opposition to the Europeans, who accepted an offensive US strategy less and less at the expense of their very existence. In Germany in particular, where the détente policy of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and GDR President Erich Honecker brought about a great deal of relief and a variety of contacts, there was little willingness to join the US administration: “There were even considerations in the Chancellery to save the détente policy to abandon the 'politics in the middle of the convoy' of the Allies and to dare a conflict strategy against the Reagan administration. ”On the other hand, the Soviet leadership increasingly recognized its economic difficulties in the unchecked arms race and showed itself internationally after the failures in Afghanistan ready to talk. In addition, there was the pressure from the problems that were seen as 'internal', especially since the August strikes in Poland in 1980 , which seemed to herald the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and escalated in 1981. "The Soviet leadership signaled readiness to talk again (and) [...] thus the Europeans had succeeded in overcoming the worst blockage of the East-West dialogue [...]."
With his confrontational course and through "... the aggressive rhetoric with key terms such as the 'beheading' of the Soviet Union, the 'empire of evil' ...", Reagan had become a negative symbol of the growing peace movement in the western world. Resistance also grew in the USA - “In 1980, 56 percent were in favor of further armament, at the end of 1981 it was only 14 percent. Reagan took this protest into account. ”He slowed down his rhetoric. "Of course, the Reagan administration [1981] did not show a willingness to realistically assess the negotiation problems [...] ..."
In the summer of 1982, the US President went on a trip to Europe to reassure the governments and the population with the newly announced willingness to negotiate and, due to the symbolic power in Berlin, to reaffirm the unchanged solidarity of the USA for the 'protection of the free world'.
Preparations and activities in advance
“Reagan is secured by 17,000 police officers, a life guard from the security group of the Federal Criminal Police Office and American forces. […] An extensive aerial reconnaissance has started in the greater Bonn area […]. In the wooded and difficult to see ridges around Bonn, which could be used as a launching base for anti-aircraft missiles of the Soviet "Sam" type, special police units have begun to systematically comb through the woods. "It was feared that" the dispersed relatives of the 'Red Army Faction' are planning a 'Kamikaze company'. "
In Berlin, “the Senate, the judiciary and the police cracked down on alleged 'un-American activities'. Around a thousand banners and slogans on house facades directed against President Reagan were removed or whitewashed by the day of the visit. The police painting squads came into over 100 squatted houses adorned with slogans with a search warrant in their pockets. "
A demonstration in Berlin was registered for the day before the visit - at the same time as the peace demonstration in Bonn; a demonstration ban was imposed in the city on the day of the visit itself, June 11.
June 9, 1982: Arrival of Ronald Reagan in Bonn
"Immediately after landing at Cologne-Bonn Airport at 1 p.m. Reagan and his wife Nancy, accompanied by Foreign Minister Genscher and Ms. Bärbel, flew in a helicopter to the federal capital [...] for a detailed exchange of views" with Federal Chancellor Schmidt:
"While Reagan emphasized that the policy of détente brought more advantages to the Soviet Union than to the West, Schmidt described the détente as an ongoing process that had brought advantages especially in domestic German politics."
Reagan's speech to the German Bundestag
"Reagan emphasized that the US is determined to 'maintain the presence of well-equipped and well-trained troops in Europe, modernize our strategic armed forces and keep them assigned to the Alliance.'"
However, Reagan does not want to be fooled into how best to “achieve the common goal”: “In the United States we are moving forward with the plans I announced last year to modernize our strategic nuclear forces.” Time and again Reagan pointed out in his speech that he was willing to talk and negotiate and that disarmament was proposed. But "we must not assume in a simplistic way that every other nation wants the peace that we so desperately long for," he says, referring to the Soviet Union.
June 10, 1982 in Bonn
Meeting of the NATO Ministerial Conference
Representatives of the 16 NATO nations met in the plenary hall of the Bundestag for the opening event.
In his welcoming speech, Federal Chancellor Schmidt stated that "in addition to the necessary military strength, the persistent and unswerving endeavor to control arms control and disarmament is just as indispensable as a security strategy."
During Reagan's stay in Germany, the Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon came to a head . In addition to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the acute conflicts in Afghanistan, the war between England and Argentina over the Falkland Islands , the Iraq-Iran war and the civil war in Angola continued to be the topics of the conference's closed session .
Demonstrations in Bonn and Berlin
After 300,000 people demonstrated in Bonn against the NATO double decision in October of the previous year, "... the police (now) estimated the number at 200,000, but higher numbers were also mentioned." - the taz named 400,000 people who met on June 10th Founded together in 1982 under the motto "Stand up for peace". There were only marginal incidents. At evening discussion events it was emphasized that although the movement unites many things, it also has to discuss the differences (Rudolf Bahro). "'The protest must become resistance,' it says in the final declaration."
On the same day 40,000 (police) to 100,000 (organizers) people demonstrated against Reagan's policies. According to general observation, the demonstration - just like in Bonn at the same time - had the character of a folk festival.
June 11, 1982: Reagan visits Berlin (West)
The official side of the visit to Berlin went behind a screen of extensive security measures. Reagan had landed [...] in Tempelhof and, after addressing the members of the American colony, had visited Checkpoint Charlie. He returned to Tempelhof Airport and then flew in a helicopter to Charlottenburg Palace, where he addressed his speech to the Berliners and entered the city's Golden Book. In front of the 2,000 guests of honor and 30,000 selected representatives of the Berlin population, the American president addressed his Soviet opponent directly: “I urge President Brezhnev to join me in a serious endeavor to resolve the disappointed hopes of the 1970s in the reality of a safe and free To implement Europe in the eighties. ”After the event, Reagan and his companion flew back to Tempelhof. From there they returned to Bonn, where an official farewell ceremony was held. Then Reagan started the flight home to the USA. On Sunday, June 13, 1982, Federal Chancellor Schmidt “flew to New York to present the Federal Government's position on the disarmament question to the United Nations Special General Assembly on Monday,”
Counter-demonstrations in Berlin
In Berlin, at the same time as Reagan's visit, with the exception of a women's mourning demonstration, all gathering activities were banned. The registration of a further demonstration by the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection (AL) was rejected by the administrative court and, on the previous evening, by the higher administrative court. However, the date of the meeting had been known for days - '10 o'clock at Nollendorfplatz '- and leaflets from groups of various backgrounds called for disregarding the ban. The AL spoke of not allowing the "basic right to freely exercise the right to demonstrate."
The forbidden demonstration in Berlin-Schöneberg
The descriptions of the course of the disputes vary in detail (in detail: Tagesspiegel, Volksblatt Berlin, Die Tageszeitung, all from June 12, 1982), but they agree that the event should be up to 1.80 meters high even before the 10 a.m. meeting Barbed wire (taz), which was largely sealed off, Nollendorfplatz was kept open by the police until 2,500 (BZ) to 4,000 (taz) people had arrived. Shortly after 10 o'clock a police spokesman announced by megaphone that two entrances to the Kessel (to Bülowstrasse and Maaßenstrasse) were kept open, through which "Friedfertige" and passers-by (Nollendorfplatz is also a shopping area) could come out. This quickly led to traffic jams, as the personal details of those who were pushing out were compared and finally to a massive attack by the “anarchist autonomous groups” ( Der Tagesspiegel ), who did not want to endure this procedure. In no time the environment resembled a "cauldron" (taz). A high-speed passage of eight police personnel carriers through the middle of the crowd caused a stir. A police vehicle broke down with engine failure, was overturned and set on fire. The officers were able to save themselves with weapons and radios. As a result, the situation got completely out of control; barricades were built and set alight using furniture from a shop and other vehicles; the fire brigade was no longer let through by the demonstrators. The taz documented a civil servant with a pistol drawn. In the meantime, the police ring has also been attacked from the outside and in some cases 'blown up'.
_1982.jpg)
The escaped gathered not far on Winterfeldtplatz. Here the fighting continued into the early evening hours. There were also disputes in Winterfeldtstrasse, at Kottbusser Tor and in Charlottenburg on Wilmersdorfer Strasse. In the evening, the police broke into the occupied houses at Potsdamer Strasse 157/59 and, according to the information provided by those affected, hit “everything short and sweet” (taz).
The fights in Schöneberg met with wide coverage in the entire press in Berlin and Germany, and the GDR news agency ADN had even put them in the spotlight.
The “women's demonstration was peaceful”.
Aftermath of the events in Berlin
The Alternative List (AL), in particular, came under pressure in Berlin politics and public opinion, which maintained the call for a demonstration despite the judicial ban on the assembly. "The chairmen of the FDP parliamentary groups from the federal and state levels accused [...] the AL of having exposed itself as a co-initiator of the demonstration, which was violent from the outset, as an 'enemy of democracy'."
On the other hand, the AL also came under criticism of the 'public opinion' of Reagan opponents, who accused it of failing to take responsibility for the demonstration, for example with files and megaphones: “At no point did the demonstrators attempt to organize the fearful crowd so that the autonomous street fighters could take over the reins. "
The autonomists lost a lot of trust capital: "Some psychopaths are denouncing a whole movement [...] The unholy alliance of informers - who under the pretext of a demonstration only leave broken pieces - with large parts of the press harms 'us' (the peace movement.)"
"The police confirmed: These are professional thugs who have entered the country ..." are being referred to for the first time in the press these days as "so-called autonomous groups". The left as a whole is now beginning to deal more closely with the self-image of these groups, which, after the massive criticism - “have no consideration and cook their stony soup at the expense of others” (Zitty) - also have to reflect on their positions: “You could join us talk together about people's fears about certain actions; we will go into it and try to find a way to deal with it, but not only to commit ourselves to a form of resistance, but to remain flexible. ”However, the majority of the movements, especially in practical matters, were the 'autonomous groups' marginalized. The squatters also saw a danger in the fact that the militant demeanor of the autonomists threatened to lose any sympathy in the population - which was hardly differentiated here. Nevertheless, the 'split' that had been hoped for (and demanded) from the political side did not occur: critical solidarity was maintained, but the autonomists did not succeed in dominating major political events again.
Political consequences of the US President's visit
World politics
The immediate résumé consisted of the agreement on the European side that a further intensification of the East-West conflict had rather been averted and that a new round of negotiations could be initiated in November of that year. But before the talks began, Leonid Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982. The planned consultations and negotiations were delayed or - as one ironic comment noted - were replaced by “funeral diplomacy”. Because the subsequent Soviet heads of state were both not long in office - Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov died on February 9, 1984 and Konstantin Ustinowitsch Chernenko on March 10, 1985. So the Reagan visit in 1982 appears in history today rather as a marginal event, because it through the relatively quick successive deaths of three Soviet leaders as a "Berlin Initiative" developed little meaning. The confrontation seemed to be heated up again in 1983; on November 23, 1983, the Bundestag decided to deploy [...] (and) the feasibility of a nuclear war continued to be debated in the USA [...] most specialists thought the project 'star wars' (SDI ) However, it is impracticable, which has come true despite immense expenditure. "Only with the President following Chernenko" ... Mikhail Gorbachev 1985 (took place) a decisive change. "It took until September 30, 1986, until one in Iceland Meeting Reagan - Gorbachev the INF agreement was concluded (withdrawal of all medium-range missiles of both sides from Europe).
German domestic politics
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the view that SPD presidium member Egon Bahr formulated immediately after the summit was gradually gaining ground: “Unlike months ago, the US was ready to confirm the ability to defend itself and detente as the cornerstone of NATO policy. In this respect, the Federal Government could say with satisfaction that it had pushed through the position it had held for months. ”“ This was no longer of much use to the Schmidt / Genscher government. Not only was Schmidt's strategy poorly understood in the SPD; the SPD / FDP coalition had outlived itself politically and had to give way to Helmut Kohl's CDU / FDP government in the autumn of 1982 elections after Schmidt fell on October 1, 1982 in a constructive vote of no confidence. As the opposition, the SPD […] quickly distanced itself from Helmut Schmidt's retrofitting policy […] The government policy (Helmut Kohls) ultimately changed far less than the conflict language suggested. ”So the disputes at the beginning of the rocket deployment in 1983 continued as a result of the NATO's double decision continued unabated, in October 1983 the largest demonstrations in German history took place. After Gorbachev took office, “... German-Soviet relations began to intensify. [...] (and): The idea of understanding and disarmament had firmly established itself in German public opinion in 1989. "
literature
- Wolfgang Benz, Hermann Graml: Europe after the Second World War 1945–1982. Weltbild-Verlag, Weltgeschichte Volume 35, Augsburg 1998.
- Detlev Junker (Ed.): The USA and Germany in the Cold War era 1945–1990. DVA, Stuttgart / Munich, 2001.
- Bernd Stöver: The Cold War. CH Beck, Munich 2007.
- Dietrich Thränhardt: History of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949–1990. edition suhrkamp 1267, Frankfurt am Main
Individual evidence
- ↑ "Reagan Doesn't Understand the World" , June 7, 1982 article on Spiegel Online
- ↑ Stöver, Bernd: The Cold War . CH Beck, Munich 2007, p. 405.
- ↑ Junker, Detlev (Ed.): The USA and Germany in the Age of the Cold War 1945–1990 . DVA, Stuttgart-Munich, 2001, p. 237.
- ^ Thränhardt, Dietrich: History of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949–1990 . edition suhrkamp 1267, Frankfurt a. M., p. 249.
- ↑ Junker: Age . P. 238
- ↑ Benz, Wolfgang & Graml, Hermann: Europe after the Second World War 1945–1982 . Weltbild-Verlag, Weltgeschichte Volume 35, Augsburg 1998, pp. 506–507.
- ↑ Junker, Age . P. 64.
- ^ Benz & Graml: Europe . P. 508f.
- ^ Thränhardt, Dietrich: History of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949–1990 . edition suhrkamp 1267, Frankfurt a. M., p. 250.
- ↑ Stöver: Cold War . P. 433.
- ↑ Benz & Graml: Europa , p. 511.
- ↑ Der Tagesspiegel: Safety has priority , June 5, 1982, p. 3.
- ↑ Tagesspiegel: Security . P. 3.
- ↑ Zitty: Hysterical Games . 14/82, p. 14 .: "Criminal offense in the 'Lappenkrieg': insult or threat."
- ↑ Berliner Morgenpost, June 10, 1982, p. 1.
- ↑ Morgenpost: Address to the German Bundestag . June 10, 1982, p. 2
- ↑ Tagesspiegel: June 11, 1982, p. 6.
- ↑ Der Tagesspiegel, June 11, 1982, p. 2.
- ↑ taz, June 14, 1982, p. 12.
- ↑ Der Tagesspiegel, June 11, 1982, pp. 1 and 12.
- ↑ Der Tagesspiegel, June 12, 1982, p. 1.
- ↑ Morgenpost, June 12, 1982, p. 1.
- ↑ Tagesspiegel, June 12, 1982, p. 1.
- ↑ Tagesspiegel, June 12, 1982, p. 2.
- ↑ Zitty, 14/82, p. 15.
- ↑ Tagesspiegel, June 12, 1982, p. 4.
- ↑ Tagesspiegel, June 12, 1982, p. 9.
- ↑ Tagesspiegel, June 12, 1982, p. 9.
- ↑ Zitty: Hysterical Games . P. 14.
- ↑ Werner Radasewsky: The street battle . In: Zitty, 14/82, p. 16.
- ↑ BZ, June 12, 1982, p. 1.
- ^ Leaflet by Autonomen dated June 11, 1982, Archives of Youth Cultures
- ↑ Tränhardt: History of Germany, S. 292nd
- ↑ Stöver: Cold War . P. 437
- ↑ Tränhardt: History of BRD . P. 291.
- ↑ Tränhardt: History of the FRG. P. 292
- ↑ Stöver: The Cold War . P. 439f.
- ↑ Volksblatt Berlin, June 12, 1982, p. 2.
- ↑ Tränhardt: History of BRD . P. 257.
- ↑ Tränhardt: History of BRD . P. 291.
- ↑ Tränhardt: History of the FRG. P. 295.