Tehran hostage-taking

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US admission of the 52 hostages at Wiesbaden Air Base Hospital (January 1981)

When Tehran was taken hostage on November 4, 1979, during the Islamic Revolution , Iranian students occupied the US embassy in Tehran to demonstrate against the acceptance of the ousted Shah Reza Pahlavi in the USA . They held 52 diplomats of the United States on 4 November 1979 to 20 January 1981 as hostages and demanded the extradition of the Shah. Washington imposed sanctions and the hostage-taking ended after 444 days.

prehistory

During the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left his country on January 16, 1979. On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile in France and took over the leadership of the revolution.

On February 14, 1979, the Tehran US embassy was besieged by the armed, left-wing Fedayeen-e Chalq and stormed for the first time. 102 embassy staff were taken hostage. Khomeini's armed forces intervened, vacated the embassy, ​​freed the hostages and returned their embassy to the United States.

After the Shah worked in Egypt and Morocco , the US oil billionaire and banker David Rockefeller first brokered the Coral Gables country estate in the Bahamas , but after ten weeks it became too expensive at a daily cost of US $ 24,000 , so that the overthrown monarch went to Mexico moved on. After months of efforts Rockefeller could, his brother and former US Vice President Nelson Rockefeller , the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the then World Bank -President John J. McCloy US President Jimmy Carter to convince the hard-cancer Shah into the United States to so he could get medical treatment there. The Shah arrived in New York on October 22, 1979 and was immediately admitted to Cornell Medical Center at New York-Presbyterian Hospital under the unauthorized pseudonym of "Under Secretary of State David D. Newsom " , where gallstones were surgically removed on October 23 .

The Iranian revolutionaries demanded his extradition. On November 4, 1979, Khomeini had a statement circulated in memory of the students who had died a year earlier in demonstrations at Tehran University:

"It is therefore up to the dear pupils, students and theology students to intensify the attacks against the USA and Israel with all their might so that they can force the USA to extradite the deposed and criminal Shah ..."

This declaration served as a justification for the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran by Iranian students on the same day, from which the hostage situation developed. This conclusion is obvious, because without at least the approval of the Revolutionary Council and Khomeinis, no hostage-taking could have taken place. Hans-Peter Drögemüller even assumed that the Islamic Republican Party faction of the Revolutionary Council (Beheschti-Chāmene'i-Rafsanjāni) was behind the embassy occupation.

course

Occupation of the embassy

On November 4, 1979 at 11:30 am the US embassy in Tehran was stormed by about 400 Iranian students from the group "Students of the Imam's Line" ( Daneschdschuyane Chatte Emam , Persian دانشجونان خظ امام, DMG dānesšğūyān-e ḫaṭṭ-e emām ), led by Mohsen Mirdamadi , among others , and on the 444-day hostage-taking of Tehran .

Several thousand demonstrators then gathered in front of the building. 90 embassy employees were arrested and 66 Americans were arrested in order to demand the extradition of the former Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi . The hostages were repeatedly blindfolded to the crowd and television cameras. On November 5, the United States refused to extradite the Shah.

The press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran dated November 5, 1979 justified the hostage situation as:

"Demonstration of part of our population and the natural reaction of the oppressed Iranian people to the American government's disregard for the hurt feelings of these people."

One day after the occupation of the embassy, ​​around 40 Iranian students penetrated the grounds of the US embassy in Bonn . They demanded that the ambassador telegraph their request to extradite the Shah to the American government. Police evacuated the site after demonstrators refused to voluntarily leave.

On November 6, 1979, the Ministerial Director of the Foreign Office Meyer-Landrut noted :

“The US embassy has been manned by Islamic students since Sunday, November 4, 1979. 60 embassy staff were taken hostage. The occupiers are demanding that the United States extradite the Shah. Further demands, which were made inconsistently, concern the involvement of two Iranian doctors in the medical examination of the Shah, the cancellation of all contracts with the USA, the deportation of the remaining American advisors and the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Ayatollah Khomeini approved the student's action in a radio statement on Monday November 5th. The Iranian Foreign Ministry also stood behind the occupiers, over whom it had no influence. On Monday 5 November the American consulates in Tabriz , Shiraz and Isfahan were also occupied by students and the Revolutionary Guards (Pāsdārān). There were no hostages because the Americans had cleared the buildings beforehand. … The British embassy was also manned by Islamic students for about six hours on Monday, November 5th. They demanded the extradition of the former Prime Minister Bakhtiyār , who was supposed to be in Great Britain, and protested against official restrictions in Great Britain. "

Six US diplomats escaped and were able to flee to the Canadian embassy. The CIA managed to get this out of the country on January 28, 1980 in an operation commonly known in the United States as the Canadian Caper .

The German ambassador to Tehran, Ritzel , forwarded a letter to the Foreign Office on November 7, 1979 from an unknown group called the “Iranian Islamic Revolution Eagles”, in which “the liberation of all Iranian citizens who had been in contact with the German judiciary for nine months come, arrested or convicted ”was requested. If this is not done, the German embassy would be occupied.

The press spokeswoman for the hostage takers was the future Iranian Environment Minister Masoumeh Ebtekar .

Diplomatic and political responses

On November 6, 1979, the Iranian government resigned under Prime Minister Mehdi Bāzargān . The reasons for this were the hostage-taking and the "undermining" of the government by radical organizations. Bāzargān stated:

“After the revolution something completely unforeseen happened - the clergy completely pushed us out and took control of the country. His rule began at the exact moment when the mullahs were supposed to be replaced by lay people. At this point in time, all parties with an Islamic orientation were asleep, as was the left, which never really became attractive to the masses and remained on the edge of reality. We civilians enabled the clergy to come to power through our inactivity. "

Jimmy Carter (1980)

On November 9, the United Nations Security Council called for the hostages to be released. The US government decided on further economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. On November 11, US President Jimmy Carter ordered the deportation of all Iranians living illegally in the US. On November 12, 1979, all oil imports from Iran to the US were stopped. Three days later, Iran's cash balances were frozen with US banks. The total was between $ 1.5 billion and $ 8 billion.

Talks with the Iranian leadership initially continued via the US embassy in Beirut with PLO leader Yasser Arafat . As a result of Arafat's mediation efforts, 13 hostages - women and African American - were released on November 19. However, the remaining 52 remained in detention. Another hostage, Vice Consul Richard Queen, was released on July 11, 1980 because of illness on instructions from Khomeini.

Undersecretary of State Newsom briefed the German State Secretary van Well on November 20, 1979 about his talks with the released hostages:

“Their impression was that the hostage-takers were well organized and carefully prepared for the action against the American embassy. With a few exceptions, they are students who have never left the country. About three months ago they were selected and properly trained for this anti-American campaign. Demands for extradition of the Shah are only one occasion. The assumption is that Khomeini is behind it. … The students used sophisticated and differentiated methods of surveillance; the shielding from the outside world is total; Messages from relatives that the guards received were not passed on to the hostages. "

On November 13, after the resignation of the Bāzargān government from the Revolutionary Council, Foreign Minister Abu l-Hasan Banisadr invited all ambassadors to the ministry. The German ambassador Ritzel had received instructions not to keep the appointment and hold the other European ambassadors. Despite the German warning, almost all of the invited ambassadors took part in the meeting, with the exception of the German ambassador. Banisadr announced that it would involve the United Nations Security Council in order to get the American government to accept an investigation into the past shah's delinquency and to have the assets that the shah and his family and the leaders of the earlier regime transfer to America returned to the Iranian government. President Carter did not respond to the demands of the Iranian government.

On November 26, 1979, Iran applied for a special session of the United Nations Security Council. Contrary to a recommendation by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim , the special meeting did not take place.

On November 29, 1979, the United States filed a lawsuit against Iran at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague . The revolutionary government of Iran, however, sued the overthrown Shah in New York for repayment of 56.6 billion US dollars, which the latter is said to have illegally brought abroad. On December 15, 1979, the International Court of Justice unanimously decided, with reference to the applicable treaties and general international law, that the embassy and consular buildings should be returned immediately, all US citizens immediately released, and the staff of the embassy and consulates full protection and respect the privileges of immunity would have to be guaranteed.

On December 2, 1979, the Shah left New York and was taken to an air force base in Texas . The US was feverishly looking for a country that would give him asylum .

One day later, on December 3, 1979, the referendum on the new constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran took place. According to official information, almost 100 percent of the electorate voted for the new constitution (other sources report 60 percent approval). Ayatollah Khomeini was now at his destination. As Supreme Leader, he now officially had the entire power of the state in his hands.

Also on December 3, 1979, the German Foreign Office contacted Shah Rezā Pahlavi, who had meanwhile left the hospital in New York and was brought to the hermetically sealed Lackland Air Force Base outside of San Antonio (Texas). Former Prime Minister Mehdi Bāzargān handed the German ambassador in Tehran Ritzel a letter to the Shah on December 1, 1979 with the words:

“After consultation with the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, he asked the federal government to convey to the US government to influence the Shah in an appropriate way so that the Shah voluntarily returns to Iran. Iran will assure the Shah of safe conduct and allow him to leave the country after presenting the complaints of the Iranian people and hearing their account. "

On December 2, 1979, then Ministerialdirektor Montfort traveled to the United States to deliver the letter to the Shah. Shah Reza Pahlavi thanked the federal government for its efforts and said he was ready to help as far as the hostages in the US embassy were concerned. But he refused to accept a letter from the current rulers in Tehran, because they were murderers with whom he no longer wanted to have anything to do with.

On December 5, the UN Security Council unanimously called for the hostages to be released, which the occupiers of the embassy immediately rejected. On December 8, 1979, the new Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh made a series of demands for the release of the hostages: In addition to the repatriation of the Shah, an independent commission should examine the role of the USA in Iranian politics since 1953.

On December 12, 1979, Iran was asked to reduce the embassy staff in Washington, DC from 218 to 35 people. The Shah left the United States for Panama three days later and received asylum in the Central American state . On January 3, 1980, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim promised an investigation into violations and crimes of the Shah regime. Sanctions before the UN Security Council, sought by the USA on January 14, 1980, were prevented by a veto by the Soviet Union , but on February 2, 1980 the Revolutionary Council accepted an investigation into the Shah's period under UN supervision.

Abu l-Hasan Banisadr , the new Iranian president since January 27, declared on February 13, 1980 that Khomeini would agree to the release of the hostages without continuing to insist on the extradition of the Shah, if the US regretted the Shah's support . After the new constitution came into force, Khomeini became supreme leader and Banisadr was able to serve as president, the hostages were no longer needed. The formal change in the form of government from the constitutional monarchy established in 1906 to the Islamic republic was complete.

A UN commission arrived in Tehran on February 23, 1980. This consisted of five lawyers and diplomats, namely the Algerian Mohammed Bedjaoui , the Syrian Adib Daoudy , the Sri Lankan Hector Wilfred Jayewardene , the Venezuelan Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley and the French Louis-Edmond Pettiti . Khomeini did not date a possible release date before the general election in April .

On March 8, 1980, the occupiers of the embassy refused to transfer the hostages to the security forces of the Revolutionary Council, and three days later the UN representatives left the country without result. The German ambassador in Tehran Ritzel reported that Khomeini had decided that the hostages would remain in the hands of the students:

“If he doesn't get the Shah, Khomeini wants his tribunal, a tribunal that sits in judgment not only on the crimes of the Shah, but also on the crimes of US imperialism and publicly denounces them - and for that he needs also the American hostages. One can assume that Khomeini's hatred of the USA is as great and unforgiving as his hatred of the Shah. "

The USA broke off diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980 . Furthermore, all Iranian diplomats were expelled from the USA and exports from the USA to Iran were banned with the exception of food and medicine. Carter threatened on April 17, 1980 with stricter measures as well as a blockade as a "possible next step", which Sādegh Ghotbzādeh responded immediately with a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz . The European Community (EC) has also announced economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran if the hostages are not released within a month.

Liberation attempt

After President Carter publicly ruled out a forcible release of the hostages on December 8, 1979, he approved the establishment of a secret rescue mission. On December 4, 1979, the German Legation Councilor Vestring recorded in writing that the Soviet Union was ready to accept military action by the USA to rescue the hostages as a one-off retaliation. The Soviet ambassador in Tehran, Vinogradov, had already informed the Iranian leadership in this regard on November 19, 1979.

“The Soviet Union does not consider an American intervention with a limited goal and for a limited duration to be threatening and probably even intends to use the anti-Americanism that will then continue to grow to its advantage for propaganda purposes. ... All in all, developments in Iran are proceeding along the lines of the Soviet Union. The revolutionary process has regained momentum. "

On the night of April 24th to 25th, 1980, the time had come. As the first part of the operation, some met C-130 transport planes in the embodiment MC-130E Combat Talon with eight RH-53D-Sea Stallion helicopters on an airstrip in the Great Salt Desert in the southeast of Iran. Two of the helicopters failed due to a sandstorm , and a third was damaged on landing. The mission was then canceled, but when the aircraft took off, a helicopter hit a Lockheed C-130 and crashed. Eight American soldiers died and at least four others were injured. Later, during massive protest demonstrations in the streets of Tehran, Sadegh Chalkhali showed some of the bodies in front of television cameras from around the world. On May 6, 1980, the bodies of the US soldiers were transferred to the USA and US President Carter ordered a three-day national mourning . The hostages in the embassy were taken to various cities in Iran in the days that followed to prevent another attempt at rescue.

Economic sanctions

The US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance , who had opposed the military action to free the hostages, resigned. On April 21 and 22, 1980, the EC Council of Ministers took place in Luxembourg. At this meeting, comprehensive economic sanctions against Iran were decided. The basis of the sanctions was a UN Security Council resolution of January 10, 1980, which had found a majority but had been blocked by the Soviet Union through a veto. As an immediate measure, the ministers decided to reintroduce the visa requirement for Iranians and not permit arms exports to Iran. Furthermore, no new contracts should be concluded with the Iranian government or Iranian companies.

negotiations

After Vice Consul Richard Queen was released on July 11, 1980, as ordered the day before by Khomeini, on "humanitarian grounds" because of his poor health, his son Ahmad, Speaker of Parliament Akbar Hāschemi , discussed on September 9, 1980 in the house of Khomeini Rafsanjani and Sadegh Tabatabai a procedure for the release of the remaining 52 hostages, which was approved by Khomeini. The procedure envisaged the unblocking of Iranian assets in the USA, a binding American promise not to undertake any military or political intervention in Iran, and the return of the assets of the Shah, who died on July 27, 1980 in Cairo. Tabatabai informed the German ambassador in Teheran Ritzel about this agreement and asked for a meeting with representatives of the USA on German soil.

In a speech to Iranian pilgrims in Mecca on September 12, 1980, Khomeini first publicly stated the conditions for the release of the hostages. This included the restitution of the US assets of the Shah who died in Cairo on July 27, 1980 and the Iranian funds frozen in American banks, the US waiver of military and political interventions in Iran and the waiver of possible claims for damages by the hostages against the Iran. In Iran, a parliamentary commission had been formed to resolve the hostage question, consisting of the former Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi , the Friday prayer leader of Tehran Ali Khamene'i and today's supreme leader of Iran, the religious confidante of the embassy occupiers and later Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi and the later President Mohammad Chātami , who was the head of the Islamic Center Hamburg . On September 16 and 18, 1980, Sadegh Tabatabai, State Secretary in the office of the Iranian Prime Minister, the US Deputy Foreign Minister Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher met in Bonn for direct talks. Warren Christopher assured Tabatabai that the American government would make every effort to assist in the return of the Shah's property. A lifting of the confiscation of Iranian funds in American banks is also possible. Furthermore, President Carter is ready to give the desired assurance that he will refrain from any military and political interference in Iran. As for the waiver of possible claims for damages by American citizens, in particular the hostages and their relatives, Christopher referred to the independence of the American judiciary.

On September 20, 1980, the day Tabatabai wanted to return to Iran to report on the outcome of his talks with Christopher in Iran, Iraq began to invade Iran . All flights to Iran were canceled and Tabatabai was stuck in Germany until September 26, but then reached Iran via a flight to Damascus. On October 10, 1980, the White House received a request from Iran through the German Foreign Office to draw up a list of all goods that Iran had ordered but not yet delivered to the United States during the time of the Shah. President Carter agreed to deliver $ 150 million worth of military equipment ordered by Iran to Iran after the hostages were released.

In mid-October, President Mohammad Ali Rajāʾi flew to New York to address the United Nations about the Iraqi invasion of Iran. On October 18, Rajāʾi was approached by Algerian diplomats to finally end the hostage crisis in the interests of Iran. The Algerian representation had been contacted by the USA in the run-up to the Iranian President's visit with a request to mediate on the hostage issue. After his return to Iran on October 22, Rajāʾi said he was certain that the US would meet the conditions set by Khomeini and that the release of the hostages would not be a problem. In his televised debate with Ronald Reagan on October 28, 1980, US President Carter stated that if the hostages were released, the Iranian assets in the USA as well as US-American weapons already paid for by Iran would be released. The relevant debate in the Iranian parliament had already started on October 26, 1980, which, by resolution of November 2, 1980, set Khomeini's four conditions for the release of the hostages (no interference in internal affairs, release of the blocked assets, waiver of claims against Iran and extradition of the Shah's property) officially confirmed.

Now events came tumbling down: on November 3, 1980, Iran appointed Algeria as the mediator and negotiator for an agreement with the USA. On December 1, Iranian President Mohammad Ali Rajāʾi announced that the occupiers of the embassy had handed over the hostages to the Iranian government. On December 25, 1980, Iran released a video film with the hostages about “Second Christmas in Captivity”.

release

The hostages flown out from the balcony of the Wiesbaden US military hospital were taken in January 1981

With the help of Algerian mediation, an Iranian-American agreement on the release of hostages (Algiers Accords) was concluded on January 19, 1981 . On the day US President Ronald Reagan was sworn in, the 52 prisoners were released on January 20, 1981 in return for the release of Iranian assets and were able to fly with a Boeing 727 from Tehran via Athens and Algiers to Frankfurt am Main . Khomeini commented: "Now we don't need them anymore."

The hostages, who had lived in captivity for 444 days, were brought to Wiesbaden on arrival in Frankfurt, where they greeted President Reagan's predecessor Jimmy Carter that evening as the emissary of President Reagan. In the US military hospital ( Wiesbaden Air Base Hospital ) everyone was examined for their state of health and then flown to Washington on January 25, where they were received as heroes. On January 20, 1981, Iran received back the previously frozen money of almost eight billion US dollars via Algerian trust accounts at the Bank of England .

Motifs

In a message sent from Tehran on November 15, 1979 to the Foreign Office, Colonel i. G. Meyer-Plath asked about the motives for the action:

“In my opinion, the extradition of the Shah, intended as the 'crowning conclusion of the victorious revolution', is not a reason, but a pretext. Most likely the purpose of the action is to give the lost, divergent, self-neutralizing revolution a new impetus and to force the people more clearly than before behind their great leader. ... As a result of the illegal action, one of the main brakes on the way to dictatorship could be removed: the liberal Bazargan, which advocates international law and human rights. Together with Bazargan, the cabinet had to resign. Significantly, no new government in the classical sense was formed, but a few inconsistent figures, including those of the Revolutionary Council, were entrusted with government offices. The result of this action was the elimination of the 'subsidiary government' Bazargan, which did not comply with the instructions from Qom in all cases. "

The referendum on Iran's new constitution was scheduled for December 3, 1979. Khomeini's popular support had fallen massively. The political opposition Ayatollah Shariatmadaris had caused uncontrollable conditions in his hometown of Tabriz . In the southern province of Abadan and in the eastern province of Balochistan , too , everything indicated that the results of the vote would be against the constitution. It was completely unclear whether there would still have been a majority for a constitution for an Islamic republic. Due to the occupation of the American embassy and the corresponding propaganda campaign, the subject of the “constitutional referendum” had initially faded into the background. Problems that arose in the referendum, or even a defeat in the vote, could now be covered up much more easily by reporting a successful vote.

Referendum on the new constitution

The domestic political consequences for Iran were dramatic. The resignation of Prime Minister Bazargan's government initially created a vacuum. On November 16, 1979, the Revolutionary Council appointed a new cabinet without a prime minister. The new cabinet consisted of 15 men, ten of whom had already held ministerial posts under Bazargan. Abu l-Hasan Banisadr headed the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Justice was led by a council of four experts.

On December 3, 1979, there was a referendum on the new constitution of Iran. According to official information, as in the referendum on March 31st on the question of whether Iran should become an Islamic Republic, approval was almost 100 percent, but other sources speak of around 60 percent. Thus the former monarchy of Iran became the Islamic Republic, a Shiite state of god, with the highest religious authority, Khomeini, the supreme leader at the top. The German Ambassador Ritzel reported from Tehran on December 4, 1979:

“The constitutional referendum passed without serious disputes. There were clashes in Tabriz between constitutional opponents from the Shariatmadaris camp and Khomeini supporters, and in the large cities of Baluchistan it was not possible to vote at all because the polling stations were blocked. But the worst fears did not materialize. ... Revolutionary spokesman Habib announced yesterday evening the next stages in the state process of the Islamic Republic. After that, elections for President and Majles (Parliament) are planned in two months. At the end of this week, Khomeini will presumably nominate the half of the 'Guardian Committee' to be determined by him according to the constitution (checking that parliament's legislation is compatible with Islamic principles). "

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

On December 17, 1979, the German ambassador to the USA, Hermes, reported to the Foreign Office that, according to American knowledge, a Soviet division previously stationed on the Soviet-Afghan border on Soviet territory had not been detectable for a few days. ... For weeks the Soviet propaganda had denounced American military preparations in the region without a special cause. It is now apparent that this propaganda, in connection with the exploitation of the Iranian events, is being used by the Soviets as a pretext for sending troops to Afghanistan.

On the night of December 25th to 26th, 1979, the first parts of the Soviet 40th Army, which had been trained for use, landed in Kabul . 7000 elite soldiers of the 103rd 'Vitebsk' airborne division occupied not only the airport but also central points in the capital. On December 27, 1979, Soviet troops of the 5th and 108th Motorized Rifle Divisions marched across the border into Afghanistan. With Operation Storm-333 , parts of a total of 650 men strong special unit of the KGB (including Spetsnaz ) reached the government palace on December 27, 1979. Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin was killed by soldiers in Afghan uniforms. The affairs of state took over Babrak Karmal . The Soviet-Afghan war had begun.

Influence on the US election campaign

The hostage-taking was, alongside the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR , one of the main themes in the election campaign for the 1980 US presidential election , which Jimmy Carter lost to Ronald Reagan on November 4, 1980, the anniversary of the hostage-taking . Carter's inability to resolve the hostage crisis is said to have been critical to his defeat.

October Surprise Theory

The Iranian government announced the release of the hostages 20 minutes after the end of Reagan's speech when he took office on January 20, 1981. This and other evidence should indicate that the Reagan camp had been conducting secret negotiations with representatives of Tehran for a long time before the November 4, 1980 election in order to delay the release of the hostages so that they would not end up as an October surprise in favor of the election Carter's impact. In return, the Iranian government is said to have been offered support in releasing blocked foreign accounts as well as undercover arms deliveries - in fact, a few years later, extensive, illegal arms deliveries by the Reagan government to Iran came to light as part of the Iran-Contra scandal in 1986. The contact is said to have gone through Reagan's campaign manager and later Director of Central Intelligence William Joseph Casey and the Iranian arms dealer Jamschid Hashemi . The October Surprise Theory draws on Iranian and American sources, most notably Gary Sick , an advisor to Carter and a member of the United States National Security Council at the time, and Abu l-Hasan Banisadr , then President of Iran. However, final proof of Reagan's influence could never be produced.

Legal processing

In contrast to the hostage-takers at the Iranian embassy in London , none of those involved have been charged in Iran.

The released hostages received compensation from the US government in an escrow account. At the start of the hostage situation, $ 12 billion in Iranian assets were frozen in the US. Of this, 8 billion US dollars were transferred to an escrow account before the hostages were released.

  • US $ 3.67 billion was used to settle loans that came from the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
  • US $ 1.42 billion remained in the escrow account to cover potential claims by American banks against the Iranian state.
  • $ 2.88 billion was paid to Iran.

Another US $ 2.2 billion was made available for distribution by an international arbitration tribunal, of which US $ 1 billion went to a separate escrow account for claims by US citizens and US companies against the Iranian state. In total, Iran received less than $ 4 billion, or less than 30 percent of the funds it had at American banks before the hostage-taking.

36 years after the hostage-taking, each of the 53 US hostages or their descendants received up to 4.4 million US dollars, reports the New York Times in December 2015. This compensation payment coincided with the 2015 negotiations on Iran's nuclear program linked, explains the hostages lawyer, Thomas Lankford in an interview.

Film about the crisis

The two-part TV co-production of the USA, France and Great Britain 444 Days - America in Hostage (original title: Days of Crisis or L'Amérique en otage ) from 1991 describes the events in Iran and the USA from that time. Although the film is also quite critical of the monarch's politics, it is banned in Iran.

The 2012 film Argo shows the liberation of the six Americans who found shelter in the Canadian embassy and were liberated in January 1980.

literature

  • Masoumeh Ebtekar , Fred A. Reed: Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 US Embassy Capture. Vancouver (Canada) 2000
  • David Patrick Houghton: US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, ISBN 978-0-5218-0509-4
  • David Farber: Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam . Princeton University Press, Princeton 2005, ISBN 978-1-4008-2620-9
  • Christopher de Bellaigue: In the rose garden of the martyrs. A portrait of Iran. From the English by Sigrid Langhaeuser, Verlag CH Beck, Munich 2006 (English original edition: London 2004), pp. 48 f. And 101-104
  • Debra Johanyak: Behind the Veil. An American Woman's Memoir of the 1979 Hostage Crisis . Akron, 2007, ISBN 978-1-931968-38-6 .
  • Mark Bowden : Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America's War with Militant Islam . Grove / Atlantic. New York 2007, ISBN 978-0-8021-4303-7

Web links

Commons : Tehran hostage-taking  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Ulrich Tilgner: Upheaval in Iran . 1979, p. 189 .
  2. ^ Airforce historical support division: Operation Eagle Claw. Online text, October 16, 2012.
  3. a b suffered terribly. With Reagan's help, the Americans wanted to suppress the shame of the Tehran hostage affair. But now there are new revelations about the background. In: Der Spiegel , June 1, 1981.
  4. , New York Times, April 5, 2008: "David Newsom, 90, Diplomat in Iran Crisis, Dies"
  5. "THE SHAH'S HEALTH: A POLITICAL GAMBLE" by Terrence Smith, reprinted in the New York Times-Magazine on May 17, 1981
  6. a b c Michael Naumann, Josef Joffe: Teheran. A revolution is being executed . Munich 1980, ISBN 3-453-01233-X , p. 214 f .
  7. Hans-Peter Drögemüller: Iranisches Tagebuch. 5 years of revolution . Hamburg 1983, p. 240 ff .
  8. ^ David Rockefeller: Memoirs . Random House Trade Paperbacks, ISBN 0-8129-6973-1 , pp. 356-375.
  9. “The 'students' are very well organized, better than you normally are after a few semesters at university. The core consists of ten people, eight of whom are identified. ”Sadegh Tabātabāi in a conversation on March 21, 1980 in Bonn with Foreign Minister Genscher. In: Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1980 Vol. I: January 1 to June 30, 1980. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011, p. 497.
  10. Terrence Smith: Why Carter admitted the Shah. In: New York Times, May 17, 1981, pp. 42, 44, 48.
  11. ^ FAZ, November 6, 1979, p. 2.
  12. ^ A b Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1661.
  13. Jane Janjigian: What next for 'Mary' of Tehran? Chicago Tribune, Feb. 26, 1981, p. B4. Masoumeh Ebtekar, Fred A. Reed: Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 US Embassy Capture. Vancouver (Canada) 2000
  14. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1879.
  15. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1728.
  16. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1694.
  17. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1829.
  18. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1828.
  19. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1885.
  20. The UN's Five Wise Men . In: TIME . March 3, 1980 ( TIME [accessed December 21, 2008]).
  21. Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1980 Vol. I: January 1 to June 30, 1980. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011, p. 499.
  22. Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1980 Vol. II: January 1 to June 30, 1980. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011, p. 568.
  23. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1838 f.
  24. Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1980 Vol. I: January 1 to June 30, 1980. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011, p. 621.
  25. PAUL LEWIS: Richard I. Queen, 51, Hostage Freed Early by Iranians in '80. In: NYTimes.com. August 21, 2002, retrieved August 21, 2015 (obituary for Richard I. Queen (1951-2002)).
  26. Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1980 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1980. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011, p. 1375 f.
  27. Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1980 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1980. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011, pp. 1414-1420.
  28. Garry Sick: All Fall Down. Random House, New York 1985, p. 314.
  29. Garry Sick: All Fall Down. Random House, New York 1985, p. 315.
  30. Tim Geiger, Amit Das Gupta, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1980 Vol. I: January 1 to June 30, 1980. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2011, p. 306.
  31. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1706.
  32. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1873.
  33. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1936.
  34. Forget everything , article from September 5, 1988 on Spiegel Online
  35. Tied up like Gulliver. In: Der Spiegel , April 15, 1991.
  36. Everyone is terrified. In: Der Spiegel , August 12, 1991.
  37. ^ Gary Sick : October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. In: Foreign Affairs , Spring 1993 edition.
  38. Martin Kilian: The hostage deal that remained a rumor. In: Tages-Anzeiger , June 26, 2009.
  39. ^ Gary Sick , The Election Story of the Decade  In: The New York Times , April 15, 1991.
  40. Garry Sick: All fall down. New York 1985, p. 337.
  41. Report: US hostages from Tehran receive millions. In: ORF , December 24, 2015.
  42. 444 days - America held hostage. Internet Movie Database , accessed May 22, 2015 .
  43. Argo. Internet Movie Database , accessed May 22, 2015 .