Cuban military operation in Angola

Cuba (red), Angola (green), South Africa (blue)

During the Cuban military operation in Angola, Cuba intervened between autumn 1975 and May 1991 on the side of the Angolan liberation front Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). This intervention was decisive in ensuring that the MPLA prevailed over the competing liberation movements FNLA and UNITA , established the first government of independent Angola and then asserted itself in the Angolan civil war .

In addition, Cuba's efforts promoted Namibia's independence and accelerated the decline of the apartheid regime in South Africa .

The Cuban engagement in Angola comprised not only the military but also an important civil part.

prehistory

Cuban internationalism

Geographical map of Angola

From the beginning, the Cuban revolution defined itself as internationalist and global: it should spread to as many other countries as possible. Through this combination of idealism and foreign policy survival strategy, Cuba took over military and civilian missions in the southern hemisphere just a year after the revolution. Although still a developing country itself, Cuba supported political groups in African , Latin American and Asian countries in the military, medical and educational fields. These "overseas adventures" not only caused considerable irritation in the USA , but also gave the friendly Soviet Union a headache.

From the mid-1960s, Africa moved into the center of Cuba's foreign policy activities, where young African revolutionaries such as Patrice Lumumba , Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto asked Cubans for support for their liberation movements. With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial power in Africa and the independence of Angola, the Cuban government decided in autumn 1975 to intervene on a large scale in defense of the friendly liberation movement MPLA. In contrast to other engagements in Africa, e.g. For example, in Ethiopia , Guinea , Guinea-Bissau or Benin , this mission made the Caribbean island a "global player" for a short time in the middle of the Cold War. Cuba also had an extensive civil development program in Africa in which tens of thousands of Cuban aid workers (doctors, educators, construction workers, technicians) worked and the same number of young Africans studied in Cuba for free.

Cuba supported the Algerian National Liberation Front ( FLN ) against France as early as 1961 . Shortly after Algerian independence, neighboring Morocco started a border war in which Cuba sent troops to Africa for the first time. A memorandum dated October 20, 1963 from Major Raúl Castro , Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces in charge of the operation, to two leaders of the operation in Algeria , Major Flavio Bravo and Major Jorge Serguera, shows that Cuba values ​​correct behavior the Cuban placed in a foreign country: Castro emphasizes extreme self-control within the troop, which included the ban on alcoholic beverages and intimate relationships with women, as well as modesty, insisting on being decent and decent and not behaving like "experts" . In addition to the rules of conduct, Castro encouraged the troops to show “complete and absolute” consideration for customs, traditions and religion. When the Cubans arrived in Algeria after the sea voyage, Morocco had withdrawn again.

In 1965 Cuba supported an uprising by supporters of Lumumbas ( Simba Rebellion ) in the east of the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo ) under the personal leadership of Che Guevara . Among the rebels was Laurent-Désiré Kabila , who 30 years later was to overthrow the long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko . This secret Cuban operation turned out to be a complete failure. In contrast, Cuba had a decisive influence in Guinea-Bissau's war of independence against Portugal from 1966 to 1974.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba increased its military presence abroad, particularly in Africa. At times there were up to 50,000 men in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia and hundreds in other countries. Cuban armed forces played a key role in the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia , maintaining a substantial garrison there for over a decade. In Mozambique from 1977 and in Congo-Brazzaville (today Republic of the Congo ) they worked as consultants; the latter was an important base for the intervention in Angola.

Cuban-Soviet relations were never easy, and Cuba's activities abroad caused irritation in Moscow. These tensions did not escape the attention of the US secret service CIA , which noted in a report shortly after Che Guevara's death: " Brezhnev thinks Castro is some idiot and Castro probably does not think much of Brezhnev". Much of the tension, according to this analysis, was due to Cuba's support for underground wars in many Latin American countries, while the Soviet Union was keen to forge diplomatic and economic ties with the very governments the Cubans wanted to overthrow.

Map of Angola

Carnation Revolution and Angola's independence

The Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974 in Portugal surprised the rest of the world and led to the sudden independence of the last colonies in Africa, Angola , Cape Verde , Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe , without further fighting. Guinea-Bissau , another Portuguese colony in Africa, had to fight for its independence the year before. Mozambique was granted independence on June 25, 1975 with comparatively no problems, and Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe were also given their independence in the summer of 1975 without any problems. Angola, on the other hand, became a bone of contention between rival liberation groups MPLA , FNLA and UNITA in Angola proper and the FLEC in the Cabinda exclave .

Until then, despite considerable differences among each other, the liberation struggle against the Portuguese had top priority. In the beginning they had no clear or fixed ties and received support from a wide range of countries, some of which supported several groups at the same time or alternately. By the time of the Portuguese Revolution, however, they had more or less drifted into the eastern (MPLA) or western (UNITA, FNLA, FLEC) camps. When Portugal disappeared from the scene, their ethnic and ideological differences came to the fore again. The disagreement and the refusal of the three movements to negotiate jointly prevented the Portuguese from handing over power. The Treaty of Alvor , which they signed on January 15, 1975, did not provide a solid basis for this. Above all, no agreement was reached on who should be the interim or first president of Angola from independence day to the first election. The transitional government that this treaty provided for was occupied in equal parts by the three liberation movements and Portugal and was set up on January 31, 1975; Independence Day was set for November 11, 1975, the Armistice Day. The FLEC was not involved in the negotiations in Alvor because it campaigned for the independence of Cabinda, which was administratively linked to Angola by the Portuguese as an exclave.

Civil war: battle for the capital

Fighting broke out in Luanda just two weeks after the Provisional Government took office. For the MPLA this was the beginning of the "Second Liberation War". FNLA troops, flown in from Zaire, began moving into the city as early as October 1974. The MPLA, still involved in internal power struggles, followed later and in smaller numbers. The fighting quickly spread across the country. Every liberation movement wanted to have the best strategic starting points up to independence; most important of all was control of the capital. In a meeting of the US National Security Council (NSC) on June 27, 1975, President Ford made it clear that despite the planned elections, it was important to get "your husband" in first, by which he meant that UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi , Luanda should have in hand before the elections. After secret talks with the participation of South Africa, the FNLA and UNITA allied and withdrew from the provisional government, which was officially repealed on August 14th.

The MPLA managed to drive the FNLA out of Luanda by July 9th. The FNLA took positions east of Kifangondo on the eastern foothills of the capital, from where they maintained their pressure on the MPLA. In the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire, which the FNLA controlled, the MPLA presence was completely eliminated.

Foreign intervention

The Angolan liberation movements had a long history of foreign support, starting right after they were founded in the early 1960s. This support came from all directions and with the movements' main focus on the struggle against the Portuguese it was not necessarily immediately apparent in which political camps they would end up.

The FNLA was based in Zaire, from which it received most of its support. Their leader, Holden Roberto, was related to Mobutu through his wife and owed to him by previous favors. As a result, over the years the FNLA has become little more than a branch of Mobutu's own armed forces. Much of the support from Zaire was again from the United States, with whom Mobutu was on very good terms. The Kennedy administration had already started supporting the FNLA in 1960. Zaire was the first country to send troops to Angola in March 1975 and was the first to be involved in fighting against the MPLA that summer. In late January 1975, just before the Provisional Government under the Alvor Accords would take office, a high-ranking US government policy-making body approved $ 300,000 for the FNLA.

The fighting in Angola only broke out shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, and the US was therefore sensitive to any further setbacks in other regions of the world. The success of a left liberation army with the help of the USSR and Cuba would have meant the first serious interference by the Eastern bloc in the internal affairs of an African country, which the US saw as a strategic threat. At a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on June 27, 1975 attended by Gerald Ford (US President), Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State), James Schlesinger (Secretary of Defense), Donald Rumsfeld (Assistant to the President) and William Egan Colby (CIA Chef) and others, the United States considered developments in Angola more intensively, mainly because it had become aware of Soviet support for the MPLA. They found that the Portuguese gave up the country without any preparation for independence. It was clear to them that the control of the capital Luanda meant power over the entire country and used as a comparison the situation in Congo-Leopoldville , where the USA and its allies had succeeded in the civil war, the capital Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) and thus to retain or regain control of the whole country. In the discussion round the options of the USA were considered: neutrality and staying out of everything or a diplomatic offensive that Kissinger did not believe in. A blackened section follows in the minutes and from the course of the further conversation it can be assumed that Kissinger listed a third option, which involved active support for the opposing liberation movements UNITA and FLNA. Kissinger indicated that the CIA Oversight Committee had already approved financial and arms support. The first two options were discarded for various considerations and reasons. There are further blackened sections in the protocol . One telling comment by Schlesinger is that the US could also promote the disintegration of Angola. If Mobutu had the Cabinda exclave in its clutches, the oil reserves would be far safer. In any case, he was of the opinion that if the US supported it, it wanted a secure chance of success, otherwise it should remain neutral. Inaction did not seem acceptable to the President. At the end of the session he asked to examine the options more closely. On July 18, 1975, Ford approved the CIA secret operation " IAFEATURE " to support the FNLA and UNITA with money, weapons and trainers, with the neighboring country Zaire , whose President Mobutu was friends with the United States, acting as mediator. In addition, Zaire also supported the FLNA with its own units.

In the summer of 1974, the Chinese were the first to station 200 military instructors in Zaire and train FNLA troops; they also provided military support. North Koreans, the Mobutus Elite Division , who trained Kamanyola , also trained the FNLA, but withdrew their support in late December 1975.

UNITA, which was formed in 1965/1966 through a split from the FNLA, was originally Maoist in orientation and received some support from China. The USA increased its aid to the FNLA and included UNITA for the first time. On July 18, 1975, Ford approved the secret CIA operation "IAFEATURE" to support FNLA and UNITA with money, weapons and instructors. American instructors from the CIA arrived in South Angola in early August 1975, where they worked closely with South African instructors who arrived around the same time.

Other countries with their own secret support actions for the FNLA and UNITA were Great Britain and France .

Eastern bloc countries made their first contacts with the MPLA during the underground war against the Portuguese. Their support remained secret, only came in small doses and sometimes dried up completely. This was the case, for example, when the MPLA came under great pressure from the Portuguese in 1972 and was also torn by internal disputes (directional battle between Agostinho Neto and Chipenda from 1972 to 1974). The small flow of Soviet and Chinese aid they had received through the 1960s was cut; only deliveries worth mentioning came from Yugoslavia .

Direct assistance from the Soviet Union in connection with the civil war began in 1975 with arms deliveries via Brazzaville and Dar-es-Salaam . The Soviet Union has always been a little reluctant to support the MPLA. She distrusted Neto and their relationship remained ambivalent over the years that followed. Even after the South African invasion, the Soviet Union only sent weapons, but no instructors for the increasingly complex equipment. Among the other Eastern Bloc countries, the MPLA had well-functioning connections to the GDR and Romania . The GDR shipped large amounts of civilian material to Angola.

South Africa and Cuba intervene

Cuba and the MPLA before the civil war

The first Cuban contacts with the MPLA go back to the 1960s. The MPLA received initial support when it moved its headquarters from Zaire to Congo-Brazzaville (formerly: French Congo) in 1963. In 1966, Neto, accompanied by Hoji Ya Henda, the MPLA's commander in chief, traveled to Cuba to meet Fidel Castro . Cubans' contact with the MPLA in Congo-Brazzaville ended in disappointment for both sides and relations cooled. Some MPLA fighters were sent to Cuba for training, and Cuba supported the MPLA on the international stage, but otherwise there were no contacts. In a note dated November 22, 1972 from the Cuban Deputy Interior Minister Manuel Piñeiro Lozada to Major Raúl Castro regarding the sending of a delegation to Angola and Mozambique, it is said: to get to know revolutionary movements in these countries. These movements are a mystery even to those socialist countries which give them considerable aid. Research would help us provide better, more targeted support to these movements. I hardly need to point out the importance of these countries; one only has to point out that a change in the course of the wars which develop in both countries means a shift in all forces on the African continent. It would be the first time that there would be two independent countries in Africa, one of which a major war could be waged and which would share borders with a region that is the target of most investment and which is a core area of ​​imperialism: South Africa , Rhodesia , Zaire and the Portuguese colonies. Our comrades from the MPLA sent us the following request last May:

• a) that we train 10 men in underground warfare ...
• b) that we send pilots for a DC3 ...
• c) that you want to send a high-level delegation to Cuba ...

... Both movements ( FRELIMO and MPLA) will coordinate our visit with the governments of Tanzania and Zambia in order to enable our comrades to travel safely through their areas ... ”.

These deliberations in 1972 bore no fruit and Cuba's attention remained on Guinea-Bissau. Only after the Portuguese Revolution did an MPLA delegation in Cuba bring a request for economic support, military training and weapons on July 26, 1974. In early October, Cuba received another request, this time even more urgent, for five Cuban military instructors to build the MPLA's army, the FAPLA. In December 1974 / January 1975 Cuba sent a party and government delegation, including Major Alfonso Perez Morales and Carlos Cadelo, to Angola and Mozambique to get an idea of ​​the situation. Neto handed the two of them a letter dated January 26, 1975 in Dar-es-Salaam, in which the wishes for Cuba were listed:

1. The establishment and maintenance of a military school for cadres. We urgently need to create a security unit and we need to train military personnel.
2. A ship to bring war material that we have stored in Dar-es-Salaam to Angola. The delivery in Angola could take place outside the territorial waters if it is a Cuban ship.
3. Weapons and transport equipment for the Rapid Reaction Force (Brigada de Intervencion) that we plan to deploy, as well as light weapons for some infantry battalions.
4. Transmitting and receiving devices to solve the communication problems with the widely distributed military units.
5. Uniforms and military equipment for 10,000 men.
6. Two pilots and a flight mechanic.
7. Support for training union leaders.
8. Support for the establishment of schools for teaching Marxism ...
9. Literature on political and military matters, especially instruction manuals.
10. Financial support as long as we line up and organize.

Although Cuba was considering setting up a military mission in Angola, there was again no official response to the request. It was not repeated until May 1975 when the Cuban commander Flavio Bravo met with Neto in Brazzaville while the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from the African colonies.

The hopes of the MPLA were directed mainly to the Eastern bloc, from where, however, the support did not come to the extent that they wished for. Neto is quoted in a Cuban report as complaining about the half-hearted support of the Soviet Union. He also expressed his hope that Angola would become "a major issue in the struggle between imperialism and socialism". But neither the USSR nor the MPLA itself anticipated the outbreak of a major war before independence. In March 1975 the MPLA sent about 100 members to the Soviet Union for training; On the other hand, she received the 100,000 US dollars they had asked for from Yugoslavia.

South African engagement in Angola

South Africa was also anxious to prevent the MPLA from establishing a Marxist-socialist system in its neighborhood, since it could assume that it would be the next target of the liberation movements. The sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique in 1974 ended a phase of military and secret service cooperation between South Africa and the colonial power against Angolan and Namibian liberation movements that went back to the 1960s. Their commitment to South African historiography, which they refer to as the "South African border war", began in 1966 when the first major clashes broke out with SWAPO , which was based in Zambia. With the loss of the Portuguese as allies and the rise of black governments in the two former colonies, South Africa lost a prized buffer between itself and sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that these new governments were also left-wing only increased the threat to the apartheid regime.

On July 14, 1975, Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster approved a US $ 14 million list of weapons to be secretly procured for the FNLA and UNITA. The first deliveries for the FNLA and UNITA from South Africa arrived in August 1975.

From August 9, 1975 advanced units of the South African Army ( South African Defense Force , SADF) about 50 km into southern Angola to the physical structures of the Cunene project at Calueque the Kunene River , South African investment for water supply in northern Namibia and the planned electricity generation in Ruacana , to be occupied. With the protection of the Calueque Dam near the border with what was then South West Africa, South Africa justified the first occupation of regions within Angola by SADF units.

On September 4, Vorster approved the provision of limited military training, advice, and logistical support. In return, FNLA and UNITA would support SADF in the fight against SWAPO. In addition, the SADF started operations "Sausage II", a major hunt for SWAPO in southern Angola. With the MPLA's recent successes, UNITA's territory had shrunk to parts of central Angola and it became clear to South Africa that the MPLA would win the battle without his intervention.

On October 14th, South Africa started the secret operation "Savannah" and the first of several columns, the special unit "Zulu", marched from Namibia into Angola and advanced very quickly northwards. A second special unit called "Foxbat" landed in Angola in mid-October. The operation saw the elimination of the MPLA in the southern border area, then in southwestern Angola and central Angola, and finally the capture of Luanda .

Documents show that the US was aware of the South African engagement in Namibia and Angola in advance and was cooperating militarily with South Africa, contrary to what Ford told the Chinese, who supported the FNLA and were aware of the South African engagement in Angola concerned, and what Kissinger said before the Congress and presented in his memoirs. For example, the CIA helped the South Africans hold key positions on the Angolan southern front.

Cuban military mission

The problem with all liberation movements was the lack of trained specialists, especially for weapons systems that were becoming more and more technically complex. By the end of August, Cuba only had a few technical advisors in Angola that the CIA had noticed. Neto had repeatedly and urgently asked for 100 Cuban instructors, but it was only after a thorough assessment of the situation on site that the decision was made to set up four military training centers, “Centros de Instruccion Revolucionaria” (CIR) in Angola. On August 3, 1975, a Cuban delegation traveled a second time to Angola to assess the situation in the country and assess the necessary aid. In a note dated August 11, 1975 to Major Raúl Castro, Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles informed about the reasons and the content of the visit. He pointed to the aggression on the part of the FNLA and Mobutus and the development of possible future actions under consideration until independence in November, as well as the “reactionaries and imperialists who would use all possible methods to defeat the forces of the MPLA to prevent them from taking power ”. The delegation brought $ 100,000 to the MPLA. Arguelles also mentioned that Neto had complained about the "low level of support from the socialist countries, and that the USSR withheld aid in 1972, although they now tell us they are giving us arms, but it is very little compared to our great needs ”. Arguelles agreed with Neto that the fronts were clearly defined, that the FNLA and UNITA represented the international imperialist forces and the MPLA the progressive and national ones.

After the delegation returned, the Cubans considered the options of their trainers in Angola in the event of an invasion by South Africa or Zaire. They would either have to embark on an underground war or withdraw to Zambia, where Cuba was about to open an embassy. On August 15, 1975, Castro urged the USSR to increase its support for the MPLA and offered to send special forces to Angola. The Soviet Union refused.

Instead of the requested 100 trainers, the CIR was equipped with almost 500 Cubans who were supposed to train around 5,300 Angolans in three to six months. These 500 men included 17 in a medical brigade and 284 officers. Shipments began in late August and the most urgently needed specialists were using scheduled international flights over Europe; the rest came on ships and two Cuban airliners. The arrival of two Cuban ships in Angola in early October 1975 was recorded by the CIA without causing any concern in Washington. The CIRs were set up in Cabinda , Benguela , Saurimo (formerly Henrique de Carvalho) and in N'Dalatando (formerly Salazar). The CIR in Cabinda made up almost half of the total workforce in Angola with 191; the remaining CIR received 66 or 67 men each. Some were stationed at headquarters in Luanda and another was distributed around the rest of the country. The reason for the stationing of the largest contingent in Cabinda was the assumed threat that Zaire posed to Cabinda or the Republic of Congo. By the time the CIR was able to start operations on October 18-20, Operation Savannah was in full swing, unnoticed by the world.

Civil War July to December 1975

Operation Carlota

In contrast to the MPLA's continued successes in the south, where it took control of 12 provinces and most of the urban centers, on the northern front they found it difficult to keep the well-equipped FNLA and its allies away from the capital. The FNLA received supplies from the USA via Zaire from the end of July 1975. Between July and November the front moved back and forth several times between Caxito and Kifangondo. Neto asked for more support from the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union had no intention of engaging in personnel before independence and was reluctant to send more weapons.

Forty instructors from CIR Salazar were the first Cubans to be drawn into fighting for the defense of Kifangondo on October 23. A second group supported the MPLA on October 28 in the same line of defense east of Kifangondo.

Maximum extent of the UNITA territory

The areas that the MPLA had just captured in southern Angola were quickly lost to South Africa. South African advisers and armor-piercing weapons helped repel an MPLA attack on Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in early October. Zulu took Rocadas until October 20, Sa da Bandeira until October 24, and Mocamedes until October 28. On November 2-3, Cuban trainers took part in fighting for the third time, this time between 35 and 40 men from the CIR Benguela, who unsuccessfully tried to stop the South African advance at Catengue with the MPLA. On November 6, 1975, Zulu took the port city of Benguela, which had been abandoned by the MPLA, and thus had control of the end point of the Benguela Railway . A day later, Zulu took Lobito. In central Angola, the Foxbat combat group had meanwhile advanced 800 km north towards Luanda. The MPLA could not prevent the South African Army (SADF) and UNITA from taking the entire south of the country and getting up to 100 km from Luanda. From the north the FNLA advanced with Zairean units and logistically supported by the USA to Luanda, from the south the South Africans and UNITA. Despite Soviet arms deliveries, a few days before independence became apparent for the MPLA.

Cuba intervenes in the fighting

Only after the shocking MPLA defeat at Catengue did the Cubans realize that it was an invasion of South Africa and that if they did not act quickly, Luanda would fall. On November 4, 1975, Fidel Castro decided to send combat troops. On the same day, a first machine with 100 heavy weapons specialists, requested by the MPLA in September, left for Brazzaville; the troops arrived in Luanda on November 7th. On November 9th, the first two Cuban planes landed in Luanda with the first 100 of a special unit of 652 men. Operation Carlota had started with only three aged medium-range Bristol Britannia propeller planes that had to refuel twice on the route. An artillery regiment followed by ship. The Cubans' top priority was to defend the capital. The MPLA had not asked the Cubans to send troops. The matter had only been discussed informally with the CIR military mission.

Bristol Britannia (1964)

Castro justified the Cuban intervention: “When the invasion of Angola by regular troops from South Africa began on October 23, we couldn't put our hands on our laps. And when the MPLA asked us for help, we offered the help needed to prevent apartheid from spreading to Angola ”. Unlike the Cuban engagements in the 1960s, this was not a secret operation. On November 4, 1975, Castro decided to openly engage in Angola and sent special troops and 35,000 infantry. With "Operation Carlota", named after a leader of a slave revolt in Cuba on November 5, 1843, Cuba became a major player in the Angola conflict. The dispatch of these troops was not discussed with the USSR, as was shown in particular by the USA, and it was completely unprepared. The USSR was forced to accept this approach, among other things because it did not want to endanger its important outpost in direct proximity to the USA, but it wanted to keep the deployment within limits. Only after two months did they help the Cubans with the transport by promising 10 transport flights from Cuba to Angola.

The few Cuban troops that were able to intervene on the MPLA's side before independence were the trainers of the three CIRs, the 100 specialists who arrived on November 7th, and 158 special forces from Operation Carlota who arrived on two flights on November 9th . The 100 specialists and 88 of the special troops were immediately sent by Luanda to Kifangondo (northern front), 30 km away, where a battle was already in full swing. There they supported 850 MPLA and 200 Katanga soldiers as well as the only Soviet instructor. Heavy weapons had already arrived from Cuba by ship on November 7th, including guns, grenade launchers and six BM-21 missile launchers , each equipped with 40 missiles.

Northern front

Two days before independence, the main threat to the MPLA came from the FNLA, which lay directly east of Kifangondo, supported by three infantry battalions from Zaire, Portuguese mercenaries, and a number of military advisors, including a small CIA contingent and a South African group under the leadership by General Ben de Wet Roos. They had already broken a first line of defense at Porto Quipiri about 50 km from Luanda.

On November 10th, the MPLA near Kifangondo was able to repel the last major attack by the FNLA and its allies with Cuban help and thus to hold the capital. On the same day, the Portuguese handed over power to the "Angolan people" and shortly after midnight Neto proclaimed Angola's independence. Under pressure from the CIA and other secret services, UNITA and FNLA proclaimed the People's Democratic Republic with the provisional capital Huambo. However, the two movements could not agree on a common government, and fighting broke out between the two on the eve of the declaration of independence.

It took a few days for the US to realize just how bad the defeat of the FNLA and the Zairians was at Kifangondo. But even then, they did not realize the full importance of the Cuban intervention, as the news from the south was still positive for them. Kissinger, as well as the South Africans, were shocked by the extent of the Cuban and Soviet reaction. The Angola special group at the CIA headquarters in Langley was so certain of a victory for the Zairians and South Africans that they celebrated Angolan independence with wine and cheese in their garlanded office on November 11th.

The USA confirmed the presence of Cuban troops in Angola in an official announcement on November 24, 1975. Kissinger remarked to Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez: “Our secret service has become so bad that we only found out about Cuban troops when they were sent were there". At that point in time, there were more Cuban troops, specialists and civilian technicians in Angola than Kissinger imagined. In fact, so many ships were anchored in Luanda Bay that Neto remarked to a close official: "This is not right, if the Cubans keep going like this they will be ruined". It is unlikely that the Cubans themselves had any idea what they were getting into and that their aid to Angola would reach such proportions.

Because of the intimate hostility between the United States and Cuba, Americans viewed such a Cuban demeanor as a defeat that could not be tolerated. The US naturally assumed that the Soviet Union was behind Cuban interference. They also presented the motives and the passage of time in their own version: Accordingly, South Africa had to intervene after the Cubans had sent troops to Angola in support of the MPLA. They viewed the war in Angola as a major new challenge to American power from an expansionist Moscow, which had gained new self-confidence through military successes over American client states in Indochina. It was only years later that the Americans realized that the Cubans had acted without consulting the Soviet Union and that they wanted to bring the Soviet Union into play with this move.

Castro saw US behavior as follows: “Why were you irritated? Why did you plan everything to take Angola before November 11th? Angola is a country rich in natural resources. There is a lot of oil in Cabinda . Some imperialists wonder why we are helping the Angolans, what interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country will only help another if it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other mineral resources. No, we have no material interests, and it is logical that the imperialists do not understand that. Because they only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. We are fulfilling a fundamental duty of internationalism in helping the people of Angola ”.

On Independence Day, the MPLA held little more than the capital and a strip of central Angola from the ocean to the border with Zaire and Cabinda. By November 8th, around 1000 MPLA fighters (FAPLA) and 232 Cubans had managed to hold the exclave, which had been attacked by Zairean troops, FLEC fighters and French mercenaries.

At a high-level meeting on December 3, 1975 during a state visit to China with, among others, US President Gerald Ford , Deng Xiaoping (Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Mao Zedong ), Qiao Guanhua (Chinese Foreign Minister), Henry Kissinger (US Foreign Minister), Brent Scowcroft (Assistant to the President for the NSA) and George HW Bush (Head of the US Liaison Office in Beijing) discussed international issues. Ford had spoken to Mao about Angola prior to this meeting. Although the Chinese had previously also supported the MPLA, they now refer to the FNLA and UNITA. Nonetheless, sub-Saharan African sensitivities made them concerned about the South African engagement, which they described as "the relatively complex and paramount problem". Kissinger then assured that the US is ready to force South Africa out of the conflict as soon as an alternative military force can be created. It was during that conversation that Ford told the Chinese, "We had nothing to do with the South African engagement and we will take action to get South Africa out if compensation can be obtained for their absence".

As long as the Cubans were on their own, the deployment of troops in Angola was slow but steady over December and January. Two months after the start of Operation Carlota, the Soviet Union agreed to support with ten charter flights on long-haul aircraft of the type IL-62 from January 8, 1976. More troops also came on Cuban ships. With the increasing number of troops and improved technical equipment, the situation of the MPLA visibly improved from the beginning of February. The last offensive in the north began on January 1st - by the end of February the MPLA and 300 Cubans had completely dissolved the FNLA and drove the remnants across the border together with the Zairean army. The last mercenaries left the country on January 17th; the South African contingent on the northern front under General de Wet Roos was even evacuated by ship on November 28th.

South: South African advance is halted

hatched: areas of activity of the South African army

In November and December 1975 the SADF troop strength in Angola was 2,900 to 3,000 men. Although she still had an advantage over the FAPLA and the Cubans in terms of this strength, despite determined efforts she was no longer able to penetrate further north from Novo Redondo. Luanda stayed out of reach. In a last successful advance on December 11th, a South African special unit with UNITA troops captured Luso on the Benguela Railway, which they held until December 27th. From mid-December, the apartheid government had to extend military service and call up reservists. The stalemate at the front was not South Africa's only problem. The international press took notice of the operation in Angola for the first time and the US changed its official policy.

Reactions

The world takes notice

The South Africans had managed to keep the invasion of Angola hidden from the world for a while. Even the MPLA was not clear until October 23 that these were not white mercenaries, but the SADF advancing from the south into Luanda. Nevertheless, it took a whole month before the world press took notice of the events. On November 23, a major Western newspaper, the Washington Post , announced that regular South African troops were fighting in Angola. Although other newspapers still took their time with such reports, e.g. For example, the New York Times on December 12, 1975, the fact was gradually becoming internationally known. Even the South African population themselves had been left in the dark. It was not until December 19 that people learned more about what was referred to as the "border war" when the newspapers published pictures of SADF soldiers captured by FAPLA and Cubans in Angola. As a result of this becoming known, even the last few friends or allies tried to distance themselves from the apartheid regime, and Pretoria became increasingly isolated. Even UNITA made a move to save face by calling South Africa an "invader".

Official US support withdrawn

It was not until the US government asked Congress for $ 28 million for Operation IA Feature that Congress paid full attention to what was going on in Angola. Meanwhile, “the evidence of the South African invasion was overwhelming and the smell of secret collaboration with Pretoria hung in the air. What was worse: the increasing number of Cuban troops had thrown the CIA plans off track and the government seemed at a loss as to how to proceed ”. The money for IAFEATURE was not approved and on December 20 the Senate passed a law banning secret support for anti-communist forces in Angola. Later that winter, an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill introduced by Dick Clark extended the ban. The US government resorted to other means to support the FNLA and UNITA. One of them was hiring mercenaries. The CIA started a secret program to recruit Brazilians and Europeans, mostly Portuguese and British, to fight in northern Angola. Altogether they succeeded in recruiting around 250 men, but by the time significant parts of them arrived in January, the war in northern Angola in favor of the MPLA was almost decided.

A report by Kissinger of January 13, 1976 gives an insight into the activities and fighting in Angola at the time (excerpt):

• 2. This is followed by an updated management report based on confidential sources.

• A: Diplomatic
• (1) Two Cuban delegations were present in Adis Ababa. During the OAU conference that has just ended, a delegation led by Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriarán, PCC… dealing with Africa and the Middle East and a member of the PCC Central Committee, visited the Congo, Uganda and Algeria in the run-up to the meeting. Another delegation was led by Cuba's Ambassador Ricardo Alarcon.
• (2) In late December and early January, an MPLA delegation visited Jamaica , Guyana , Venezuela and Panama to gain support for their cause. The delegation is still in the region.

• B: Military
• (1) It is estimated that Cuba may now have close to 9,000 soldiers in Angola. The estimate is based on the number of Cuban flights and boat trips that have arrived in Angola so far. The military aid may have cost Cuba the equivalent of US $ 30 million, the cost of transporting people and materials and maintaining the troops in the field.
• (2) Cuban forces carried the brunt of the fight in the MPLA offensive in the northern sector last week that led to the MPLA's capture of Uige (Carmona). The MPLA may be preparing for an offensive in the south, partly at the request of SWAPO.
• (3) It is reported that eight Soviet fighter jets, believed to be Mig-17s , are being assembled in Luanda . The planes arrived in late December and the origin is unknown. Eight MiGs of unknown type are expected in Angola from Nigeria. Numerous Cuban pilots arrived during December. The pilots fly many of the aircraft now available to the MPLA, including a Fokker F-27 Friendship. The Cubans will fly the MiG planes.
• (4) Cuban forces have had full control of Luanda since January 9th. They are responsible for all security patrols, manning checkpoints and it appears that they will soon take control of the buildings and grounds at Luanda Airport.
• (5) Cuba may use IL-62 aircraft (200 passenger capacity) for its supply flights. The IL-62 has twice the capacity of the Bristol Britannia and IL-18 that Cuba has used and a greater range. Also, IL-62 left Havana for Luanda on January 10th and 11th.

• C: Other: All civil Portuguese flights that are now arriving in Luanda bring as much food as possible as cargo. Food available to the general public has become scarce. Signed: Kissinger

"The US Secret Service estimates that there were 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans in Angola as of December 20". Cuban sources, however, suggest the number held out around 3,500 to 4,000. These numbers would have more or less balanced the strength of the South Africans on the southern front.

South Africa and UNITA withdraw

Pretoria had to make a decision as to whether to continue fighting in Angola and bring in more troops. At the end of December there were heated debates between Vorster, Foreign Minister Muller, Defense Minister Botha, the head of the South African Office for State Security (BOSS) Hendrik van den Bergh and some other government officials about withdrawing or staying. Zaire, UNITA and the USA pressed the South Africans to stay. But the US was not ready to openly support the South African invasion or guarantee further military aid in the event of an escalation. Sobered by the Cuban achievements and the cold shoulder of the West, Pretoria preferred to withdraw its troops from Angola. On December 30, Vorster decided to withdraw to a line 50 to 80 km north of the Namibian border after the express meeting of the OAU in Adis Abeba on January 13.

The depressed mood of the government in Pretoria is expressed in a speech by Botha, which he delivered to the South African parliament on April 17, 1978: “Against which neighboring states have we taken aggressive steps? I know of only one case in recent years when we crossed a border and that was the case of Angola, when we did so with the consent and knowledge of the Americans. But they let us down. We will keep this story alive: the story needs to be spoken out and how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we were near the climax, we were unscrupulous in the Were let down ”. In the course of January 1976 the SADF gave up Cela, on January 25th Novo Redondo and the FAPLA and the Cubans made the first small forays into the south. But apart from minor follow-up skirmishes, they kept their distance from the retreating South Africans. By the beginning of February 1976, the SADF had withdrawn far to the south of Angola, leaving behind minefields and blown bridges. 4 to 5 thousand soldiers were supposed to hold a strip up to 80 km deep along the Namibian border until Angola at least gave the assurance that they would no longer provide SWAPO with retreat areas and that they would continue to supply electricity from the Cuene dams to Namibia.

Without the South African support, UNITA collapsed under the FAPLA attacks. What was left of them withdrew to Zaire. UNITA was particularly discredited among African countries because of its close contacts with the apartheid regime, the CIA and the white mercenaries. “Savimbi's career seemed to be over. But he was saved by the Cold War and its benefits to the US and South Africa. "

The Cuban engagement in Angola had a number of wider consequences:

1. Initially, it won and held the country for the MPLA despite strong efforts, mainly by the US and South Africa, to keep a left-wing movement out of power. South Africa could not prevent left-wing, anti-apartheid governments from coming to power in all neighboring states that had become independent and from SWAPO again taking up its positions on the Angolan side of the Namibian border. Many military observers refer to March 27, 1976 as the actual beginning of the SWAPO underground operations in Namibia.
2. The South African newspaper Rand Daily Mail called the legacy of Angola on the one hand the blow against South African pride. To have to withdraw without any gain was seen as shameful. Retired South African Brigadier General JG Willers called Angola the Bay of Pigs of South Africa. On the other hand, Angola represented a boost for the African national consciousness, which could now point to the fact that South Africa had to withdraw. The South African blacks now realized that the SADF is vulnerable and their pride is expressed in the statement: "Their racist arrogance shrank when they were pulled away by our MPLA comrades".
3. Another view for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa was that “in Angola, black troops - Cubans and Angolans - had defeated white troops in a military battle. In the skin color context, it didn't matter whether the main burden of the fighting was carried by the Cubans or the Angolans. The main thing is that they won and weren't white. The psychological advantage that the white man enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonial times is melting away. White elitism has received an irreversible blow in Angola and the whites who have been there know it ”. A South African MP warned: "We must expect the views of our own non-white people to harden". As a result, Castro was celebrated as a hero by most African states on a tour after the independence celebrations in Luanda.

The UN Security Council met to discuss “the act of aggression by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola” and on March 31, 1976, called South Africa an aggressor and demanded compensation from Angola for the war damage. South Africa found itself completely isolated on the international stage.

Civil War 1976 to 1988

Cuban engagement

At the height of the troops stationed in Angola, Cuba had 35,000 to 40,000 men in the country. In addition, more and more civilian forces, technicians, medical staff and teachers came to fill the gaps left by the withdrawn Portuguese. After the South Africans withdrew, the FNLA had completely disappeared from Angola and UNITA had largely withdrawn to Zaire. The MPLA government was recognized internationally, but not by the US.

Once victory was assured, Castro and Neto agreed at a meeting in Conakry on March 14, 1976 that the Cubans would slowly withdraw. Only as many soldiers were to remain behind as were necessary to build a strong, modern army capable of ensuring future internal security and national independence. By the end of May over 3,000 soldiers had already returned to Cuba and many more were on their way.

Fidel Castro giving a speech in Havana in 1978, Photo: Marcelo Montecino.

The Cubans had high hopes after their victory in Angola. In cooperation with the USSR, they could have liberated all of southern Africa from US and Chinese influence. They set up a training camp for Namibian, Rhodesian and South African liberation fighters in Angola. But another result of the events in Angola in 1976 was increased American awareness of what was going on in Africa, particularly in the southern part of the continent. Kissinger was concerned that "if the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next and then South Africa itself". In order to distance themselves from the outcasts in the eyes of Black Africa, they also accepted that they would no longer support the white regime in Rhodesia, a price the USA wanted to pay to put a stop to communism. Within five years of Angola's independence, the independent black-ruled state of Zimbabwe emerged from Rhodesia. Former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith had sworn that this would not happen in 100 years.

In the years that followed, Cuba continued to be active in a number of African countries. In 1978 Cuba sent 16,000 soldiers to Ethiopia ( Ogaden War ), but this time in consultation with the Soviet Union. In addition, Cuba was active with smaller military missions in the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Benin. Tens of thousands of technical, educational and medical personnel worked in more countries on the continent: including Algeria (Tindouf), Mozambique, Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe and Tanzania. Up to 18,000 students from these countries studied on the island each year at Cuba's expense.

Course in 1976

In the subsequent period up to the end of the 1970s, however, Angola largely moved out of the focus of international interest, although the fighting in the country continued. In the south, UNITA infiltrated again and, still supported by South Africa, posed a threat. The government failed to maintain control over the entire country. The Cuban military presence, which had been largely reduced after independence, was increased again due to tensions surrounding the Shaba conflict with Zaire in March 1977. Mobutu accused Angola of instigating and supporting the attack by the FNLC ( Front national de liberation du Congo - Congolese Liberation Front) on the Zairian province of Shaba . Neto, on the other hand, accused Mobutu of providing shelter to the FNLA and FLEC. Just two months later, Cubans played a role in stabilizing the Neto government and crushing the Nitista revolt when Nito Alves and Jose van Dunem split from government and led an uprising. Alves and Neto both believed that the USSR supported the overthrow of Neto, another indication of the mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and Neto, as well as the different interests between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Raúl Castro sent an additional 4,000 soldiers to prevent further strife within the MPLA leadership and met with Neto in August to show Cuban solidarity with his government. In contrast, Neto's distrust of the Soviet Union increased and relations deteriorated.

Angola , light green: Cuando Cubango province

After their withdrawal from Angola, the South Africans waged war against SWAPO from neighboring Namibia. This operated from southern Angola against the South African occupation in Namibia with the support of the Angolan government. With her support for UNITA, she won them over to the fight against SWAPO in order to take away their safe refuge in southern Angola. SADF set up military bases in Cuando Cubango Province in southeastern Angola and the South African Air Force (SAAF) provided UNITA with air support from Namibian bases. South Africa went to great lengths to polish up Savimbi's reputation abroad, especially in the USA. Savimbi, the friend of African tyrants, was toasted in the White House and he was celebrated by the right in many countries.

History 1977 to 1987

In 1977 Great Britain, Canada, France, the USA and what was then West Germany formed the informal so-called “contact group” that was supposed to negotiate with South Africa the implementation of the UN plan for free elections in Namibia. Pretoria, however, categorically opposed this plan, which they believed was biased in favor of the establishment of a SWAPO government.

Due to increasing South African advances and the spread of UNITA northwards from 1978 onwards, the Angolan government was forced to increase its spending on Soviet armaments and increasingly depended on Soviet, East German and Cuban military personnel. The first large-scale SADF forays took place in May 1978 when the South Africans raided a Namibian refugee camp near Cassinga, killing hundreds. After the bombing of Lubango in late 1979, an unexplained border war was in full swing.

After Neto's death on September 10, 1979 in Moscow, where he received medical treatment, José Eduardo dos Santos succeeded him. Less than a month later, Ronald Reagan became President of the USA, who took a tougher course against Angola: The Cubans should definitely be expelled from Angola. The Reagan administration resumed support for UNITA and, with US support, UNITA was equipped from 1986. Among other things, it received FIM-92 Stinger missiles, a weapon system that the United States had reserved only for its closest allies.

In an effort to drive the USSR and Cuba out of Angola, the United States entered negotiations with Angola directly in the early 1980s. Angola pointed out that it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors if it weren't for the constant South African encroachments and threats to the southern border. The most obvious solution was Namibia's independence, which South Africa would have to give up. But after Pretoria had to accept a left-wing government in Angola, they were reluctant to give up control of Namibia, especially since there was a possibility that the first elections would be won by SWAPO, the “traditional nemesis” of South Africa. They continued to participate in the talks with the contact group during the early 1980s, always ready for action but not ready for agreement. Cuba, not involved in these negotiations, was basically in favor of a solution that paved Namibia’s way to independence. The talks, however, bore no fruit until the end of Reagan's second term.

After the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia had failed at the end of January 1981, South Africa increased military pressure on Angolan targets and the SWAPO. In August 1981, the SADF started Operation Protea, with several thousand soldiers advancing 120 km into southwest Angola. In doing so, they not only acted against SWAPO, but openly intensified their attacks on economic Angolan targets and occupied Angolan territory, particularly in the province of Cunene. In 1982 and 1983 the SADF also took part in UNITA actions, which infiltrated more and more areas. These went well beyond the lightning raids of the past, which were mainly directed against the Benguela Railway. The UNITA underground war and the South African attacks had a crippling effect on the Angolan economy, especially agriculture and infrastructure. The fighting resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees. UNITA also took the hostage of foreign technicians.

Cuito Cuanavale 1987/88

In 1987, FAPLA launched a major offensive against UNITA with Soviet support. Cuba and the Soviet Union had significant differences of opinion over strategic views and the Cubans did not participate. In fact, they had advised against it, as it would give the South Africans an excuse to intervene on a large scale. So it happened. When the offensive showed its first success, the SADF, which already had the south of southwest Angola under its control, intervened massively. It stopped the advance of the FAPLA and threw them back. By early November 1987, they had cornered the FAPLA units at Cuito Cuanavale and were on the verge of rubbing them up. Cuito Cuanavale was only a small village, but there was an important air base for the surveillance and defense of southern Angola and it was considered a gateway to the north. The Soviet advisors were inexperienced in the African arena and, despite considerable material support, were unable to reverse the course of the battle. UNITA dealt the FAPLA one blow after the other. They were put to flight in a valley near the Lomba River, leaving the FAPLA behind in large quantities of destroyed equipment. 2000 Angolans died in this battle and part of the Angolan army was also trapped by UNITA.

The UN Security Council called for the SADF to withdraw unconditionally from Angola, but the US made sure that the decision had no consequences for South Africa. The US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker assured the South African ambassador: “The resolution does not threaten comprehensive sanctions and does not provide any support for Angola. That was not a coincidence, but a result of our own efforts to keep the resolution within limits. "

When the situation of the enclosed Angolan troops became critical, the Cubans stationed in the country felt compelled to intervene to save their allies from ruin. According to the Cubans, a South African victory would not only have meant the capture of Cuito, but also the destruction of the best Angolan military units and, very likely, the end of Angola as an independent state. On November 15, Castro decided to reinforce the forces stationed in Angola and sent fresh units, weapons and equipment, including tanks, artillery, surface-to-air missiles and aircraft. Over time, the number of troops in Angola doubled to around 50,000, with around 40,000 deployed in the south, where the greatest clashes took place. Cuba managed to break the South African air superiority, which was an important prerequisite for the defense of the SADF. Castro wanted to throw the South Africans out of Angola and to keep Cuito was the top priority.

As in 1975, the Soviet Union was not informed or asked in advance about the Cuban plans. One reason was the very tense relationship between the two countries. Castro viewed the détente policy of Soviet President Gorbachev with displeasure and suspicion.

Location of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola

In southeastern Angola, the Cuban, Angolan and South African armed forces saw the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the largest battle that has taken place on the African continent since World War II and in the course of which nearly 20,000 soldiers were killed. Airplanes and 1500 Cuban soldiers strengthened the FAPLA at Cuito and the place and the base could be held. On March 23, 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack, which, however, as SADF Colonel Jan Breytenbach describes it, "was definitely and completely brought to a standstill" by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces. However, while there was no decision even after 6 months at Cuito, Angolan and Cuban units advanced towards the Namibian border in the southwest. The South Africans, impressed by the suddenness and extent of the Cuban effort, withdrew to avoid major losses. On May 26, 1988, the head of the SADF announced that heavily armored Cuban and SWAPO forces had come together for the first time within 60 km of the Namibian border. The South African general administrator in Namibia admitted on June 26th that Cuban MIG-23s were operating over Namibia, which was a dramatic reversal of the previous situation. The sky had previously belonged to the SAAF alone. He added that the "presence of the Cubans caused a touch of unrest and worry" in South Africa. While the fighting at Cuito continued and Cuban units followed the retreating South Africans in the southwest towards the border, efforts to find a negotiated solution continued. This time, however, they were only run under governments, which precluded UNITA from participating. The two most important questions were whether South Africa would finally accept the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 , which provided for Namibia's independence, and whether the parties could agree on a time frame for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Americans had no intention of including the Cubans in the talks. Castro let them know that negotiations involving Cuba would be far more promising. Thereupon US Secretary of State George P. Shultz authorized the American delegation to hold direct talks with the Cubans, but with the strict stipulation that they only talk about Angola and Namibia and not about the US embargo on Cuba.

Tripartite Treaty 1988

The Cuban government entered the negotiations on January 28, 1988 and was thus directly involved in the negotiations on the future of Angola and Namibia for the first time. The first talks took place in the presidential palace in Luanda, with fighting continued at Cuito Cuanavale. Negotiations later resumed in Cairo, then Geneva, London and finally New York. South Africa participated from May 3rd, hoping that Resolution 435 would be amended. Defense Minister Malan and President PW Botha assured that South Africa will only withdraw from Angola "if Russia and its deputies do the same". You did not mention a withdrawal from Namibia. On March 16, 1988, the Business Day newspaper reported that Pretoria “offered to withdraw to Namibia - not Namibia - in exchange for a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This implied that South Africa had no real intention of giving up territories in the near future ”.

But the Cubans had meanwhile reversed the situation in Angola. Indeed, Americans wondered if the Cubans would stop at the Namibian border as they advance south. Therefore Jorge Risquet countered the demand of the South Africans: “The time for their military adventures, for their aggressions, which they could pursue with impunity, for their massacre of refugees… is up…. South Africa acts as if it were a victorious army and not for what it really is: a defeated aggressor who is withdrawing ... South Africa has to face the fact that it cannot achieve at the negotiating table what it was denied on the battlefield " . Crocker telegraphed Shultz that the negotiations "took place against the background of mounting military tensions in connection with the massive Cuban deployment in southwestern Angola, near the Namibian border ... The Cuban deployment in southwestern Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic".

In the further course of the fighting, which continued unabated, Cuban fighter planes attacked SADF positions near the Calueque Dam , 11 km north of the Namibian border, on June 27, 1988 . The CIA reported that the Cubans had gained air sovereignty over southern Angola and northern Namibia. Only a few hours after this attack, the SADF destroyed a bridge near the dam over the Kunene River , as the CIA speculated, in order to "deny the Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy access to Namibia and to reduce the number of positions to be defended".

An armistice was finally agreed on August 8, 1988. The last SADF troops left Angola on August 30, before the timeframe for the Cuban withdrawal had been discussed. On December 22, 1988, one month before the end of the Reagan term, the Tripartite Treaty was signed in New York by Angola, South Africa and Cuba. This envisaged the withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola within 30 months.

The staggered withdrawal of Cuban troops began on January 10, 1989 and ended 13 years of military presence. It was completed on May 25, 1991, a month ahead of schedule. With the withdrawal from Angola, Cuban troops were withdrawn from Pointe-Noire (Republic of the Congo) and Ethiopia.

aftermath

Despite the efforts of South Africa and Washington, Cuba changed the course of history in southern Africa. As W. Freeman, Ambassador, US State Department, Dept. Africa Policy, put it: “Castro can call himself the father of Namibia's independence and the man who put an end to colonialism in Africa. Indeed, Cuba showed great responsibility and maturity in its behavior, and this should actually have been recognized by the US as an important gesture that deserves an appropriate response. But US policy on relations with Cuba is absolutely poisoned and so Cuba, which has acted really responsibly, did not get the credit it deserved ”. At least Crocker confessed when he telegraphed to Schultz on August 25th during the negotiations: “It is an art to read the Cubans. They are ready for war as well as peace. We recognize considerable tactical skill and truly inventive moves at the negotiating table. This happens against the background of Castro's grandiose romp and the unprecedented show of power of his army on the ground ”.

On December 7, 1988, all Cuban soldiers who died in Africa were buried simultaneously throughout Cuba. According to government figures, the losses of all “internationalist” missions in Africa from the early 1960s to the withdrawal of the last soldier from Angola amount to 2,077. Historians put the loss at around 10,000. From the first secret engagement on April 24, 1965 under Ernesto Che Guevara to the withdrawal of the last troops on May 25, 1991, Cuba had 450,000 soldiers and development workers on duty.

During the 1988 negotiations, South Africa was asked to release Nelson Mandela as a token of goodwill. But Pretoria did not comply. Mandela remained in prison until February 2, 1990, when the ANC ban was lifted. In July of the same year, Mandela traveled to Havana to personally thank Castro for his central role in the fight against apartheid. He underlined Cuba's important role in a speech in Havana: “The Cuban people have a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice that is unparalleled in its principled and selfless character. We in Africa are used to being victims of countries that want to divide up our country and undermine our sovereignty. It is unprecedented in African history for another people to rise up in defense of one of ours. The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration for the hard-fighting people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale, the ban on our organizations would not have been lifted! The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale made it possible for me to be here today! Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for African liberation! "

In the first free elections, which were held in Namibia in November 1989, the SWAPO won 57% of the vote, although Pretoria had made efforts to influence the outcome in favor of other parties. Namibia gained independence in March 1990. The situation in Angola was far from resolved and the country was torn apart by civil war for another decade. Despite free elections, Jonas Savimbi did not want to admit his defeat and take the opposition bank in the government. UNITA picked up the weapons again. Peace did not return until Savimbi was killed in a FAPLA attack in 2002.

Documentation, literature, web links

• Une Odyssey Africaine (France, 2006, 59mn) Director: Jihan El Tahri
• ICAIC (Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematográficos)
• George, Edward: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991 , Frank Cass, London, 2005
• Gleijeses, Piero: Cuba in Africa 1975–1991. In: Bernd Greiner / Christian Th. Müller / Dierk Walter (eds.): Hot wars in the cold war. Hamburg, 2006, ISBN 3-936096-61-9
• Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press)
• Arte TV: Fidel, the Che and the African Odyssey
• Department of Social Sciences at the University of Hamburg on the war in Angola
• Africa Bulletin No. 123, August / September 2006 with a focus on Angola
• German Foreign Office on the history of Angola
• Welt Online: How Castro exported the revolution
• Christine Hatzky: Cuba in Africa
• The National Security Archive: Secret Cuban Documents on Africa Involvement
• Saney, Isaac, "African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, no. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81-117.
• Nelson Mandela & Fidel Castro, How Far We Slaves Have Come! (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991)
• Pazzanita, Anthony G, "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola." The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 29 No 1 (March 1991): 83-114.
• Jay Malin Sr., Cuba in Angola, Miami: University of Miami & Coral Gable, 1987
• Stockwell, John, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: WW Norton & Co. Inc., 1978)
• Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two: Repression and Resistance

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Jim Lobe http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/50-9.aspx
2. ↑ [1] (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR - Information Center for Defense of the Revolutionary Armed Forces; PDF; 186 kB)
3. ^ Ernesto Che Guevara: "The African Dream" - The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo. With an introduction by Richard Gott. Grove Press, New York 2001.
4. ^ CIA document. (PDF; 324 kB) Accessible through the Freedom of Information Act.
5. ^ Library of Congress Country Studies : Angola - COALITION, THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND CIVIL WAR
6. ↑ ^{a b c d} Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, The University of North Carolina Press, 2002
7. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), p 250
8. ↑ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses6.pdf (Document obtained from Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2)
9. ^ ^{A b} Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - Collapse of the Transitional Government
10. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} IPRI — Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais: The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974–1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference “Portugal, Europe and the United States”, Lisbon, October, 2003
11. ^ ^{A b c} Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - Foreign Intervention
12. ↑ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses6.pdf (Document from the Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2)
13. ^ Klinghoffer, AJ in: The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World, Boulder, 1980
14. ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - Emergence of UNITA
15. ↑ ^{a b} Missions Conflicting: Gleijeses, Piero Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp 293-294, 296-297
16. ↑ Tali, Mabeko in: Dissidences, p. 348
17. ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - Ascendancy of the MPLA
18. ↑ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses7.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Center for Defense of the Revolutionary Armed Forces])
19. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero in: Conflicting Missions, p. 244-245 (Quotations from interview with Cadelo and from Cienfuegos to Senen Casas, Havana, November 22, 1974)
20. ↑ Agostinho Neto: necesidades Urgentes. Lista dirigada al Comite Central del Partido Communista de Cuba, January 26, 1975, annexed in “Visita”, p. 22-23
21. ↑ Garcia Marquez, Gabriel in: Operation Carlota, http://www.rhodesia.nl/marquez.htm
22. ↑ Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 8-9, p. 24.
23. ↑ ^{a b} Missions Conflicting: Gleijeses, Piero Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p 298
24. ↑ ^{a b c d} Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - South African Intervention (English)
25. ↑ Spies, FJ du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 64-65.
26. ↑ ^{a b} Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80
27. ^ SAIRR : A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1976 . Johannesburg 1977, p. 411
28. ↑ du Preez in: Avontuur, p. 28.
29. ↑ Bureau of Intelligence and Research, DOS, in: Angola: The MPLA Prepares for Independence, Sept. 22, 1975, pp. 4-5, National Security Archive, Washington
30. ↑ Le Monde, Sept. 13, 1975, p. 3
31. ^ Diaz Arguelles to Colomé, October 1, 1975, p. 11
32. ^ Du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. The verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria, pp. 32, 63, 86
33. ↑ Spies, FJ du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 93-101
34. ^ CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4, NSA
35. ↑ http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/17/documents/angola/
36. ↑ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses5.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Center for Defense of the Revolutionary Armed Forces])
37. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p 255
38. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), cited: Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis 1974-76: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International Project Bulletin, n.8-9, p. 25
39. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias: Composicion de fuerzas y medios de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4
40. ^ CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4
41. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp 255-256, 265
42. ↑ Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1975, B1
43. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p 258
44. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, quoted 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press): The Rand Daily Mail, August 3, 1975, p.5
45. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p 269
46. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l} “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
47. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias: Batallon de Tropas Especiales, nd
48. ↑ - ( Memento of October 14, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
49. ↑ ^{a b} Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp 310-311
50. ↑ Quotations from Bridgeland in: Savimbi, p. 151
51. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959 - cited 1976 (The University of North Carolina Press): The Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 10, 1975, p. 3
52. ↑ Jornal Novo, Nov. 12, 1975, p. 15th
53. ^ CIA, Intelligence Checklist, Nov. 14, 1975, pp. A2-A5, NSA
54. ↑ Marquez, Gabriel García in: Operation Carlota, New Left Review I / 101-102, January-April 1977
55. ↑ Hermann Cohen, National Security Council (NSC), USA, in “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59min) Director: Jihan El Tahri
56. ↑ Frank Wisner Jr., Ambassador, US State Department, in “Une Odyssey Africaine” (France, 2006, 59min) Director: Jihan El Tahri
57. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp 319-320.
58. ↑ Memorandum of Conversation (between United States and China) (PDF; 306 kB) United States Department of State . December 3, 1975. Retrieved January 8, 2011. Document obtained by National Security Archive, from National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord)
59. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) cited: Note about the conversation with President d. VR Angola, Comrades Dr. Agositinho Neto, February 26, 1976, p. 2, SED, DY30IV2 / 2.035 / 128
60. ^ Guardian, Manchester, February 18, 1976, p. 2
61. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted Steenkamp, Willem in South Africa's Border War, 1966-1989, Gibraltar, 1989, p 51- 52
62. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), cited: Spies, FJ du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 140-143
63. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: quoted Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press): Conflicting Missions du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. The verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 121–122
64. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted de Villiers, PW, p 259
65. ↑ Spies, FJ du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria 1989, p. 215.
66. ^ Observer, December 7, 1975, p. 11.
67. ↑ Times, December 11, 1975, p. 7.
68. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: quoted Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press): Conflicting Missions du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. The verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 154–173.
69. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), cited: Spies, FJ du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 203-218.
70. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: quoted Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press): Conflicting Missions du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. The verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975–1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 186–201.
71. ↑ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8 December 28, 1975, E3 (quoting Botha)
72. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted Steenkamp, Willem in South Africa's Border War 1966-1989, Gibraltar, 1989, p 55th
73. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp 325th
74. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp 332nd
75. ↑ http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/clark.htm
76. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp 334-337.
77. ↑ it: Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriarán
78. ↑ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses1.pdf (Document from the Department of State based on the Freedom of Information Act FOIA)
79. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted Secretary of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, Dec. 20, 1975
80. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: “Informe”, p. 11
81. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp 337, 341
82. ↑ World (Johannesburg), December 3, 1975, p. 1: Quotations from Admiral HH Biermann
83. ↑ Thom, William in: Angola's 1975-76 Civil War, Autumn 1998, 1-44, p. 31
84. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) cited: See the pessimistic reports of Generals André van Deventer, Magnus Malan and Viljoen in Spies, FJ du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 259, 261, 264
85. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: Spies, FJ du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, pp. 260-263
86. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: de Villers Dirk and Johanna in: PW-A biography of South Africa's President PW Botha, Cape Town: Tafelberg , 1984, pp. 266-269
87. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) cited: Botha, PW, January 27, 1976, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, col. 114
88. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted CIA, National Intelligence Daily, January 8, 1976
89. ↑ Washington Post, February 4, 1976, p. 1
90. ↑ ^{a b c} Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war , February 25, 2002 (English)
91. ↑ IPRI — Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais: The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
92. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: In: Jannie Geldenhuys : A General's Story , p 58-59
93. ↑ Christopher Saunders, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa in: Journal of Military History (Society for Military History), http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/journal_of_military_history/v067/67.1saunders.html ( Memento from December 14, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
94. ↑ Le Monde, March 30, 1976, p. 6th
95. ↑ Willers, JG (Brigadier Ret.) In: Letter to the editor, Cape Times, April 28, 1976, p. 10
96. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p 346
97. ^ Rand Daily Mail, February 17, 1976, p. 10
98. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted American Embassy London to the Secretary of State, March 2, 1976, page 2, DOS MF 8904623
99. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: Republic of South Africa, Report, 1: 579, quoting African National Congress (ANC) pamphlet issued to celebrate the event
100. ^ Sargent, Roger in: Rand Daily Mail, February 13, 1976, p. 13
101. ^ Jacobs, Gideon (United Party) in: Rand Daily Mail, February 28, 1976, p. 6
102. ↑ Garcia Marquez, Gabriel in: Operation Carlota, 1976, http://www.rhodesia.nl/marquez.htm
103. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted Matthews, Herbert in: Forward with Fidel Castro, Anywhere, New York Times, March 4, 1976, p .31
104. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: Quotations from Kissinger NSC meeting, April 7, 1976, p. 13, NSAd, NSC Meeting Minutes, box 2, GRFL
105. ↑ Newsweek, May 10, 1976, p. 51
106. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p 392
107. ^ Library of Congress Country Studies : Angola - Shaba Invasion and the Nitista Plot
108. ^ ^{A b} Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - Strengthening Ties with the Soviet Union and Its Allies (English)
109. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted George, Edward: The Cuban intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, 2005, pp. 129-131
110. ^ ^{A b} Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - The UNITA Insurgency and the South African Threat (English)
111. ↑ General Magnus Malan , South African Minister of Defense in “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) Director: Jihan El Tahri
112. ↑ ^{a b} Collelo, Thomas, ed Angola. A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. http://countrystudies.us/angola/48.htm
113. ^ ^{A b} Library of Congress Country Studies: Angola - The Namibia Issue and Security Threats in the 1980s (English)
114. ↑ ^{a b c} Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Piero, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 - ( Memento of July 14, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
115. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted Secretary of State to American Embassy, Pretoria, December 5, 1987, Freedom of Information Act
116. ↑ Transcripción sobre la reunión del Comandante en Jefe con la delegación de políticos de África del Sur (Companero Slovo), Centro de Información de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (CIFAR), Havana
117. ^ Saney, Issac in: African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81-117
118. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), cited: Abramowitz (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State) to Secretary of State, May 13, 1988 , Freedom of Information Act
119. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: “Entrevista de Risquet con Chester Crocker, 26/6/88”, ACC
120. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted: “Actas das Conversaçôes Quadripartidas entre a RPA, Cuba, Estados Unidos de América and Africa do Sul realizadas no Cairo de 24-26.06.988 ”, Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana
121. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoted Crocker to Secretary of State, June 26, 1988, Freedom of Information Act
122. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), cited: CIA, “South Africa-Angola-Cuba”, June 29, 1988, Freedom of Information Act and CIA , “South Africa-Angola-Namibia”, July 1, 1988, Freedom of Information Act
123. ↑ Alao, Abiodun. Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa , 1994. Pages XIX – XXI.
124. ↑ United Nations: Angola - UNAVEM I, Background
125. ↑ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, quoted 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press): Crocker to Secretary of State, August 25, 1988, Freedom of Information Act
126. ^ Nathan C Nash: Cuba Is Mired in Angola, Top Defector Says , New York Times . July 1, 1987. 
127. ^ The Guardian, July 26, 1991