Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

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Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
date January / February 1988
place Cuito Cuanavale in Angola
Casus Belli FAPLA offensive against UNITA
output Stalemate (each side claimed victory for themselves)
consequences South Africa realizes that the conflict in southern Africa cannot be won in its favor
Parties to the conflict

South Africa 1961South Africa South Africa UNITA
Flag of UNITA.svg

Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (bandeira) .svg MPLA Cuba
CubaCuba 

Commander

Colonel Deon Ferreira
Jonas Savimbi

General Manuel Hilario dos Santos (FAPLA)
Brigadier General / Major General Miguel Angel Lorente León (Cuba)

Troop strength
900 SADF
2500 UNITA

40 tanks
100 AIFV / APC
40 planes

25,000 FAPLA
10,000 Cuba

150 tanks
300 AIFV / APC
40 planes

losses

43 Fallen SADF
1500 Fallen UNITA
3 tanks
10 AIFV

4,300 FAPLA dead,
94 tanks
100 AIFV

The battle of Cuito Cuanavale at the beginning of 1988 was an attempt by a mixed combat group made up of units from the Angolan UNITA and units from the South African SADF to stop the Cubano-Angolan advance on Namibia and the remaining UNITA retreats. Despite the initial tactical partial success of SADF / UNITA, the operations "Moduler", "Hooper" and "Packer" failed in their entirety, as the advance of the FAPLA on Mavinga and Jamba could not be stopped. The advance on Calueque further west could not be stopped by South Africa ; the strategic goal of forcing South Africa to negotiate peace was achieved.

The troops of the FAPLA commanded General Manuel Hilario dos Santos , the Cuban Brigadier General / Major General Miguel Angel Lorente León .

prehistory

As part of the “ Operação Saludando Octubre ”, the FAPLA was upgraded with 150 T-55 and T-54B and some Mi-24 and Mi-8 / Mi-17 helicopters.

This operation turned into a disaster due to insufficient attention to local conditions and the template-like transfer of the operational principles of the Soviet Army for the European theater of war by the Soviet advisors of the FAPLA. In the Battle of Lomba (September / October 1987) the South Africans succeeded in stopping four Angolan brigades (21st and 25th light infantry, 47th armored and 59th mechanized) under the guidance of Soviet military experts on their advance on Jamba. The SADF / UNITA troops went on the offensive. In order to stop the further advance of UNITA and SADF, Cuito had to be stopped at the Cunene crossing. Since only personnel relief could stop a disaster for the Angolan army, Cuba sent troops and other weapons to Angola unilaterally and without prior information to the Soviet Union.

Troops involved

Angola

The Angolan troops consisted of the 21st and 25th light infantry brigade (Commander: OSL Joaquim Soria), the 47th tank brigade and the 59th motorized rifle brigade. These troops were reinforced by units of the 13th Brigade (airborne troops), which therefore appears to be involved in some sources. The FAPLA brigades corresponded to regiments of the Soviet structure and had a nominal strength of around 2,000 men, which was never reached.

Cuba

Cuba sent support units from its 50th motorized rifle division, which were supported by T-62 units and which represented the strategic reserve.

UNITA

There is no reliable information about the UNITA troops involved, various sources speak of the 3rd and 5th regular, the 13th light and the 275th special forces battalion - which together are said to have been over 3,000 men strong.

South Africa

The South African troops had formed a 20th brigade from the 61st Mechanized Infantry Battalion Group, the 32nd Battalion and the 101st Battalion. This had three "Combat Groups" (A, B, C) in battalion strength. The combat groups consisted of two motorized or mechanized infantry companies, an anti-tank or anti-tank platoon and a launcher platoon. The 20th artillery regiment was added.

Other troops

Units of the military arm of the SWAPO ( PLAN ) led by Peter Mweshihange and ANC members who were in Angola for military training were involved in the entire military operation .

course

January 13, 1988

Location of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola

In two successive attacks by Cuban MiG-21 and MiG-23ML from the Menongue base on the advancing troops of the South Africans and UNITA, these seven tanks and numerous men were lost. The attack by the South Africans was stopped, but in the wake of the armed reconnaissance the strength and position of the Cubano-Angolan troops was determined. The South Africans withdrew to their positions a few kilometers south of the Cunene. The troops of the central government built Cuito Cuanavale into a fortress. Both sides brought in supplies. It stayed with the occasional skirmish.

17th January 1988

FAPLA's 59th and 25th Brigades, which have taken advanced positions on the east bank of the river, are retreating towards the river in order to reduce the area to be defended.

February 14, 1988

On February 14, 1988, SADF and UNITA opened a second attack on the FAPLA positions in Cuito Cuanavale. An Olifant battalion (40 vehicles) was used to support the infantry. An attack with brigade strength can therefore be assumed.

February 25 to March 23, 1988

However, the defending Angolan government troops, weakened by the previous attacks and not yet replenished, held their well-developed positions and the South African offensive had to be carried out on both sides after attacks on February 25th, March 1st and a last multi-day attack with extensive use of artillery from March 21st to March 23rd, 1988 will be permanently canceled.

Since the Cuban relief attack on Caleque was successful in the meantime, the South African troops from Cuito Cuanavale were transferred there. Nothing prevented the Angolan government troops from advancing to the UNITA headquarters in Jamba.

output

It was a Pyrrhic victory for both sides: Angola and Cuba suffered great losses in terms of personnel and material, while South Africa and UNITA were unable to gain ground.

Since Angola and Cuba had as a strategic goal to hold the city, while the South African goal was to capture it, one can speak of an Angolan-Cuban victory.

The victory of the Cubano-Angolan troops made it clear to South Africa that an invasion of the country by the frontline states was moving into the realm of realistic scenarios. This had to be avoided at all costs, because here, as in Zimbabwe , it was feared that the white minority would be permanently and completely removed from power.

At the time, the political centers in Washington and Moscow were of the opinion that a direct confrontation between the two large power blocs made no sense because the global importance of southern Africa was not great enough for both sides. Under Gorbachev , the long-standing realization that the Soviet Africa policy had to be thoroughly reconsidered became more apparent. The cost of sustained support for revolutionary upheavals was estimated to be too high, which is why the divergent domestic and foreign policy course was increasingly tolerated by countries allied with the Soviet Union in Africa. The Soviet military engagement in Angola, which is comparatively high with other African conflict regions, only apparently contradicted Gorbachev's Africa policy. Moscow analysts saw in the US engagement for UNITA a tendency towards a global roll back policy of the USA, as a result of which the MPLA Government in Luanda could have been overthrown. In order to defend the claim to an equivalent global military power, the Soviet Union provided extensive military assistance for the government of Angola.

literature

  • Juan Benemelis: Las Guerras Secretas de Fidel Castro . Fundación Elena Mederos, 1988. ISBN 978-1-890829-21-6 .
  • Michel Bole-Richard: Angola: une importante garnison gouvernementale serait sur le point de tomber aux mains de l'UNITA . Le Monde, January 23, 1988, p. 5 (French).
  • Jacklyn Cock, Laurie Nathan: War and Society: the Militarization of South Africa . New Africa Books, 1989. ISBN 978-0-86486-115-3 .
  • Chester A. Crocker: High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood . WW Norton, 1992. ISBN 978-0-393-03432-5 .
  • Edward George: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991 . London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005. ISBN 978-0-415-35015-0 .
  • Piero Gleijeses: Cuito Cuanavale revisited: analysis . Mail & Guardian Online, July 11, 2007.
  • C. Holt: At Thy Call We Did Not Falter . Zebra Press, 2005. ISBN 978-1-77007-117-9 .
  • Robert S. Jaster: The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa . Adelphi Papers. 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1990. ISBN 978-0-08-040974-0 .
  • Karl Maier: Angola: Promises and Lies . London: Serif, 1996. ISBN 978-1-897959-22-0 .
  • John Marcum: South Africa and the Angola-Namibia Agreement . In Owen Ellison Kahn. Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia. New Brunswick: University of Miami Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, 1990. ISBN 978-0-88738-361-8 .
  • James W. Martin, Susan Herlin Broadhead: Historical Dictionary of Angola . 2nd edition, Scarecrow Press, 2004. ISBN 978-0-8108-4940-2 .
  • Michael McFaul: Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola . International Security 14 (3): 99-135, 1990. JSTOR 2538933.
  • Greg Mills, David Williams: Seven Battles that Shaped South Africa . Cape Town: Table Mountain, 2006. ISBN 978-0-624-04298-3 .
  • David Niddrie: Angola: The siege of Cuito Cuanavale . Africa Confidential 29 (3), 1988.
  • Piet Nortje: 32nd Battalion . Cape Town: Struik Publishers, 2003. ISBN 978-1-86872-914-2 .
  • Anthony Pazzanita: The conflict resolution process in Angola . Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1): 83-114, 1991. JSTOR 160994.
  • Michael Radu, Anthony Arnold: The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World . Transaction Publishers, 1990. ISBN 978-0-88738-307-6 .
  • Roger Ricardo Luis: Prepárense a vivir: Crónicas de Cuito Cuanavale . Havana: Editora Politica, 1989.
  • Isaac Saney: African Stalingrad - The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism, and the End of Apartheid . In: LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 150, Vol. 33, No. 5, September 2006 81-117, online at http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/saney-african-stalingrad-pdf-111.pdf
  • Bernard E. Trainor: South Africa's strategy on Angola falls short, enhancing Cubans' role . The New York Times, July 12, 1988.
  • Joseph B. Treaster: Castro faults Soviet tactics in war in Angola . The New York Times, July 28, 1988.
  • Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Report). October 2nd, 1988.
  • Anthony Turton: Shaking Hands with Billy . Durban: Just Done Productions, 2010. OL22656001M.
  • Peter Vanneman: Soviet foreign policy for Angola / Namibia in the 1980s: a strategy of coercive diplomacy . In: Owen Ellison Kahn: Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia . New Brunswick: University of Miami Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, 1990. pp. 69-94. ISBN 978-0-88738-361-8 .
  • Andreas Velthuizen: The significance of the battle for Cuito Cuanavale: Long-term foresight of the current strategic landscape . In: Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 37, No. 2, 2009. online at: ( http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/download/71/99&ei=12aaUM3qNoiB4gTHqYDQCg&usg=AFQjCNF1wrJaKbYt- ul0FxvfQeliLcVTzA & cad = rja )
  • John Frederick Walker: A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope . Grove Press, 2004. ISBN 978-0-8021-4068-5 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. A South African website of veterans ( http://www.sadf.info/SADF%20Roll%20of%20Honour%20Border.html ) gives the number of 110 soldiers killed in all South African military operations in 1988 - so the losses must have been greater be.
  2. http://nvo.ng.ru/notes/2008-03-28/8_angola.html
  3. These were equipped with a smooth-barreled cannon and were therefore superior to the on-board weapons of all opponents' weapons in range and penetration.
  4. https://sites.google.com/site/sabushwarsite/Home/modularhooperpacker2/the-sadf-and-unita-during-ops-modular-hooper-and-packer/sadf-oefen
  5. Winrich Kühne : Gorbatschow and southern Africa. On the change in Africa-political thinking in the Soviet Union. In: Christine Lienemann-Perrin, Wolfgang Lienemann (ed.): Political legitimacy in South Africa . Texts and materials from the research center of the Evangelical Study Community, Heidelberg 1988, pp. 182–212, here pp. 207, 209