South African Defense Force

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Flag of South Africa (1928–1994) .svg South African Defense Force, Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag
Ensign of the South African Defense Force (1981-1994) .svg
guide
Commander in Chief
de jure :		 Prime Minister or (from 1984) President of South Africa
Commander in chief de facto : Chief of the SADF / Hoof van die SAW
Headquarters: Pretoria
Military strength
Active soldiers: Last 45,000
Reservists: 180,000
Conscription: one / two years
Eligibility for military service:
Share of gross domestic product : last 2.6%
history
Founding: November 1, 1958
Replacement: May 1, 1994
Paratroopers ( Valskermsoldate ) of the SADF during training
Main battle tank Olifant Mk.1A of the SADF in the de Brug Training Area, 1993
The former SADF base in Outapi in what is now Namibia

The South African Defense Force ( SADF ; German literally "South African Defense Forces"; Afrikaans Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag ( SAW ); German literally South African Wehrmacht ) were the South African armed forces from November 1, 1958 to May 10, 1994. Before that, they were as a union Defense Force known; the new name was given in 1957 in Defense Act No. 44 set. The SADF was replaced in 1994 by the South African National Defense Force .

history

War missions

Angola

The SADF has been involved in two interrelated wars during its existence. From 1966 to 1989 the SADF fought in the area of ​​the border between South West Africa and Angola as well as in Zambia in the “ South African Border War ”, especially against the liberation organization SWAPO , which ended with the independence of the former South West Africa as Namibia .

From 1975 the SADF fought directly in the Angolan Civil War on the side of UNITA with the support of the USA against the MPLA , which was supported by Cuba . The 32-Bataljon , in which numerous foreigners fought , belonged to the South African troops . The first military units in South Africa crossed the Angolan border between August 9 and 11, 1975. As a result of this troop intervention, SADF units occupied the dams of Calueque in order to secure South Africa's long-term investments in an infrastructure complex that is important in terms of energy and agricultural policy beyond the area under its control.

In 1979, an air raid by the South African Air Force destroyed the ANC training camp at Novo Catengue, not far from the border with South West Africa. Responsible for the targeted bombing was the then camp commandant Timothy Tebogo (Chief) Seremane, a senior MK functionary who, in the opinion of the MK Security Service, played an important role in an agent ring of the counter-espionage established by South Africa and had already been in the service of its security police since 1976 should have. He was executed in 1981 as a result of a military tribunal in the Angolan Quatro prison camp . There are divergent opinions about any previous torture by ANC members.

The military conflicts in Angola from 1987 to 1988 culminated in the decisive battle at Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988 in the south of the country and led to the withdrawal of SADF, SWATF and UNITA. South Africa cooperated with the armaments company of the Canadian engineer Gerald Bull and used the GC-45 howitzer from its development and South African production in Angola against the SWAPO. The weapon was manufactured by Lyttelton Engineering Works / Lyttleton Ingenieurswerke in Verwoerdburg .

South West Africa

In order to secure the political, economic and security interests of South Africa in the mandate area South West Africa / Namibia that it annexed , the government of Pretoria set up the SADF in coordination with the South West African authorities. Their tasks were in counterinsurgency, regional military administration, border security in the direction of Angola and Zambia, as well as ensuring rearward services for their own military operations in neighboring countries. Since the founding of the South West African Territory Force in 1980, there has been close cooperation, partly under joint command structures. The conscription for South West Africans between the ages of 18 and 24 and of all ethnic origins, introduced in 1981, found differentiated acceptance. When preparations began in South Africa in 1974 to set up small SADF units made up of volunteers from the Colored and Indian populations, the Minister of Defense reported in a parliamentary speech in February 1974 that the use of applicants for military service from the black population with leaders of the Homeland was also taking place -Governments had been discussed. Indigenous people have already served as trackers on army patrols in the Caprivi Strip (South West Africa). They were armed on duty and wore military uniforms, but they were not regular members of the army.

In June 1974, the SADF launched an advertisement campaign in several newspapers to recruit blacks for military service. The selected applicants were promised training in drill training , military law, the use of weapons, as well as first aid and hygiene . The general commissioner for the indigenous population of South West Africa, Jannie de Wet, announced publicly in June that ten selected men from the Ovambo population are to be sent to Pretoria to take part in a training course for military instructors . After their return, their assignment as a trainer for other volunteers under SADF control was planned. The idea for this model project came from within the Owambo Legislative Council . The plan to build an ethnically separate army for Owambo turned out to be an aggravating factor in the fight against PLAN activities, as it also had the potential to multiply the political conflict within the security structures.

Between 1986 and 1987, employees of the military secret service trained around 200 members of the Inkatha party in guerrilla methods, including sabotage and homicide, in a training camp (called: Hippo) on the sandbanks of the Cuando in the Caprivi Strip (today Namibia ) in seven months. Only some of them received personal protection instructions , which Inkatha boss Buthelezi has long claimed for all of these participants. Upon their return, they took on posts within the KwaZulu homeland police force . Here they trained small task forces in different regions of the Natal province . ANC supporters were murdered between 1992 and 1993. They also infiltrated industrial workers' dormitories on the eastern Witwatersrand ( East Rand ). The weapons they used were given to them by the Vlakplaas .

Rhodesia

The SADF was also represented with several units in Rhodesia , in violation of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement , until Robert Mugabe was elected . Parallel to the regular supply of the Rhodesian armed forces with armaments and fuel, SADF troops operated from the state territory of Rhodesia against the neighboring states of Angola, Mozambique and Zambia. These military actions were part of the South African destabilization strategy to strengthen Pretoria's influence in the depths of the continent. South Africa's military engagement was flanked by political and diplomatic efforts to split the Patriotic Front . The South African government, its Rhodesian allies and the politically active head of the Lonrho mining company Tiny Rowland took part . During this time, according to research by the British Observer, political followers of Ndabaningi Sithole received military pilot training in the SADF air force training centers. After he came to power, Mugabe ordered the immediate withdrawal of all South African troops, which then left the country in March 1980. There were four companies and two airborne units with armored vehicles and Puma helicopters . Hundreds of former members of the Rhodesian armed forces were accepted by the SADF and some of them were deployed because of their special experience in the fight against guerrilla groups in what was later to become Namibia. Another part remained stationed not far from the border with Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe ) in the Transvaal because South Africa reserved the right to military intervention in the neighboring country. Furthermore, the SADF took on a considerable number of mercenaries from the military units of Abel Muzorewa , of which around 10,000 to 15,000 members fled to South Africa.

Mozambique

SADF troops attacked neighboring states several times in commando operations in the 1980s, killing numerous people in the process. South African air forces attacked the Mozambican settlement of Liberdade in Matola in May 1983, a week after a bomb attack in Pretoria that left 19 dead . According to a SADF statement, five bases of the African National Congress (ANC) were bombed , from which preparations for the "urban and rural terror" in the Transvaal should have been initiated. According to South African information, 64 ANC members were killed. According to the Mozambican government, there were six victims. The operation received international attention. The UK , Italy , France , the US , Zambia and Kenya officially condemned the violation of Mozambique's sovereignty. Military operations with the character of retaliatory actions were intended by the government as a warning to organizations in neighboring countries that South Africa was able and willing to investigate and combat such targets in civilian areas as well. According to the then South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha , 95% of the subversive attacks on his country came from the territory of Mozambique. He took this position on his trip to Europe in 1983 to the British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe and thus made the position taken by Pretoria towards the neighboring country clear.

Lesotho, Botswana

In addition, SADF units repeatedly attacked the neighboring states of Lesotho and Botswana in commando operations in order to kill members of the ANC living in exile. On December 9, 1982, around 100 soldiers crossed the border into Lesotho and shot 42 people, including 30 South Africans , in nearby Maseru (see South African attack on Lesotho 1982 ). The UN Security Council condemned the action. In the 1980s they shot 15 people in Botswana in several actions.

Role inside

Within South Africa, the SADF played an important role in suppressing the opposition to the ruling apartheid system and in maintaining law and order in accordance with it. The tasks of the SADF were adapted to the respective geostrategic situation assessment. In the 1970s, it was expected that there would be longstanding confrontation through guerrilla activities . This resulted in three areas of action:

  • Regulatory functions in the domestic area in the event of unrest
  • Preventing the infiltration of combatants across the external borders
  • Ensuring a powerful army to deter potential attackers and as an attack potential against neighboring countries.

The delimitation of the spectrum of activities of the SADF from the tasks of the South African police and other functions in civil society was fluid. In addition to the army with its armed forces Army, Air Force and Navy, there was an active area of reservists ( Citizen Force ) annually recurring military exercises and the "Commands" ( Commandos ). The latter were paramilitary units on the basis of a two-year basic training, which represented a flank of the regular SADF in the form of exclusively white volunteers. These were created to support the police with military means and played an important role in South Africa's military policy.

When Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster resigned from his post in 1978 due to the Muldergate affair , Pieter Willem Botha , who had been Minister of Defense since 1967, also took over the post of Prime Minister in South Africa. As a result of this personal union, the SADF gained increasing political influence, combined with a growing defense budget. The parliamentary opposition at the time criticized the direct influence of the armed forces on government work and the continued influence of the military on the media in the sense of uncritical reporting. According to the government, the country was in an irregular state of war at the time, which must be countered with a “ total national strategy ”. When Magnus Malan , the previous head of the SADF and security advisor to Botha, was appointed Minister of Defense in 1980, the Department of Military Intelligence was given an influential advisory position within the government.

During the existence of the SADF, conscription was introduced for white male South Africans in 1967. The duration of the military service was one year, from 1977 two years, and included subsequent reserve exercises. The End Conscription Campaign fought against conscription from 1983 onwards (for example: " End the conscription campaign"). There were also volunteers, some of whom were of other skin colors. Women could also be members of the army, but not in combat. A small unit of members of the colored population had existed since 1963 . At the beginning of 1978 a battalion of black soldiers had been deployed on the Angolan border for four months. In 1978 only 2.5% were non-whites in the service of the armed forces.

In 1971/72 the defense budget accounted for 2.2% of South Africa's gross domestic product . In 1977/1978 the expenditures for the SADF and nearby areas amounted to 5.1% and in 1983/1984 4.3% of the gross domestic product, in 1993/1994 the share had fallen to 2.6%. In the same year of the arms embargo resolution of the United Nations Security Council , Defense Minister Pieter Willem Botha visited the arms industry in Portugal and France in 1967. Since 1968, the South African government has made massive efforts to promote domestic arms development and production based on the French model of cooperation between the defense sector and the private sector. In doing so, she received effective support from the Industrial Development Corporation (for example, "Industrie-Entwicklungsgesellschaft"). Within a short period of time, South Africa was able to reduce its dependence on arms imports through the ARMSCOR ( Armaments Development and Production Corporation , founded in 1968 : "Society for Arms Development and Production "; from 1977 Armaments Corporation of South Africa ). In 1977, the purchase of weapons abroad claimed a share of 57% of the South African military budget, although the Security Council of the United Nations decided in 1976 a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. The Botha government now practiced circumvention policies, cooperating with Spain, Italy, Belgium, Greece and Portugal. There was an intensive technical cooperation between the SADF and the Rhodesian armed forces.

With the Internal Security Act ( Act No. 74/1982 ), the SADF was able to carry out a comprehensive operation in the interior of the country, which was connected with the mandate to inform parliament (according to Section 72) about the specific action. In the introductory definitions of Section 1, Paragraph XVI, the police are named as the competent executive body to enforce this law, and each department of the SADF that can be used for the "prevention or suppression of terrorism or civil unrest" is also included. According to these specifications, there were no precise framework conditions for the deployment of the military in this regard. As a result, the responsibilities of the police and the army overlapped.

After 200 Inkatha members had been trained in guerrilla methods in the Caprivi Strip (Namibia) around 1987 and were integrated into the police service of the homeland of KwaZulu, there was no calming down there. Chief Buthelezi was concerned that ANC MK units might attack his homeland and murder him. In addition, the situation in KwaZulu escalated due to "wars" among taxi companies, which the chiefs used to illegally transport weapons. The Homeland Police received further assistance from Pretoria. The South African police dispatched General Jac Buchner and other veterans from the former Rhodesia. In addition, the SADF undertook another training campaign in 1991. Not far from the town of Mkuze , in the mountains of the Ghost Mountains , hit squads were trained whose task it was to kill anti-apartheid activists in Natal in the future. According to research by the Weekly Mail newspaper , the SADF used such front organizations as a field of operations for their military reconnaissance and spent an annual amount of 2.25 million rand on them. Buthelezi denied all the results of the investigation at the time. Richard Goldstone came to the conclusion in his report to President De Klerk in March 1994 that this press research was not an understatement and even provided further evidence and testimony. Independently of this, the journalist Phillip van Niekerk had researched the violence in detail. He came across evidence of a massacre in the Nquthu settlement . His report on it was published on March 6, 1994 in the British Observer .

In December 1992, President Frederik Willem de Klerk dismissed 16 officers, including six generals, for their alleged involvement in Third Force (“Third Force”) actions against opposition South Africans, especially supporters of the African National Congress . Another seven officers were suspended.

organization

The Prime Minister, later the State President, was the Supreme Commander . It was followed by the

  • Chief of the SADF / Hoof van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag (CSADF), who could be appointed from any of the four armed forces groups. In the 1970s, as the SADF expanded, it acquired six areas to support the CSADF: finance, intelligence , logistics, operations, human resources and planning. They all belonged to the Defense Headquarters (DHQ, "Armed Forces Headquarters ") and were from
  • Chief of Defense Force Staff / Hoof van die Weermagstaf .

The military decisions were made by three bodies, primarily the Defense Command Council (DCC, " Defense Command Council ") and, to a lesser extent, the Defense Staff Council (DSC, " Defense Staff Council ") for coordinating groups and the Defense Manpower Liasion Committee ("Military Personnel - Liaison Committee ") for the cooperation of SADF with the Department of Manpower (" Department for Personnel ") and the private sector.

In addition to the South African Army , the South African Navy and the South African Air Force (SAAF), there was also the South African Medical Service (SAMS) with the following commanders:

  • Chief of the Army / Hoof van die Leër
  • Chief of the Air Force / Hoof van die Lugmag
  • Chief of the Navy / Hoof van die Vloot
  • Chief of the Medical Service / Hoof van die Geneeskundige Dienst

Other high positions included the Inspector General of the SADF / Inspector-Generaal and the Chaplain General / Kapelaan generaal .

Commanders of the SADF (CSADF)

Surname Beginning of the term of office End of term
General Stephen Melville November 1, 1958 December 31, 1960
General Pieter Grobbelaar January 1, 1961 December 30, 1965
General Rudolph Hiemstra January 1, 1966 March 31, 1972
Admiral Hugo Biermann April 1, 1972 August 31, 1976
General Magnus Malan September 1, 1976 October 6, 1980
General Constand Viljoen October 7, 1980 October 30, 1985
General Johannes Geldenhuys November 1, 1985 October 31, 1990
General Andreas Liebenberg November 1, 1990 October 31, 1993
General Georg Lodewyk Meiring November 1, 1993 April 30, 1994

staff

Monument of the SADF in Fort Klapperkop (Pretoria)
  • Permanent Forces - active full-time soldiers with a service period of at least two years, up to a maximum of 65 years of age
  • National Servicemen - conscripts, exclusively “white” men, around 25,000 per year until 1992; This was followed by a year of service with the Citizen Forces or a longer service with the Commando Forces
  • Citizen Forces - fully trained part-time soldiers
  • Commando Forces - also called Active Citizen Force. - fully trained, "white" members who mostly acted in Germany, for example in security and reconnaissance
  • Voluntary Term Service - for volunteers, established in 1992 to replace military service
  • Service Volunteers - temporary full-time employees, exclusively staff who did not belong to the "white" men, for example several battalions of "black" soldiers
  • Auxiliary Service - limited operational personnel who did not meet the standards of military service, but performed subordinate functions such as driving services; including non-whites
  • Reserve - up to 16 years after the end of military service or until reaching the age of 65

Before the dissolution, the SADF had the following strengths:

  • Full-time - 40,000 in the Voluntary Service, 5,000 in the National Service
    • Auxiliary Service - 16,000
    • Civil Service - 24,000
  • Part time - 500,000
    • Citizen Forces - around 120,000
    • Commando Forces - around 130,000 in 200 units
    • Reserve - around 180,000

The South African Army had a share of 65 percent of all South African full-time soldiers and 80 percent of the part-time soldiers, while the South African Air Force and the South African Navy operated almost exclusively with full-time soldiers. The South African Medical Service had a high proportion of part-time soldiers and the highest proportion of women in the four branches of the armed forces.

Other units and activities

On October 1, 1972, the Special Forces , known as Recces , were founded and initially engaged in reconnaissance . Until 1980 they belonged to the South African Army and were then only subordinate to the CSADF. As of 1986, the Special Forces included the covertly operating unit Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB, for example: "Civil Cooperation Office"). She was active at home and abroad and was responsible for numerous arson, intimidation, sabotage and murder attacks, for example on the South African David Webster in 1989. In 1990 the CCB was dissolved. In the 1991 parliamentary debate on the national defense budget, MP Mahmoud Rajab ( Democratic Party ) noted that the government owed parliamentary explanations on the matter, given "revelations about the activities of the CCB" and continued secrecy about the budget for the Special Forces .

In 2014 two former officers of the 4 Reconnaissance Regiment, 4 Recce for short , reported on their activities. One of their operations was an attempted assassination attempt on the executive committee of the ANC in Tanzania in the 1980s . Large-frame photos of ANC politicians, framed with booby traps , were to be placed in the conference room . The attack failed because their plane had to turn back due to poor visibility over Malawi .

In the course of the investigation by the Goldstone Commission in the early 1990s, it became known that the SADF had been running the military training of Inkatha members from 1986 onwards so that they should destabilize the townships through violence. According to reports in various newspapers, in The Weekly Mail and in Ilanga from the second half of 1991, there were reports on SADF training camps for members of the IFP. On the slopes of Ghost Mountain in the northern part of the Natal province , not far from the village of Mkuze, there was a training camp for deployments in house and guerrilla warfare . According to IFP members, the participants were trained to lead groups of thugs to carry out attacks on anti-apartheid activists.

Another training camp called Hippo was located 80 kilometers west of Katima Mulilo on the alluvial banks of the Cuando in the Caprivi Strip . According to media reports, 200 IFP fighters are said to have completed a seven-month military training program here in 1987. Some of them received training to serve as future security officers in the administration of the KwaZulu homeland . According to statements by the South African President, the SADF trained 150 Zulu members in security tasks and the protection of persons with VIP status . Mangosuthu Buthelezi denied his party's participation in these training sessions. All participants took part on the recommendation of the police in his homeland. He justified this decision with the fact that from 1985 an increase in the armed ANC activities had been recorded and a unit of the Umkhonto we Sizwe had penetrated the homeland in order to murder him and destroy administrative buildings in Ulundi . In particular, Buthelezi opposed reports in the media that he or the IFP were running a private army or a terrorist group ( hit squad ). However, the Weekly Mail reported again in December 1991 that SADF had supported the homeland in the field of military intelligence operations and assassination capabilities for at least five people, as well as an annual budget of 2.25 million rand to pay IFP members. According to reports, special training courses for four people were also offered in Israel at the instigation of the SADF. The newspaper relied on information from among military intelligence experts, from two training participants and from a longtime IFP member. Mangosuthu Buthelezi again contradicted press reports on the matter.

Armament

The following important information is missing from this article or section:
Vehicles and planes
Help Wikipedia by researching and pasting it .

Hand weapons

The armed forces were equipped with hand weapons from the country's own production and development as well as with products from foreign manufacturers.

Weapons of mass destruction

South Africa possessed weapons of mass destruction during the existence of the SADF , including six nuclear weapons , biological weapons and chemical weapons . During a press conference in April 1979, the South African Defense Minister stated that his country had the theoretical ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, but was planning to use this technology to generate energy for peaceful purposes. On September 22, 1979, the Vela incident occurred south of South Africa , in which a South African atomic bomb was probably detonated with the help of Israel . The stocks were destroyed in the course of the abolition of apartheid in the early 1990s by the SADF under the control of the UN . This made South Africa the first state to completely destroy these weapons.

Formation of the successor army

In 1994 the SADF was united with the armies of some homelands as well as former guerrilla fighters of the Umkhonto we Sizwe , the Azanian People's Liberation Army and the Inkatha under the name South African National Defense Force .

Others

On the initiative of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research ( CSIR ), government agencies founded the National Institute for Defense Research in 1954 (German roughly: National Institute for Defense Research ). A steadily growing military research took place under its jurisdiction, until the successor institution, the semi-public Armscor ( Armaments Development and Production Corporation ), was established in 1968 through a statutory provision ( Armaments Development and Production Act, Act No. 57/1968 ).

South African Armed Forces G5 Howitzer (in use since 1983)
Denel XH-2 Rooivalk (8 September 1994 at Farnborough)

In addition to the SADF, the non-commercial part of the Armscor was subordinate to the Defense Minister since 1968. With a wide range of products, South Africa appeared at the defense equipment fair Defendory Expo '82 in Athens in 1982 . In addition to the G5 howitzer , armored vehicles from South African production that had been brought to Athens in a Hercules transport plane were on display . This trade fair participation on the soil of a NATO state and at the invitation of Greek government agencies was presented by the then Armscor boss Piet Marais as a foreign policy success for his country. At this time South Africa tried to sell war equipment on the international armaments market primarily to customers in South America, the Middle East and East Asia as well as in other African countries. Defense Minister General Magnus Malan denied in 1982 that arms deliveries from South Africa had gone to Argentina during the Falklands War .

South Africa built the first combat helicopter from a production cycle in the southern hemisphere, directed by Armscor . The Denel Rooivalk was first publicly presented in January 1990 by the state armaments company in Kempton Park . The operational aircraft was created in the course of a 14-year development and testing phase on the basis of the specifications of the South African Air Force . According to Air Force Chief of Staff Major General James Kriel, the SAAF did not plan to buy the helicopter at the time, however, as the peace process in which South Africa was in no longer justified this purchase.

Armscor was also responsible for the export of weapons. Despite an embargo (UN resolution 558 of December 13, 1984) against the country, South Africa was the tenth largest arms exporter worldwide during its existence. By the end of the 1980s, around 3,000 South African companies were involved in the purchase of armaments. Around 1988, according to a report in the Times , which was reported in the South African Star , Armscor is said to have even ranked 5th among international arms sellers worldwide and at that time had an order volume of 9 billion rand . Armaments were the third largest export sector in South Africa after gold and coal . Armscor exported South African armaments to 23 countries in the late 1980s.

The state owned company was on the basis of a law (2003 Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act, Act 51/2003 privatized) and carries since then the name Armaments Corporation of South Africa SOC Limited . This also included the restriction (Chapter 1, Section 4 / 2g) not to participate in any international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The company Executive Outcomes was founded in 1989 by Eeben Barlow founded and other former members of the SADF. It took part in numerous armed conflicts in Africa until 1999.

SADF periodicals

  • Paratus, official magazine of the South African Defense Force ( Afrikaans : die amptelike maandblad van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag ), place of publication: Pretoria, documented years 1970 to 1994
  • South African Defense Force review (Afrikaans: Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag oorsig ), place of publication: Durban
  • Uniform, Koerant van die SA Leër ( English : Newspaper of the SA Army ), place of publication: Pretoria

Web links

literature

  • Ronald Meinardus: The Africa Policy of the Republic of South Africa. Bonn 1981, ISBN 3-921614-50-3 .

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d Command structure of the SADF (Afrikaans and English)
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g h Overview of the development of the SADF ( Memento from April 25, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) (English), accessed on August 25, 2012.
  3. ^ SAIRR : A Survey of Race relations in South Africa 1976 . Johannesburg 1977, p. 411
  4. ^ Ronald Meinardus: The Africa policy of the Republic of South Africa . Bonn 1981, p. 402
  5. ^ Luli Callinicos: Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains . Claremont 2005, p. 456 (English)
  6. ^ TRC : The Liberation Movements from 1960 to 1990 . In: Final report of TRC, presented to President Nelson Mandela. October 29, 1998 . on www.stanford.edu (English)
  7. ^ South African History Online: Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in exile . on www.sahistory.org.za (English)
  8. ^ SAIRR: Race Relations Survey 1987/88 . Johannesburg 1988, pp. 524-526
  9. ↑ Kevin Toolis: The Man Behind Iraq's Supergun . Reported August 26, 1990 on www.nytimes.com (English)
  10. ↑ Gerald Vincent Bull 1928-1990 . In: The Wednesday Report . at www.mobrien.com (English)
  11. ↑ SAIRR: Survey 1982, p. 617
  12. ↑ SAIRR: Survey 1974 . Johannesburg 1975, pp. 56-57
  13. ↑ SAIRR: Survey 1974 . Johannesburg 1975, p. 57
  14. ^ André du Pisani : SWA / Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change . Jonathan Ball Publishers , Johannesburg 1986, p. 233
  15. ↑ Allister Sparks : Tomorrow is another land. South Africa's secret revolution . Berlin Verlag 1995, pp. 246-249
  16. ↑ SAIRR: Race Relations Survey 1991/92 . Johannesburg 1992, p. 501
  17. ↑ Meinardus, 1981, pp. 139, 150-151.
  18. ^ Sithole pilots in RSA - for training . The Observer, August 13, 1979 (quoted in Meinardus, 1981, p. 136)
  19. ^ SAIRR: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983 . Johannesburg 1984. pp. 595,597
  20. ↑ report at sahistory.org.za (English), accessed on February 15 2016th
  21. ^ Scan from The Montreal Gazette at news.google.co.uk , accessed May 17, 2013
  22. ↑ Meinardus, 1981, p. 376.
  23. ↑ Meinardus, 1981, pp. 377-378.
  24. ↑ Meinardus, 1981, pp. 372-375.
  25. ↑ Africa Confidential (1979), No. 16, p. 3.
  26. ^ SAIRR: Race Relations Survey 1987/88 . Johannesburg 1988, p. 513
  27. ↑ Meinardus, 1981, p. 378.
  28. ^ Republic of South Africa: Official Yearbook . 1978, p. 327.
  29. ↑ History of ARMSCOR on the ARMSCOR website ( Memento from June 26, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) (English)
  30. ↑ Meinardus, 1981, pp. 381-382, 385-386.
  31. ^ J. Paul Dunne: The making of arms in South Africa . ( Memento of September 7, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) In: The Economics of Peace and Security Journal. (2006) Vol. 1, No. 1, ISSN  1749-852X , pp. 40-48.
  32. ^ Republic of South Africa: Internal Security Act of 1982 . on www.disa.ukzn.ac.za (English)
  33. ↑ Stephen Ellis : External Mission. The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990 . Jonathan Ball Publishers , Johannesburg, Cape Town 2012, p. 253
  34. ↑ SAIRR: Race Relations Survey 1991/92 . Johannesburg 1992, pp. 501-502
  35. ↑ Allister Sparks : Tomorrow is another land. South Africa's secret revolution . Berlin Verlag 1995, p. 247
  36. ↑ De Klerk concedes military had role in township strife. New York Times, December 20, 1992; accessed March 12, 2017
  37. ^ South African History Online: Apartheid - A Crime Against Humanity: The Unfolding of Total Strategy 1948-1989. Covert Operations . at sahistory.org.za, accessed August 28, 2012.
  38. ^ SAIRR: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983 . Johannesburg 1984. p. 461
  39. ^ How the SADF plotted to kill Thabo Mbeki. timeslive.co.za, December 23, 2014, accessed March 18, 2015
  40. ^ Goldstone Commission on Allegations of SADF funding of Violence in Townships , accessed on July 13, 2013 (Report of the Goldstone Commission on the financing of Inkatha members to promote violence in the townships by the South African Defense Force from 1986 )
  41. ↑ SAIRR: Race Relations Survey 1991/92 . Johannesburg 1992, pp. 501-503. ISSN  0258-7246
  42. ^ SAIRR: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979 . Johannesburg 1980, p. 86.
  43. ^ Armscor: Corporate Information . at www.armscor.co.za, accessed on September 2, 2017
  44. ↑ Der Spiegel : Cactus and Olifant . Reporting in SPIEGEL on October 25, 1982 on www.spiegel.de
  45. ^ SAIRR: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982 . Johannesburg 1983, p. 200
  46. ^ SAIRR: Race Relations Survey 1989/90 . Johannesburg 1990. p. 135
  47. ↑ The Star: Armscor No 5 in sales of weapons . PDF document p. 34, online at www.saldru.lib.msu.edu
  48. ^ Graeme Simpson: The Politics and Economics of the Armaments Industry in South Africa . In: J. Cock, L. Nathan, L. (Eds.): War and Society . Cape Town, Johannesburg: David Philip, 1989, pp. 217–231 online at www.csvr.org.za (English)
  49. ^ Armscor: Strategic Focus . on www.armscor.co.za (English)
  50. ↑ Republic of South Africa: Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act - Act No. 51/2003 . In: Government Gazette No. 51 of 2003, online at www.saflii.org (English; PDF; 871 kB), accessed on February 15, 2016
  51. ↑ Paratus . Entry in worldcat. on www.worldcat.org
  52. ^ South African Defense Force review . Entry in worldcat. on www.worldcat.org
  53. ↑ Uniform . Entry in worldcat. on www.worldcat.org