Pieter Willem Botha

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Pieter Willem Botha

Pieter Willem Botha ( afrikaans : / ˈpitəɹ ˈvələm ˈbʊə̯tɑ /; * January 12, 1916 in Paul Roux District ( Orange Free State ); † October 31, 2006 in Wilderness , Western Cape Province ), commonly known in South Africa as PW or - because of his persistent persecution of political opponents - as Die Groot Krokodil (/ di xrʊə̯t krokəˈdəɫ /, the great crocodile ), was Prime Minister of South Africa from 1978 to 1984 and President of the Republic of South Africa from 1984 to 1989.

Life

Youth and education

Botha was the son of Pieter Willem and Hendrina, née de Wet, and his family was African . His father fought against the British in the Second Boer War , and his mother was interned in a concentration camp. Botha graduated from school in Bethlehem, South Africa, and began studying law at the University of the Free State in 1934 , which he quickly abandoned in favor of a political career. In the period before the Second World War Botha sympathized with the Nazis and joined the right-national organization Ossewabrandwag at which the Herenigde Nasionale Party of Daniel Francois Malan was close to. After the end of National Socialist rule, Botha distanced herself from the organization and criticized its national socialism in contrast to Christian socialism. In 1943 he married Anna Elizabeth Rossouw, called Elise, with whom he had three daughters and two sons.

Political career

The uncertainty of the time after the world war led to the fact that the now National Party (NP), called the splitting off of the United Party under Malan, got a boost. Botha had been through the Ossewabrandwag since 1936 a supporter and organizer of the party and supporter of racial segregation and the apartheid system . In 1946 Botha was elected secretary of the youth organization of the NP, in the 1948 elections he became a member of the Volksraads , the lower house of the South African parliament, for George in the western Cape region . He held the seat until 1984.

In 1958, Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd appointed Botha as deputy minister of the interior , in 1961 he became minister for Community Development and Colored Affairs (German: "Gemeinwesenentwicklung und Coloredfragen "). In 1966 he was elected chairman of the NP in the Cape Province. In the same year Verwoerd was murdered, his successor Balthazar Johannes Vorster appointed Botha as Minister of Defense . Botha relied on defense at the expense of diplomacy and trade , the defense budget rose to 20% of the national budget, and South Africa participated in the war of independence and the subsequent civil war in Angola with partly secret operations .

Botha's political career reached its temporary climax when Vorster had to resign in 1978 as a result of the Muldergate affair , named after the then Information Minister Connie Mulder , whereupon Botha became Prime Minister ( Botha I Cabinet ). He remained Secretary of Defense until 1980, when Magnus Malan succeeded him. In the same year, Botha was also elected party chairman, a position he held until 1989.

Total strategy

Botha tightened apartheid laws and took military action against the African National Congress (ANC). This period marks the rapidly growing militarization of South African apartheid society. His government program of economic liberalization and reform of the labor markets from 1978, consisting of twelve points, was known under the terms "Reform apartheid" or Bothanomics . With these government goals, which he described as having no alternative, he wanted to counter three “unacceptable” political scenarios for South Africa. Those were:

  1. a " Marxist " state,
  2. a “racial state” with internal unrest and foreign policy isolation or
  3. a "black" dictatorship .

To achieve the goals, a total strategy should be implemented, which primarily included a liberation of the economy from the restrictions of the previous apartheid. A further point of this strategy envisaged reform of the military and the security authorities . The concept of the total strategy aimed to stabilize the “white” rule in South Africa permanently, internally and externally, primarily with military and security-structural means. Within the legislative action level, his activities as defense minister and as prime minister were based on the following measures to implement this strategy:

  • Emergency regulations to put down unrest through operational powers of the South African armed forces ,
  • Creation of paramilitary structures with the civilian population,
  • Position of the institutions of state infrastructure and the non-military economy under defense policy premises.

The concept of the Total Strategy was first taken up in 1974 in South Africa by Defense Minister Magnus Malan and publicly propagated. In essence, he was referring to the military theoretical work of the French General André Beaufre , which was essentially his processing of various decolonization conflicts in North Africa, especially the Algerian War. With the creation of new emergency regulations and their amendments, such as the Civil Defense Act, Act No. 67/1977 and the Internal Security Act, Act No. 74/1982 , the separation of duties between the police and the army was dissolved. The central power position of the State Security Council , which Botha expanded, weakened parliament and government work. His policy prepared for a civil war scenario, the possibility of which became apparent through attacks by Umkhonto we Sizwe . Through this course Botha pushed important instruments of democracy such as public opinion, parliament, the cabinet and political organizations into a marginal situation. The total strategy also included political influence on the media. At the annual meeting of the Nasionale Party in 1979, Pieter Willem Botha declared : “The press is essential in the overall strategy. In a situation where South Africa is facing a total attack , a disciplined press is necessary ”. In order to achieve this goal, the Steyn Commission drew up assessments and proposals, which from 1982 onwards resulted in a large number of legally defined restrictions in the form of censorship and self-censorship . Black journalists in particular were threatened and the media for this target group were largely switched off. The restrictions were met with displeasure even in editorial offices close to the government. In addition, the occupation of the neighboring state of Namibia was called for.

Bothanomics

The RSA-3 , a South African launcher and ICBM , started development during Botha's tenure as Secretary of Defense

The Bothanomics were a repressive political program to promote industry based on frozen wages, deregulation , uncontrolled wages in regional labor markets and ruthless privatization .

The catalog of his government work formulated after taking office as Prime Minister comprised twelve basic points:

  1. “South Africa is a multinational society. There are minorities .
  2. There are vertical differences between the population groups.
  3. The right of self-determination of the different population groups should be guaranteed in as many areas as possible.
  4. The government is responsible for consolidating the homelands as much as possible .
  5. In the rest of South Africa, power is said to be shared between whites, coloreds and Indians in general matters.
  6. The recognition of the principle of separate institutions and schools.
  7. The elimination of unnecessary discrimination .
  8. Strengthening the independence of the economy from the state.
  9. The creation of a South African association of states with mutual respect for the members.
  10. Protecting South Africa from international interventions.
  11. Efficient decision-making based on a functioning military and proper administration.
  12. The realization of a free market economy as a task of the government. "

Nuclear weapons program

As Defense Minister, Botha supported the South African nuclear weapons program with its technological focus in Pelindaba as well as the preparations of the military for a nuclear test from 1968 . In 1975 Shimon Peres and Botha signed the "Jericho Treaty", a secret nuclear program between the two countries. Nuclear tests by South Africa have been suspected several times by the Western press.

In August 1977 the Soviet Union reported that photos from Soviet reconnaissance satellites showed preparations for an atomic bomb test in the Kalahari . The NZZ reported on this in its August 31, 1977 issue.

Another event on September 22, 1979, recorded by a US reconnaissance satellite on the Vela series , became known as the Vela Incident . Because of the (allegedly) undetectable radioactive fallout in the SZ on March 11, 1980, it was discussed as a possible neutron bomb test . A basis for these suspicions in public provided statements by the South African government, according to which "it would only be prepared not to join the nuclear club if the West supports the country's resistance to Russia's expansionist ambitions". According to a report in the Africa Contemporary Record. According to the annual survey and documents , this was the answer to a request by the US government to Pretoria to refrain from its intentions to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Constitutional reform 1983/1984 and second cabinet

With the comprehensive constitutional amendments prepared during his tenure as Prime Minister, a parliamentary representation of the white, colored and Indian ethnic groups in a three-chamber system was provided, but under unequal conditions. No parliamentary representation was planned for the black population. The government was given the opportunity to participate in the elections in the homelands. That was the platform for co-determination that the apartheid concept assigned to them within the total strategy .

On November 2, 1983, the government conducted a referendum on the new constitution , in which only white citizens entitled to vote were allowed to vote. They voted with 76 percent participation with 65.95 percent for the new constitution, which meant a complete exclusion of all blacks from political participation rights in the "heartland" of South Africa. On the occasion of the unrest in South African townships in 1984, Prime Minister Botha expressed his view of the design of the new electoral law as follows: “I'm giving you a final warning: one man, one vote in this country is out - that is never!” (Total Strategy) . He referred to an older demand (one man, one vote!) Of the ANC for equal voting rights, which was also represented by Nelson Mandela personally.

With the revision of the South African constitution , which was still under his leadership as Prime Minister and finally came into effect in 1984 , a presidential office with strong executive powers was created, which Botha himself occupied. After he resigned as Prime Minister on September 3, 1984, he was elected President on September 5 of the same year in an electoral college of 88 members according to the provisions of the constitution that came into force the day before. The constitutional process, the election of the president and the subsequent formation of a government were of considerable unrest in the townships of "Vaal Triangle" ( Vaal Triangle accompanied). This was expected, however, and the Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange was unimpressed by these events.

Late reign and resignation

As a consequence of Botha's policy, unrest and political resistance intensified, both from apartheid opponents and from right-wing supporters. An increasing number of white South Africans joined anti-apartheid demonstrations. An unlimited state of emergency was declared in 1985, and in 1986 Desmond Tutu called on the United Nations , which had excluded South Africa from the General Assembly in 1974, to impose stricter sanctions . Officially, Botha stuck to his hard line and spoke at the 1986 party congress that South Africa was not a nation of "washcloths". At the opening of the parliamentary session on January 31, 1986, Botha declared his interest and willingness to negotiate with leaders of the African opposition by creating and chairing a National Council (NC; German: "Nationalrat") for this purpose . This body was supposed to advise the President on the consideration of common interests of all groups in South Africa. With this concept it was also intended to discuss legislative proposals before the creation of constitutional structures for the African population, which should then lead to joint agreements.

Eventually, negotiations with Nelson Mandela began in secret . Botha hoped that his release would defuse the crisis without having to make major concessions or show any weakness. The sharp backlash to his reform activities led to the further strengthening of ultra-conservative forces inside and outside parliament as well as the progressive disintegration of his party, which finally manifested itself in the outcome of the 1987 parliamentary elections . On January 18, 1989, Botha suffered a stroke , which is why he could no longer attend parliamentary sessions and on February 2, he resigned from the party chairmanship, but remained in the office of President. In the traditional understanding of the National Party and based on the inherited model of the British system of government, the party chairmanship was always linked to the highest government function. This situation was new to his party and created a competitive pool of applicants. Four people ran for successors, of whom Pik Botha , (Foreign Minister), Barend du Plessis (Minister of Finance) and Chris Heunis (Minister for Constitutional Development and Planning) were considered reform-oriented, as well as Frederik Willem de Klerk (Minister of Education), who was seen as conservative . Botha supported du Plessis, but de Klerk won by only eight votes. Initially without the knowledge of President Botha, secret meetings of the ANC with predominantly Boer South Africans took place since 1987 mostly abroad, for example at Mells , in Dakar ( Dakar Conference ), Lusaka and in Zimbabwe . From the results of the talks, the ANC developed a strategy paper for future negotiations with the government, the Harare Declaration of August 21, 1989. Botha met Mandela in July 1989, according to which the reconciliation process could no longer be stopped. In August 1989, de Klerk and a large part of the cabinet suggested that he resign. On the night of August 14, 1989, Botha announced his immediate resignation in an aggressive and long speech on television. De Klerk also succeeded him in the office of President.

Botha described the truth and reconciliation commission established in 1996 as a witch hunt. He has been found guilty of serious human rights abuses; In particular, as chairman of the State Security Council, he was responsible for murders, torture, kidnappings, arson and sabotage. In 1997 he was sentenced to twelve months probation for refusing to testify before the Commission; the judgment was overturned on appeal. Botha emphasized that there was nothing for which he had to apologize and also rejected a possible amnesty . He died at the age of 90 from complications from a heart attack in his home. The Botha family turned down the offer of a state funeral.

Evaluation of the policy

Despite the hard line, Botha's domestic and apartheid policies were more moderate in many respects than those of his predecessors. He legalized marriage between members of different "races", which was previously banned, and relaxed the Group Areas Act , which kept "non-whites" away from living in certain areas, and guaranteed colored people, including the numerous descendants of Indian foreign workers from colonial times, a minimum of political rights. However, Botha blocked all plans to give black South Africans full political voting rights . For economic reasons, too, he was prepared to relax the more apolitical consequences of apartheid as a compromise - but he left no doubt about the central aspect of racial segregation and the white minority government. It has been established that Botha commissioned bomb attacks on the headquarters of the South African Council of Churches in the 1980s . The government suspected a secret office of the ANC and the trade union confederation there.

Botha's uncompromising policy on the whole, which was also expressed in his Rubicon speech in 1985, polarized his own party, which was then split into different wings. Botha was controversial within and outside of the party and government. After his death, reactions and evaluations were documented. Thabo Mbeki , who had lost a son, a brother and a cousin during the apartheid period, paid tribute to Botha after his death in October 2006 for the fact that under him the first contacts between the apartheid government and the ANC took place. Nelson Mandela highlighted Botha's steps towards peaceful coexistence, despite his symbolic role during apartheid. Helen Suzman called Botha “her black beast”, but at the same time emphasized the processes that were initiated by him. Denis Goldberg , who had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1963, attested Botha unscrupulousness and brutality. Pik Botha characterized him as a humorous person and effective organizer with a penchant for authoritarian action. The Guardian called Botha a state terrorist and murderer.

Quotes

“I'm giving you a final warning: one man, one vote in this country is out - that is never! (Total Strategy)

“I give you one last warning: a man, a vote is not possible in this country - never that! (Total strategy) "

- PW Botha (1984) : From apartheid to democracy (PDF file; 606 kB); Quoted from: C. Culpin: South Africa since 1948: A study in depth . London, John Murray, 2000, ISBN 0-7195-7476-5 , p. 109.

"They replied I could use my health as an excuse. To this I replied that I am not prepared to leave on a lie. (You replied that I could give my health as a reason. I replied that I was not ready to go with a lie.) "

- PW Botha, in his resignation speech : Article Botha Quits, Criticizes Successor in the Washington Post, August 15, 1989, accessed February 12, 2012.

Honors

Honors in a public way

  • PW Botha Airport in George , today George Airport
  • 1976: Honorary doctorate in military science, Stellenbosch University
  • 1981: Honorary doctorate in philosophy, Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat
  • Multiple award of honorary citizenship in South African places, for example in Stilfontein (1971), George (1973), Margate (1978), Robertson (1979), Paul Roux (1979), Krugersdorp (1980), Germiston (1980), Kroonstad (1980) , Nelspruit (1980), Swellendam (1981), Ermelo (1981), Benoni (1981), Uitenhage (1981), Bellville (1982), Caledon (1982), Ladysmith (Natal, 1982), Knysna (1982), Piet Retief (1983), Klerksdorp (1983), Barkly-East (1983)

Medal awards

There were medals conferred by governments: Paraguay , Portugal , South Africa, Taiwan .

  • March 1967, Portugal: Grand Cross ( Grã-Cruz ) of the Ordem Militar de Cristo / Military Order of Christ ,
  • May 1976, South Africa: Decoration for Meritorious Service ,
  • November 1979, South Africa: Star of South Africa ,
  • October 1980, Taiwan: Order of Propitious Clouds with Special Grand Cordon .

Single receipts

  1. a b c d The life and times of PW Botha . In: iol news of November 1, 2006, accessed October 8, 2011.
  2. a b c d e f P. W. Botha, Defender of Apartheid, Is Dead at 90 . In: The New York Times, November 1, 2006, accessed October 9, 2011.
  3. ^ Horace Campbell: The Military Defeat of the South Africans in Angola . In: Monthly Review, Vol. 64 (2013), Issue 11. at www.monthlyreview.org (English)
  4. ^ Andrea Lang: Separate Development and the Department of Bantu Administration in South Africa . Work from the Institute for Africa Customer No. 103. Hamburg (Verbund Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-Institut) 1999, pp. 110–112
  5. Niel Barnard : Secret Revolution. Memoirs of a Spy Boss . Tafelberg, Cape Town 2015 ISBN 978-0-624-07457-1 pp. 133-134
  6. Christoph Sodemann: The laws of apartheid. Bonn 1986, ISBN 3-921614-15-5 . Pp. 97-98, 134-135 and 181-185.
  7. Christoph Sodemann: The laws of apartheid. Bonn 1986, ISBN 3-921614-15-5 . P. 119 f.
  8. Jacklyn Cock, Laurie Nathan: War and society: The militarization of South Africa . Volume 1989, Part 2, pp. 146-147, ISBN 0-312-03551-9 online
  9. ^ Andrea Lang: Separate Development and the Department of Bantu Administration in South Africa . Work from the Institute for Africa Customer No. 103. Hamburg (Verbund Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-Institut) 1999, pp. 110–111
  10. ^ Director of Central Intelligence: The September 22, 1979 Event . at www.gwu.edu (George Washington University) (English; PDF file; 1.20 MB)
  11. Thomas B. Cochran: Highly Enriched Uranium Production for South African Nuclear Weapons . In: Science & Global Security, 1994, Volume 4, pp. 161–176 (English; PDF file; 1.77 MB)
  12. ^ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's secret alliance with apartheid South Africa (The secret alliance: Israel's secret alliance with the apartheid state of South Africa). New York 2010.
  13. Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1977, pp. 1090f.
  14. quoted from: Ronald Meinardus: The Africa Policy of the Republic of South Africa . Bonn 1981, p. 437 footnote 2
  15. quoted from: Ronald Meinardus: The Africa Policy of the Republic of South Africa . Bonn 1981, p. 437, footnote 4
  16. quoted from: Ronald Meinardus: The Africa Policy of the Republic of South Africa . Bonn 1981, p. 445 and footnote 2 (ACR 77/78, page B 919). By "Russia" is meant the Soviet Union; with "Pretoria" the South African government
  17. ^ Problems facing the National Party and the ANC in the transition to democracy in South Africa . on www.hsc.csu.edu.au ( Memento from March 28, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) (English)
  18. Manfred Kurz: Indirect rule and violence in South Africa . Hamburg 1981. p. 54
  19. Albie Sachs , Hilda Bernstein: The laws of apartheid . Bonn 1976, p. 2
  20. Christoph Sodemann: The laws of apartheid . Bonn 1986, ISBN 3-921614-15-5 , p. 90
  21. FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY (PDF file; 606 kB); quoted from: C. Culpin: South Africa since 1948: a study in depth . London, John Murray, 2000, ISBN 0-7195-7476-5 , p. 109.
  22. ^ SAIRR : Race Relations Survey 1984 . Johannesburg 1985, pp. 129-130
  23. ^ SAIRR: Race Relations Survey 1987/88 . Johannesburg 1988, p. 112
  24. Shelagh Gastrow: Who's Who in South African Politics, Number 5 . Ravan Press, Johannesburg 1995, p. 38
  25. Allister Sparks : Tomorrow is another land. South Africa's secret revolution . Berlin Verlag Berlin 1995, p. 129
  26. Allister Sparks: Tomorrow is another land . 1995, pp. 117-129
  27. ^ Sheridan Johns, R. Hunt Davis: Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: the struggle against apartheid, 1948–1990: a documentary survey . Oxford University Press , New York, Oxford 1991, pp. 305-307. ISBN 0-19-570641-2
  28. a b TRC findings: PW Botha . In: BBC News, October 29, 1998, accessed October 9, 2011.
  29. ^ PW Botha: Reaction in quotes . In: BBC News, November 1, 2006, accessed October 8, 2011.
  30. PW Botha . In: The Guardian, November 2, 2006, accessed October 9, 2011.
  31. a b c d e Shelagh Gastrow: Who's Who in South African Politics, Number Two . Ravan Press, Johannesburg 1987, p. 34
  32. a b c d e Shelagh Gastrow: Who's Who in South African Politics . Ravan Press, Johannesburg 1986, 2nd edition, p. 50

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