Executive outcomes

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Logo of the former company Executive Outcomes
Executive Outcomes fought in the African civil wars with former South African special forces who used formerly Soviet weapon systems (here a Mil-Mi-24 attack helicopter (Hind) ).

Executive Outcomes ( EO ) was a privately owned security and military company that provided mercenaries and military material for military use worldwide. EO was made up of members of former elite units of the South African army who no longer had a military-political function in democratic South Africa after the end of apartheid .

Within a few years, Executive Outcomes became part of a global network of military service, mining and oil companies headquartered in Pretoria , London and some tax havens . At the beginning of 1999 the company officially dissolved. The network continued to exist in companies such as Lifeguard and Ibis Air . Executive Outcomes has become a well-known example of modern global military corporations through spectacular and widely publicized missions in Angola and Sierra Leone .

Foundation and early years

Basics in the South African Army

The background for the establishment was the political reform efforts in the late phase of apartheid in South Africa and the associated restructuring of the political system. This resulted in a reconstruction of the South African armed forces. In 1989 the South African government began to disband its special forces, which were deployed both in the civil war in Angola and in the interior of the country to combat political opposition, in particular the African National Congress (ANC).

Among these units were the 32-Bataljon , the Koevoet and the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB). The 32-Bataljon had supported the anti-communist UNITA in the Angolan civil war in order to prevent a victory of the MPLA , which was supported by Cuban troops and Soviet and North Korean specialists . The 32-Bataljon was militarily effective - it had the best ratio of killed opponents to its own losses by the South African army - but was later charged with numerous serious violations of human rights before the Truth Commission . The Koevoet was a South African anti-terrorist unit operating in South West Africa ( Namibia ). The Civil Cooperation Bureau tried to circumvent the international arms embargoes against South Africa with the help of bogus companies and carried out several attacks on ANC executives in Western Europe.

The founder Eeben Barlow was the commanding officer of the reconnaissance unit of the 32-Bataljon and later worked for the Western Europe section of the CCB and probably for the Armaments Corporation of South Africa . He is said to have been involved in the arms trade and to have planned murder squads against individual ANC leaders residing in Europe. He was involved in spreading disinformation about the ANC; in the UK, for example, the claim that the ANC and IRA would work closely together.

First years

Barlow was able to successfully use his experience in South African military and intelligence service structures, where he not only gained direct combat experience, but also extensive contacts in the arms trade and related industries, for executive outcomes. He has knowledge of public relations and the organizational knowledge to later be able to build the internationally branched and difficult to understand corporate network around executive outcomes. He recruited the first EO employees from the former soldiers of his former military units. Within a short period of time, 500 military advisers and 3,000 special forces were available to Executive Outcomes.

In its early years, EO still functioned as a privatized part of apartheid South Africa. The company spied on ANC executives and trained the special forces of the South African Defense Force . At this time they also offered services to which they denied any relationship in later years:

  • Support of "secret warfare"
  • Training of "freedom fighters"
  • Procurement of "all types of weapons and equipment"
  • Carrying out "secret acts of sabotage"
  • "... individual actions in areas behind the front"
  • Implementation of "political propaganda actions"
  • "... total guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines"

The first contacts with mining companies, both in the Anglo-American region and with South Africa's diamond giant De Beers, date from this time .

Attitude of South Africa

Leaders and soldiers from Executive Outcomes were composed primarily of the military elites of the South African apartheid state. These had mainly served in anti-insurgency units of the old government and so fought either directly against the ANC or against close allies of the ANC. In its early years, Executive Outcomes continued to support the old state's power elites. Even so, they managed to be tolerated by the new South African government for several years. When Executive Outcomes internationalized its actions, it officially announced that it would only support “legitimate governments” that were politically in line with the new South African government. So it happened that the 32-Bataljon fought with UNITA against the Angolan government until 1989, Executive Outcomes from 1993 with the Angolan government against UNITA.

The official position on the company was summarized by Kader Asmal , then the South African Minister for Water Resources and Chairman of the National Committee for Arms Sales, in 1996: “I think that if foreign forces hire military personnel, this should be regulated in the same way as arms sales. ... It is regulated in relation to the legitimacy of the government and in relation to how democratic it is and to what extent it accepts human rights. I don't see any difference between arms exports and military advice or services. They are the same. ”The government maintained this position as the Organization for African Unity put increasing pressure on South Africa to restrict the activities of EO.

The South African government did not officially announce that, especially in the turbulent times of the transition to the “new South Africa”, it was not reluctant to see the military elites of the apartheid state not staying in South Africa without employment. As long as they were earning money in other parts of the continent, they couldn't disrupt the transition process. It was only when the new South Africa had stabilized that South Africa tightened its laws against mercenary companies and acted against EO.

Calls

First deployment in Angola: the company is expanding

Map of Angola

The company became internationally known through its first deployment in Angola. Barlow was hired by British businessman Tony Buckingham to retake the Kefekwena oil depots and the oil town of Soyo in northwestern Angola . Buckingham has served on the boards of several North American oil companies and the founder and owner of Heritage Oil and Gas in London. The oil fields belonged to Heritage Oil and were overrun and occupied by UNITA in March 1993 .

After the Angolan army, the Forças Armadas Angolanos (FAA) , was unable to retake the camp, Buckingham signed Executive Outcomes. The company put together a group of 50 officers and NCOs. The Executive Outcomes staff organized an attack by 600 Angolan Army soldiers. The area was recaptured in a very short time with minimal casualties of three wounded. EO secured the camp for the next several months. While UNITA immediately accused the Angolan government of using white mercenaries, it first spoke of a multiracial security service. It was only when the military equipment and manpower of the troops became known that Angola gave details of the operation and the troops involved. The action caused unrest among former members of the South African army as well as at UNITA. Both felt betrayed by their former comrades in arms. At the same time, however, it demonstrated the military difference that even a small force could make if it consisted of EO personnel. The difference was also made clear by the fact that UNITA was able to recapture the oil fields only shortly after EO left the area again.

This was followed by an assignment to guard the Canfunfo diamond mine in Lunda Norte . For about 40 million US dollars EO men and military equipment procured. Although officially hired as a consultant, permission to carry out pre-emptive strikes against UNITA was also part of the contract, which EO exploited extensively with the implied benevolence of the government.

Second assignment in Angola

Executive Outcomes achieved its international breakthrough when the Angolan government signed the company directly for one year in September 1993. With the mediation of Buckingham and former Special Air Service man Simon Mann , the MPLA , which threatened to lose the civil war in Angola , was looking for a military company that UNITA knew. EO's bills were paid in part by Angolan's state-owned oil company Sonangol , and unofficially expanded through concessions to Buckingham's oil company.

Executive Outcomes, which was probably deployed with a force of several thousand men, trained and supported his former opponent of the civil war, the Forças Armadas Angolanos, in the fight against their former UNITA comrades. The FAA rebuilt the 16th Brigade, which ironically had been wiped out by South African forces in the 1980s. Through many years of fighting experience on different sides of the conflict, the Angolans and their advisors succeeded in locating old mistakes and developing new strategies against UNITA. 5000 men of the Angolan army and 500 EO mercenaries fought after building and training the brigade as a spearhead in the fight of the Angolan government in the reconquest of the country.

The joint FAA / EO troops succeeded in bringing the entire oil fields in the country as well as the diamond mines under their control. They use new artillery tactics, just as they fought specifically at night for the first time in the 30-year history of the Angola War so as not to give their opponents any rest. The use of EO was instrumental in weakening UNITA to such an extent that it signed the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 , which ended the civil war in the country. She only signed on the condition that Executive Outcomes leave the country. However, under the uncertain peace conditions, EO stayed in the country until Bill Clinton personally lobbyed for Executive Outcomes to leave Angola in December 1995 in late 1995.

public relation

Following its success in Angola, Executive Outcomes began extensive public relations work in 1994. It invited journalists from many international magazines as well as CNN , BBC and Sky to Angola. An EO subsidiary flew the journalists directly from Pretoria to Angola, where Barlow and other officers showed them the joint training of the EO and FAA. The subsidiary Gemini Video Productions shot promotional videos that the television stations could cut into their reports. They denied any participation in real combat operations, as well as participation of EOs in oil production. This publicity campaign helped EO establish an internationally known brand name and helped it acquire future contracts.

Sierra Leone

Origin of the civil war

Diamond hunt in Sierra Leone

In the early 1990s, Sierra Leone , which is rich in natural resources, was in last place on the human development index due to decades of corruption and a shortage economy . In March 1991 the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under Foday Sankoh, with the support of Charles Taylor, began to invade the country from Liberia and cover Sierra Leone with a civil war and a "campaign of terror". Above all, the RUF was supposed to secure Taylor's access to the diamond mines in Sierra Leone (see also blood diamond ).

The RUF began to recruit people who were dissatisfied with the regime and were characterized by brutality that was unusual even for African civil war conditions. In addition to using previously kidnapped child soldiers , the RUF troops made it a habit to behead village elders and other local leaders and impale their heads at the entrance to the village. The amputation of arms or legs became the hallmark of the RUF. They met a Sierra Leonean army that had been weakened for decades so as not to represent an internal power factor. In view of the danger, she quickly recruited readily available personnel such as criminals or street children without military combat experience and provided them with daily rations of rum and marijuana to increase their loyalty . Since the pay was otherwise poor, the regular army soon began to plunder villages and shoot officers if they called for regular combat missions.

Executive Outcomes intervenes

Sierra Leones Map

In 1995 the government finally tried to hire another mercenary company, Gurkha Security Group . However, the latter quickly withdrew from the country after suffering heavy losses in an ambush. Since the militarily powerful states of the world such as the USA and Great Britain, but also the United Nations, refused military aid, the then 27-year-old President Valentine Strasser signed EO in April 1995. He had got to know the company through reports in Newsweek , Soldier of Fortune, and probably through Tony Buckingham's agency. Since Sierra Leone could neither pay the fee of 15 million US dollars nor the necessary advance payment, Tony Buckingham laid the money out in return for later mining concessions in the diamond area of Koidu (formerly Kono). The concession went to Branch Energy Sierra Leone , a company in which Branch Energy holds 60 percent, the Sierra Leone government 30 percent and a private investor from Sierra Leone 10 percent of the shares. The mining rights obtained through the EO use bring a yield of around 200,000 carats of diamonds per year (approx. 100 kilograms).

Sierra Leone's regular troops viewed executive outcomes as a threat to their position and were reluctant to work with the company. Nevertheless, EO managed to drive the rebels out of the capital within nine days with an estimated 150 to 200 men as well as Russian attack helicopters and to repel 130 kilometers. Two days later they had recaptured the country's most important source of foreign currency, the Koidu diamond mines. In total, around 300,000 refugees were able to return to their homeland through the use of EO. However, EO ignored areas that did not contain any raw materials, so that the civilian population there remained very vulnerable to the rebels.

EO relied heavily on the use of attack helicopters, which had previously played no role in the conflict. In addition, they managed to establish good relations with local militias; EO was able to fall back on the information network that existed in the rural area of ​​Sierra Leone. In addition, the company took up a concept that had already been successful for the South African Koevoet units in the fight against the liberation movements of Namibia: They trained local Mende hunters ; the units then called Kamajohs were excellent trackers who were familiar with the area and could count on the support of the local population. In the long term, however, they created another military power factor that further destabilized the situation in the country.

Since the EO mercenaries were wearing Sierra Leone army uniforms, a large part of the force were black Africans and the white mercenaries blackened their faces, it took some time for the RUF to realize who they were fighting. After that, the RUF leader Sankoh offered a reward of USD 75,000 for each EO helicopter downed. However, nobody could redeem this. Compared to the fight against the 30-year-old war veterans in Angola, EO mercenaries described the operation as "child's play"; they killed several hundred RUF members with minimal losses of their own and caused over 1000 desertions.

Not least because of the use of executive outcomes, it was possible to force the rebels to sign the Abidjan peace agreement in November 1996 , so that democratic elections could be held in Sierra Leone in 1996. A condition of the peace agreement was that EO leave the country; In fact, it was the only point of the agreement that was actually implemented, also because the World Bank asked the Sierra Leone government to withdraw from EO.

The influence that EO also had domestically during this period was evident in the position of President: On January 6, 1996, Julius Maada Bio successfully staged a coup against Valentine Strasser ; EO likely knew about this in advance but did nothing as they found Bio to be the more reliable business partner.

Aftermath

After EO withdrew from the country in January 1997, they prophesied to the newly elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah that there would be another coup against him within 100 days. In fact, officers succeeded in May 1997, 97 days after the withdrawal of EO, a coup against Kabbah and as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) to conquer the country together with the Revolutionary United Front and to establish a nine-month "reign of terror", which is more than 30,000 people fell victim.

During the UN's ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone, EO supported the Nigerian Air Force with pilots for their Alpha Jets and provided the UN troops with their own attack helicopters and crew. EO was happy to point out, however, that the ECOMOG mission, despite a budget and troop strength that corresponded to more than 20 times the EO funds, could not prevent and barely contain a civil war. The UN mission UNAMSIL was also unable to end the civil war. It was only when troops from Sandline International entered the country through British mediation and used EO as subcontractors that the situation was stabilized militarily and President Kabah was reinstated. However, after the Sandline retreat, civil war broke out again. At times, the RUF fighters took 500 UNAMSIL soldiers hostage and it was only through massive military intervention by Great Britain that the civil war could finally be ended.

Other missions

In addition to the large and relatively well-known assignments, Executive Outcomes was also employed in a large number of other countries. According to a report by the British weekly newspaper The Observer, there were at least 30 countries - mostly African countries such as Kenya or Madagascar, but also in Asia, for example in South Korea or Malaysia. In addition to various governments in Africa, Asia, Oceania and South America, De Beers , Chevron , Rio Tinto Zinc and Texaco were among the customers of EO.

Executive Outcomes itself took the view: "We are something like the UN for Africa, only with a smaller budget." During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, an in-house study came to the conclusion that EO had troops in Rwanda and within 14 days For six weeks, 1500 infantry with the support of air forces could have stationed and thus established protected areas for civilians from massacres and thus effectively prevented the genocide. After all, the UN mission in Rwanda did not take place until long after the genocide and, at 3 million US dollars per day, cost a multiple of the 600,000 US dollars per day advised by the EO.

Resolution and consequences

Executive Outcomes officially dissolved on January 1, 1999, as South African laws against mercenary companies were tightened. The office in Pretoria continued to work, as did the employees in Sierra Leone. There they then traded as employees of the EO offshoot Lifeguard.

Likewise, the numerous companies associated with EO persisted. Among them was the private military company Sandline International , whose other appearances mainly involved EO personnel and equipment. Sandline gained worldwide fame during a mission in Papua New Guinea , which was carried out entirely with EO personnel and equipment. The military staged a coup in the country, terminated the contract with Sandline, temporarily took the mercenaries hostage and kept the equipment. The litigation that followed, and that Sandline won, was one of the few occasions on which a contract with a private military company came to the fore. The former Sandline boss Tim Spicer, in turn, founded the company Aegis Defense Services in 2000 , which, among other things, operates personal protection for high government officials, US officials and UN employees in Iraq and is active in the intelligence service there.

On August 23, 2004, proceedings against 67 former Executive Outcomes members, including Simon Mann and Nick du Toit , were opened for an alleged attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea . They are said to have tried to bring weapons from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea to support the coup there. The son of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher , Mark Thatcher , and the Spanish government by Equatorial Guinean ruler Teodore Obiang were also accused. Thatcher was fined approximately $ 500,000 for violating the South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (incorrectly called the Anti-Mercenary Act) and was given a four-year suspended sentence. Simon Mann was sentenced to seven years in prison at Chikurubi Prison near Harare . South African Nick du Toit was arrested in Equatorial Guinea and sentenced to 34 years in prison, of which he served five years and eight months in solitary confinement in the infamous Black Beach Prison.

Structure and staff

Corporate structure

After having existed as a company in South Africa for the first few years, the men behind Executive Outcomes developed an elaborate corporate structure since 1992. They created a corporate network that included other military companies. Companies that provided the necessary logistics and companies that could exploit the raw materials to fight for the PO. The companies were officially based in several African countries, Great Britain, the Channel Islands , the Bahamas or Cyprus, but primarily operated from Pretoria and London. They were based on the Strategic Resources Group (SRG) in Pretoria , South Africa and Branch Energy in London. Although legally independent companies and even though those involved denied any direct relationship between individual parts of the groups, they were closely linked in their management bodies and worked closely together. For example, although Branch Energy was officially registered in the Bahamas, it shared the same address and phone number at Plaza 107 in London with the other London parts of the London group.

London offered itself as an important location, as the city is one of the mercenary strongholds in the world. The behavior of the British government towards military companies is largely responsible for this. UK law makes it legal to recruit British citizens as mercenaries as long as the recruiting state is not engaged in a war with the UK. There are few requirements for such companies.

Barlow headed the SRG in Pretoria and controlled most of the military operations from here. Branch Energy and its associated companies in London were headed by its future British partners Tony Buckingham and Simon Mann . Although denied by those involved, a large portion of the payment for EO operations appears to have been made by the governments in question granting Branch Energy exclusive mining rights in their jurisdictions. Even the UN reporter Enrique Bernales Ballesteros criticized in a 1996 report on Sierra Leone and Angola:

“As soon as the security situation in a country has improved, the company obviously begins to take advantage of the concessions it has received. For this purpose, it sets up a certain number of partner and subsidiary companies that are involved in air transport, road construction and import and export. In this way it succeeds in occupying a significant, if not hegemonic, position in the economic system of the country in which it operates. "

Executive Outcomes also used the planes of the Malta-based charter company, Ibis Air , to bring its troops into a country. After the country was pacified, the conglomerate organized the political education necessary for a functioning civil society. While the South African part of the company dissolved in 1999 and became a subsidiary, the London part still exists today.

Executive Outcomes often withdrew from a crisis area after a successful combat mission. Executive Outcomes was able to announce in its public relations work that the private military company no longer had any connections to the crisis area. In fact, other parts of the conglomerate, such as Lifeguard, simply took over the remaining security tasks. Most of the time, they even use the same staff and large parts of the previously used equipment. The structure itself included companies such as Falconeer and Bridge International, which supported the UN on various occasions in Africa.

Personnel and equipment

In addition to Barlow, important figures in EO history were Tony Buckingham , Michael Grunberg and Simon Mann . The company only had a very small number of permanent employees who mainly looked after the office and communication units in Pretoria. The company only recruited the actual combat troops for the respective missions. It was able to fall back on an extensive database of former South African special forces.

The combat troops consisted mostly of black Africans, while the officers were mostly white. Overall, around 70 percent of the soldiers deployed were black Africans. The language within the troops was Afrikaans , which gave EO the advantage over most opponents that their conversation was usually not understood. The preferred mercenaries included former members of the elite troops of the apartheid state: members of the Koevoet unit, which had fought against the SWAPO in Namibia , of the 32-Bataljon (Buffalo Battalion) , the so-called Foreign Legion of South Africa, of reconnaissance units of the special forces, the 44th parachutist -Brigade and from the offensive departments of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) as well as individual members of the South African police . In addition to the common language, the homogeneous composition of its fighters gave EO the advantage that many soldiers had fought with one another before and had undergone very similar military training. Due to the extensive conflicts in which South Africa's apartheid army was involved, EO was able to advertise with a total of "more than 5000 years of combat experience" and thus show more than most of the regular armed forces on earth.

The staff made between $ 2,000 and $ 13,000 a month, depending on the post and combat experience. The average salary for a soldier was $ 3,500 and a fighter pilot was $ 7,500 per month. The salaries were about five times as high as in the South African army and ten times as high as in most other African armed forces. In addition, EO paid in much more stable dollars and, unlike many armed forces in Africa, also paid regularly and reliably. EO was the first private military company to provide free medical care and life insurance to its employees. For larger deployments, the company also hired soldiers from the operational areas, although they only received a tenth of the salary of the regular EO troops. The only exception were the pilots and ground crew of the fighter planes, which were leased from Ukraine along with the planes.

BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle

Executive Outcomes preferred to use weapons made in the former Soviet Union. These were produced in large numbers during the existence of the Soviet Union and were cheap to acquire after the end of the Soviet Union. The most widely deployed ground vehicles included BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and BTR-60 armored personnel carriers . During the operation in Sierra Leone, the company chartered an entire cargo ship, which was in the port of Freetown during the operation .

EO, however, did not provide air troops directly, but instead negotiated a second contract with Ibis Air . However, the companies worked so closely together that outsiders could no longer make out the difference. Equipment used by Executive Outcomes or related companies included Mil-Mi-24 attack helicopters (Hind) , Mil-Mi-17 transport helicopters ("Hip"), MiG-23 fighter aircraft, Aero L-39 training aircraft , Pilatus PC-7 , Hawker-Siddeley-Andover transport aircraft and two Boeing 727s . In addition, Ibis Air had the opportunity to lease further combat aircraft or helicopters at short notice, so that Ibis Air / EO pilots also used Sukhoi Su-25 and MiG-27 , for example .

Employees today

After the company's dissolution, a number of EO employees are active for other clients with military services on the African continent. According to reports from 2015, Nigeria is using South African mercenaries in its fight against Boko Haram . Russian mercenaries would be responsible for training with newly acquired equipment such as military helicopters, while the South Africans would be considered good trainers and their tactical skills would be required.

literature

  • Thomas K. Adams: The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict. In: Parameters. US Army War College Quarterly. Sommer 1999, pp. 103-116 ( online ).
  • Guy Arnold: Mercenaries. The Scourge of the Third World. St. Martin's Press New York, New York 1999, ISBN 0-312-22203-3 .
  • Eeben Barlow: Executive Outcomes - Against All Odds. 30 Degrees South Publishers, 2019, ISBN 978-1-928359-05-0 .
  • Martin Binder: The use of mercenary companies by elected governments - an “antinomy of democratic peace”? In: Tübingen working papers on international politics and peace research. No. 44, Tübingen 2004, ISBN 3-927604-41-0 .
  • Douglas J. Brooks: The Business End of Military Intelligence: Private Military Companies. In: Military Professional Intelligence Bulletin. July – September 1999 ( online as PDF ).
  • Dena Montague: The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone. In: The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Volume 9, Issue 1, Spring 2002, pp. 229–237 ( online as PDF ).
  • Khareen Pech: Executive Outcomes - a corporatice Conquest. In: Jakkie Cilliers, Peggy Mason: Peace, Profit or Plunder ?: The Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies. Institute for Security Studies, pp. 83-109 ( online as PDF ).
  • Stefan Prunner: Private military ventures at the end of the 20th century. University of Vienna (2009) (online as PDF; 691 kB)
  • Elizabeth Rubin: Mercenaries. In: Roy Gutman, David Rieff (eds.): Crimes of War. What the Public Should Know. WW Norton & Company 1999, ISBN 0-393-31914-8 ( online ).
  • PW Singer: Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press, Ithaca / London 2003, ISBN 0-8014-8915-6 .
  • PW Singer (2003a): Peacekeepers, Inc. In: Policy Review. No. 119, June / July 2003 ( online ).

Remarks

  1. ↑ a b Singer 2003; 102
  2. ↑ Pech 2003: 84
  3. ^ Executive Outcomes, Special Training Program Proposal, 1992–1993. quoted according to Pech 2003: 85
  4. ↑ a b quot. n. Arnold 1999; 117
  5. ↑ a b Arnold 1999; 121
  6. ↑ a b c d Adams 1999
  7. ↑ a b Singer 2003; 108
  8. ↑ a b Singer 2003; 109
  9. ↑ Pech 2003; 83-85
  10. ↑ Pech 2003; 89
  11. ↑ Montague 2002; 229
  12. ↑ Singer 2003; 111/112
  13. ↑ Singer 2003; 110-112
  14. ↑ Brooks 1999; 2
  15. ↑ a b Rubin 1999
  16. ↑ Montague 2002; 233
  17. ↑ Brooks 1999; 4th
  18. ↑ Montague 2002; 234
  19. ↑ Singer 2003; 110
  20. ↑ a b c Binder 2004; 36
  21. ^ The Times, March 11, 1998
  22. ↑ a b Singer 2003a
  23. ↑ Arnold 1999; 120
  24. ↑ In the original: “We are something like the UN of Africa, only with a smaller budget.” Quoted in Rubin 1999
  25. ↑ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/13/simon-mann-mercenary-renounces-war
  26. ↑ James Brabazon: My Friend the Mercenary. Grove Press (March 22, 2011), ISBN 978-0802119759 . Nick du Toit biography.
  27. ↑ Arnold 1999; 119
  28. ↑ a b Pech 2003; 85-90
  29. ↑ Singer 2003; 104
  30. ↑ Pech 2003: 81
  31. ↑ a b Singer 2003; 103
  32. ↑ Arnold 1999; 117
  33. ↑ Singer 2003; 106
  34. ↑ Pech 2003; 88
  35. ↑ Christian Putsch: Nigeria: How South Africa's Mercenaries Defeat Boko Haram . In: THE WORLD . May 5, 2015 ( welt.de [accessed November 29, 2018]).

Web links

This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on December 11, 2006 .