Alvin Plantinga

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Alvin Plantinga

Alvin Carl Plantinga (born November 15, 1932 in Ann Arbor , Michigan ) is an American philosopher specializing in modal logic , epistemology and the philosophy of religion .

biography

Plantinga is a son of the philosopher Cornelius A. Plantinga and Lettie Bossenbroek, both of whom came from Calvinist churches in the Netherlands . As a child, he often spent the summers with his grandparents Bossenbroek, who had a farm between Waupun and Alto , Wisconsin . He began his studies at Harvard , but after only one year he moved to Calvin College in Grand Rapids , Michigan, to study philosophy with William Harry Jellema and Henry Stob . In addition, he took courses in psychology, which his father taught. In 1953 he left Calvin College to continue studying at the University of Michigan . There he learned a lot from the philosopher William K. Frankena . In 1955 he married Kathleen DeBoer and they have four children together. With her he also shared his enthusiasm for the mountains and mountaineering.

In 1958, Plantinga received a Ph.D. from Yale University. doctorate , after studying metaphysics there. During this time he already taught at Wayne State University in Detroit , then at Harvard and at the University of Illinois . In Detroit he met Hector Castañeda , George Nakhnikian and Edmund Gettier , who confronted him with deep anti-theist philosophical arguments. From 1964 to 1982 he was a professor at Calvin College in Grand Rapids (Michigan), from 1982 to 2010 at the University of Notre Dame near South Bend in Indiana . Plantinga is criticized for its proximity to the intelligent design movement .

Honors

Philosophical positions

Plantinga initially researched in the field of (then very young) modal logic , since the 1970s he has been increasingly concerned with epistemology and, in part, with the philosophy of mind . The unifying element of all of his philosophical positions is that they all aim to philosophically justify belief in God as an at least rationally defensible position.

Modal logic

At the beginning of his philosophical career, Plantinga was mainly concerned with modal logic. His attempt to reformulate the ontological proof of God by Anselm of Canterbury , so that from the possibility of the possibility of the necessity of God's existence, is particularly well known . This argument makes use of the concept of metaphysical necessity and assumes a system of possible worlds with transitive and symmetrical access relations (i.e. from every possible world every other possible world is also a possible world).

His variant of the ontological proof of God makes use of two premises: First, there is a possible world in which a being (or at least something) exists with maximum size and thus maximum perfection. Second, a being can only have maximum size if it is omnipotent , all-benevolent and all-knowing in every possible world . Given these premises, it inevitably follows that in every possible world - including the real (our) world - such a being must have these properties and must therefore also exist. This being can now also be called God .

Plantinga herself admits that no one is forced to accept the first premise; a reflection on the term could well show this, but it is not irrational to mean the opposite. In contrast, however, there are also atheistic arguments that accept Plantinga's conclusion as valid, but infer the impossibility of his existence with the same pattern of the falsehood of the necessity of God's existence. The critical consideration of the argument by John Leslie Mackie starts with this premise: Given Plantinga's understanding of possibility, it is not compatible with the assertion that there is a possible world without a perfect something. However, since this assertion is just as understandable and free of contradictions and a conclusion would result in a self-contradiction in both cases, neither of the two assertions should rationally be held to be true.

Plantinga's portrayal of a theodicy with the help of free will is also influential . Accordingly, it is logically compatible with the omnipotence, benevolence, and omniscience of God that there is evils in the world. As Leibniz has worked out, it must be assumed that we live in the best of all possible worlds. This means that any removal of an evil would result in an even greater evil. Free will is now a good that can plausibly be said to be affected by the removal of many evils. The existence of natural evils can at least possibly be explained by saying that these are the consequences of fallen angels and a necessary consequence of their free will. Mackie's criticism of this defense strategy is that while it may save the logical possibility of God's existence, it makes the actual existence appear highly improbable.

Epistemology

Since the late 1970s Plantinga developed his "reformed epistemology". His basic idea is that belief in God can be a “proper basic belief”. “Proper basic beliefs” are beliefs that do not have to be derived from other beliefs and cannot be derived from other beliefs either. For beliefs like “2 × 2 = 4”, “There is a tree in front of my house”, “I had corn flakes for breakfast this morning” I cannot provide any arguments or evidence, but these beliefs can be knowledge. They are basic beliefs that are formed by individual modules of our cognitive faculties in a corresponding environment. Such positions are usually referred to as epistemic fundamentalism.

According to Plantinga, belief in God is also mostly formed in a basic way. When looking at the starry sky, for example, the conviction “God created this world” can arise spontaneously. According to Plantinga, it is just as sensible to trust this part of our cognitive faculties as it is to trust our memory or our logical reasoning - provided there are no compelling arguments to suggest that a particular belief is wrong. Since there are no such compelling arguments (defeaters) for Plantinga with regard to the belief in God and generally with regard to the Christian faith, he considers these beliefs to be rationally justified.

In recent debates, Plantinga's “evolutionary argument against naturalism ” has also been much discussed. He attacks naturalistic positions that want to explain cognitive abilities with the help of the theory of evolution without belief in God or independent non-material forces . This results in a special skeptical challenge: From a naturalistic perspective, opinions in the sense of propositional attitudes with a certain content must arise at some point in the evolutionary process. These prevail evolutionarily when they lead to better adaptive behavior. Adaptive behavior is also possible due to wrong opinions: namely when the neurophysiological state leads to the desired result, but the content of the opinion is not seen as the causal cause of the behavior, but can be a completely different one. Therefore, naturalists cannot assume that the majority of their opinions have true content, so that their scientific worldview ultimately refutes itself. Theistic positions avoid this skeptical problem by pointing out, like René Descartes , that God does not deceive and that our opinions are by and large reliable.

Fonts

Major works

  • The Nature of Necessity. Oxford 1974.
  • with Nicholas Wolterstorff: Faith and Rationality. Notre Dame 1983.
  • Warrant: the current debate. Oxford 1993.
  • Warrant and proper function. Oxford 1993.
  • Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford 2000.
    • German edition: Guaranteed Christian Faith . Translated from English by Joachim Schulte. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2015.
  • Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. Oxford 2011.

Introductory texts (selection)

  • God, Freedom and Evil. Grand Rapids 1974.
  • Is belief in God justifiably basic? In: Christoph Jäger (Ed.): Analytical Philosophy of Religion. Schöningh, Paderborn [a. a.] 1998, ISBN 3-506-99489-1 , pp. 317-330.
  • with Michael Tooley: Knowledge of God. Oxford 2008.
  • God and Necessity. In: Joachim Bromand & Guido Kreis (eds.): Proofs of God. From Anselm to Gödel. Suhrkamp, ​​Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-518-29546-5 , pp. 453-482.

literature

  • Schönecker, Dieter (Ed.): Essays on "Warranted Christian Belief". With replies by Alvin Plantinga. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2015.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Alvin Plantinga: Spiritual Autobiography. I Roots and Early Days. Notre Dame, South Bend March 1992
  2. ^ Alvin Plantinga: Spiritual Autobiography. IV Wayne Days. Notre Dame, South Bend March 1992
  3. ↑ Cf. Barbara Forrest & Paul Gross: Creationism's Trojan Horse. Oxford 2004, pp. 156, 191, 212 and 269.
  4. ↑ Cf. Plantinga: God, Freedom and Evil. Oxford 1974, p. 111.
  5. ↑ Cf. Plantinga: God, Freedom and Evil. Oxford 1974, p. 112.
  6. ↑ Cf. Michael Tooley: Does God Exist? In: Plantinga & Tooley: Knowledge of God. Pp. 83-85.
  7. ↑ See John Leslie Mackie: The Miracle of Theism. Arguments for and against the existence of God. Reclam, Stuttgart 1985, ISBN 3-15-008075-4 , p. 96f.
  8. ↑ Cf. Plantinga: God, Freedon and Evil. Oxford 1974, pp. 29-34.
  9. ↑ See Plantinga: The Nature of Necessity. Oxford 1974, p. 192.
  10. ↑ See John Leslie Mackie: The Miracle of Theism. Arguments for and against the existence of God. Reclam, Stuttgart 1985, ISBN 3-15-008075-4 , p. 258.
  11. ↑ Cf. Plantinga: Warrant and proper function. Pp. 229-237.
personal data
SURNAME Plantinga, Alvin
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Plantinga, Alvin Carl (full name)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION American theologian and religious philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH November 15, 1932
PLACE OF BIRTH Ann Arbor , Michigan , United States