Saudia Flight 163
| Saudia Flight 163 | |
|---|---|
 A comparable L-1011 from Saudia |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Failure to evacuate after fire on board |
| place |
Riyadh airport 
|
| date | 19th August 1980 |
| Fatalities | 301 |
| Survivors | 0 |
| Injured | 0 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type | Lockheed L-1011 TriStar |
| operator | Saudia |
| Mark | HZ-AHK |
| Surname | SV 163 |
| Departure airport |
Karachi Airport 
|
| Stopover |
Riyadh airport
|
| Destination airport |
Jeddah Airport (old)
|
| Passengers | 287 |
| crew | 14th |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
Saudia Flight 163 was a Saudia scheduled flight from Karachi / Jinnah International Airport to Jeddah Airport with a stopover in Riyadh . During the flight on August 19, 1980, shortly after take-off from Riyadh, a fire broke out in the rear underfloor hold of the Lockheed L-1011 TriStar . The pilots managed to return to Riyadh and make an emergency landing , but no immediate evacuation was carried out. All 301 people were killed in the smoke and fire. This aircraft accident is both the most serious of a Lockheed L-1011 Tristar and the most serious in Saudi Arabia and is one of the10 worst accidents in civil aviation .
Course of the accident
The plane took off at 13:32 ( UTC ) in Karachi and landed on schedule at the stop in Riyadh at 16:06. After a two-hour stay, during which all passengers had to get off the plane and the plane was refueled, the plane took off again at 6:08 p.m. in Riyadh. About seven minutes after take-off, optical and acoustic signals indicated the development of smoke in the rear of the L-1011's hold. After the flight engineer had confirmed the smoke development after a visual check, the flight captain decided to return to Riyadh at 18:20 at an altitude of around 22,000 ft (approx. 6,700 m ) and a distance of 78 nm (approx. 140 km ).
The crew informed air traffic control in Riyadh about the fire on board and was given immediate clearance to land. At the same time the airport fire brigade was called in. At 6:25 p.m., the pilots found that the thrust lever of engine no. 2 could no longer be moved. At the same time, the cockpit crew was informed by a flight attendant that there was now a fire in the cabin that the passengers were fighting in the aisles. Shortly afterwards, the flight captain made an announcement asking the passengers to clear the aisles and stay in their seats. At 6:29 pm a flight attendant informed that there was now “too much smoke” in the cabin.
Three minutes later the captain informed air traffic control that he had the assigned runway in sight. He contacted the tower on instructions from air traffic control. Shortly before landing, engine no. 2, which could no longer be regulated, was switched off. In the meantime, flight attendants had asked whether the aircraft should be evacuated after landing. At 6:35 p.m. the master decided against an immediate evacuation after landing; the flight engineer passed this on to the flight attendants. A minute later the aircraft touched down on runway 01 .
After landing, the Lockheed Tristar rolled to the end of the runway, turned 180 degrees, and then turned right onto a taxiway . It was only there, at 6:39 p.m., around 2:40 minutes after touchdown, that the aircraft was brought to a stop. The pilots reported to the tower "Okay, we are shutting down the engines now and evacuating" . At 6:40 p.m. the tower announced that the fire was visible, and the last radio message came from the cockpit, which reads: “Affirmative, we are trying to evacuate now.” At 6:42 p.m., the two remaining engines were switched on switched off.
The rushed rescue workers were only able to open door 2R from the outside at 19:05. At 7:08 p.m. the interior of the aircraft was completely on fire. During this time, the crew made no attempts to open the aircraft from the inside or was no longer able to do so.
The aircraft burned out completely, all 301 people (crew and passengers) on board were killed.
Determination of causes
The accident investigations were led by the Saudi aviation authority and carried out under the then valid ICAO procedure (Annex 13) in cooperation with the US National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration as well as the British Air Accidents Investigation Branch .
plane
The aircraft with the registration HZ-AHK was an L-1011 TriStar from the manufacturer Lockheed with the serial number 1169. The L-1011 was equipped with three RB211 engines from Rolls-Royce . It was put into service in 1979. At the time of the accident, it had completed 3,023 flight hours. The plane had been serviced regularly.
Determination of cause of death
The majority of the fatalities had fled to the front of the aircraft after landing from the flames and were found there in front of exits L2 and R2. The autopsy of the examined fatalities showed that all of these people died of smoke inhalation. Soot was detectable in the lungs of all victims .
Behavior of the pilots
The investigators investigated, among other things, why the aircraft did not come to a stop until around 2:40 minutes after touchdown. The investigation showed that after landing there was very probably no or very little braking . Why the pilots did not use the maximum braking force remained open. The investigations showed, however, that the pilots would have had sufficient hydraulic pressure available for braking. If the brakes had been applied with full force, the aircraft would have come to a standstill around two minutes earlier and closer to the rescue services. This time would have been important for the survival of the passengers and crew, especially if an immediate evacuation had followed after the stop.
Behavior of the rescue workers
The interviews of the firefighters deployed by the investigators showed that the firefighters had little or no knowledge of the door mechanism of the L-1011. Only two firefighters had previously been explained the door mechanism by employees of the airline, they were not allowed to operate it themselves.
It was also found that none of the firefighters interviewed knew how many doors there were on this pattern or how otherwise one could have got inside the aircraft. This ignorance was found for all aircraft types flying to Riyadh. Only four firefighters had any training at the fire brigade school in Jeddah, all other forces had only been trained on site.
Due to the lack of training and equipment, the rescue workers only managed to open the first door around 20 minutes after landing. Although there was enough time to prepare, the rescue workers failed to bring the appropriate tools for opening the cabin door by force.
Examination result
The origin of the fire could no longer be finally determined in the investigations. In all probability, the fire broke out in area C3 of the hold. The intensity of the fire was so intense that it burned through the floor of the passenger compartment. As a result, the passengers sitting there fled to the front before landing.
The investigators found two gas stoves together with an empty fire extinguisher in the rubble . Some airlines allowed devout Muslim passengers to use a gas cooker on board so that they could comply with the food laws during the flight . The same cause of accident was assumed for the accident of a Boeing 707-300 on Pakistan International Airlines Flight 740 a year earlier.
The published investigation report states that the accident would in principle have been “survivable”. The main reasons for the fatal outcome were
- the master's refusal to prepare the cabin crew for a post-landing evacuation, braking the aircraft with maximum force, followed by an immediate evacuation,
- the failure of the master to make full use of the capabilities of his cockpit crew and
- the failure of rescue workers' management to ensure that rescue workers have sufficient training and equipment to take the correct action in an emergency.
recommendations
In its report, the investigation committee makes the following recommendations based on its findings on the causes of the accident and the deficiencies discovered:
- A review of all cargo holds larger than 500 ft³ (14 m³ ) for the use of fire retardant materials (recommendation from the NTSB to the FAA , which was adopted in the report of the Saudi commission).
- Revision of the company's internal guidelines for training and recruiting flight personnel and, in particular, for strengthening crew resource management .
- Compliance with guidelines for the handling of hand luggage and free baggage .
- Improvement in the training and further education of the staff of the airport fire brigade of the Saudi airports.
Others
This accident is the incident with the most fatalities of this type of aircraft and the second worst of the Saudia airline (as of 04/2017). Only in the plane collision at Charkhi Dadri , in which a Boeing 747 from Saudi Arabian Airlines was involved, more (349) people were killed, including all 37 occupants of an Ilyushin Il-76 from Air Kazakhstan .
See also
- Nigeria Airways Flight 2120
- Pakistan International Airlines Flight 740
- VARIG flight 820
- Air Canada Flight 797
- CAAC flight 2311
Web links
- Investigation report of the Saudi Accident Investigation Commission of the Presidency of the civil aviation in Jeddah
- Re-enactment of the accident in the flight simulator
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d Accident report L-1011 HZ-AHK , Aviation Safety Network (English), accessed on January 17, 2019.
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k Investigation report ( memento of the original dated December 31, 2013 on WebCite ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. of the Saudi Accident Commission, published on the website of the Federal Aviation Administration
Coordinates: 24 ° 57 ′ 28 " N , 46 ° 41 ′ 56" E