Battle of the Pontes longi

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Roman-Germanic Wars
date 15 AD
place Possibly Kalkriese near Bramsche
output draw
Parties to the conflict

Roman Empire

Germanic tribes
( Cheruskers , Marser , Chatten , Brukterer , Chauken and other tribes)

Commander

Aulus Caecina Severus

Arminius

Troop strength
four legions, 28,000 to 30,000 men including the train
Legio I Germanica
Legio V Alaudae
Legio XX Valeria Victrix
Legio XXI Rapax
unknown
losses

10,000 to 15,000

unknown

The battle of the Pontes longi took place in 15 AD between Germanic tribal warriors under Arminius and Roman troops under Aulus Caecina Severus . It ended as a defensive success of the Romans, who, albeit with heavy losses, evaded the annihilation by the Teutons and were able to reach the Rhine. The battle is part of the Germanicus campaigns (14-16 AD).

prehistory

After the annihilation of three legions under Publius Quinctilius Varus by Arminius in AD 9, the Romans carried out another campaign 6 years later in the Germanic area .

The Roman troops under Germanicus and General Caecina pushed forward to the old battlefield of the Varus Battle and buried the remains of the dead. Then there was a battle between the Romans and the Germanic tribes led by Arminius, which, according to Tacitus, ended in a draw. The assumption is strong, however, that the Romans suffered very heavy losses; especially their cavalry and auxiliary troops seem to have been badly damaged. In any case, it is certain that Germanicus immediately withdrew from Germania afterwards, although he had apparently planned to keep a large part of the country occupied for longer (after all, he had a tumulus built at the site of the Varus Battle, which the Teutons after the siege of one Fort on the Lippe destroyed again).

Germanicus, who at that time was west of the Weser, first withdrew to the Ems and then led 4 legions back to the Lower Rhine by river or sea. They suffered heavy losses from a storm surge. Previously he ordered Caecina, with four legions , namely the 1st , 5th , 20th and 21st (all in all 28,000 to 30,000 men including the entourage), one called "pontes longi" ("long bridges") To repair the path that was laid out by the Romans around the year 1 AD.

This is often assumed to be a wooden plank path through the swampy lip lowlands between Xanten and Haltern or Rheine , but this remains unoccupied. Raphael v. Uslar has made it clear that the conventional Germanic boardwalk paths could not have been suitable for transporting one (or even four) Roman legion / s, so this must be a heaped dam path. In other words, Caecina probably did not travel a long way over “pontes longi”, but was supposed to repair an old Roman dam at a certain point.

Course of the battle

When Caecina and his troops reached the causeway, which was in a desolate condition, they were surrounded by Arminius' warriors, who had advanced in much larger numbers than expected, in such a way that the Romans were building roads in the swampy lowland while the Germans camped on the wooded height. So Caecina had a camp built while the other part of the troops was busy with the attacks of the Teutons. After heavy battles with many losses, the Romans withdrew to the camp in the evening. By diverting streams, the Germanic tribes then let masses of water flow down from the heights, which also destroyed the laboriously built dam. The next day, the Romans gave up the further construction on the Dammweg and continued their march over a sandy slope, which was apparently too narrow to allow the planned "square formation" through which the entourage in the middle through those on the flanks The 5th and 21st Legions were to be protected, while the 20th formed the rearguard and the 1st the vanguard. The legions on the flanks left their positions and gave the Teutons the opportunity to attack the entourage. In the battles for the entourage, the 1st Legion stood out, courageously opposing the Germans. But soon the path led again into swampy terrain; Towards evening the Romans were only able to fight their way into the dry land with enormous losses, where they set up a makeshift fortified camp and had hardly any provisions left.

Tacitus reports in detail about the desperation of the Romans that night, primarily to praise the leadership of the general Caecina, who despite everything held the troops together and thus - because the battle is consistently compared to the Varus battle - a positive counter-example to the allegedly culpably inept Varus delivered. He is also said to have set up a cavalry unit by taking away the officers' personal horses and assigning them to suitable soldiers - starting with his own horse. It is therefore clear that the Romans had already lost their entire cavalry, probably in the first battle mentioned further north.

At the same time, the Teutons held an army assembly , with Arminius' uncle Ingomerus calling for a storm on the Roman camp. Arminius' contradiction and his arguments for sticking to the tried and tested strategy of attrition attacks on the marching enemy army were ignored. The next day the Germans attacked the camp, but were repulsed with great losses. Caecina was able to continue his retreat to the Rhine undisputed and lead the remnants of his army across the Rhine to the main camp Xanten-Birten. The entourage and a large part of the soldiers (10,000 to 15,000 men) were lost. Germanicus had not yet arrived with his units, but his wife Agrippina quickly took over the management of the rescuing soldiers and prevented the demolition of the Rhine bridge by the garrison, which feared an attack by the Teutons across the bridge. This behavior angered the emperor Tiberius against his nephew Germanicus, since it put the figures of the generals shamefully in the shadow of a mere woman.

research

Some ancient historians ( Peter Kehne , Reinhard Wolters ) claim that the Kalkriese find region gives evidence of the battle of the Pontes longi.

This opinion is represented by the currently strongest group of critics against Kalkriese as the site of the Varus Battle. The thesis is based on the possibility that the division of the Germanicus army could have already taken place east of the Ems and that Caecina's four legionary army was involved in the battle described in detail by Tacitus in the Kalkriese pass.

Tacitus, Annalen 1,63: “.... mox reducto ad Amisiam exercitu legiones classe, ut ad vexerat, reportat; pars equitum litore Oceani petere Rhenum iussa; Caecina, qui suum militem ducebat, monitus, quamquam notis itineribus regrederetur, pontes longos quam maturrime superare. "
Translated: “Soon afterwards Germanicus led his army back to the Ems and led his legions home with the fleet, just as he had brought them. Part of the cavalry was ordered to reach the Rhine along the sea coast. Caecina, who was in command of his own division, was instructed to cross the long bridges at all possible speed, even though he was marching back along a path he knew. "

Remains of a plank path have been found near Hunteburg only 10 km away from the Kalkriese battlefield, the horizon of which can be dendrochronologically dated to the year 15 AD - the year of the battle of the Pontes Longi. Wooden swords and clubs that clearly show signs of battle were found as additional finds.

Other historians, on the other hand, argue that the battle site is southwest of the Ems. However, this remains unclear; the area between Münster and Coesfeld was assumed in the past. The Hamburg economist Siegfried Schoppe assumes that the connecting route between Wiedenbrück and Lippstadt corresponds to the route Pontes Longi.

Individual evidence

  1. Tacitus, Annals 1.63-69
  2. Raphael v. Uslar: To the Pontes Longi , Gymnasium, 78 /, 1971
  3. Tacitus, Annals 1.65
  4. Cf. Rainer Wiegels : Rome Germania and the excavations of Kalkriese
  5. ^ Ralf G. Jahn : Der Römisch-Germanische Krieg , dissertation, Bonn, 2001

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