Battle of Ayacucho
| date | December 9, 1824 |
|---|---|
| place | Ayacucho , Peru |
| output | Surrender of the Spaniards, which led to the independence of most South American states. |
| consequences | Surrender of the Spaniards in Peru |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 5780 | 6900 |
| losses | |
|
309 dead, 670 wounded |
1,800 dead, 700 wounded and 2,000 prisoners |
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The battle of Ayacucho was the decisive battle in the war of independence of the Spanish colonies in South America under Simón Bolívar . The subsequent surrender of Ayacucho only ended the war nominally - even after the acceptance of the surrender in March 1825 in Upper Peru ( Alto Peru , today Bolivia ).
Ayacucho means the "corner of the dead" in Quechua . This locality is located in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield discussed about 15 km northeast of the city of the same name. Here at the end of the 14th century the Wari culture , which was already in decline, was finally defeated by the Incas and assimilated into their empire. In 1825, Bolívar renamed today's provincial capital by decree in honor of the victory of the patriots: to this day, however, the original name Huamanga is used by the locals.
prehistory
After the unsuccessful success of the Chilean-Argentine expedition of José de San Martín to support the Peruvian separatists 1820-1822, Simón Bolívar came to Peru at the request of the Congress in Lima to promote the country's emancipation. First he had overcome the inner conflict of the patriots and then prepared his campaign for the liberation of Peru. The first part of the plan provided for the breaking up of the Northern Division in the central highlands, which the Southern Division in Cusco was to follow. With the Battle of Junín on August 6th, the united army of great Colombians and Peruvians, in which about 100 Argentines and Chileans fought, reached its first stage and was now on the not too serious pursuit of the royal army towards the southeast.
Starting position of the Spaniards
José Canterac, who was in command of the Northern Division, had to fight desertions on his escape alongside the montoneros , local guerrilla troops (such as skirmishers ) . Against the latter, the guards set up in the night camps were of little help either. The colonial army in Peru was composed mainly of Indians and a few blacks and mestizos . The officers were white Creoles , and just under six percent of the army, mostly the top management level, came from Spain. In view of this composition, it is not surprising that Canterac lost more than seven times as many soldiers on his flight as in the Battle of Junín, namely around 2700. Through forced recruitment, he was able to regain a good third on the way to Viceroy José de la Serna in Cusco balance.
At the end of September the Northern Division reached the area around Cusco. De la Serna himself led another 1,800 soldiers from the old Inca capital to Canterac to replenish its troubled army. He had fortified positions built south and west of Cusco to prevent a possible attack by the patriots. He had also ordered back Jerónimo Valdés' southern division, which was occupied with Pedro Antonio Olañeta in Upper Peru. Olañeta had renounced the authority of the viceroy at the end of last year and obtained the appointment of viceroy for the viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata from the Spanish King Ferdinand VII . The Spanish rebel could never have conquered Argentina, but by competing with the Spanish in Peru he made a decisive contribution to the success of the patriots there. The background to the dispute in the ranks of the Spaniards was that Olañeta de la Serna (who had put himself into office in 1821 for almost exactly the same reason) accused him of not being sufficiently loyal to the king and of the liberal Spanish constitution, inspired by the French Revolution 1812 (see Constitution of Cadiz ) to be attached.
De la Serna had Canterac reorganize the army as chief of staff in October, while the viceroy regulated his official business in Cusco in such a way that he had the opportunity to lead the royal army against the separatists for a while. Jerónimo Valdés took over the vanguard with his division consisting of four battalions, while Juan Antonio Monet (four battalions) and Alejandro Gonzáles Villalobos (five battalions) commanded the two infantry divisions. A cavalry division under Valentín Ferraz, four regiments and two squadrons in two brigades, as well as fourteen guns commanded by Fernando Cacho, and an engineering division completed the colonial army, which was around nine thousand men. With this the viceroy began a march against the united army of patriots in the last days of October.
In Spain, the New Year's uprising of 1820, in which Rafael del Riego led the army destined for the reconquest of South America to Madrid and Ferdinand VII had made him swear by the constitution of 1812, had brought about a more liberal attitude towards the colonies, but the one that had been forced back to the monarchy The French had sent Louis-Antoine de Bourbon, duc d'Angoulême , the later Charles X, to Spain with a large army and at the end of 1823 the Bourbone was again absolute ruler in Spain. Now he was again thinking of a strong expedition that might not only have prolonged the war, but in the worst case would have led to the renewed submission of the Spanish overseas possessions. Bolívar was familiar with these thoughts from his childhood playmate, and he knew that only the quick creation of facts could put an end to these royal mind games.
Location of the patriots
Bolívar took time to pursue the Spanish Northern Division, and individual units liberated the villages and towns along the road that led via Huancayo and Ayacucho in September to the area southwest of what is now the provincial capital of Apurímac , Abancay . From here he sent reconnaissance patrols to scout the Spaniards east of the Río Apurímac and, if necessary, to liberate places from Spanish rule. He had the bulk of his army take a position because Bolívar had ordered it, and because the rainy season was approaching, which decisively restricted the use of muzzle-loaders.
Bolívar therefore expected that the Viceroy would not plan any major operations either, and went to Huancayo at the end of September. Here he arrived on October 6th, established his headquarters and began training reinforcements for Sucre. In this situation, Bolívar reached the request brought before the Congress by his deputy Francisco de Paula Santander in Bogotá to surrender the supreme command of the united army. Santander cared about the well-being of Greater Colombia, which needed all his strength to rebuild after almost fifteen years of war of liberation, while Bolívar knew that only the complete liberation of the continent would secure what had been achieved.
Knowing that in his capacity as dictator president of Peru he would continue to hold the strings in hand, and because in Antonio José Sucre he had a loyal officer who was inferior in age but not inferior in skill and commitment, he fulfilled the conditions of the Parliament of Greater Colombia and gave Sucre the supreme command. At first he gave Sucre instructions and advice on how to proceed, but as the situation got worse he gave Sucre a free hand as he was closer to the action, while Bolívar stayed on the coast north of Lima from early November and occupied the capital on December 5th .
The troops of the republic were divided into the divisions of José María Córdova from Greater Colombia with four battalions, the vanguard, the Peruvian under José de la Mar with three, and the four battalions also recruited in Greater Colombia under Jacinto Lara, who formed the rear guard. William Miller led the three cavalry regiments that completed the army of over six thousand men with two guns. In October he moved these troops a few dozen kilometers to the northeast, towards Abancay, where he intended to counter a possible attack by the Spaniards, which he did not expect.
The Viceroy's Initiative
On October 25th, the king's forces set out and crossed the Río Apurímac. The troops bypassed the positions of the patriots far to the south and Sucre responded with a small shift of his troops back to Andahuaylas . At first he did not believe in a major Operation de la Sernas and accordingly behaved passively. Bolívar advised him, however, not to let the viceroy march too far away from him, as several Spanish ships were lying off the south coast of Peru, with which de la Serna, in conjunction with his army, could have caused some mischief.
However, as it soon became apparent, De la Serna had very different plans. He turned north from his originally westward movement to cut Sucre off from reinforcements from the central highlands and communication with Bolívar. If he had previously been east-southeast and, after marching away, south of the United Army, he was north-east in mid-November and on the 19th sent his scouts to Huamanga to the north. Sucre was surprised by the de la Sernas movement, which in turn was surprised by Sucres' immobility as he had expected the separatists to prevent him from taking Huamanga.
Sucre admitted his mistake and now moved his troops west. Here the Río Pampas flows approximately north-south. On a mountain near the village of Bómbon, west of Andahuaylas, he had his soldiers buried and waited for the Spaniards. De la Serna did come, but despite his numerical superiority, he shied away from an attack because he feared too high losses. He withdrew again to the west side of the Río Pampas and made a series of movements in late November that were intended to lure Sucre from his position. After a few unsuccessful attempts, he sent Valdés with the vanguard on the 29th behind the position of the patriots. Sucre understood immediately that if attacked from two sides, his position would become untenable. He gave up his position on the night of November 30th and crossed the river north of the position of de la Serna on the morning of December 1st.
When the Viceroy found out about this, he followed the heels of the United Army and ordered Valdés back to the main body of his army. At times with visual contact, the two armies marched side by side to the north-northwest. When Valdés met de la Serna at noon on December 3, the latter ordered him to attack the Republicans who were just crossing the Rió Collpahuaico (also Corpahuaico). This vehement attack on Lara’s rearguard, which was in marching formation, led to the almost total loss of the proven Rifles battalion and heavy losses to the Vargas battalion . One of the two guns had to be abandoned and the Spaniards captured large parts of the separatists' equipment. The relatively easy to defend river crossing and the falling night prevented the Patriots from losing more than three hundred men - ten times as many as the Spaniards.
Sucre had no choice but to continue his march, and even a night march could not shake off the stubborn pursuer. On December 6, he reached the hamlet of Quinoa, a good ten kilometers east of Huamanga as the crow flies, where he let his army rest. De la Serna had followed him further west, had Huamanga occupied as a precaution, and had advanced further north. The following day he turned to the southeast and reached the mountain Condorcunca , on the slopes of which he had his soldiers erect a fortified position.
Between the Condorcunca and Quinoa there is a small plateau about twelve hundred meters long at 3200 meters above sea level, which the Quechua- speaking indigenous population calls Ayak'uchu , the angle of the dead, since here in 1437 Pachacútec Yupanqui , who climbed the Inkathron the following year, at this point defeated the Wari (also Huari), who owned their cultural center just a few kilometers to the west, in a bloody battle . The decisive battle of the Wars of Liberation in South America was fought on December 9, 1824 at this historic location.
Before the battle
Few exchanges of fire are reported from the night before the battle, but also of a meeting of family members between the two armies, initiated by Gonzáles Villalobos and approved by Sucre. The relatives, who fought under different flags, were allowed to celebrate a final farewell less because of different views within families than more because of forced recruitment and prisoners of war deployed in both armies from the other side.
The discipline enforced, especially among the Spaniards, had led to abundant desertions during the viceroy's marches in recent weeks, so that of the originally more than nine thousand soldiers only just under seven thousand remained who faced the 5,780 patriots to fight that morning. While the senior officers discussed with the viceroy at nine o'clock how they wanted to shape the upcoming battle, Sucre strengthened his troops morally with an appeal: “ Soldiers! The fate of South America depends on today's efforts, another day of glory will crown your admirable steadfastness. Soldiers! Long live the liberator! Long live Bolívar, the savior of Peru! “With his numerically inferior forces he could not lead an uphill attack against the royalists, but had to wait for their initiative.
Course of the battle
A. Position of the royalists on the night of 8th to 9th
B. Deployment for the attack of the royalists
C. Approach of Colonel Rubín de Celis Battalion
D. Approach and attack of Monet's division
E. Attack by Valdé's vanguard on that defended by independence fighters Homestead
F. Attack by the royalist cavalry
M. and the Gerona battalion broken up by the royalist reserve
K. Ferdinand VII battalion, last royalist reserve
The republican army had taken up position near the present-day memorial obelisk and was waiting for the enemy in the following formation: De la Mars Peruvians stood on the left, i.e. in the northwest, Córdova on the right with the Great Columbians and in between, set back a little, the battered division of Lara. Sucre Miller's rider was posted in front of it. De la Serna's plan provided that Jerónimo Valdés with his battle-tested division attack the weak left side with de la Mars Peruvians and the two other divisions should move up and support him, as well as the two cavalry brigades, which were to be sent if necessary. At first, the Spaniards' calculation seemed to work, because when Valdés advanced around ten o'clock, the Peruvians got into the predicted distress.
Sucre responded by sending his cavalry and also let Córdova rush to the aid of the Peruvians. On the one hand, since Córdova could not get from the right to the left flank as quickly as necessary, and Valdés had pushed the Division de la Mar further back than intended, only a single Spanish battalion got onto the battlefield at first and was worn out by the Córdova Division . But since this had also cost time and the Spaniards threw an entire division forward, Sucre ordered the Lara division, with the exception of the Rifles, to the Peruvians to the left.
The Spaniards later stated that the area was covered by mudslides and that they were therefore only able to advance slowly to the scene of the battle. These terrain-related difficulties also served as a reason for the individual divisions - and even individual parts of them - arriving on the battlefield one after the other. In any case, José María Córdova drove the royalists with his youthful verve and the bayonet. In doing so, he prevented the relief that Valdés had trusted when the Peruvians were supported by parts of the Lara division . Cordova, with the help of some cavalry units sent by Miller, dispersed the first brigade of Monet's division to receive cavalry support from Ferraz. Subsequently, the Villalobos division arrived, which Córdova also defeated. The royal associations began to disintegrate, and Sucre then sent his reserves onto the battlefield. Valdés, too, was left with only retreat, which he, like his colleagues in the center of the battle, was unable to manage in an orderly manner. Persecuted mainly by the cavalry, because Córdova and his soldiers urgently needed a break, the royalists fled to their positions on the Condurcunca. The pursuit of the successes of Córdova was so quick that the viceroy, standing behind the lines with reserves and artillery, was forced to fight himself before he was injured and taken prisoner.
Balance sheet and consequences of the battle
In the three-hour battle, a good three hundred patriots lost their lives and over six hundred men were wounded. The Spaniards, on the other hand, had 1,800 dead and 700 wounded, plus a thousand prisoners on the battlefield. This disproportion on the part of the Spaniards can be explained by a subsequent massacre on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, on the mountainside above the place of the meeting, the remaining senior officers of the Spaniards discussed their next steps. Valdés and others would have liked to continue the fight, as there were still some intact garrisons, especially on the south coast of Peru, over a thousand royalists had escaped defeat and Upper Peru was still under Spanish control. However, Chief of Staff Canterac favored the surrender of the entire viceroyalty, since a continuation of the fighting would have only delayed the end of colonial rule in Spain, but would not have averted it. The defector José de la Mar arrived at the camp of the royal army around 5 p.m. and presented Sucres with an offer for an honorable surrender. That tipped the balance and Canterac signed the deed of surrender on behalf of de la Sernas. Another thousand soldiers were taken prisoner here.
A few days later, Sucre continued his march on Cusco and went with some of his troops to other cities in southern Peru. In 1825 he devoted himself to Upper Peru, where only the Spaniards fought among themselves, when he moved south with broad support and an ever-growing army. Pedro Antonio Olañeta was shot (with or without battle) in Tumusla by his own men on March 1st. This officially ended the war of liberation, but persistent royalists continued to offer local resistance for years, which was repeatedly suppressed militarily.
Ayacucho's Spanish officers were given privileges while in South America, and Bolívar approved their departure to Spain. There, however, an investigation into Freemasonry was initiated (which is tantamount to the accusation that they supported the independence movement). Indeed, the question arises as to why de la Serna and his officers did not make better use of their numerical superiority and wiped out Sucres army with a concentrated attack. At that time the investigations were stopped, but a current Spanish historian speaks of the "betrayal of Ayacucho" and assumes that the outcome of the battle had already been negotiated and the meeting on the Ayacucho plateau was therefore only a bloody spectacle for the king with no real value has been.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Bol. Mus. Arqueol. Antropol. (UNMSM)
- ↑ LECUNA, 1950, Chapter XXVI, Final de la persecución a Canterac.
- ↑ BENCOMO, 2007, p. 97-99
- ^ French invasion of Spain
- ↑ MILLER, 1828, p. 139ff .
- ↑ LECUNA, 1950, chap. XXVII, Sucre general en jefe.
- ↑ BENCOMO, 2007, p. 97
- ↑ GARCIA CAMBA, 1846, p. 217
- ↑ GARCIA CAMBA, 1846, p. 219
- ↑ LECUNA, 1955, chap. XIII, Confianza de Sucre.
- ↑ BENCOMO 2007, p. 102-103
- ↑ MILLER, 1828, p. 158f .
- ↑ BENCOMO 2007, p. 104
- ↑ GARCIA CAMBA, 1846, p. 233
- ↑ LECUNA 1950, chap. XXVII, Batalla de Ayacucho.
- ↑ Bencomo 2007, p. 109
- ↑ Parte de la batalla de Ayacucho, Antonio José Sucre, z. B. BENCOMO, p. 111, 2007
- ↑ Spanish original text of the surrender as pdf
swell
- Aniversario de la Batalla de Ayacucho. Educativo Huascarán portal.
- Batalla de Ayacucho. Quemarropa
- Batalla de Ayacucho. El Gran Capitán .
- Stefan K. Beck: The Wars of Liberation in the Bolivarian Countries of South America. ISBN 978-3-00-032556-4 .
- Héctor Bencomo Barrios: La emancipación del Perú. Caracas 2007. ISBN 980-7053-00-5 .
- Héctor Bencomo Barrios: Bolívar y Sucre en la emancipación del Perú. Academia Nacional de la Historia, Venezuela.
- Andrés García Camba: Memorias for the historia de las armas españolas en el Perú. Vol. II , 1846.
- Vicente Lecuna: Crónica Razonada de las Guerras de Bolívar. Caracas, 1950.
- Vicente Lecuna: Bolívar y el Arte Militar. Colonial Press, New York, 1955. Chap. XIII, rtf download
- John Miller: Memoirs of General Miller in the service of the Republic of Peru. Vol. II , 1828.