Battle of Dumlupinar
Greek soldiers west of Afyonkarahisar (August 29, 1922)
| date | August 26-30, 1922 |
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| place | Near Kütahya , western Turkey |
| output | Turkish victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
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| Commander | |
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| Troop strength | |
| Parts of: 98,670 infantry 5,286 cavalry 323 artillery |
Parts of: 130,000 infantry 1,300 cavalry 348 artillery |
| losses | |
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August 26 - September 9: |
As of August 31: |
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Smyrna I - Aydın - İnönü I - İnönü II - Eskişehir - Sakarya - Great Offensive ( Dumlupınar - Smyrna II )
The Battle of Dumlupınar ( Greek Μάχη του Τουμλού Μπουνάρ machi tou Toumloú Bounár , Turkish Dumlupınar Muharebesi or Başkumandanlık (Meydan) Muharebesi ; literally battle the commander ) was the last battle of the Greco-Turkish War (part of the Turkish War of Independence ). The battle took place near Kütahya between August 26 and 30, 1922 .
background
After the Battle of Sakarya from August 23 to September 13, 1921, the Greek Army of Asia Minor under General Anastasios Papoulas withdrew to the line of defense between İzmit , Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar . The Greeks formed a 700 km long arc in a north-south direction on a hilly terrain. There was only one railway connection from Afyonkarahisar to the Greek headquarters in Izmir , which was the main supply line for the Greeks. The fortified city of Dumlupınar , the site of the later battle, was located in a valley 48 km west of Afyonkarahisar on this route and was surrounded by the Murat and Ahır mountains. The headquarters were barely able to communicate with the front lines and thus plan the raids.
Preparations
After the lost battle on Sakarya, the Greek army was reorganized: some of the troops were relocated to Thrace, where they were supposed to be ready for an offensive on Istanbul, which was never implemented. General Papoulas was replaced by General Georgios Hatzianestis in May 1922 . Morale in the army was not good as many soldiers had been under arms for years and there was no end of the war in sight. Political rifts and the fact that the population of the occupied territories was not friendly, weighed more on morale.
Meanwhile, the Turks in Ankara, under their new Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal , took advantage of their victory and the time gained with it to strengthen their forces and to influence the Allies through diplomacy, so that in the end the Italians and French tended more towards the Turks and the British remained as the only ally of the Greeks.
Mustafa Kemal decided to attack the Greeks in August 1922. Knowing that the Turkish army could only carry out one major offensive, he reinforced the first Turkish army under Nureddin Pasha , which was used against the southern Greek line at Afyonkarahisar. This move was risky because if the Greeks were able to counterattack they would cut off and surround the first army.
Armed forces
Greek troops
The Greek Army of Asia Minor consisted of around 220,000 men in twelve infantry and one cavalry division. The divisions were divided into three corps, under the command of Major General Nikolaos Trikoupis (Corps I in Afyonkarahisar), Major General Kimon Digenis (Corps II in Gazligöl) and Major General Petros Soumilas (Corps III in Eskişehir). The cavalry division did not belong to any corps and was used with other small groups for the security of the troops and against guerrilla actions by the Turks. Each corps consisted of four divisions: The I. Corps consisted of the 1st, 4th, 5th and 12th divisions, the II. Corps of the 2nd, 7th, 9th and 12th divisions and the III. Corps from the 3rd, 10th, 11th and an "independent" division. The Greeks were numerically strong, but had hardly any heavy artillery (40 outdated guns) and little cavalry (half a company per division).
Turkish troops
The 208,000 strong Turkish troops in the west were under the command of Mirliva (roughly equivalent to Brigadier General ) İsmet Pascha . They consisted of 18 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions. The Turkish headquarters was in Koca Tepe 15 km south of Afyonkarahisar. Mirliva Nureddin Pascha commanded the 1st Army (1st, 2nd and 4th Corps) in Koca Tepe, Mirliva Yakub Şevki Pascha in Doğlat the 2nd Army (3rd and VIth Corps and 1st and 61st Infantry Divisions), Colonel Halid Bey the Kocaeli Group (18th Infantry Division with additional units) and Mirliva Fahreddin Pascha the 5th Cavalry Corps (1st, 2nd and 14th Cavalry Division ). Each Turkish infantry division, which consisted of an average of 7,500 men, was divided into an attack battalion and several regiments and 12 artillery weapons.
tactics
Turkish plan
The Turkish plan provided for the Greek troops in Afyonkarahisar to be cut off from their headquarters and surrounded. For this purpose, the 1st Army was supposed to attack the southwestern positions, while the 5th Cavalry Corps was supposed to get behind the Greek line through the weakly guarded Kirka Gorge and the 2nd Army was supposed to attack the lines north of Afyonkarahisar. Furthermore, the rail connections were to be interrupted and in a later phase the two armies south of Kütahya were to unite and thus form a ring around the Greeks in Afyonkarahisar.
Greek plan
The Greeks suspected a major offensive by the Turks, but did not know from which direction it would come. They expected an attack along the Ankara – Eskişehir or Konya – Afyonkarahisar railway lines. But the rail link from Ankara was destroyed by the Greeks in the summer of 1921 after the Battle of Sakarya and the Turks had not yet repaired it. After 1921, the Greek army was divided into two groups that were supposed to repel any Turkish attack independently. But with the new commander Georgios Hatzianestis , the old order was restored, so that the entire front was held by three Greek corps (I., II. And III.). Corps I was with Afyonkarahisar, Corps II with Eskişehir and Corps III served as a reserve. In the event of an attack, Reserve Corps II should rush to the rescue and hit the Turks on their flank. Contrary to what was reported to the contrary, Hatzianestis thought that his army was strong enough to fend off the Turks. The Greek reconnaissance reported Turkish activities, but could not find out the correct army size and the time of the attack.
The battle
Turkish attack and breakthrough (August 26-27, 1922)
The Turkish attack began on the night of August 25th to 26th when the 5th Turkish Cavalry Corps entered the Greek line through the Kirka Gorge. The gorge was guarded, but the guard was overrun. The Turkish cavalry set about cutting the telegraph connections and sabotaging the railway line, which severely affected Greek communication with Izmir.
On the morning of August 26, the 1st and 2nd Turkish Armies attacked simultaneously. The 2nd Army attacked the surprised Greeks after a bombardment and captured the positions of the 5th Greek Division. But the Greeks were able to regain their position. The 2nd Army attacked the III. Corps and prevented it from rushing to the aid of the II Corps.
The attacks by the 1st Army were accompanied by devastating artillery fire. The superior Turkish heavy artillery was able to shut down the Greek artillery batteries and thus cause great damage among the infantry battalions. After the bombardment, seven infantry divisions attacked. The situation of the Greek 1st Corps quickly became critical when faced with overwhelming odds. The Turkish attack concentrated on the positions between the 1st and 4th Greek divisions. At noon the Turkish 1st Corps had managed to reach the defensive trenches of the Greeks. When the Greek 7th Division arrived in the afternoon for reinforcement, the Greeks were able to counterattack, but only won back a small part.
The Greek headquarters in Izmir did not have a clear picture of the situation. For example, in a letter to the I and II Corps at 11:00 p.m. on August 26, headquarters said that it was still not known from which direction the Turks would attack. The Greeks continued with their original plan and prepared a counterattack by II Corps on the Turkish right flank on August 28, while I Corps would maintain its position. But this arrangement was in direct contradiction to the orders of the 1st Corps to the 2nd Corps. The 2nd Corps should rather send its troops south to relieve the 1st and 4th divisions. Headquarters in Izmir received no feedback and assumed that preparations for a counterattack were underway.
On August 27 at 2 a.m., the Turkish artillery bombardment began again and at 6 a.m. the infantry attacked again between the 1st and 4th Greek divisions. Hours later (9:00 am) the IV Corps was able to break through under Sami and take the Erkmentepe hill. The Greeks gave the order to retreat on a line 20 km to the north and then to evacuate Afyonkarahisar. Because of the broken lines, the order did not get through to the 1st Division, which held its position. At about 1.30 p.m. the front collapsed and the flank of the 4th Division was exposed. The 1st and 7th divisions withdrew to their new position at 5:00 p.m.
Greek retreat to Dumlupınar and Alıören (August 27-29, 1922)
The commander of the 1st Division, Major General Frangou, ordered his troops, consisting of the 1st, 7th Divisions and other small units, to retreat to Dumlupınar on the night of August 28th. He did so in the belief that Major General Trikoupis would also withdraw. In fact, however, Trikoupis and his troops, which consisted of most of the I and II Corps, stayed where they were and did not want to begin the retreat until the daytime (August 28). This confusion created a gap between the two groups.
The headquarters in Izmir lost track of the situation: In an order at 5:30 p.m., the I. Corps should counterattack if possible and restore its old position or withdraw in combat, while the II Corps launched an attack towards Çobanlar south from Afyonkarahisar should lead. Likewise, the First Corps was unaware of Frangou's retreat to the west and gave misleading orders. At 2 a.m. on August 28, the high command revoked its orders and placed the II. Corps and a division of the III. Corps under the command of Major General Trikoupis.
At 5 a.m. on August 28, the Trikoupis group began their retreat as planned. Without the protection of Frangou's troops, at 7 o'clock the columns of the 4th Division's retreat for the Greeks were attacked by surprise. On its retreat, the 9th Division encountered parts of the Turkish V Corps, inflicting heavy losses on them and taking artillery and prisoners. Then the Turks withdrew. The rest of the Trikoupis group (5th, 12th and 13th divisions) were able to withdraw without any problems. Trikoupis spent the night of August 29 at Olucak's.
At the same time, the Frangou group was under pressure from the Turkish IV Corps. Frangous troops stood around the place Başkimse. After the establishment of a communication channel with the I. Corps failed several times, the group began to retreat to Dumlupınar at 4 p.m. At 5:00 am on August 29th, Frangou arrived in Dumlupınar.
The Battle of Hamurköy-İlbulak Dağ (August 29, 1922)
During the night of August 28th to 29th, the Turkish VI. Corps to the west and stood north of the Trikoupis group. The Turkish V Corps, part of the First Army (I., II. And IV. Corps), advanced on the Frangou and Trikoupis groups. The I Corps advanced on Dumlupınar and met the Frangou group, while the IV and V Corps drove a wedge between the Greek troops and thus encircled the Trikoupis group.
The Trikoupis group began to retreat westward on August 29 and encountered units of the Turkish IV and V Corps. General Trikoupis gave the order to attack to break through the Turkish lines, but his 9th Division soon fell on the defensive. The Turks also attacked the eastern flank of the Trikoupis group. The fighting dragged on throughout the day and resulted in heavy losses on both sides. Trikoupis could not break through to Dumlupınar or reach Frangous' troops, while the Turks could not wear out the Trikoupis group despite the encirclement.
During the night the Greeks of the Trikoupis group decided not to retreat to Dumlupınar, but in the direction of the village of Çalköy. The order of battle of the Greeks was lost, so that the 5th Division lost contact with the group. Meanwhile the Frangout troops stood in front of Dumlupınar on a 20 km long front whose right flank had collapsed. Frangou gave the order to hold the left flank under all circumstances in order to give the Trikoupis group a chance to reach Dumlupınar.
The Battle of Alıören (August 30, 1922)
On the morning of August 30th, the Trikoupis group reached Çalköy. Trikoupis consulted with his commanders on how to proceed. They suggested he go west via Alıören to Banaz, but Trikoupis ignored the suggestion and ordered his troops to march south on Dumlupınar. At 11 o'clock a report reached Trikoupis about the condition of his army. He only had about 7,000 infantrymen, 80 cavalrymen and 116 pieces of artillery. 10,000 to 15,000 men in his army ran out of weapons and the food supplies and ammunition were almost completely used up. In view of this situation, Trikoupis realized that he could not resist the Turks and ordered the march on Banaz. The way to the west was free while the Turks controlled the areas north and south of it.
On the way to Alıören, the Greeks discovered a Turkish blockade at 1:30 p.m. A breakthrough failed and Trikoupis ordered his troops to prepare for a major battle. At around 4 p.m., the Turkish artillery began firing, causing great damage among the Greeks. When the VI. Turkish corps exerted great pressure from the east and south and the VI. Corps attacked from the north, the Greeks were in a critical position. Towards evening the Greek flank was broken and Trikoupis ordered the escape to the west. All heavy wagons, field artillery and wounded were left behind. The Turks counted over 2000 dead Greeks. Trikoupis' troops were dispersed and marching west in three groups. Two groups of around 7–8,000 men - including Trikoupis - surrendered one after the other on September 1st and 2nd. The third group with 5,000 managed to escape, but no longer had any military power. Trikoupis and General Digenis were brought to Mustafa Kemal. This informed Trikoupis that he was commander in chief of the Greek army in Anatolia. But Trikoupis knew nothing about this. This fact showed the level of confusion and chaos in the Greek command.
Frangou's forces had also been attacked on August 30, but were able to resist for a while. But around midnight he too had to retreat. With that the battle of Dumlupinar came to an end.
consequences
The end of the battle was the end of the Greek presence in Anatolia. Trikoupis' army of around 34 infantry battalions and 130 pieces of artillery was no longer an effective force after the defeat. The remaining troops from Frangou were too weak to stop the Turks. The Greeks suffered great losses: by September 7th they had 35,000 dead and 15,000 prisoners. The losses of war materials were also high: by September 4, 910 cannons, 1,200 trucks, 5,000 machine guns, 11 aircraft, 40,000 rifles and 400 truckloads of ammunition had fallen to the Turks. By comparison, the Turks lost 13,476 between August 26 and September 9 (2318 dead, 9360 wounded, 1679 missing and 101 prisoners). In these two weeks the Turkish army was able to recapture all areas occupied since May 1919. The Turks drove the Greeks back 250 kilometers to Izmir, which was evacuated by the Greeks. In the entire Greco-Turkish War, the Greeks had around 101,000 casualties out of 200–250,000 soldiers (24,240 dead, 48,880 wounded, 18,095 missing and 10,000 prisoners). The war cost Greece $ 100 million. During the entire war of liberation, the Turks suffered 13,000 deaths, 35,000 wounded and 24,000 deaths from illness during and shortly after the war. The last Greek troops left Anatolia on September 18th. On October 11, 1922, Turkey, Italy, France and Great Britain signed the Mudanya Armistice . Greece signed three days later on October 14th.
Since then, August 30 has been a public holiday in Turkey as Zafer Bayramı (victory bayram ).
gallery
War memorial in Dumlupınar
The Dumlupinar battlefield
Captured Greek Officers in Ankara (September 29, 1922)
Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pascha inspect a military exercise of the 1st Army near Ilgın on April 1, 1922
General Kimon Digenis and his soldiers are taken prisoner of war
Turkish soldiers wait in a trench for the order to attack
War memorial on a hill near Dumlupınar
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Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Belgelerle Türk tarihi dergisi, Editions 28-31 , Menteş Kitabevi, 1999, page 35 (Turkish)
- ↑ a b A. Dural: His Story: Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Revolution , ISBN 0-595-41251-3 , iUniverse, 2007, page 93
- ↑ a b Nizamettin Nazif Tepedelenlioğlu: Bilinmiyen taraflariyle Atutürk , Yeni Çığır Kitabevi, 1959, page 64 (Turkish)
- ^ A b Assertion of unitary, independent national states in central and southeast europe (1821-1923) , Bibliotheca historica romaniae Edition 62, Edited by Viorica Moisuc and Ion Calafeteanu, Section des sciences historiques de l'Académie de la République Populaire Roumaine., 1980, page 340 (footnote 94)
- ↑ a b Ali Çimen, Göknur Göğebakan: Tarihi Değiştiren Savaşlar , ISBN 975-263-486-9 , 2nd edition, Timas Publishing Group, 2007, p. 321 (Turkish)
- ↑ a b c d e Atilla Kollu, Büyük Zafer (Öncesi ve Sonrası İle) Ataturk Araştırma Merkezi (Ataturk Research Center), (Ataturk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, number 24, Edition VIII, July 1992)
- ↑ Despotopoulos, Alexandros (1978): Η Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή [The Asia Minor Catastrophe] (Greek). Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους, Τόμος ΙΕ ′: Νεώτερος ελληνισμός από το 1913 ως το 1941 [History of the Greek Nation, Volume XV: Modern Hellenism from 1913 to 1941]. Ekdotiki Athinon AE pp. 200–233 (Greek)
- ↑ Belgelerle Türk tarihi dergisi (Editions 90-95) , Menteş Kitabevi, 2004, page 36 (Turkish)
- ^ Chronicling America - Historic American Newspapers, Turk Cavalry Routs Greeks , The Ogden standard-examiner (Ogden, Utah), September 7, 1922, p. 2.
- ^ Armistice Sought By Greeks As Turks Press September 8, 1922.
- ^ Greeks Hand Over Smyrna To Allies , New York Times , September 9, 1922.
- ↑ Επίτομος Ιστορία Εκστρατείας Μικράς Ασίας 1919–1922 (Abridged History of the Campaign of Minor Asia), Directorate of Army History, Athens, 1967, Table 2 (Greek)
- ↑ Σειρά Μεγάλες Μάχες: Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή (Νο 8) συλλογική εργασία, έκδοση περιοδικού Στρατιωτική Ιστορία, Εκδόσεις Περισκόπιο, Αθήνα, Νοέμβριος 2002 σελίδα 64 (Greek)
- ↑ Current history and Forum (Volume 15) , CH Publishing Corporation, 1921, page 645.
- ↑ Kate Fleet, Suraiya Faroqhi, Reşat Kasaba: The Cambridge History of Turkey Volume 4 , Cambridge University Press, 2008, ISBN 0-521-62096-1 , page 159.