Battle of Ctesiphon

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Battle of Ctesiphon
Ctesiphon1915.jpg
date 22. bis 25. November 1915
place Ctesiphon
output Tie, strategic Ottoman advantage
Parties to the conflict

United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland United Kingdom

Ottoman Empire 1844Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire

Commander

United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Charles Townshend

Ottoman Empire 1844Ottoman Empire Nureddin Pasha

Troop strength
11,000 soldiers 18,000 soldiers
losses

4,600

between 6,200 and 9,500

The battle between British-Indian and Ottoman troops at Ctesiphon in November 1915 is referred to as the Battle of Ktesiphon ( Turkish Selman-ı Pak Muharebesi after Salman Pak's grave located here ) . After a series of defeats the year before, the Ottoman forces had managed to stop the British Mesopotamia campaign at Ctesiphon.

background

The former Parthian and Sassanid capital Ctesiphon is located on the left bank of the Tigris in the barren Iraqi desert, about 610 km upstream from Basra , 64 km north of Kut al-Amara , and 26 km southeast of Baghdad . The ruins of the city make good defensive positions. The Ottoman forces had good camouflage and built a long line of trenches in front of the river. The Ottoman troops consisted of around 18,000 men and 52 cannons and were led by Nureddin Pasha .

The actual leader of the Ottoman 6th Army in Iraq had been Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz since October 1915 , a German general who had been modernizing the army for twelve years. Von der Goltz, though old, was an expert on military affairs and had a great deal of knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the Ottoman army. However, the British believed that Nureddin Pasha was still in command of the troops. This was an important factor as the British questioned Nureddin 's ability. Von der Goltz was in Baghdad and was unable to intervene directly in the battle.

The British, especially the Commander in Chief in Mesopotamia, John Nixon , were so impressed by the victorious battles of their 6th Division as far as Kut that they ignored warning signs such as the long supply routes with simultaneous shortages of transport material or the reported arrival of fresh Anatolian troops in Baghdad. Political reasons were also decisive for this: After the decision to withdraw from Gallipoli , ministers in London also believed that the capture of Baghdad was just the right time to make up for this shameful defeat. Nixon also had the prospect of receiving reinforcements from British India in the form of two new divisions.

plans

The plan of attack of the commander of India's 6th (Poona) Division, Sir Charles Townshend , was to split his troops into four groups. Three of these, Groups A, B, and C, were supposed to attack the Ottoman lines, while the fourth, Group D, was supposed to fall into the left flank of the Turks. The attack was supported by two river boats and a gunboat. Several planes were supposed to clear the Ottoman positions and their base in Baghdad before the attack, but they suffered many breakdowns, which meant that the British did not fully realize that the total strength of the Ottoman troops in Mesopotamia was now up to 60,000.

It had taken Nureddin over 55 days to prepare his defense and troops. He set up his soldiers in an L-formation. He reinforced the weakest part of his line with three regiments . There were twelve fortified bases along the first trench and a second trench in case of retreat. The Ottoman artillery was placed centrally where it could support the left flank or the central part of the defenses. She was ordered to turn fire on the British gunboats first before bombarding the infantry.

battle

Townshend ordered a night march on November 21st to attack the Ottoman positions at dawn. However, due to the poor quality of the soil on the west bank of the Tigris, the attack landed on the stronger east bank. The advance should also be supported by gunboats. But they found it difficult to advance due to the mining of the Tigris and the shelling by Ottoman artillery.

At the beginning of the battle, Division C came under heavy fire and was unable to occupy the trenches. Division A, which was supposed to attack the middle of the line, was also held up. On the right side, Department B reached the Ottoman positions and was able to force them to retreat. But when they wanted to pursue the Ottomans, they could be stopped by the reserve regiments. Townshend then ordered Division C to withdraw to capitalize on their successes and achieve a breakthrough there. This maneuver was quite complicated and the task was made more difficult when the Ottomans fell into the flank of the British. Meanwhile, Group D was bogged down in fruitless battles against the Turkish and Arab cavalry. By the end of the day, the British had captured the first line of defense, but suffered heavy losses in the process. The Ottoman troops also suffered great losses, but were able to hold their position.

On the second day, Townshend attempted another breakthrough, which the Ottomans stopped again. Then the Ottoman troops began a counterattack, which the British were now able to repel. Both armies had suffered heavy losses from the attacks. On November 24th, both armies withdrew due to heavy losses. When Nureddin noticed the British withdrawal, he let his troops pursue them.

Aftermath

Townshend decided that a retreat towards Kut was necessary to rebuild his army. The Ottoman army also suffered losses; it lost 6188 men, but was quickly able to receive reinforcements from Baghdad and follow the British. The battle revealed a fatal weakness of the British Army at the front: too long a supply line.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b Edward J. Erickson: The Effectiveness of the Ottoman Army in World War I: A Comparative Study (Routledge, New York, 2007), pp. 76, 77.
  2. ^ A b Edward J. Erickson: Orders to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in World War I (Greenwood Press, Wesport, CT 2001), p. 113.
  3. ^ Edward J. Erickson: Orders to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in World War I (Greenwood Press, Wesport, CT 2001), p. 114.

Coordinates: 33 ° 5 ′ 37 ″  N , 44 ° 34 ′ 51 ″  E