Campaign to Tabuk

Location of the city

As a campaign to Tabuk ( Arabic غزوة تبوك, DMG ġazwat tabūk ) describes a military campaign led by Mohammed , which took place from October to December of the year 630. Islamic sources - including the biography of the prophet of Muhammad ibn Ishaq and the Maghāzī (The Book of Campaigns) by al-Wāqidī - speak of a force of around 30,000 men assembled in Tabuk against a contingent of troops from the Byzantine Empire . Even if there was no confrontation with a Byzantine army, the event should still open the door for future expansion after the death of the Prophet. Since no records of this event have survived from Byzantine sources, the corresponding reports about it come from Muslim sources, the Sira and Maghazi literature and the collections of traditions .

prehistory

With the emigration of Mohammed to Medina, the assumption of socio-political tasks is associated, which consisted in the consolidation of the Islamic community and the subsequent fight against Mecca . In the course of several caravan raids, the Battle of Badr took place in 624 , from which the Muslims emerged victorious. The defeat in Uhud in 625 was followed by the unsuccessful siege of Medina by a tribal confederation under the leadership of the Quraish 627. In the following year, a peace treaty, the so-called Treaty of al-Hudaibiyya, was concluded between the two conflicting parties, which among other things allowed the unhindered execution of the small Planned pilgrimage next year. In the same year Chaibar was conquered . In January 630, Mecca was taken without major fighting. The campaign dealt with in this article was related to several undertakings of Muhammad to consolidate and expand the Islamic sphere of power since the Treaty of Hudaibiyya, and represented the largest gathering of troops by the Muslims to date.

See also: Mohammed # The Medinan Period of Prophecy (622–630)

campaign

Contrary to his custom of keeping the goal of a campaign secret for the time being, the Prophet readily stated in this case that he planned to fight the Byzantines in Tabuk. The main reason for the campaign is said to have been an alleged Byzantine troop gathering in the area of ​​what is now Jordan , which reports have turned out to be false.

The sources record a drought as a result of the extremely hot summer of that year and name several groups of people who, because of this, as well as because of the fear of the strong Byzantine army, were not interested in participating in the campaign and brought up various pretexts for their absence. This circumstance was also reflected in the Koran, where it says, among other things, regarding those who stayed behind:

“Those who have been left behind (instead of being taken into the field) are happy that they stayed behind the Messenger of God (or: in contrast to the Messenger of God) (who in turn went out). They hate to wage war with their property and in person for God's sake (w. To struggle), and they say: ›Don't go out in the heat!‹ Say: Hell's fire is hotter ( than the summer heat in which this campaign takes place). If only they would accept understanding! You will only laugh briefly (slightly) but cry for a long time (one day) (a lot). (This happens to them) as a reward for what they have committed. "

- Sura 9, verse 81 f.

When Mohammed moved north with his troops towards Tabuk, they did not encounter any aggression from the Byzantine army. When they reached Tabuk, they prepared to meet the enemy, but the Byzantine army did not appear in the field. Even after several days they stayed there to observe the area, the enemy did not come.

Under the impression of the Muslim march, numerous tribes in the north of the Arabian Peninsula joined the Islamic community, which led to an increase in the Islamic sphere of influence. The affiliation of such tribes was partly preceded by the adoption of Islam, partly the respective tribes or groups of people remained in their old religion with payment of a corresponding tribute (→ Jizya ).

Against the background of the struggle against the Byzantine Empire and the Judeo-Christian tribes of the region, the verse was revealed that served as the Koranic basis for the taxation of non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic community (see Dhimma ):

"Fight against those who do not believe in God and Judgment Day and do not forbid (or: declare it forbidden) what God and his Messenger have forbidden and do not belong to the true religion - from those who received the scriptures - ( fights against them) until they meekly pay tribute out of hand (?)! "

- Sura 9, verse 29 after Paret

Reasons for the campaign

The reasons for the enterprise of Mohammed have been discussed in research many times and with different conclusions.

According to Elias Shoufani, the Prophet is said to have originally planned to invade Syria with his armed forces and attack the tribes there in order to use the booty thus obtained to raise the discontent within the Islamic community about the lack of booty recently and its material preference for new and potential ones To counter converts. When he realized that his army would not be able to fight the Byzantines due to their insufficient equipment and the great distance from Medina, the latter is said to have decided to retreat after numerous tribes settled in under the impression of the large Muslim contingent the environment had joined him.
Francis E. Peters also attributes economic motives to the prophet for this and other campaigns in the north of the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic community was dependent on the booty from such ventures; the not yet (fully) Islamized north of the peninsula as well as the areas behind it were seen as the future target of the raids. He refers to a tradition from ibn ʿAsākirs work on the history of Damascus , according to which God turned the face of the prophet towards Syria and his back towards Yemen and told him that what was behind him should be his support and that what lies before him has been made into booty and livelihood.

Muhammad A. Shaban sees Mohammed A. Shaban's appearance in the north of the peninsula primarily as an attempt to impress both the Byzantines and the Arab tribes of the region with the fighting power of his armed forces, i.e. to show that he was able to use the trade routes to secure militarily in his sphere of control.

Above all, Watt cites a unifying factor in the campaigns to the north: Mohammed was aware of the fact that his Arab supporters needed an external enemy in order to prevent the fights between the individual tribes that were common in pre-Islamic times. The northern border region to the area of ​​the two great powers at that time was the direction in which the "warlike energies" (wording in the original: " warlike energies ") of the Arabs were to be directed.

literature

• Francis E. Peters: Muhammad and the Origins of Islam . State University of New York Press, 1994. pp. 239-242
• W. Montgomery Watt: Muhammad. Prophet and Statesman . Oxford University Press, 1961. pp. 218-222
• Frants Buhl: The life of Muhammad . Scientific Book Society Darmstadt, 1961. pp. 322–333

Individual evidence

1. ^ W. Montgomery Watt: Muhammad. Prophet and Statesman . Oxford University Press, 1961. p. 218
2. ↑ See W. Montgomery Watt: Muhammad at Medina . Oxford University Press, 1956. pp. 105 and 343 with references there. See Moshe Gil: A History of Palestine, 634-1099 . Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 27 ; W. Montgomery Watt: Muḥammad . In: Bernard Lewis et al. a. (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Islam . Cambridge University Press, 1985. Vol. 1A, p. 53
3. ^ For example, W. Montgomery Watt: Muhammad. Prophet and Statesman . Oxford University Press, 1961. p. 219: " All this goes to show that, when Muḥammad set out in October 630 with his relatively enormous army, he was more or less aware that he was launching the Islamic state on a challenge to the Byzantine empire. "Cf. also in Muhammad at Medina . Oxford University Press, 1956. p. 105
4. ↑ See Frants Buhl: Das Leben Muhammeds . Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 1961. p. 322 and sources cited there
5. ↑ See Theodor Nöldeke: History of the Qorāns. Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1909. Vol. 1, pp. 223-225. See Albrecht Noth: Early Islam . In: Ulrich Haarmann (Hrsg.): History of the Arab world . CH Beck, 2001. p. 56
6. ↑ See W. Montgomery Watt: Muhammad at Medina . Oxford University Press, 1956. S. 144 and Albrecht Noth: Early Islam . In: Ulrich Haarmann (Hrsg.): History of the Arab world . CH Beck, 2001. p. 39 f.
7. ^ Frants Buhl: The life of Muhammad . Scientific Book Society Darmstadt, 1961. P. 324 f.
8. ↑ Majid Khadduri: War and Peace in the Law of Islam . The Johns Hopkinns Press, 1955. pp. 178 f.
9. ↑ Elias Shoufani: Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia . University of Toronto Press, 1973. pp. 42 f.
10. ^ Francis E. Peters: Muhammad and the Origins of Islam. State University of New York Press, 1994. p. 240: "A more probable refincentive is something close to what was reported by Ibn Asakir, that the Muslim community in Medina had become dependent on (or perhaps simply accustomed to) the booty from the Prophet's raids, and that this, like the forays against Dumat al-Jandal and Muʾta, was simply a predatory 'fishing' expedition. "
11. ↑ Muhammad A. Shaban: Islamic History. A New Interpretation . Cambridge University Press, 1971. Vol. 1, p. 14
12. ^ W. Montgomery Watt: Muhammad at Medina . Oxford University Press, 1956. p. 105 . Compare his statements regarding the concept of jihad as a basis for granting Arab unity in Muhammad. Prophet and Statesman . Oxford University Press, 1961. pp. 108 f.