Naval combat in front of Anzio

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Naval battles at Anzio
May 1944: American Sherman tanks roll out of the tank landing ship US 77 in the port of Anzio.
May 1944: American Sherman tanks roll out of the tank landing ship US 77 in the port of Anzio .
date April 20, 1944 to April 21, 1944
place Waters off Anzio , Italy
output Allied victory
Parties to the conflict

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire

United KingdomUnited Kingdom United Kingdom United States
United States 48United States 

Commander

Paul-Friedrich Düwel
Johann Otto War

Troop strength
23 negro pilots unknown
losses

10 negro pilots

3 damaged ships (not confirmed)

The sea ​​combat operation in front of Anzio describes the baptism of fire of the small combat units of the Kriegsmarine (K-units) on the night of April 20-21, 1944. The aim of the German K-units was the sinking of Allied convoys and ships in the port of Anzio . The mission, which was carried out with 23 manned torpedoes of the Neger type , was a failure. The majority of reported commercial vessels was unnoticed at the time of the attack, from the German Enlightenment, already expired again, so that the attackers only three ships and the port facility easily could damage. 10 negro pilots lost their lives in this attack.

Starting position

The Allied invasion of Italy began on September 3, 1943 . While the Allied troops made slow progress in the face of the stubborn German defense, the Commander-in-Chief of the US 5th Army , Lieutenant General Guy C. Swan , decided to make another landing behind the German main line of defense . He hoped that the Wehrmacht would withdraw from their previous positions. At the end of January 1944, under the command of John Lucas, the amphibious invasion of Anzio began . Lucas failed, however, to let his troops march out of the formed bridgehead in the direction of undefended Rome. Instead, the VI persisted . 5th US Army Corps at the landing site for six days and remained inactive. The German commander in chief for the Italian front, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring , used this time and surrounded the American landing site with strong German formations. The breakout of the American troops now failed because of the German defense. From the end of January to April 1944, a smooth delivery of personnel, supplies, ammunition, fuel and heavy equipment to the port of Anzio was possible. The German leadership under Kesselring therefore soon recognized that an effective shielding of the Allied bridgehead would no longer last under these conditions. Therefore, Kesselring turned to the High Command of the Navy (OKM) to prevent the enemy supplies, whose Achilles heel , from the sea. The weakened Luftwaffe was only able to interfere with these supplies at certain points, and the Navy itself, due to its under-presence in the Mediterranean, was unable to make an effective contribution. Since the submarines and the boats of the 1st Schnellboot Flotilla were also heavily inhibited in their use by Allied convoy security, the OKM decided to send the recently established K-formations . The manned torpedoes of the Negro type were to be used there for the first time .

preparation

Although these were still being tested in March 1944, the Marine Operations Command (MEK) 75 was hurriedly set up under the leadership of First Lieutenant Johann-Otto Krieg . The designation MEK75 was just a cover name for the K-Flotilla 361 involved in this mission. After adjusting the trim of the Negroes to the salinity of the Mediterranean Sea, the relocation of 40 Negroes (10 of them reserve) of the K-Flotilla began on April 6, 1944 361 including staff by railroad.

The approach was made more difficult by partisan activity and constant Allied air sovereignty. Their first destination was Rignano sull'Arno . There were no corresponding low loader or tractor type Sd.Kfz. 9 available for further transport, so that the flotilla under Oberleutnant Krieg did not arrive until the night of April 13-14, 1944 south of Rome at the destination Pratica di Mare . At this point in time 37 negroes were still operational for 30 pilots, three negroes had been destroyed in the course of the transport. There, the devices were camouflaged from enemy aerial reconnaissance under additional camouflage nets in a pine forest.

A closer exploration of the flat strip of shore revealed that the chosen starting point was tactically unfavorable: In order to reach navigable water depths, the negroes first had to be transported several dozen meters into the open water by muscle power, where they swam up by themselves. For this reason Oberleutnant Krieg initially requested support from the 4th Paratrooper Division stationed nearby by 500 paratroopers . Ultimately, he decided to use the coast of the nearby town of Torvaianica for his venture, as there was enough open water for the Negroes to control themselves after a short distance .

commitment

A graphic representation of the Negro- type manned torpedo . With these inadequate devices, the small combat units were deployed for the first time.

On the night of the new moon from April 20 to 21, 1944, propagandistically referred to as a “Führer birthday present”, the first K-attack in history started between 22:00 and 22:30 on the anchorage of the Allied ships 18 nautical miles away. The attack should be supported by a special unit of the Brandenburgers with the explosive boats they developed. However, their use was canceled at short notice due to the small number of explosive boats and the inexperience of the boatmen. The attack was coordinated by Captain Friedrich Düwel, who was above war in rank. As feared by the war, the watering of the devices, each weighing around five tons, ended in a fiasco. Since no cranes or trolleys were available, temporary rolling mats made of tree trunks and reed mats had to be used, but these were only conditionally suitable for such a task.

14 and 13, for example, were already buried in the silt of the sea bed when the water was shallow. The stuck Negroes were blown up after the end of the mission. The number of Negroes actually setting sail is also subject to different statements. It is numbered at 23 and 17.

It is now certain that 23 negroes were involved in the attack. The negroes were divided into three different groups. The 1st group set course for Capo d'Anzio, the 2nd group aimed at the anchorage of Anzio and the 3rd group headed for the port of Anzio directly. The three battle groups were supported by the Air Force, which flew that night three attacks and cluster bombs jettisoned to the standing at the bridgehead Allies, so as to draw attention to themselves, as well as a Flak battery that had been ordered, every 20 minutes light grenades to shoot in the direction of the target in order to improve the orientation of the negro pilots . On the Allied side, however, the decoding of the Enigma (in December 1943) and the naval code "Dolphin" contained therein warned of a possible attack by German small arms weapons on April 20, 1944. For this reason there was already a high alert.

Results

The attackers failed to achieve sustained success due to the lack of suitable ship targets. Only the negro pilots Karl Heinz Potthast , Horst Berger and Hermann Voigt reported the torpedoing of a guard ship, a steamer and a transporter. Walter Gerhold torpedoed a pier gun. An Allied confirmation of sinking or damage to ships was not known. A negro pilot ran on the return trip a few meters from the beach and fixed choking despite also used by fighter pilots known as "hunter Mask" and related Kalipatronen. It was only discovered and recovered by German units that morning. Another pilot had died of carbon monoxide poisoning on the approach or in battle. His negro was later attacked by the Allies driving in a circle. An undamaged Negro fell into the hands of the Allies for later studies.

According to the orders, the returning pilots sank the negroes on their way back in deep waters, as it was impossible for the devices to land due to the lack of suitable machinery. After the sinking, which was expressly to take place behind the German lines, they swam to the nearby bank and returned to their unit. The “own lines” were made visible by lighting a large woodshed from the start of the mission, the flames of which continued to blaze into the morning. It served as a marker light for the pilots returning home.

The K-associations suffered 10 casualties, 13 returned from action. Four pilots became US prisoners of war . After this setback and the realization that the Allies had learned of the new weapon and the surprise effect was lost, the mission at Anzio was over. The MEK 75 was relocated back to Germany - now without equipment. The unit dropped its code name and was given its original name as K-Flotilla 361.

Individual evidence

  1. Lawrence Paterson: Weapons of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 , pp. 34-36
  2. ^ A b Cajus Bekker : Lone fighter at sea. The German torpedo riders, frogmen and explosive device pilots in World War II. Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg 1968, p. 40
  3. Helmut Blocksdorf: The command of small combat units of the navy. The "Storm Vikings". Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-613-02330-X , p. 45
  4. Cajus Bekker: ... and yet loved life. 8th edition. Adolf Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1980, ISBN 3-453-00009-9 , p. 31
  5. Lawrence Paterson: Weapons of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 , p. 38
  6. a b Cajus Bekker: ... and yet loved life. 8th edition. Adolf Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1980, ISBN 3-453-00009-9 , p. 32
  7. Lawrence Paterson: Weapons of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 , p. 39
  8. Lawrence Paterson: Weapons of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 , p. 40
  9. a b c d Cajus Bekker: ... and yet loved life. 8th edition. Adolf Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1980, ISBN 3-453-00009-9 , p. 33
  10. Harald Fock: Naval small weapons. Manned torpedoes, small submarines, small speedboats, explosives yesterday - today - tomorrow. Nikol Verlagsvertretungen, Hamburg 1997, ISBN 3-930656-34-5 , p. 36
  11. ^ Werner Rahn: German Marines in Transition - From the Symbol of National Unity to the Instrument of International Security. R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 2005, ISBN 3-486-57674-7 , p. 521
  12. a b Cajus Bekker: ... and yet loved life. 8th edition. Adolf Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1980, ISBN 3-453-00009-9 , p. 34
  13. a b Lawrence Paterson: Arms of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 , p. 43
  14. Helmut Blocksdorf: The command of small combat units of the navy. The "Storm Vikings". Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-613-02330-X , p. 48
  15. ^ A b Sea War 1944, April . wlb-stuttgart.de. Retrieved July 2, 2011.
  16. ^ A b Cajus Bekker: Lone fighter at sea. The German torpedo riders, frogmen and explosive device pilots in World War II. Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg 1968, p. 45
  17. ^ Werner Rahn: German Marines in Transition - From the Symbol of National Unity to the Instrument of International Security. R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 2005, ISBN 3-486-57674-7 , p. 505
  18. ^ Cajus Bekker: Lone fighter at sea. The German torpedo riders, frogmen and explosive device pilots in World War II. Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg 1968, p. 42
  19. Lawrence Paterson: Weapons of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 , p. 44
  20. ^ Cajus Bekker: Lone fighter at sea. The German torpedo riders, frogmen and explosive device pilots in World War II. Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg 1968, p. 41
  21. ^ Werner Rahn: German Marines in Transition - From the Symbol of National Unity to the Instrument of International Security. R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 2005, ISBN 3-486-57674-7 , p. 505
  22. Lawrence Paterson: Weapons of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 , p. 48ff
  23. Helmut Blocksdorf: The command of small combat units of the navy. The "Storm Vikings". Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-613-02330-X , p. 49ff
  24. Cajus Bekker: ... and yet loved life. 8th edition. Adolf Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1980, ISBN 3-453-00009-9 , p. 43

Remarks

  1. Including the pilots Heinz Potthast, Horst Berger, Hermann Voigt, Walter Gerhold, Leopold Koch as well as Pettke and Seibicke.
  2. This was Günther Kuschke, Walter Schulz , Hans Figel and Georg Hoff.