Shock army
The Shock Army ( Russian Ударная армия ) was in the land forces of the Red Army at the time of the " Great Patriotic War " from 1941 to 1945 a special form of organization of the army . Shock armies were used in strategic attack operations in the main direction of the offensive in order to force a breakthrough and then to be able to realize the concept of " deep operation ". From November 1941 to December 1942 a total of five shock armies were set up, all of which existed until the end of the war.
history
Theoretical foundations
According to the theory of "deep operation", which was largely developed by Vladimir Triandafillow in the late 1920s and early 1930s, shock armies were to be used by the commanders-in-chief of the fronts in order to concentrate a maximum of firepower on the enemy on a narrow front and thus bring about a breakthrough. To this end, such armies should be generously equipped with all the components of combined arms combat . Triandafillow saw in his main work character of the operations of modern armies as the strength of a shock army twelve to 18 rifle divisions, supported by 16 to 20 artillery regiments and eight to twelve tank battalions. Their operations were to be supported by four to five fighter squadrons and two to three bombing brigades. In a later memorandum, Triandafillow recommended an even greater concentration of firepower from artillery and tanks, depending on the terrain, and almost twice as much support from 500 to 600 aircraft. In the case of a larger (front) offensive, several shock armies should be deployed simultaneously in the main strategic direction. Triandafillow's theories were taken up by the Chief of the General Staff from 1931, Alexander Yegorov , and made official military doctrine. The increasing equipment of the Red Army with tanks and aircraft made it possible to set up new mechanized corps and air corps, which were incorporated into the concept. The military theorists Georgi Isserson and Nikolai Warfolomejew developed the idea of the shock army further in the 1930s.
Installation and use
Under the conditions of the huge losses of war material by the Red Army in the first months of the German-Soviet War, the use of shock armies as proposed by the theories of the 1930s was initially not possible. Shock armies were set up, but not with the intended equipment and in small numbers. What differentiated the shock armies from the usual armies was their use at key points in offensive operations. Their soldiers, like those of the later Guards armies, received a higher wage than those of other armies, as well as benefits such as the right to return to their units in the event of their wounding after recovery.
The 1st of later five shock armies was formed at the end of November 1941, during the Battle of Moscow , from the troops of the disbanded 19th Army (2nd formation) and was initially in the Stawka reserve, from November 29th in the western front . It was first used on the offensive on Klin , which had previously been captured by the Germans .
In the further course of the Soviet winter counter-offensive 1941/42, the 2nd , 3rd and 4th shock armies were set up at the end of December . The 2nd Shock Army fought on the Volkhov Front first in the Ljubaner operation early 1942. The 3rd and 4th Shock Army were on the northwestern front , later the Kalinin Front used and resulted in the winter of 1941-42 the Toropets-Kholm operation by which led to the battle of Cholm .
The shock armies achieved successes during this time, but due to logistical difficulties and German counter-attacks on the breakthroughs such as in the Battle of the Volkhov, they could not be converted into decisive victories. They were mainly used in the wooded and swampy north-west of the German-Soviet front, while tank armies fulfilled their role in the plains of the south of the Soviet Union. The only exception was the 5th Shock Army , which was set up in December 1942 during the Battle of Stalingrad .
literature
- Владимир Дайнес: Советские ударные армии в бою. Эксмо-пресс, 2009, ISBN 978-5-699-31536-9 .
Individual evidence
- ^ Richard W. Harrison: Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of GS Isserson. MacFarland, 2010, ISBN 978-0-7864-4897-5 , pp. 124 ff.
- ↑ Владимир Васильевич Бешанов: Год 1942 - "учебный". Харвест, 2003, chapter 5 .