Battle for Cholm

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Battle for Cholm
German soldier in front of empty supply bombs in Cholm (March 1942). Like almost all other photographs in this article, a photo by war correspondent Richard Muck
German soldier in front of empty supply bombs in Cholm (March 1942). Like almost all other photographs in this article, a photo by war correspondent Richard Muck
date January 18 to June 8, 1942
place Cholm , Soviet Union
output German victory
Parties to the conflict

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire

Soviet Union 1923Soviet Union Soviet Union

Commander

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) Theodor Scherer

Soviet Union 1923Soviet Union Nikolai Fyodorowitsch Watutin Nikolai Grigoryevich Wassiljew
Soviet Union 1923Soviet Union

Troop strength
initially 3500 men no reliable information
losses

1550 killed and
2200 wounded

20,000 to 25,000 dead and wounded

The Battle of Cholm , also known as the Kessel von Cholm , took place during the Second World War on the German-Soviet front in the area of Army Group North . It began on January 18, 1942 with an attack by Soviet partisans on the German-occupied Cholm ( Russian Холм ) transport hub . A few days later the Red Army enclosed the city and its garrison. Cholm was supplied from the air for over three months before German troops were able to re-establish contact with the crew in a relief attack in May 1942.

During the Battle of Cholm, German troops on the Eastern Front were encircled by opposing formations over a longer period of time. After the fighting was over, the Nazi propaganda used the battle as an example of the alleged heroic struggle of German soldiers.

prehistory

Snow-covered landscape in the Cholm basin, January 1942

The city of Cholm is the capital of the raion of the same name in Novgorod Oblast . It lies at the confluence of the Lovat and Kunja rivers and is divided by the course of these rivers and their steep banks. At the beginning of 1942 the city had about 6,100 inhabitants and gained its importance on the one hand as an important river crossing and on the other hand as the intersection of a paved roadway in north-south and east-west direction. Cholm was thus a traffic junction on the only weather-resistant north-south connection between Staraya Russa and Toropez , because most of the surrounding landscape was swampy terrain. Already on August 3, 1941, the place was taken by units of the Wehrmacht . After that, a brigade of Soviet partisans had formed in the area, which operated to a small extent against the rear German lines of communication. In the months from August 1941 to January 1942, Cholm served the German troops only as a supply base and transshipment point, which at some distance from the front was only occupied by cables , rear services and weak security forces.

After the German advance was brought to a standstill in the Battle of Moscow in December 1941 , the Stavka (Soviet headquarters) launched a counteroffensive in January 1942. On January 8, 1942, she began attacking the right wing of Army Group North, which was formed by the 16th Army south of Lake Ilmen . The very next day the Soviet units broke into the German front and expanded it in the days that followed. Since the High Command of the Army (OKH) had categorically ruled out a withdrawal movement in order not to lose contact with Army Group Center , the newly appointed Commander in Chief of Army Group North, Colonel General Georg von Küchler , tried to seal off the enemy intrusions with troops detached elsewhere. On January 18, 1942, he ordered the XXXIX. Army Corps (motorized) , while the 218th Infantry Division was intended to secure the Cholm traffic junction . This had been in Denmark ; the move to the Cholm area was not yet complete at this point. She only arrived in the front area with some of the forces on January 28th.

Course of operation

Partisan attack

After the large-scale Soviet attack began, it quickly gained space in the direction of the Lovat while the German troops had to evade. On January 17, 1942, only one regimental German combat group was fighting east of Cholm. In order to conquer this important transport hub, the Soviet Chief of Staff of the Northwest Front , Lieutenant General N. F. Watutin , planned to work closely with the 2nd Leningrad Partisan Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel N. G. Vasiliev . This should occupy the city in the night of January 17th to 18th and hold it until the regular troops arrived. According to Soviet information, eight partisan detachments with about 800-1000 men from a radius of 80 kilometers took part in the following action.

On the evening of January 17th, they went into readiness and blocked all access and communication routes to the place. On the morning of January 18 at 4:00 am, they finally attacked from three directions, the main thrust coming from the west because that is where the city was least fortified. The attack was strong enough to alert the OKW . “Strong partisan attack against Cholm” was noted in the war diary, while Soviet historiography later emphasized that it was the largest Soviet partisan operation to date. The German soldiers were surprised by this and withdrew to the center of the city by 11:00 a.m. There they successfully resisted from the church and the GPU prison . The Soviet 33rd Rifle Division, which the partisans were supposed to reach, was stopped by German troops east of Cholm. Without support or ammunition, the partisans finally had to withdraw in the early evening. Isolated fighting with the partisans lasted until January 21st.

Enclosure of the city

Offensive of the Red Army south of Lake Ilmen , 7 January - 21 February 1942

On the night of January 19, 1942, the commander of the 281st Security Division, Major General Theodor Scherer and his divisional staff, assumed overall command of the units in the Cholm area. The division had previously performed security tasks against partisans in the rear area of ​​Army Group North and now had to partially reinforce the front troops. Until the city was enclosed, however, only its commander, Scherer, had arrived in Cholm. Thus, only a few smaller units from various associations were available to defend the place. Essentially, these were three companies of the Reserve Police Battalion 65 , three companies of infantry , parts of the 385 infantry regiment, hawsers and members of the rear service who were in the Cholm area. Initially there were only about 3,500 men. Under the pressure of the Soviet advance, other Wehrmacht units withdrew from the east on Cholm, which subsequently strengthened the " Scherer Combat Group ". Parts of an infantry regiment and Jagd-Kommando  8 also got into the boiler.

On January 16, the Soviet 3rd Shock Army of General M. A. Purkajev had received the order to take Cholm by January 19. On January 17, the eve of the partisan attack, their units were 20-25 km east of the city near the town of Krasnij Klin. Purkajev could only target the 33rd Rifle Division ( Colonel A. K. Makarjevs ) from the east on Cholm, because the tanks of the 146th Panzer Battalion remained behind due to lack of fuel. In general, the supply was difficult on the Soviet side. The division did not reach the outskirts until January 20, while the 257th Rifle Division and 31st Rifle Brigade circumvented the city to the south. By January 22, these three associations had enclosed the place.

On January 21st, the 73rd and 82nd Soviet Rifle Regiments of the 33rd Rifle Division began a first major attack from the south and southwest, which led to the conquest of the western part of the city and the Lovat Bridge. The situation turned out to be difficult for the German troops, as there was already a lack of grenades and other ammunition in the boiler and the combat group's command post itself was almost in the front line.

Street with damaged wooden buildings in Cholm

On the following day, January 23, the Soviet units were finally reinforced by the 146th Panzer Battalion with thirteen tanks (2  T-34s , 11  T-60s ) after it had been supplied with fuel. The T-34s were not used due to unexplained circumstances, while the eleven T-60s were dispatched to attack the eastern part of the city on the same day. Stopping this caused the defenders great difficulty, as there were hardly any anti-tank weapons available. This attack could only be repulsed with the use of six mines in street barricades and concentrated loads . On January 25, the situation for the German occupation deteriorated further due to the loss of the food depot, which was set on fire and of which only half could be saved. In the meantime, the first forces of the arriving 218th Infantry Division and other German units gathered west of the city. They were grouped under the commander of the division, Major General Horst Freiherr von Uckermann , and set up as "Kampfgruppe Uckermann" for immediate relief from Cholm. On January 26th these forces made a breakthrough from the southwest through the lines of the Soviet 73rd Rifle Regiment, which was supported by a division of the 44th Artillery Regiment. About 200 infantrymen (from MG Battalion 10) got into the pocket as reinforcement before it could be closed again by the Red Army. Later, several assault guns were brought in again on the same route . With the help of these reinforcements, the "Kampfgruppe Scherer" succeeded in recapturing the north-western part of the city, which, located next to the airfield, was indispensable for a possible air supply. In these battles the Soviet 162nd Rifle Regiment was wiped out to 312 men. The fighting to relieve Cholm continued at the end of January. From the outside the "Kampfgruppe Uckermann" stepped up again and advanced 10–15 kilometers in the direction of the boiler by January 31, while Major General Scherer set up a raiding party to unite. In contrast, the command of the 3rd Shock Army brought the 45th Rifle Brigade from its reserve, which succeeded in preventing the German shock wedges from being united.

After the Red Army units had repulsed this relief attack and had been attacking Cholm himself for ten days, they too were at the end of their tether. The regiments of the 33rd Rifle Division numbered only 200-300 soldiers each because of the high losses. Therefore, from February 1, they temporarily stopped the attacks. Overall, the crew of Cholm carried out six attacks and 15 counter-attacks as well as 20 push and scouting troop operations in the days from January 18 to 28, 1942. It had repulsed 27 enemy attacks, 7 of which were carried out with tank support. These fierce fighting had already led to high failures. 30 officers , 250 NCOs and around 1,000 men are said to have been killed or wounded at this time. After the relief attempts of the German XXXIX. Army corps (mot.) With the "Kampfgruppe Uckermann" had only "shock troop character" due to lack of strength and had failed, the occupation of Cholm was since the 27./28. January finally cut off.

Fight for the cauldron

Cholm cauldron January 18th – 5th May 1942

The exact strength of the various units that gradually came together in Cholm and then formed the "Scherer combat group" is not known. As already stated, there is an indication of about 3,500 men at the time of the encirclement in the literature. In addition to these, various smaller troop units and reinforcements of unknown size were added through the first relief attempts or by air. Since the figures on the losses in the course of the fighting are also imprecise, no statement can be made regarding the specific troop strength of the combat group in the various phases of the fighting. An indication, however, is the known number of 5,500 Cholm shields awarded after the battle . In addition to the difficulty of determining the number of soldiers, the equipment and combat strength of the thrown combat group can hardly be assessed. After the fighting until the end of January 1942, the core of the German troops in Cholm probably consisted of parts of Infantry Regiment 397 of the 218th Infantry Division , Infantry Regiment 553 of the 329th Infantry Division and parts of the 123rd Infantry Division . In addition, there were numerous smaller associations and baggage units, even a river boat division of the Navy . After reinforcements had been flown in, members of around 60 different formations were under the command of the staff of the 281st Security Division.

German post in the red ruin

With these forces an area of ​​about 1½ to 2 square kilometers (depending on the position of the main battle line) was held. The small spatial expansion of the boiler was also an advantage, which enabled the defenders to use the few defensive forces effectively and to be able to quickly gather together at focal points. However, it also meant that the entire area was within range of Soviet artillery and every deep break-in represented an incalculable risk of breaking the cauldron and often had to be made up for by counterattacks with high losses.

For the Soviet side, too, there is uncertainty about the strength of the troops deployed. Theoretically, the units deployed around Cholm had a strength of around 23,000 men, but it is not known what condition the units were in when they reached the city. In addition, the Soviet literature only provides incomplete information about the losses, personnel and material replacement and reinforcements. What is certain is that the Soviet troops at Cholm had to act with limited means, since the bulk of the 3rd shock army was deployed to the south against Velikije Luki , while another part was involved in the containment of the German troops in the Demyansk area (→ Kesselschlacht von Demjansk ). Some tanks were used near Cholm, but they were only able to support the infantry to a limited extent during combat in localities and were only usable to a limited extent in the swampy terrain after the thaw. The 44th artillery regiment brought up to support the battle for Cholm also lacked sufficient ammunition. Thus, Purkajev's troops had to engage in a primarily infantry fight.

Air supply

Loading of a cargo glider Go 242 with reinforcement for Cholm

From the beginning of February the air supply of the trapped crew of Cholm started. There was a small airfield about 200 × 500 meters west of the city, but this was under constant Soviet artillery fire. Initially, in the first days of February, transport machines of the type Ju 52 of the combat group z. b. V. 172 (partly also of the combat group e.g. V. 4) land to unload troops and goods. However, they suffered high losses. On February 3rd alone, three aircraft were destroyed on the ground by Soviet bombers. Overall, the group lost five of their seven machines. As a result, these supply flights had to be suspended again on February 9th after just under a week. According to the Soviet chief of the operations department of the 3rd Shock Army, General GG Semjonov, the commissar of the 44th Artillery Regiment Lieutenant Podkovyrkin directed the shelling of the airfield from a forest east of it with two 76mm guns and little ammunition. Instead, they were transferred to the shedding of bombs supply (V bombs) by means of the type bomber Heinkel He 111 of Kampfgeschwader 4 and 53 , and later addition to the use of gliders of the type Gotha Go 242 and DFS 230 . The supply of the crew could not be ensured in this way by the air force . The supply situation quickly became so precarious that despite the associated high losses at the end of February and mid-March, Ju 52s had to be used sporadically again in order to overcome the worst supply bottlenecks and bring in reinforcements.

Supply bomb that had to be recovered from a tree

The method of air supply using V-bombs had disadvantages, as many of them ended up blown away by the wind in the river or in the Soviet fire area. In order to recover these supplies, raid troops had to be carried out in the evening. For their part, the Soviet troops tried to hinder the recovery with shrapnel fire . It was also problematic that this method of supply was very dependent on the weather. In March in particular, only a fraction of the supplies required reached the trapped associations. Sometimes the ammunition being transported exploded on impact with the ground. In total, around 7,000 V bombs reached the crew of Cholm during the siege. In order to bring the V-bombs to the target, the He 111 were forced to fly below 400 meters depth and suffered heavy losses. At the beginning of February 1942, three bombers had to make an emergency landing behind the Soviet lines. A total of 55 aircraft were lost while supplying Cholm (27 Ju 52 and 28 He 111).

The use of gliders proved to be more effective due to their higher loading capacity, but they were also heavily dependent on the weather. With their help, important material and reinforcements could be brought into the city, including an anti-tank gun (Pak) with service, an anti- aircraft gun (flak), a heavy load launcher , a radio station facility, a medical officer, an artillery officer and 19 reinforcements. A total of 80 cargo gliders landed with more than 200 tons of material. Since the crews of the sailors could not be flown out again, the boiler crew was also reinforced. When the foreland and the airfield of the boiler were temporarily lost, the gliders landed on the wider streets of the city. After part of the urban area had also been conquered by the Red Army, there was no longer a suitable road for the larger Gotha cargo sailors. Only the smaller DFS230 cargo gliders could land on a street, which is why the main part of the supply was via V-bombs.

Conditions in the boiler

Group of German soldiers

The crew of the Cholm boiler suffered from two grievances in particular: on the one hand from the harsh weather conditions and on the other from the completely inadequate supply. In February, temperatures between −40 ° C and −46 ° C were measured, which led to severe frostbite, especially since winter clothing was only available to a limited extent and more had to be flown in first. Even in mid-March, temperatures were as low as −30 ° C with frequent snowstorms. Since the food had to be brought in using V-bombs, the daily rations were only small. Even if reserves could be stored in camps, they often fell victim to Soviet artillery fire. Almost all draft animals had been slaughtered by the end of March before an order forbade the consumption of the last 50 horses, as these were essential for maintaining the service (pulling gliders and cannons). In April the bread rations dropped to just 300 grams per day.

Soldiers in front of ruins in Kholm at a meal

The hygienic conditions were poor, as the people, civilians and soldiers alike, lived in confined spaces in the cellars and shelters and there were hardly any washing facilities. As a result, typhus spread ; Since vaccines first had to be flown in, the number of sick people rose to around 400 by the beginning of April. By February 8, more than 500 wounded and sick people could be flown out with Ju 52, then these flights were suspended. Then attempts were made to collect the wounded in dressing stations. However, since these often came under fire and had to be relocated, it was decided to accommodate the more easily wounded in the cellars and quarters of their respective units. Only the main first aid station in the “hairpin curve” with 18 destroyed houses was retained as the central collection point for the seriously wounded. The number of wounded and sick eventually increased to about two-thirds of the total boiler crew. The combat strength of the 300 men in the northern section was only 160 deployable soldiers on March 15. In order to defend the positions, it was therefore necessary to call the wounded for service. Whole reserve groups, which consisted exclusively of the injured, took part in the fighting.

Course of the fight

Officers in the trenches that only reach knee deep in the frozen ground

The Soviet 3rd Shock Army continued its attack south on Toropez and Velikiye Luki. By mid-February their front width expanded to over 200 kilometers and their attack momentum was lost. She was therefore forced to defend the line she had reached. Although Cholm was important as a traffic junction for the Soviet leadership, it had to concentrate at the same time on the fighting for the much larger Demyansk basin, in which six German divisions had been included since February 8. The planned dismantling of these German units therefore received priority, so that the Soviet troops around Cholm had to make do with their own means.

After the fighting at the end of January, relative calm returned in the following days, even if the boiler was under constant artillery fire. General Purkaev brought in the 391st Rifle Division to reinforce the 33rd Rifle Division. On Friday, February 13th, the Soviet besiegers began another concentric attack with these forces. The focus of the defense was the GPU prison, which was one of the few permanent buildings in the city and was an important base. In the following days, the German defenders had to withdraw in sections from the north-western part and from a piece of the eastern part of the city. The main reason for this was that the crew hardly had any armor-piercing weapons at the time. Only one captured Soviet cannon without a sight , concentrated loads and anti-tank rifles were available. Only later could other heavy weapons be flown in. On February 19, Major General strongly urged Scherer therefore support and delivery of a paratrooper - Company of. Without these powers he thought he could no longer hold the position. Since such a unit was not available, the OKH decided, despite the associated risk, to move the III. Battalion of the Luftwaffe Field Regiment 1 with Ju 52 to fly into the boiler. By adding these reinforcements, the German defenders were able to repel all Soviet attacks by February 26th.

German soldiers in the ruins of Cholm

During the following weeks there were no major attacks, but on the other hand not a day went by without fighting on the Kessel Front, either through Soviet attacks, German counterattacks or during the recovery of supplies. In addition, the city was constantly being bombarded by Soviet artillery. In contrast, the crew of the boiler was supported by combat units of the Luftwaffe, whose dive fighters were briefed over the radio. The relief forces' German artillery, which was twelve kilometers away, was often asked for support. Airmen and artillery alike had the task of fighting Soviet troop deployments and their artillery. Here, too, the fire control was carried out from the boiler.

German soldiers behind a cover made of snow, in the background the plains around Cholm

The ground frost made it largely impossible to dig trenches and field positions (some shelters and cellars were also full of condensation). Instead, only the meter-high snow served to entrench the lines. The burial of the fallen was not possible due to the hard frozen ground. At the same time, the snow made it easier for the Soviet soldiers to approach the German positions, and the frozen ground allowed battle tanks to be deployed in the otherwise swampy terrain. By mid-March 1942, the Soviet soldiers had captured nine stone houses and the cemetery in the northeast of the city. When the thaw finally set in at the end of March, the snow melted while the ground initially remained frozen. With this, the troops on both sides lost their positions and cover. In addition, there was the disadvantage on the German side that the rivers were now more difficult to pass (due to drift ice, among other things) for detectors and troops, which practically split the boiler into several parts.

From early to mid-April, the Red Army carried out major attacks again in order to take advantage of the disadvantages for the defenders caused by the weather change. During these attacks they succeeded in conquering the northern and northeastern parts of the city with massive use of artillery and tanks. After that, the Soviet attacking forces flagged. The "Kampfgruppe Scherer" lost around 500 soldiers dead and wounded in these battles alone. The second half of April was comparatively calm.

Relief attack

German soldiers cross a free field of fire.

After the enclosure of Cholm, the High Command of Army Group North was unable to take countermeasures immediately. The Soviet troops had taken the offensive along the entire front, so that in January and February 1942 serious crises arose in the area of ​​Army Group North on the Volkhov (→ Battle of the Volkhov ) and around Demyansk, which claimed the small reserves of the Army Group. Although the "Kampfgruppe Uckermann" continued to try to relieve Cholm, only small, hastily assembled units could be made available to them. For March 5th, the Army Group High Command finally planned another major relief attack. However, this failed at −40 ° C due to the weather conditions. In addition, the planned troops suffered great losses from Soviet artillery while they were being deployed. Now structured the commanding XXXIX in this section. Panzer Corps under General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim changed the relief forces. The newly appointed commander of the 218th Infantry Division Colonel Viktor Lang took over its leadership on March 20, 1942 - now referred to as "Gruppe Lang". From mid-April, Lang's combat group was attacked by several Soviet battalions and had to defend itself first. Another attempt to relieve the boiler was only possible at the end of the month. The new relief attack was carried out with the bulk of the 218th Infantry Division , Infantry Regiment 411 of the 122nd Infantry Division and Assault Gun Division 184. In addition there were 20 tanks and a well-equipped tank destroyer division of the 8th Panzer Division . The attack started on April 30th ("Operation Green") made slow progress against the stubborn resistance of the 8th Guards Rifle Division and the 71st Panzer Brigade, but was increasingly supported by the Air Force.

Outpost bunker in Cholm, May 1942

The Soviet leadership responded by trying to overrun the cauldron before the "Lang group" could reach it. On the evening of April 30th, the Soviets therefore started a drum fire on the entire boiler area. This was repeated again at 3:45 a.m. on the morning of May 1, before the Red Army began a concentric attack at around 5:45 a.m. They pushed forward with infantry and five tanks from the "Panzernest" (a depression in which the Soviet tanks were prepared for attacks) into the eastern part of the city and with another five tanks from the tannery also attacked the north-western part and with infantry from the west approach the airfield. Meanwhile there was heavy artillery fire on the "Red Ruins" and the church as well as on the "hairpin curve", where the main German ammunition depot was hit and burned out. Although the attack could be stopped in the northwest until 7:00 a.m., a crisis broke out in the east. There, at the beginning of the fight, the only anti-tank gun failed due to enemy action. By 9:00 am the ammunition for the heavy weapons also ran out and enemy tanks had broken through the main battle line. Major General Scherer therefore urgently asked for air support and reinforcement as well as the accelerated breakthrough of the "Group Lang". In fact, dive fighters appeared every hour, and a new anti-tank gun was flown in by glider to fight the tanks in the eastern part of the city. Already at 12:45 p.m. Scherer reported the defense against the enemy attack. However, the heavy artillery fire continued to cost heavy losses. About 1,500 shells fell on the barely 2 km² area that day. According to contemporary German estimates, around 100 German and 600 Soviet soldiers were killed in the fighting. On May 2, attacks and bombings took place again, but to a lesser extent than before. During the two days, the German defenders shot down eight tanks. It was not until May 3 that the major Soviet offensive against Cholm started again, with the Red Army again breaking into the main battle line. However, she lost several hundred soldiers and 13 tanks in the process.

German soldiers run for cover.

On the evening of that day, the first vehicles of the "Group Lang" could already be seen near the town of Kusemkino, two kilometers away. But even on May 4th, the connection could not be established despite further heavy fighting. Only on the morning of May 5th at 6:20 a.m. could a raid troop with assault guns under Lieutenant Baron von Hohenhausen reach Cholm. A telephone line could be laid by 4:10 p.m., and at 4:25 p.m. the first full battalion of the "Group Lang" arrived in town. After relieving the boiler, the commanding general of XXXIX came immediately . Panzer Corps, General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, and the commander of the 16th Army, Colonel General Ernst Busch , went to Cholm for an inspection, but the place remained fought over. It was not until May 18 that the Soviet units withdrew from the south-eastern part of the city, while the north-eastern part could not be captured by German troops until June 8, 1942. The city of Cholm remained under German occupation until it was finally evacuated on February 21, 1944 without a fight. The 218th Infantry Division established a new front in this area, while the members of the "Scherer Combat Group" were given longer home leave. A total of 1550 German soldiers lost their lives during the fighting over the boiler; about 2,200 others were wounded. Together this corresponds to around 60% of the soldiers originally trapped. There is uncertainty in the literature about the total number of Soviet losses. They were last estimated at 20,000 to 25,000 men by Robert Forczyk in 2012 .

reception

German side

Major General Theodor Scherer with the Knight's Cross in Cholm

During the fighting, the German public had not been informed of the existence of the Kholm Kettle. In the Wehrmacht report it was only succinctly stated:

"In the northern section of the Eastern Front, advanced forces successfully fended off superior enemy forces."

At the end of March 1942 it was announced that Major General Scherer had been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross on February 21 , without giving any concrete reasons:

“At the end of January, Major General Theodor Scherer defended a large town with relatively few strengths against sustained heavy attacks by the Soviets. Although he was wounded, he led the successful defense for weeks with undiminished energy using his whole personality, which was of decisive importance for the overall leadership by tying up strong enemy forces. "

It was only on May 6th, after the crew had been successfully relieved, that the Wehrmacht report announced that the "Scherer combat group" had been encircled for more than three months:

“On the northern section of the Eastern Front, German troops re-established the connection to an important base enclosed by the enemy in a bold, well-planned attack. The crew of this base, under the command of Major General Scherer, has withstood numerous attacks by superior enemy forces with outstanding bravery since January 21, 1942 in a tough defensive battle. "

In the following months the siege of Cholm was used for propaganda purposes. While the soldiers involved were honored with the Cholmschild and Major General Scherer with the oak leaves to the Knight's Cross, some reports from combat participants appeared in the magazine Die Wehrmacht . Soon afterwards the illustrated book Kampfgruppe Scherer appeared - 105 days including the war correspondent Richard Muck. At the beginning of March 1942 he had arrived in the boiler with a cargo ship and had taken around 2,500 photos, which made the events in the Cholm boiler a very well documented event to this day.

Among those killed in the battle were 105 members of the Reserve Police Battalion 65. In recognition of the unit's contribution to the successful defense of the boiler, the battalion was allowed to call itself Reserve Police Battalion 65 "Cholm" .

In 1944 another volume by Otto Karsten appeared in the series of publications on troop support , which dealt with the battle of Cholm. This book was obviously intended to strengthen the perseverance of the soldierly readers by using the “hero fight of the Scherer group” (p. 1) as an example. After that, the Battle of Cholm remained a marginal note in the overview works on the history of the Second World War, especially since it was only a small cauldron. A scientific study of the topic is still pending. The sources are poor, because extensive files, parts of the war diary, situation maps and orders were destroyed during the fighting. There is, however, a research interest, as most recently in March 2005 the public search advertisement by the American historian Dirk Burgdorf for contemporary witnesses of the battle showed.

Soviet side

Russian women rescue the dead with sleds

The source and literature situation in early Soviet journalism is even more difficult. The siege of Cholm was initially hardly mentioned in any publication. The official history of the Great Patriotic War only states that the 218th Infantry Division was enclosed in the Cholm area. Apart from the fact that only a few parts of this division were in the pocket, nothing further was carried out on the fighting. On location maps for operations of the Red Army from Soviet literature, the front line drawn always ran east of Cholm, as if the city had never been behind the Soviet lines. In the Советская Военная Энциклопедия from 1980, under the entry Cholm, there is only an explanation of the partisan attack of January 18, 1942, without mentioning that the partisans had to withdraw after a few hours, as one of the responsible persons, AN Asmolov, was correctly portrayed as early as 1969. It was not until the period of perestroika that a detailed account of the battles for the city appeared with the memoirs of former Lieutenant General G. G. Semjonov. In this, the special intensity of the fighting and the high losses on both sides were emphasized, but without giving precise details. After the collapse of the Soviet Union , more and more operational analyzes of the war appeared, in which the entire course of the fighting - including the battle of Cholm - was taken into account.

Nothing is known about the number of civilians remaining in the city during the fighting, their living conditions and victims.

Remarks

  1. ↑ Allegedly, the Germans are said to have lost around 500–600 men, 99 machine guns, two radio stations and other material, while Soviet losses are said to have only been 52 men; see: В. А. Пережогин: Холм . In: Советская Военная Энциклопедия , vol. 8, Москва 1980, p. 384 and А. Н. Асмолов: За линией фронта , p. 280.
  2. ↑ When Purkajev was reported that around 1,500 Germans were defending Cholm, he dismissed this as excessive. In his eyes the 33rd Rifle Division was in any case sufficient to ensure the conquest of the place, see: Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Воениздат, Москва 1986, p. 28 f.
  3. ↑ These breakthrough battles were marked by great hardship. The commander of the Soviet II Battalion of the 73rd Rifle Regiment, First Lieutenant PM Nečajev, fell, and his deputy, Commissioner DS Saprykin, was later awarded the Order of Lenin for his leadership . The regiment itself had only 218 soldiers after the end of the fighting, see: Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Воениздат, Москва 1986, p. 34 f.
  4. ^ A Soviet rifle brigade had 4,334 men, a rifle division 11,626. Since at least the 33rd and 391st Rifle Divisions and the 45th Rifle Brigade were involved in the fighting, the number was 21,670. These include the 146th Panzer Battalion and other smaller units (ski troops, reconnaissance units, partisans). About the figures: James F. Gebhardt: The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation - Soviet breakthrough and pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944 , Washington DC 1989 (= Leavenworth Papers , Vol. 17)
  5. ↑ The aircraft, transporters such as bombers, launched from the airfield Pskov and from April Riga, Александр Заблотский / Роман Ларинцев: Демянск - сталинграда Предтеча in: Авиамастер 1 (2004)
  6. ↑ Mainly: III./ Lw.Feld.Rgt. 1 (Major Thoms), IR 553 (329th ID), IR 386 (218 ID); see: Werner Haupt: Demjansk - Ein Bollwerk im Osten , Bad Nauheim 1961, p. 92.
  7. ↑ He is said to have destroyed 12 aircraft by the end of February, see: Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Москва 1986, p. 36 f.
  8. ↑ The DFS 230 could transport 10 soldiers or a ton of payload. The "Gotha", which was used at Cholm for the first time, could take 21 men or four tons of material on board.
  9. ↑ This battalion was characterized by great brutality throughout the war. More than 5,000 people fell victim to this unit. Arbitrary attacks and at least one murder of the civilian population are also recorded in the city of Cholm; see: Andreas Jordan: Police Battalion 65 - Deeds and crime scenes
  10. ↑ For example: А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005.

literature

swell

  • Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944 (= series of publications on troop support , vol. 55).
  • Kurt Mehner (ed.): The secret daily reports of the German Wehrmacht leadership in the Second World War 1939–1945 , Vol. 4, Biblio-Verlag, Osnabrück 1992. ISBN 3-7648-1284-2 .
  • Richard Muck: Kampfgruppe Scherer - 105 days included , original edition: Gerhard Stalling , Oldenburg 1943. New edition: Arndt , Kiel 2007. ISBN 978-3-88741-091-9 .
  • Günter Wegmann: “The High Command of the Wehrmacht announces…” The German Wehrmacht Report , Vol. 2, Biblio-Verlag, Osnabrück 1982. ISBN 3-7648-1282-6 .
  • Percy E. Schramm (Ed.): War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht , Bechtermünz, Augsburg 2002. ISBN 3-8289-0525-0 .
  • Oskars Perro: Fortress Cholm , Kurland Publ., Toronto 1992.
  • Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Воениздат, Москва 1986.

Secondary literature

  • Александр Заблотский / Роман Ларинцев: Демянск - Предтеча сталинграда , in: Авиамастер 1 (2004) ( online version )
  • А. Н. Асмолов: За линией фронта , in: Author collective: На Северо-Западном фронте , Москва 1969, pp. 269–288. ( Online version ( Memento from May 26, 2009 in the Internet Archive ))
  • В. В. Бешанов: Год 1942 , Harvest Publ., Минск 2002. ( online version )
  • Robert Forczyk: Demyansk 1942-43 - The Frozen Fortress , Osprey Publ., London 2012. ISBN 978-1-84908-552-6 .
  • А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Яуза Эксмо, Москва 2005. ISBN 5-699-10769-X . ( Online version )
  • Ernst Klink: Army and Navy . In: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= Military History Research Office [ed.]: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4 ). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 451–712 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  • В. А. Пережогин: Холм . In: Советская Военная Энциклопедия , Vol. 8, Москва 1980, p. 384.
  • Битва под Москвой - Хроника, Факты, Люди , Olma-Press, Москва 2002.

Web links

Commons : Battle of Cholm  - Collection of images, videos and audio files
  • Rolf Wypior: Readers' response to the Battle of Cholm . In: Oberpfalznetz.de (April 9, 2005)

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ В. А. Пережогин: Холм , in: Советская Военная Энциклопедия , vol. 8, Москва 1980, p. 384.
  2. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 8.
  3. ^ Ernst Klink: Heer und Kriegsmarine , pp. 629–632.
  4. ↑ Halder diary January 13, 1942: quoted in according to KTB, vol. 2, p. 220.
  5. ↑ KTB, Vol. 2, p. 236, entry from January 18, 1942.
  6. ↑ А. Н. Асмолов: За линией фронта , in: Author collective: На Северо-Западном фронте , Москва 1969, p. 279.
  7. ↑ KTB, Vol. 2, p. 239, entry from January 19, 1942.
  8. ↑ А. Н. Асмолов: За линией фронта , p. 278.
  9. ↑ KTB, Vol. 2, p. 248, entry from January 22, 1942.
  10. ↑ a b Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 9.
  11. ↑ Percy Schramm: War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 1942 . Ed .: Percy Schramm. tape 3 , volume I. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Munich 1982, ISBN 3-88199-073-9 , p. 44 .
  12. ↑ Samuel Mitcham in German Order of Battle, volume 1, 2007, p. 332, incorrectly lists 5,000 men in the Cholm pocket.
  13. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 10.
  14. ↑ А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005, pp. 155f
  15. ↑ В. В. Бешанов: Год 1942 , Минск 2002, p. 48.
  16. ↑ a b А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005, p. 159.
  17. ↑ M. А. Пoлушкин: Торопөцко-Холмская Опөрация , in: Советская Военная Энциклопедия , vol. 8, Москва 1980, p. 76.
  18. ↑ Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Воениздат, Москва 1986, p. 30.
  19. ↑ a b Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 11 f.
  20. ↑ a b c В. В. Бешанов: Год 1942 , Минск 2002, p. 56.
  21. ↑ a b Richard Muck: Kampfgruppe Scherer - 105 days included , Oldenburg 1943, p. 9.
  22. ↑ Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Воениздат, Москва 1986, p. 34 f.
  23. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 15.
  24. ↑ Werner Haupt : Demjansk - Ein Bollwerk im Osten , Bad Nauheim 1961, p. 91.
  25. ↑ Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Москва 1986, p. 33.
  26. ↑ А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005, p. 161.
  27. ↑ Александр Заблотский / Роман Ларинцев: Демянск - Предтеча сталинграда , in: Авиамастер 1 (2004); Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 19 f.
  28. ↑ А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005, p. 161; Александр Заблотский / Роман Ларинцев: Демянск - Предтеча сталинграда , in: Авиамастер 1 (2004); Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 21.
  29. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 28.
  30. ^ Richard Muck: Kampfgruppe Scherer - 105 days included , Oldenburg 1943, o. P.
  31. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 20 and 41.
  32. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 48.
  33. ↑ a b Александр Заблотский / Роман Ларинцев: Демянск - Предтеча сталинграда , in: Авиамастер 1 (2004)
  34. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 45 f.
  35. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 33 and 40.
  36. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 49 and 63.
  37. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 33 and 63.
  38. ↑ a b Report by the medical officer Hamm, see: Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 34–39.
  39. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 23 f.
  40. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 37 and 55.
  41. ↑ А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005, p. 162.
  42. ↑ А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005, p. 169.
  43. ↑ a b Битва под Москвой - Хроника, Факты, Люди , Москва 2002.
  44. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 21-27.
  45. ^ Richard Muck: Kampfgruppe Scherer - 105 days included , Oldenburg 1943, p. 12 f.
  46. ↑ Ernst Klink: Heer und Kriegsmarine , p. 637 f.
  47. ↑ Werner Haupt: The German Air Force Field Divisions 1941–1945 , Eggolsheim 2005, p. 16.
  48. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 39.
  49. ^ Richard Muck: Kampfgruppe Scherer - 105 days included , Oldenburg 1943, o. P.
  50. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 41.
  51. ↑ Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Москва 1986, p. 36 f.
  52. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 59 f.
  53. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 60.
  54. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 63–65.
  55. ^ Ernst Klink: Heer und Kriegsmarine , p. 638 f.
  56. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 51 and 65.
  57. ↑ А. Исаев: Краткий курс истории ВОВ - Наступление маршала Шапошникова , Москва 2005, p. 265 f.
  58. ↑ Robert Forczyk: Demyansk 1942-43 - The Frozen Fortress , London 2012, p 75 miles.
  59. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 70.
  60. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 71-76.
  61. ^ Richard Muck: Kampfgruppe Scherer - 105 days included , Oldenburg 1943, o. P.
  62. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 78–81.
  63. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, p. 81 f.
  64. ↑ Kurt Mehner (ed.): The secret daily reports of the German Wehrmacht leadership in the Second World War 1939-1945 , Vol. 4, Osnabrück 1992, pp. 326 and 328.
  65. ↑ Ernst Klink: Heer und Kriegsmarine , p. 642.
  66. ↑ a b Robert Forczyk: Demyansk 1942-43 - The Frozen Fortress , London 2012, p 76th
  67. ↑ Richard Muck: Kampfgruppe Scherer - 105 days included , Oldenburg 1943, p. 7.
  68. ↑ Berliner Lokalanzeiger (March 22, 1942)
  69. ↑ Günter Wegmann: The High Command of the Wehrmacht announces ... - The German Wehrmacht Report , Vol. 2, Osnabrück 1982, p. 105.
  70. ↑ Otto Karsten: Cholm , 1944, pp. 28 and 50.
  71. ↑ Rolf Wypior: Readers echo the battle of Chelm , in: Oberpfalznetz.de (9 April 2005)
  72. ^ Author collective: History of the Great Patriotic War , Vol. 2, Berlin (East) 1963, p. 385.
  73. ↑ В. А. Пережогин: Холм , in: Советская Военная Энциклопедия , vol. 8, Москва 1980, p. 384.
  74. ↑ А. Н. Асмолов: За линией фронта , in: Author collective: На Северо-Западном фронте , Москва 1969, pp. 269–288.
  75. ↑ Г. Г. Семёнов: Наступает ударная , Воениздат, Москва 1986, pp. 28-48.
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