Power failure in Europe in November 2006
On Saturday, November 4th, 2006, around 10:10 p.m., there was a major power outage in Europe. Parts of Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Austria and Spain were sometimes without electricity for up to 120 minutes; effects were felt even in Morocco.
root cause
The trigger was the scheduled temporary shutdown of two high-voltage lines Conneforde - Diele operated by E.ON (now Tennet TSO ) , which cross the Ems with the 380 kV Ems overhead line crossing, on the evening of November 4, 2006. This shutdown happened for disembarkation the Norwegian Pearl , a cruise ship built at the Meyer Werft in Papenburg . At the time of the failure, the E.ON network had a capacity of almost 10 GW (mainly generated by wind energy ) from northern Germany and northern Europe to western and southern Europe.
According to the UCTE investigation report , this shutdown was poorly planned and characterized by short-term changes. The original schedule for the line shutdown provided for a significant reduction in transport performance. Due to legal agreements, this reduction could no longer be adjusted to the updated schedule. In addition, the disconnection of the line was brought forward without informing the other participating transmission system operators Vattenfall (today 50Hertz Transmission ) and RWE (today Amprion ) in good time, so that they no longer had a chance to adapt their power generation and network capacities to the changed conditions at the new time . After the planned shutdown of the two 400 kV Conneforde-Diele lines, the E.ON network went from normal operation (in which the ( n −1) criterion was met) to the endangered but still safe operating state.
Other circumstances included incorrectly exchanged and updated limit data between the network operators for the remaining transport lines that were supposed to take over the service of the Ems overhead line crossing. This resulted in inaccurate or incorrect calculations in the load flow calculations carried out on an ongoing basis to determine network security. For example, the limit values of the 400 kV transmission line between the Landesbergen and Wehrendorf substations - this line took over a significant part of the service - were set differently on both sides - although the E.ON operators did not think about the different parameters on the RWE side were aware of:
| parameter | Landesbergen | Wehrendorf |
|---|---|---|
| Thermal limit value of the line unlimited in time : |
2,000 A | 2,000 A |
| Warning thresholds for alarm messages | 1,000 A and 2,000 A | 1,795 A |
| Maximum allowable current | 2,550 A for 1 hour | 1.995 A |
| Immediate shutdown | 3,000 A | 2,100 A |
course
After the planned shutdown of the second Ems overhead line crossing at 9:39 p.m., there was a planned increase on the 400 kV Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line from around 600 MVA to 1,300 MVA. With the help of the Danish control area, it would still have been possible to transfer the network from the endangered state to the safe ( n −1) state by 10:05 pm, but this option was not considered and was not permitted for legal reasons. since topology changes must first be made in your own network to ensure this.
Between 10:05 p.m. and 10:07 p.m. there was a further increase of 100 MW on the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line, which led to the triggering of a warning on the part of RWE and at 10:08 p.m. to an urgent clarification with the E.ON network line led to restore safe operations. E.ON's staff carried out a load flow calculation in real time to change the network topology, but without checking the ( n −1) criterion, with the result that a merger of two busbars in the Landesbergen substation converts the electricity on the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line Should reduce 80 A.
The interconnection of the busbars at 10:10:11 p.m. without further consultation with the RWE power line triggered a disaster: Instead of reducing the transmission capacity as planned, the current through the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line increased by 67 A, which was two seconds later led to the automatic triggering of the network protection in the Wehrendorf substation. Since the ( n −1) criterion for this region was not met at this point in time , the shutdown of the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line led to a chain reaction: the load was distributed in an uncontrolled manner to other lines in the vicinity, which subsequently led to further automatic shutdowns due to overload and lack of synchronicity.
At the end of the chain reaction, at 22:10:28.7 the UCTE network was separated by the sequence or automatic emergency programs in the west and north-east areas and 0.2 s later the south-east electricity network as separate sub-networks, without this there was damage to the infrastructure such as transformers or lines. Northern and Eastern Europe now generated almost 10,000 MW too much power that was lacking in Western and Southern Europe. As a consequence, the network frequency rose rapidly in the north and east of Europe, while it fell rapidly in the west and south of Europe ( underfrequency ). While it was still possible in Northern and Eastern Europe to balance the current balance in good time, mainly by disconnecting energy producers from the grid, the lack of generator capacity in Western and Southern Europe could not be mobilized quickly enough. Loads were taken from the grid by automatic load shedding , which resulted in an immediate power outage for the affected regions . At 10:40:40 p.m., it was possible to stabilize the network frequency in the remaining supply areas in the western region at a low level. As a result, attempts were made to restore the synchronicity of the power grid and to reconnect it. This was achieved across Europe after several unsuccessful attempts at around 22:50.
consequences
Up to ten million households in Europe were affected. Rail traffic was also severely affected. In Austria, in the course of the disruption, the network between western and eastern Austria was split up: While too much power was available in eastern Austria, with a significant increase in network frequency and with the result that power plants had to be taken off the grid at short notice, it was in Western Austria too little power available. For this reason, large consumers in western Austria were switched off for a short time and additional storage power plants were put into operation to support the electricity supply. The switchover caused power outages in Austria; these took a fraction of a second to (in some regions) a few minutes. After three quarters of an hour, the two halves of the network in Austria could be synchronized and connected again.
Schedule
Information according to the investigation report of the Federal Network Agency.
- September 18, 2006: Meyer Werft applies to shut down the Conneforde-Diele line on November 5, 2006, 01:00 - 05:00
- October 27, 2006: preliminary approval by E.ON, information to RWE
- November 3rd, 2006: Meyer Werft asks E.ON to move it forward to November 4th from 10:00 p.m.
- November 3rd, 2006, approx. 6:00 p.m.: E.ON transmits the routine, daily information document (DACF) to RWE. It does not contain any information about the changed schedule.
- November 4th, 2006, between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.: E.ON informs RWE about the changed schedule
- 04.11.2006, 9:30 p.m.: RWE agrees to the line shutdown.
- 04.11.2006, 21:38: the first line is switched off
- 04.11.2006, 21:39: the second line is switched off
- November 4th, 2006, 9:39 pm: E.ON receives first warning messages about possible line overloads
- November 4th, 2006, 9:42 pm: E.ON issues the so-called authorization to dispose (final approval) to Meyer Werft
- November 4th, 2006, from 10:00 p.m.: the daily change from trade agreements to 10:00 p.m. increases the load flows from around 10:05 p.m.
- November 4th, 2006, from 10:07 pm: Exceeding the safety limit value set by RWE for the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line
- November 4th, 2006, from 10:10:11 pm: E.ON inserts a coupling in the Landesbergen substation. The aim is to reduce the load flow on the critical line. The opposite occurs, the load flow increases.
- 04.11.2006, from 10:10:13 pm: The Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line switches off.
- 04.11.2006, from 22:10:15: various other lines are overloaded and switch off. The UCTE network will then be divided into three areas.
See also
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b UCTE (2007): Final Report - System Disturbance on November 4, 2006 ( entsoe.eu PDF)
- ↑ Section 13 (1) of the German Energy Industry Act of July 13, 2005.
- ↑ Albrecht Tiedemann, Chanthira Srikandam, Paul Kreutzkamp, Hans Roth, Bodo Gohla-Neudecker, Philipp Kuhn: Investigation of the electricity-economic and energy-political effects of the collection of network usage fees for the storage electricity purchase of pumped storage plants . (short: NNE pump storage). Ed .: German Energy Agency [dena]. Berlin November 24, 2008, Chapter 3.7 Excursus: Major fault in the UCTE network on November 4, 2006, p. 32 ff. ( Dena.de [PDF; 4.5 MB ; accessed on January 18, 2014] Client: Vattenfall Europe Transmission GmbH (VE-T); Final report). dena.de ( Memento of the original from August 17, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ^ Report on the system malfunction ... on November 4, 2006 (PDF; 400 kB) from the Federal Network Agency
