Tenko

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Sano Manabu, one of the most famous communists who committed tenkō , in 1948

Tenkō ( Japanese 転 向 / Kyūjitai 轉向 , German: turn, reversal, conversion, conversion) describes the political conversion of numerous Japanese socialists who broke away from the left movement or ideology between 1925 and 1945 and often confessed to nationalism . Political conversion could take place without direct repression by the state, but mostly took place under severe stress in prisons, penitentiaries or pretrial detention centers. Imprisoned socialists mostly named the awakening of their national consciousness, family reasons or the discovery of theoretical contradictions in Marxism as motives for tenkō .

The most famous cases of tenkō occurred in June 1933, when Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika , two imprisoned leaders of the illegal Communist Party of Japan (CPJ), renounced the Communist International (Comintern) and the strategy of violent revolution in an open letter demanded a specifically Japanese, national socialism under imperial care. Your communication sparked a mass movement away from the institutions and ideas of communism, which became known in Japan as the tenkō phenomenon ( 転 向 現象 , tenkō genshō ). In the years that followed, the range of beliefs revoked by converts widened to the same extent that the increasingly authoritarian Japanese state narrowed the boundaries of what could be legally thought and say.

Word origin

Directly translated, tenkō simply means change of direction, since the compound form of the Sino-Japanese characters for 転 , ten (dt. "Change, rotation") or 転 ぶ , korobu (dt. "Turn, fall over; convert") and 向 , kō ( German "direction, tendency") or 向 か う , mukau (German "turn, align").

1930 to 1945

Tenkō gained its main meaning in the summer of 1933, when Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika - two imprisoned leaders of the illegal Communist Party of Japan - broke away in an open letter from the Communist International (Comintern) and the strategy of the violent revolution and a specifically Japanese national Demanded socialism under imperial care. Japanese journalists named their U-turn as tenkō , whereupon this designation quickly passed into collective memory .

In the mid-1930s, the term became common in the literature of the Japanese police , prison authorities and the judiciary. The state authorities understood under tenkō the letting go of - from their perspective - “dangerous worldviews” ( 危 険 思想 , kiken shisō ), especially communism and anarchism . The content of the definition was expanded in the following years to include social democratic and liberal ideas. With the efforts of the Japanese state to align and mobilize the population for the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937, tenkō also transcended its negative character and became an affirmative commitment to the state, nation and imperial family.

1945 until today

With the beginning of the American occupation after the end of World War II , the political and social circumstances of the time changed considerably. Now tenkō served as a moral yardstick for intellectuals who were active before and after the war. Political converts were criticized for having supported the war instigated by the military and government or for not having opposed it steadfastly. Only the handful of indomitable communists who had retained their ideological convictions despite long prison sentences were able to present themselves as morally impeccable actors.

In the politically charged atmosphere of the 1960s, the name came up again; this time tenkō meant the merging of protagonists of the student movement into the conformity pressure of the Japanese working world. In retrospect, tenkō is also applied to the turns of modern Japanese intellectuals from progressive to conservative and nationalist positions.

Legal basis

Political conversions often took place among imprisoned socialists. The legal basis for criminal prosecution was the " Law to Maintain Public Security " ( 治安 維持 法 , chian iji hō ), which was passed in 1925 and tightened several times , which was aimed specifically at communists and anarchists. In order to control and monitor those accused or convicted under this law after their release, the 1936 "Law for the Protection and Monitoring of Beliefs of Beliefs " ( 思想 犯 保護 観 察 法 , shisōhan hogo kansatsu hō ) was added, the aim of which was to rehabilitate "belief offenders " her tenkō and avoiding relapse was. Both laws were abolished in 1945 by the US occupation authorities (GHQ).

Namba Daisuke, who failed with an assassination attempt on Prince Regent Hirohito in 1923

The persecution of subversive ideologies had already begun in the Meiji period through the "Police and Order Act" ( 治安 警察 法 , chian keisatsu hō ) and various newspaper and press laws passed in 1900 . In the 1920s, this “threat” moved again into the focus of the home and justice ministries . Conservative officials pushed for the containment of “dangerous worldviews”, especially communism and anarchism. A bill called the "Law to Control Radical Social Movements" ( 過激 社会 運動 取締 法 , kageki shakai undō torishimari hō ) did not get beyond the status of a draft in parliament after violent protests by the workers' movement . The belief in the need for a new law to deal with radical movements was reinforced by new knowledge about international contacts between the illegal Communist Party of Japan and the Comintern in Moscow, as well as an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Crown Prince and later Emperor Hirohito on December 27, 1923 by Namba Daisuke, a sympathizer of the communists, who became famous under the name Toranomon incident ( 虎 ノ 門 事件 , toranomon jiken ).

Public Security Act 1925

Fears about the subversive potential of the socialist movement resulted in the Law to Maintain Public Security , which came into force on February 19, 1925. However, the terms “communism” or “anarchism” were not included in the legal text due to definition problems. Instead, the legislators resorted to the morally charged and imprecise word kokutai (English: national being). The elevation of this term, which remained undefined until 1929, to the legal term signaled the link between legality and morality and, in Mitchell's words, created a legal hydra ("legal hydra "), which opened up extensive powers to the police and law enforcement agencies. Article 1 of the law made the establishment of or knowingly membership in an organization with the "aim of changing the kokutai or the rejection of the system of private property" punishable by up to ten years in prison or penitentiary. There were lower penalties for agitation, financial or personal support of such projects. In 1928 the maximum sentence was extended to the death penalty and in 1941 the law was tightened again. A total of around 66,000 people were arrested under the law between 1928 and 1941. However, only around 5,600 were charged and only one person was sentenced to death.

Law for the Protection and Monitoring of Beliefs on Beliefs, 1936

By the mid-1930s, the number of people charged and released under the Public Security Act had risen to over 10,000. These included those who, in the opinion of the authorities, had credibly renounced their ideology, as well as those who had not committed tenkō ( 非 転 向 , hitenkō ) , or had committed insufficiently , but were released, for example, for lack of evidence. The dismissed converts and non-converts continued to pose a threat to the judiciary and the police. Inadequate and non-converts should therefore be monitored just as much as converts who were at risk of relapsing into old ways of thinking caused by various difficulties, such as the Job search, has been tightened.

In order to ensure effective control of non-converts and successful rehabilitation of converts, parliament passed the law on the protection and surveillance of offenders on May 18, 1936. On the basis of this law, political converts were monitored and controlled for two years. If possible, a private guardian was assigned. A number of semi-official associations were also set up. These functioned on the model of the 帝国 更新 会 , Teikoku kōshinkai (dt. Imperial Renewal Society ) in Tōkyō, a rehabilitation facility for paroled persons that had set up its own department for "ideological offenders". Political converts found material support there, as well as advice and support as well as weekly discussion groups. The entire strategy was aimed at rehabilitating the “ideological perpetrators”.

Development of the tenkō phenomenon

Deviations from the constantly changing course of the CPY and, in particular, in the expansion of the Communist International in Moscow, have existed in the socialist movement of Japan, which is rich in ideological trench warfare, since the founding of the first CPY in 1923. The name tenkō was applied to some of these changes in direction in retrospect but not before Sano and Nabeyama, so to speak, provided the blueprint for political conversion.

Conversion of Sano and Nabeyama

Newspaper report in the Asahi Shimbun of June 10, 1933 about the Sanos and Nabeyama's declaration

Sano and Nabeyama had been on the JPY leadership committee since December 1, 1927, and after their arrest were sentenced to life imprisonment under the Public Security Act in October 1932. After the verdict was announced, Sano and Nabeyama were transferred to Ichigaya Prison in Tokyo . From there in the summer of 1933 came the declaration mentioned at the beginning. In July 1933, the left-wing magazine Kaizō published the wording of the announcement entitled "Notice to the Co- Accused Comrades" ( 共同 被告 同志 に 告 ぐ る 書 , Kyōdō hikoku dōshi ni tsuguru sho ). In it, Sano and Nabeyama renounced the Comintern and the strategy of violent revolution and called for a specifically Japanese, national socialism under imperial care.

Conversion of Japanese communists

Their turnaround had former comrades Sano and Nabeyama branded as “traitors”, “spies” and “ social fascists ”. The announcement of the announcement among imprisoned communist writers, critics and political activists, financed by funds from the Justice Ministry, sparked an entirely different reaction. Within a month, almost a third (548 out of 1762) of the members and sympathizers imprisoned in prisons and pre-trial detention centers renounced the CPJ. Later more and more people separated from the party and its front organizations . By the mid-1930s, the number of apostates had risen to almost three quarters of all comrades imprisoned (324 of 438).

At this point the party had de facto ceased to exist within Japanese society. Some leadership cadres went into exile in China; only a handful of dispersed factions remained active domestically. The disintegration of the YPY gave rise to concerns among the authorities that communists might move their secret activities to semi-legal organizations or organizations that have so far only been loosely associated with the YPY. This happened for example with the "Japanese League of Proletarian Writers" ( 日本 プ ロ レ タ リ ア 作家 同盟 , Nihon puroretaria sakka dōmei ), the most influential writers' association of the proletarian literary movement , in which in 1932 supporters of the CPJ took control. Under pressure from the police and the judiciary, but also due to internal disagreements, the league disbanded in February 1934 and most of the novelists converted. Honda Shūgo estimates that at least 95 percent of proletarian writers committed tenkō .

The police, judiciary and prison authorities analyzed each tenkō case and categorized it based on personal motives, although police violence, torture or threats were not included in the evaluation. The Ministry of Justice published the findings in several studies. An example of such studies are the "Investigations into Weltanschauung crimes of subjects under observation" published in March 1943 ( 思想 犯 保護 対 象 者 に 関 す る 諸 調査 , shisōhan hogo taishōsha ni kansuru shochōsa ) among 2,888 people (2,710 men, 178 women). It is noticeable that the respondents often justify their political conversion with the awakening of their national consciousness, family reasons and the discovery of theoretical contradictions. However, some researchers warn against taking such claims at face value. Max Ward and the historian Itō Akira point out that motivations such as love for the family did not suddenly appear at the moment of arrest, but simply opened up a way out of the defeated communist movement.

Reasons for conversion /
forbidden worldview		 total (Religious)
belief		 Family
reasons		 Discovery of
theoretical
contradictions		 National
consciousness		 health
reasons		 Repentance through
imprisonment		 Other
reasons
communism 2403 52 677 299 768 232 299 76
anarchism 55 4th 16 5 19th 6th 2 3
Religions 153 3 21st 6th 52 16 50 5
Popular movement 60 1 5 2 13 2 34 4th
total 2671 59 719 321 852 256 385 88
Percentage 100% 2.3% 26.9% 22.7% 31.9% 9.6% 14.4% 3.3%

Conversion of entire organizations

The wave of conversions had initially swept imprisoned communists with it and then spilled over into the public, which can be seen in the voluntary declarations of left-wing intellectuals, literary circles, student groups, liberal law faculties at universities, trade unions and cultural associations. Tenkō advanced to the preventive gesture of approval of the state, nation, imperial house and the acts of war of the imperial army in East and Southeast Asia. From 1937 onwards, whole organizations began to profess themselves in this way. The Social Mass Party ( 社会 大衆 党 , Shakai taishūtō ), for example, a legal proletarian party in which all legal left parties had united years before, now publicly served the national cause in an act of political conversion. The climax of the tenkō of entire organizations marked the year 1942 with the dissolution of all political parties and their merger to form the Imperial Aid Society ( 大 政 翼 賛 会 , Taisei yokusankai ), with which Japan became a de facto one-party state.

Explanatory approaches

The causes of the tenkō phenomenon are complex and controversial. In the research literature , individual , social and cultural psychological explanations are used as well as approaches to the history of ideas. Individual motives of the political converts and socio-cultural or ideological characteristics that made tenkō easier, superimposed and often complemented one another.

External pressure

A common explanation refers to the significance of external pressure. The sociologist Patricia G. Steinhoff differentiates between physical, psychological and social pressure.

  • Physical pressure includes physical violence from police and prison staff, as well as life-threatening illnesses from adverse detention conditions.
  • Psychological pressure means the pressure of suffering during the prison stay, which confronted the inmates with fear of death, fear of the future and social isolation .
  • Finally, social pressure relates to attempts at persuasion by caregivers; this includes comrades who have already converted, family members, relatives, former school friends and teachers, as well as prison doctors , prison priests and criminal officials.

Some researchers consider physical and psychological pressures to be the main causes of political conversions for many socialists in the 1930s. A classic example of this interpretation is Honda Shūgo, who says he was “extremely close” to communism. Honda writes: “The main cause of tenkō was of course external pressure. This included not only arrest, incarceration and torture, but also the fear of having to face the death penalty in the worst case, which was made possible by a tightening of the law for the maintenance of public security. "

The historian Henry DeWitt Smith takes the opposite position, for whom police violence and threats make the "perhaps the least convincing explanation" ("[p] erases the least persuasive explanation"). There were both, of course, but apparently they were small in scope and ineffective compared to other techniques.

Group and consensus orientation

Closely related to the question of the significance of external pressure is the question of the susceptibility of Japanese socialists to these forms of pressure. Some researchers see the effectiveness of external pressures as being rooted in socio-cultural characteristics of Japanese society.

Patricia G. Steinhoff mentions the traditional consensus orientation of Japanese society in this regard . This is based on the ideas of harmony and unity and manifests itself in practice, for example, in consensus-based decision-making processes. This also includes the idea that the well-being of the group should be put above one's own desires, needs and ideas. According to Steinhoff, the traditional consensus orientation also had an impact on the decisions of political converts to revoke their radical convictions. Richard H. Mitchell takes a similar view, according to which the political converts were particularly susceptible to external pressure due to the traditionally high homogeneity, group and consensus orientation of Japanese society. Tsurumi Shunsuke also refers to group solidarity as a factor in political conversions. He attributes this solidarity to a specifically Japanese cultural tradition of insularity .

nationalism

One explanation points out the nationalism of the Japanese socialists. This is significant in that the government authorities found socialism incompatible with the kokutai as an expression of the Japanese national essence. However, a political conversion due to nationalism was not synonymous with an adjustment to the ideological position of state power. A distinction can be made here between statism ("state nationalism") and ethno-cultural ("völkisch") nationalism, which was critical of the state, but occasionally invoked the same national symbols and specifics.

Ethnonationalism gained considerable importance in the socialist movement of Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, which historian Henry DeWitt Smith attributes to changed geopolitical conditions. Socialists had developed their political ideals under the premise of internationalism , which materialized in the League of Nations after the First World War . Since Japan had few external enemies to fear until the late 1920s, the focus of Japanese socialists was on internal reforms. International relations have only been analyzed using the metaphor of class struggle . This changed at the latest in 1931 with the outbreak of the Manchurian Crisis , which triggered a wave of hurray patriotism in Japan that swept along with numerous socialists and heralded the end of Taishō democracy , a phase of liberal and democratic endeavors. Some political converts such as Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika tried to combine the concepts of “nationalism” and “socialism” , which the state had declared antagonisms , in a “national revolutionary socialism” that should take Japanese specifics into account.

Internalization

Some researchers see the underlying causes of political conversions in the superficial reception of modern, western world views in Japan. The Japanese socialists would have accepted the external pressure because they did not internalize the socialist ideology sufficiently.

The Japanese scientist Fukuzawa Hiroomi speaks in this context of “grafted” conceptual apparatus. Unlike in Europe, where scholars abstracted the scientific language from the respective vernacular language , the Marxist terminology did not originate “naturally” from the Japanese colloquial language , but was simply translated and “patched together”, according to Fukuzawa, from Sino-Japanese characters . The Marxist terms remained “abstract sign” and ultimately “without any deeper meaning or consequence”. According to Fukuzawa, this meant that little pressure was required to induce the Japanese socialists to shake off the Marxist conceptual apparatus and the associated worldview.

intellectualism

Sometimes the distance to the ordinary population is also blamed for individual tenkō decisions by socialist intellectuals in particular, and political conversions are consequently interpreted as an adjustment to the mood of the population.

The socialist movement in general, and the JCP in particular, were by no means the products of a grassroots movement , but rather were largely supported by young intellectuals. In 1926 and 1927, students made up just under a quarter of the party members; Intellectuals were estimated to make up at least half. The intellectuals were said to have a paradoxical attitude towards the ordinary population. On the one hand there is talk of a romantic bond with the proletariat, on the other hand there is a strong claim to leadership. These two poles increasingly came into conflict from the end of the 1920s when the CPJ, under the leadership of the Comintern , went public in Moscow in 1928 with the demand for the abolition of the monarchy and thus head-on attacked the popular emperor. Recognizing this distance between the CPY and the mood of the common population presented the socialists with a fundamental decision. They either followed the CPJ and thus the Comintern, or the Japanese working class . Both paths were taken. "The communist movement in Japan," Honda observes, "has a tendency to split into a rigid, ultra-left idealism and a mass-following opportunism."

Tenkō literature

Murayama Tomoyoshi , representative of the tenkō literature, in 1955

When the number of apostates from communism skyrocketed in the 1930s, a new genre of novels established itself , which was named tenkō literature ( 転 向 文学 , tenkō bungaku ) after its main theme . The authors of these novels were mostly former or active members of the proletarian literary movement ( プ ロ レ タ リ ア 文学 運動 , puroretaria bungaku undō ) who sought to artistically process the profound experience of their political conversion. Prominent examples of the tenkō literature are the short story “Helle Nacht” ( 白夜 , Byakuya ; 1934) by Murayama Tomoyoshi and the novel “Das Haus im Dorf” ( 村 の 家 , Mura no ie ; 1935) by Nakano Shigeharu . Murayama was arrested in 1932 as one of the leading figures of the proletarian literary movement, distanced himself from Marxism the following year and was released from prison in 1934. “Bright Night” dissects the psychology of political conversion, for example when the main character in the novel, out of remorse for his own inadequacy in the face of external pressure, inflicts himself injuries with multiple hits of the head against the cell wall. Nakano, a member of the CPJ from 1931, was also arrested in 1932 for his commitment to the proletarian literary movement, renounced the CPJ in 1934 and was released from prison in 1934. His novel “Das Haus im Dorf” deals with the aftermath of political conversion. The protagonist Benji is confronted, for example, with the criticism of his father Magozō that he lacks integrity .

Prominent political converts

Japanese names: As usual in Japan, the Japanese personal names mentioned in this article have the family name before the first name.

literature

  • Olaf Butz: A left story. The traitor Sano Manabu. In: Steffi Richter (Ed.): Japan Reading Book III, Intelli. Konkursbuchverlag, Tübingen 1998, pp. 86-107.
  • Fujita Shōzō: Shōwa hachinen o chūshin to suru tenkō no jōkyō. In: Shisō no kagaku kenkyūkai (ed.): Kyōdō kenkyū tenkō 1 Senzenhen jō. (German Cooperative Conversion Research 1, pre-war edition, first volume) 6 volumes. Heibonsha, Tōkyō 2012, pp. 73–129. --- Abridged and translated v. Foljanty, Detlef: The ideological conversion around 1933. In: Masao Nishikawa, Masato Miyachi (Hrsg.): Japan between the wars. A selection of Japanese research on fascism and ultra-nationalism. Announcements of the Society for Nature and Ethnology of East Asia (MOAG), Hamburg 1990, pp. 379–408.
  • Honda Shūgo: Tenkō bungakuron. ( About tenkô literature ) 3rd edition, Miraisha, Tōkyō 1972.
  • Germaine A. Hoston: Tenkō. Marxism & the National Question in Prewar Japan. In: Polity , Volume 16 (1), 1983, pp. 96-118.
  • Maruyama Masao: Thinking in Japan. Ed. And transl. v. Wolfgang Schamoni and Wolfgang Seifert. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1988.
  • Richard H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca et al. a. 1976.
  • Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō and Thought Control. In: Gail Lee Bernstein, Haruhiro Fukui (Ed.): Japan and the World. Essays on Japanese History and Politics in Honor of Ishida Takeshi. St. Martin's Press, New York 1988, pp. 78-94
  • Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969.
  • Tsurumi Shunsuke: Tenkō no kyōdō kenkyū ni tsuite. In: Shisō no kagaku kenkyūkai (ed.): Kyōdō kenkyū tenkō 1 Senzenhen jō. (German Cooperative Conversion Research 1, pre-war edition, first volume) 6 volumes. Heibonsha, Tōkyō 2012, pp. 19–68.
  • Tsurumi Shunsuke: An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan 1931–1945. KPI Limited, London a. a. 1986.
  • Yoshimoto Takaaki: Tenkōron (German about political conversion ). In: Shōichi Noma (Ed.): Yoshimoto Takaaki . Kōdansha, Tōkyō 1972, pp. 384-399. --- Translated into English v. Wake, Hisaaki: On Tenkō, or Ideological Conversion. In: Review of Japanese Culture and Society 20 (December) 2008, pp. 99-119 ( online, accessed March 16, 2016 ).

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ 5749911- 転 向 - wadoku.de. In: wadoku.de. Retrieved May 10, 2016 .
  2. ↑ Butz, Olaf: A left story. The traitor Sano Manabu. In: Steffi Richter (Ed.): Japan Reading Book III, Intelli. Konkursbuchverlag, Tübingen 1998, p. 87 f.
  3. ↑ Max M. Ward: The Problem of "Thought". Crisis, National Essence and the Interwar Japanese State. Dissertation, New York University 2011, p. 131 f.
  4. ^ Fujita, Shōzō: Shōwa hachinen o chūshin to suru tenkō no jōkyō. In: Shisō no kagaku kenkyūkai (ed.): Kyōdō kenkyū tenkō 1 Senzenhen jō. 6 volumes. Heibonsha, Tōkyō 2012, p. 75 f.
  5. ↑ Maruyama, Masao: Thinking in Japan. Ed. And transl. v. Wolfgang Schamoni and Wolfgang Seifert. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 115.
  6. ↑ Max M. Ward: The Problem of "Thought". Crisis, National Essence and the Interwar Japanese State. Dissertation, New York University 2011, p. 32 f.
  7. ↑ Steinhoff, Patricia G .: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 206 ff.
  8. ↑ William T. de Bary et al. (Ed.): Sources of Japanese Tradition. Volume 2: 1868 to 2000. 2nd edition, Columbia University Press, New York 1998, p. 256.
  9. ↑ Tsurumi Shunsuke: An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan 1931-1945. KPI Limited, London a. a. 1986, p. 51 f.
  10. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 7.
  11. ^ Richard H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca et al. a. 1976, p. 22 ff.
  12. ↑ Masao Maruyama: Thinking in Japan. Ed. And transl. v. Wolfgang Schamoni and Wolfgang Seifert. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 83.
  13. ↑ Max M. Ward: The Problem of "Thought". Crisis, National Essence and the Interwar Japanese State. Dissertation, New York University 2011, p. 58.
  14. ^ Richard H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca et al. a. 1976, pp. 52, 55.
  15. ^ Richard H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca et al. a. 1976, p. 64.
  16. ^ Richard H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca et al. a. 1976, p. 67.
  17. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 36.
  18. ↑ Masao Maruyama: Thinking in Japan. Ed. And transl. v. Wolfgang Schamoni and Wolfgang Seifert. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 83.
  19. ^ Richard H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca et al. a. 1976, pp. 142, 12.
  20. ↑ Kokushi daijiten, entry shisōhan hogo kansatsuhō .
  21. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 243 f.
  22. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 245 f.
  23. ^ George M. Beckmann, Okubo Genji: The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945. Stanford University Press, Stanford (California) 1969, p. 219.
  24. ↑ Jeffrey Paul Wagner: Sano Manabu and the Japanese Adaptation of Socialism. Dissertation, University of Arizona, Tucson 1978, p. 108 f.
  25. ↑ Statistics quoted from Takabatake Michitoshi: Ikkoku shakaishugisha. Sano Manabu, Nabeyama Sadachika (German one-country socialists: Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika ). In: Shisō no kagaku kenkyūkai (ed.): Kyōdō kenkyū tenkō Vol. 1 Senzenhen jō. 6 volumes. Heibonsha, Tōkyō 2012, pp. 324, 372.
  26. ↑ Olaf Butz: A left story. The traitor Sano Manabu. In: Steffi Richter (Ed.): Japan Reading Book III, Intelli. Konkursbuchverlag, Tübingen 1998, p. 87.
  27. ↑ Nihon daihyakka Zensho (Nipponica) entry Nihon puroretaria sakka domei .
  28. ↑ Honda Shūgo: Tenkō bungakuron. 3rd edition, Miraisha, Tōkyō 1972, p. 180.
  29. ^ Statistics quoted from Tsurumi Shunsuke: Tenkō no kyōdō kenkyū ni tsuite. In: Shisō no kagaku kenkyūkai (ed.): Kyōdō kenkyū tenkō 1 Senzenhen jō. 6 volumes. Heibonsha, Tōkyō 2012, p. 53 ff.
  30. ↑ Max M. Ward: The Problem of "Thought". Crisis, National Essence and the Interwar Japanese State. Dissertation, New York University 2011, p. 133 f.
  31. ↑ Max M. Ward: The Problem of "Thought". Crisis, National Essence and the Interwar Japanese State. Dissertation, New York University 2011, p. 132 f.
  32. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 253 f.
  33. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 129 ff.
  34. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 134 ff.
  35. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, p. 139 ff.
  36. ↑ Honda Shūgo: Tenkō bungakuron. 3rd edition, Miraisha, Tōkyō 1972, p. 183.
  37. ↑ Honda Shūgo: Tenkō bungakuron. 3rd edition, Miraisha, Tōkyō 1972, p. 198.
  38. ↑ Henry DeWitt SMITH: Japan's First Student Radicals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1972, p. 248. Original emphasis.
  39. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō and Thought Control. In: Bernstein, Gail Lee and Fukui, Haruhiro (Eds.): Japan and the World. Essays on Japanese History and Politics in Honor of Ishida Takeshi. St. Martin's Press, New York 1988, p. 81.
  40. ^ Richard H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca et al. a. 1976, p. 145 f.
  41. ↑ Tsurumi Shunsuke: An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan 1931-1945. KPI Limited, London a. a. 1986, p. 19.
  42. ↑ Kevin Doak: What Is a Nation and Who Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth-Century Japan. In: The American Historical Review , Volume 102 (2), 1997, pp. 289 ff. ( Online, last accessed on March 12, 2016 ).
  43. ^ Henry DeWitt Smith: Japan's First Student Radicals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1972, p. 248.
  44. ↑ Hiroomi Fukuzawa: On the reception of the European scientific vocabulary in the Meiji period. In: News of the Society for Nature and Ethnology of East Asia , Volume 143, Hamburg 1990, p. 15 f. ( online, last accessed March 16, 2016 ).
  45. ↑ Patricia G. Steinhoff: Tenkō. Ideology and Societal Integration in Prewar Japan. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, pp. 88, 89, 91.
  46. ↑ Peter Duus, Irwin Scheiner: Socialism, Liberalism and Marxism, 1901-1931. In: Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Ed.): Modern Japanese Thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), p. 188.
  47. ↑ Tsurumi Shunsuke: An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan 1931-1945. KPI Limited, London a. a. 1986, p. 11.
  48. ↑ Honda Shūgo: Tenkō bungakuron. 3rd edition, Miraisha, Tōkyō 1972, p. 226.
  49. ↑ Honda Shūgo: Tenkō bungakuron. 3rd edition, Miraisha, Tōkyō 1972, p. 202.
  50. ^ Tsurumi Kazuko: Social Change and the Individual. Japan before and after Defeat in World War II. Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey) 1970, pp. 58 ff.
  51. ^ Tsurumi Kazuko: Social Change and the Individual. Japan before and after Defeat in World War II. Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey) 1970, pp. 60 ff.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on June 21, 2016 in this version .