Theory of Mind

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Theory of Mind (ToM, synonymous with theory of mind ) is a term from psychology and cognitive science . It describes the ability to make an assumption about consciousness processes in other people and to recognize them in oneself - i. H. Suspecting feelings, needs, ideas, intentions, expectations, and opinions in others.

There is a difference here between affective and cognitive theory of mind. Affective ToM describes the ability to recognize and understand the emotions of others, while cognitive ToM is to infer the intentions of others.

Alan M. Leslie sees ToM as a mechanism of selective attention. Here, the presence of mental concepts is the basis for paying attention to the corresponding mental states of actors. This enables these properties to be developed.

The concept of mentalization according to Peter Fonagy and Mary Target, two psychoanalytic researchers, was derived, among other things, from the psychoanalytic concept of symbolization and the theory of mind. Fonagy defines the concept of mentalization as follows: Mentalization is the "ability to interpret one's own behavior or the behavior of other people by attributing mental states". There is currently no standard German equivalent for the term.

Developmental Psychology of Theory of Mind

In the first year of life, the child already reacts to social signals, for example to smiles from caregivers. This is also associated with “ social referencing ”, that is, orienting towards the affects of a caregiver. In this phase, the ability to empathize is already beginning to show .

Three-year-olds can already relate quite competently to the subjective state ("emotional state") of another. But they cannot yet recognize their own thinking content as subjective.

The Theory of Mind is only developed when the opinion of another can be distinguished from one's own and when conceptions of facts can be recognized as wrong. This is the case from the age of four to five. Children can now take the perspective of others and take into account the level of knowledge of a listener. With the entry into the phase of social perspective assumption, a distinction between reality and appearance becomes possible.

A basis for developing a theory of mind is the ability to distinguish between animate and inanimate, since internal states are ascribed only to animate. In addition, there is the ability to differentiate between the mental and physical world. As early as three year olds are able to distinguish between the two worlds. For example, they understand that you can stroke a real dog, but not an imagined dog. Furthermore, by the age of three, children understand that action decisions depend on the person's desires and intentions, and they can predict actions from information about a person's desires and intentions.

Another step in developing a theory of mind is to realize that actions of other people can be guided not only by their desires and intentions, but also by their beliefs. This distinction becomes relevant when another person has a wrong view of a situation. As long as a person has a “true” belief, no problem arises and one can predict how he will act according to his wishes. If, on the other hand, she assumes a conviction that does not correspond to reality, her wrong idea must be taken into account when predicting the action. Here is an example from Rolf Oerter and Leo Montada :

If Peter wants to eat ice cream and thinks there is ice in the fridge [,] and there is actually ice in the fridge, then we can predict what he will do without even thinking about what he thinks. But if he mistakenly believes that there is no ice cream even though there is actually still ice in the refrigerator, then we have to take into account his false beliefs in order to arrive at correct predictions about his actions (e.g. to predict that he will go to buy ice cream becomes).

Children between the ages of three and five learn to take into account a person's beliefs. Before that, they do not understand that subjective beliefs can deviate from reality, and therefore do not take them into account when predicting action. According to a study published in 2010, much younger toddlers should already have a theory of mind. Studies in China, the USA, Canada, Peru, India, Samoa, Thailand and the Baka people suggest that the ability to pass the explicit version of the false belief test is developing in all societies, albeit between the ages of four and nine Years (and developed countries are at the extreme low end).

The Theory of Mind is also considered to be a crucial prerequisite for being able to develop metacognitions , i.e. the ability to make cognitive processes the subject of reflection.

examination

Theory of Mind is investigated using various paradigms and task types, but mostly these are so-called "false belief" tasks. Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner (1983) wrote the first and classic “False Belief” task 'Maxi and the Chocolate' . In this relocation task, children are played a little story with toy figures: Maxi has a chocolate, which he puts in box 1 when he leaves the scene. In Maxi's absence, his mother takes the chocolate out of box 1 and puts it in box 2. Then Maxi comes back and would like to have his chocolate. The relevant test question follows (“Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?”). If the children state that Maxi will search in box 1 even though they themselves know that the chocolate is in box 2, they are able to ascribe a wrong belief. This paradigm can therefore be used to test whether the individuals have an explicit and clear representation of the false beliefs of others.

Another type of task that is often used to study the Theory of Mind is the “unexpected content” paradigm. It was designed by Josef Perner , Susan Leekam and Heinz Wimmer (1987). During this task, the child is shown a Smarties roll and asked what is in the box. Then the lid is opened and it is revealed that there are pens in the box. After the pens have been put back into the Smarties roll and the package has been closed again, a control question is asked about the actual contents of the package. This is followed by two test questions. First of all, it asks what the child thought at the beginning, what was in the box. Then ask the child to say what a person who is not in the room and has therefore not seen the true contents of the box would think what would be in the box if they only saw the closed box. If the children give “Smarties” as an answer to both test questions, then, according to Perner and colleagues, they understand false beliefs.

To examine the Theory of Mind in adults, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test is used. This is originally from the psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen (1995). The test persons are shown 25 pictures of the eye area that express different emotions. The test persons are asked to choose the most appropriate from various terms. The result shows their ability to empathize with others (affective ToM), but not their ability to infer the intentions of others (cognitive ToM). Adults who have autism or Asperger's syndrome do significantly worse in this test than adults without these developmental disorders.

research

ToM research has so far focused on epistemological beliefs and less on representations of motivational or emotional states. It has recently been linked to attachment theory and the representational point of view has been incorporated into research.

ToM is researched in particular in the context of cognitive developmental psychology , with research on early childhood autism being an important specialty. Certain deficits in the development of ToM occur in autistic children. For example, Simon Baron-Cohen , Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith (1985) were able to show that compared to average developed children, autistic children do not understand when a false belief test is performed that a person can have a wrong belief. Such findings have led to the theory that the social deficits that are an integral part of impairment are due to the inability of autistic children to empathize with other people's thoughts and emotions. However, it must be noted that the connection between autism and a ToM deficit is still controversial in research.

However, new research increases the likelihood of a connection between autism and a ToM deficit (e.g. Senju et al. 2010)

In an fMRI study, normally developed adults and adults with pronounced autism were examined for their brain activity during a “reading the mind in the eyes” test. For this test, the test subjects were presented with photographs of sections of the face on which only the eyes can be seen and then had to decide which adjective best describes the facial expression. The author found brain activity in the orbitofrontal cortex , STS, and amygdala in normally developed adults. In adults with autism, the author found no brain activity in the amygdala, but abnormal activity in the STS.

In addition, further research has shown that while adult people with Asperger's syndrome were unable to ascribe a false belief on false belief tests, they were perfectly capable of passing false belief tests when explicitly encouraged to do so become.

Empirical studies also suggest a connection between ToM and aggressive behavior and between ToM and social competence . There are theories that children react aggressively because they are unable to properly assess another person's intentions. For example, accidental jostling is seen as a provocation (see also: Disorder of social behavior ). A connection between secure attachment and the ability to mentalize could also be found.

Researchers also found that ToM can be trained by reading literary fiction. Since you put yourself in the shoes of the protagonists and experience their thoughts and opinions, you learn to understand and understand new perspectives. This phenomenon cannot be seen in popular literature. Since popular literature tends to show a known world, the compulsion to think is limited to the setting given in the story. Thus, the scope for interpretation here is significantly less than in literary fiction.

Related services and concepts

The concepts related to Theory of Mind include both mimesis and social competence . Mimesis, i.e. the imitation of another person, succeeds all the more aptly, the better the imitator can empathize with the emotional state of the imitated. In imitation, there is an approach to the inner perspective of another. Social intelligence is also a related achievement, which is successful and skilful behavior in dealing with fellow human beings within society.

Theory of Mind in Animals

The Theory of Mind has its origin in neurobiology . In 1938, neuroscientists Heinrich Klüver and Paul Bucy studied the behavior of rhesus monkeys that had surgically removed the front part of the temporal lobe , including the amygdala. The researchers discovered important changes in the apes' behavior. These became calmer and more passive and showed violations of social rules, such as sexual disinhibition ( Klüver-Bucy syndrome ). The removal of the amygdala , which is responsible for conveying the emotional meanings of environmental stimuli, was decisive for this behavior . The horde of operated rhesus monkeys then also excluded them.

The example of the rhesus monkey shows that the ToM not only characterizes humans, but is also applied to animals.

However, this assumption is still heavily criticized as much research suggests the opposite. Nevertheless, there are many experiments on monkeys that show that ToM does not describe a special cognitive position of humans, but that other living beings also have this ability. For example, a group of researchers led by Michael Tomasello from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig carried out an experiment with monkeys in which the monkeys watched a “little soap opera” on a screen, in which actors looked for an object, but also after looking for an ape-like disguised person, King Kong. The monkeys were able to observe that the very person is no longer where the actor last saw him because he was taken away. The eye movements of the monkeys, however, could be interpreted as their expectation that the actor would look exactly where he last saw King Kong.

With this experiment it becomes clear that great apes also display some key aspects of the theory of mind. In contrast to humans, however, apes cannot convert such ascriptions into explicit action decisions.

Legal meaning

This article or the following section is not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

The ToM develops legal significance for the question of the existence of a legal incapacity or testamentary incapacity. Anyone who is not able to represent strange psychological states in their own cognitive system is blind to the hidden motives of their fellow human beings. This can lead to an abnormally increased ability to be influenced by others, with the consequence of business and testament incapacity.

Computer games and digitization

ToM is used in the field of computer games and digitization. Analogous to the ToM in humans and animals, a "ToM of the computer" ("Theory of Mind Modeling and Induction") is aimed for. Through targeted processing of the data that arise when interacting with the user, an attempt is made to obtain information about his world of thoughts and feelings and to use this information to predict the future behavior of the user. The aim is for the computer to learn "what the observed person has in mind".

See also

literature

  • Peter Fonagy , György Gergely, Elliott L. Jurist, Mary Target : Affect Regulation, Mentalization and the Development of the Self. Klett-Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-608-94384-6 .
  • Rolf Oerter , Leo Montada (Ed.): Developmental Psychology. 5th, completely revised edition. Beltz / PVU, Weinheim 2002, ISBN 3-621-27479-0 .
  • Simon Baron-Cohen , Alan M. Leslie, Uta Frith : Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind"? In: Cognition. Volume 21, 1985, pp. 37-46, doi: 10.1016 / 0010-0277 (85) 90022-8 , (full text; PDF) .
  • Rüdiger Kißgen, Roland Schleiffer: On the specificity hypothesis of a theory-of-mind deficit in early childhood autism. In: Journal for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Psychotherapy. Volume 30, No. 1, 2002, pp. 29-40, (full text; PDF) .
  • Laura Capage, Anne C. Watson: Individual differences in theory of mind, aggressive behavior, and social skills in young children. In: Early Education & Development. Volume 12, No. 4, 2001, pp. 613-628, doi: 10.1207 / s15566935eed1204_7 .
  • Henry M. Wellman, David Estes: Early understanding of mental entities: A reexamination of childhood realism. In: Child Development. Volume 57, 1986, pp. 910-923, doi: 10.2307 / 1130367 .
  • Maria Legerstee: A review of the animate-in-animate distinction in infancy. Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing. In: Early Development and Parenting. Volume 1, No. 2, 1992, pp. 59-67, doi: 10.1002 / edp.2430010202 .
  • Manuel Schrepfer: I know what you mean! Theory of Mind, Language and Cognitive Development. AVM Verlag, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-86924-502-7 .
on Theory of Mind in Animals
  • Michael Tomasello , Josep Call, Brian Hare: Chimpanzees understand psychological states - the question is which ones and to what extent. In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Volume 7, No. 4, 2003, pp. 153-156, doi: 10.1016 / S1364-6613 (03) 00035-4 .
  • Alexandra Horowitz: Theory of mind in dogs? Examining method and concept. In: Learning & Behavior. 39, 2011, pp. 314-317, doi: 10.3758 / s13420-011-0041-7 .
  • Josef Perner , Susan R. Leekam, Heinz Wimmer: Three-year-old's difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit. In: British Journal of Developmental Psychology. Volume 5, No. 2, 1987, pp. 125-137, doi: 10.1111 / j.2044-835X.1987.tb01048.x .
  • Heinz Wimmer, Josef Perner: Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. In: Cognition. Volume 13, No. 1, 1983, pp. 103-128, doi: 10.1016 / 0010-0277 (83) 90004-5 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b Franz Resch et al.: Developmental Psychopathology of Childhood and Adolescence. A textbook. 2nd Edition. Belz, Weinheim 1999, ISBN 3-621-27445-6 .
  2. ↑ a b David Comer Kidd, Emanuele Castano: Reading literary fiction improves Theory of Mind . In: Science . tape 342 , no. 6156 , 2013, p. 377-380 , doi : 10.1126 / science.1239918 .
  3. ^ Alan M. Leslie: 'Theory of Mind' as a mechanism of selective attention. In: Michael S. Gazzangia (Ed.): The New Cognitive Neurosciences. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2000, ISBN 0-262-07195-9 , pp. 1235-1247.
  4. ↑ Lois W. Choi-Kain, John G. Gunderson: Mentalization: Ontogeny, Assessment, and Application in the Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder. In: The American Journal of Psychiatry. Volume 165, No. 9, 2008, pp. 1127–1135, doi: 10.1176 / appi.ajp.2008.07081360 , (full text)
  5. ^ Peter Fonagy , György Gergely, Elliott L. Jurist, Mary Target : Affect regulation, mentalization and the development of the self. Klett-Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-608-94384-6 .
  6. ^ Maria Legerstee: A review of the animate-in-animate distinction in infancy. Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing. In: Early Development and Parenting. Volume 1, 1992, pp. 59-67, doi: 10.1002 / edp.2430010202 .
  7. ^ Henry M. Wellman, David Estes: Early Understanding of Mental Entities: A Reexamination of Childhood Realism. In: Child Development. Volume 57, No. 4, 1986, pp. 910-923, doi: 10.2307 / 1130367 .
  8. ^ Rolf Oerter, Leo Montada: Developmental Psychology. A textbook. BeltzPVU, Weinheim 2001, ISBN 3-621-27244-5 .
  9. ↑ Ágnes Melinda Kovács et al: The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others' Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults. In: Science. Volume 330, No. 6012, 2010, pp. 1830-1834, doi: 10.1126 / science.1190792
  10. ^ Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, Ara Norenzayan: The Weirdest People in the World? In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Volume 33, 2010, pp. 61–135, doi: 10.1017 / S0140525X0999152X , full text (PDF; 1.2 MB)
  11. ↑ Jutta Kienbaum, Bettina Schuhrke: Developmental Psychology of the Child. From birth to 12 years of age. (= Outline of Psychology. Volume 13). Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2010, ISBN 978-3-17-018181-6 , pp. 183-184.
  12. ↑ Martin Dornes: The soul of the child. Origin and development. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2006, ISBN 3-596-17051-6 .
  13. ↑ Heinz Wimmer, Josef Perner: Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. (PDF) In: Cognition, 13 (1983) 103-128. Retrieved May 22, 2017 (English).
  14. ^ Josef Perner , Susan R. Leekam, Heinz Wimmer: Three-year-old's difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit. In: British Journal of Developmental Psychology. Volume 5, No. 2, 1987, pp. 125-137, doi: 10.1111 / j.2044-835X.1987.tb01048.x
  15. ↑ Simon Baron-Cohen, Theresa Jolliffe et al.: Another advanced test of Theory of Mind: Evidence from very high functioning adults with autism or asperger syndrome . In: The journal of child psychology and psychiatry . tape 38 , no. 7 , 1997, pp. 813-822 , doi : 10.1111 / j.1469-7610.1997.tb01599.x .
  16. ↑ Simon Baron-Cohen, Sally Wheelwright et al: The '"Reading the Mind in the Eyes" Test Revised Version: A Study with Normal Adults, and Adults with Asperger Syndrome or High-functioning Autism . In: The journal of child psychology and psychiatry . tape 42 , no. 2 , 2001, p. 241-251 , doi : 10.1111 / 1469-7610.00715 .
  17. ↑ Rüdiger Kißgen, Roland Schleiffer: On the specificity hypothesis of a theory-of-mind deficit in early childhood autism. In: Journal for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Psychotherapy. Volume 30, No. 1, 2002, pp. 29-40, (full text) . (PDF; 389 kB)
  18. ^ A. Senju, V. Southgate, Y. Miura, T. Matsui, T. Hasegawa, Y. Tojo, G. Csibra: Absence of spontaneous action anticipation by false belief attribution in children with autism spectrum disorder. In: Development and Psychopathology. Volume 22, No. 2, 2010, pp. 353-360. doi: 10.1017 / S0954579410000106
  19. ^ MV Lombardo, B. Chakrabarti, ET Bullmore, S. Baron-Cohen, MRC AIMS Consortium: Specialization of right temporo-parietal junction for mentalizing and its relation to social impairments in autism . In: NeuroImage . tape 56 , no. 3 , 2011, p. 1832-1838 , doi : 10.1016 / j.neuroimage.2011.02.067 , PMID 21356316 .
  20. ↑ Atsushi Senju, Victoria Southgate, Sarah White, Uta Frith: Mindblind Eyes: An Absence of Spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome. In: Science. Volume 325, 2009, pp. 883-885.
  21. ↑ Horst Kächele , Anna Buchheim : Psychoanalytic findings and the AAI. ( Memento from May 25, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 268 kB) Materials for a lecture during the Lindau Psychotherapy Weeks 2002.
  22. ↑ Förstl, Hans .: Theory of mind: neurobiology and psychology of social behavior . 2., revised. and updated edition. Springer Medicine, Berlin 2012, ISBN 3-642-24915-9 .
  23. ↑ Klüver-Bucy Syndrome. Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, accessed February 7, 2018 .
  24. ↑ Hans Förstl: Theory of Mind: neurobiology and psychology of social behavior . 2nd Edition. Springer, S. 8-9 .
  25. ↑ a b primate cognition. In: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, accessed on February 8, 2018 .
  26. ↑ Personality and behavioral disorder due to an illness, damage or dysfunction of the brain. (ICD-10 F 07.-)
  27. ↑ Klaus Peter Jantke , Sebastian Drefahl Theory of Mind Modeling and Induction: Expression and Reach , 2016, ADISY Tech Report 03/2016, online: [1]