Value freedom

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Freedom of value is an epistemological requirement for theories or statements , according to which their truth should be independent of their normative content. Instead, formal relations and the empirical or descriptive content should guarantee quality and validity. Scientific theorems should be independent of values ( opinions , conceptions , ideas , ideals ) or should not require them.

Idea of ​​value neutrality

The ideal of value neutrality is often tacitly assumed in the scientific principle . It is assumed that the non-scientific, personal or social norms of the scientist are not decisive for the acceptance or rejection of a theory by the scientific community . A historical starting point for this separation was British empiricism , especially David Hume's formulation of the should -be fallacy . Hume explained that it is not logically imperative to infer value judgments from pure fact descriptions. This made it impossible to justify a norm solely based on facts (without further Sollens statements), in particular based on cosmological or metaphysical assumptions. A fundamental difference between factual and value judgments is already represented therein. This distinction also suggests that one cannot infer (unknown) facts in the world from a value judgment.

The best-known formulation of a demand for freedom from value judgments can be found in Max Weber , who spoke out against the appropriation of the social sciences for social reform as well as socially conservative movements. Scientific theories aim to describe facts in the world, and value judgments are irrelevant for this aim. In other words: for answering the question “What is the case in the world?” An answer to the question “What should be the case in the world?” Is irrelevant.

criticism

The thesis of freedom from values ​​has been criticized from various perspectives in the philosophy of science of the 20th century . With reference to the history of science and the sociology of knowledge, it is often argued that the sciences are not only pervaded de facto by value judgments, but that sciences cannot be thought of as anything other than value-loaded. The standards of scientific evaluation and the scientific methods are always shaped by a cultural context that itself contains value judgments. Other arguments against the value freedom thesis are essentially motivated by the philosophy of language . Hilary Putnam , for example, supports the thesis that many indispensable terms in the sciences are equally descriptive and evaluative.

Freedom of value and freedom of judgment

A distinction between freedom from values ​​and freedom from value judgments offers an important possibility of differentiation for applied scientific questions . For example, most research in agricultural sciences is directed, either directly or indirectly, to "better" producing agricultural products. This research therefore takes place in a valuable space. Income interests of the producers, questions of food safety and other interests of the consumers as well as the protection and preservation of the affected environmental goods regularly play a role in the orientation of individual knowledge interests and research projects as well as in the definition of extensive research programs. Nevertheless, it is a standard requirement of the empirical research work to separate the determination of the natural or social science facts from their evaluation as far as possible. Corresponding work cannot then be described as "value-free", but definitely as "free of value judgment".

See also

literature

  • Hans Albert , Ernst Topitsch (ed.): Value judgment dispute. Darmstadt 1971.
  • Ulrich Beck : Objectivity and Normativity. The theory-practice debate in modern German and American sociology. Reinbek 1974
  • Stephen Finlay: The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment. In: The Journal of Ethics. 8/3 (2004), pp. 205-223.
  • W. Haas: Value Judgments. In: Min. 62 (1953).
  • Jürgen Habermas : A Discussion Note (1964): Freedom of Value and Objectivity. In: On the logic of the social sciences. (= Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, Wissenschaft. 517). 5th edition. Frankfurt 1982, ISBN 3-518-28117-8 , p. 77.
  • Karl-Heinz Hillmann : Freedom of Value Judgment. In: ders .: Dictionary of Sociology (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 410). 4th, revised and expanded edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1994, ISBN 3-520-41004-4 , p. 932.
  • WD Lamont: The Value Judgment. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1955.
  • Richard Mervyn: The Language of Morals. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1952.
  • Hugo Meynell: The Objectivity of Value Judgments. In: Philosophical Quarterly. 21 (1971).
  • A. Pieper, Hügli, A .: Value judgment, value judgment dispute. In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy. Volume 12, pp. 614-621.
  • Roy Wood Sellars : In What Sense do Value Judgments and Moral Judgments Have Objective Import? In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 28 (1967).
  • Hilary Putnam : The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy and Other Essays . Harvard University Press, Harvard 2004, ISBN 0-674-01380-8 .
  • Max Weber : The 'objectivity' of sociological and sociopolitical knowledge. In: Johannes Winckelmann (ed.): Collected essays on science. Tübingen 1988, ISBN 3-8252-1492-3 as well as in: Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre. Reclam, Stuttgart 1991, ISBN 3-15-008748-1 .
  • Max Weber: The sense of the "freedom from values" of the sociological and economic sciences. (1917). In: ders .: Collected essays on science. Tübingen 1988, pp. 489-540. (first 1922)

Individual evidence

  1. David Hume: A Treatise on Human Nature. (Engl. A Treatise of Human Nature. ) Meiner, Hamburg 1989, ISBN 3-7873-0921-7 , Book III, Part I, Chapter I.
  2. Max Weber : The 'objectivity' of sociological and sociopolitical knowledge. In: Johannes Winckelmann (ed.): Collected essays on science. Tübingen 1988, ISBN 3-8252-1492-3 as well as in: Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre. Reclam, Stuttgart 1991, ISBN 3-15-008748-1 .
  3. cf. for example: Paul Feyerabend : Against the method constraint. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1975, ISBN 3-518-28197-6 , p. 84 ff.
  4. ^ Hilary Putnam : The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy and Other Essays . Harvard University Press, Harvard 2004, ISBN 0-674-01380-8 .
  5. The term freedom from value judgments is more recent and not very widespread, cf. but as evidence: freedom from value judgment. In: Karl-Heinz Hillmann: Dictionary of Sociology. Kröner, Stuttgart 1994, p. 932.