Science of logic

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Science of Logic (Volume One)

The Science of Logic is a two-volume work by the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), which was first published between 1812 and 1816 in Nuremberg. On the Phenomenology of Spirit Building one should here ontological - metaphysical logic are developed on the ancient logos - philosophy followed. At the same time it wants to be ontotheology .

This work is one of the most influential philosophical writings of modern times, which play a role in neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School , philosophical hermeneutics and dialectical materialism . Many philosophers - up to the present day - have dealt intensively with their content and a. Søren Kierkegaard , Bruno Liebrucks or Dieter Henrich .

content

In logic, Hegel presupposes the "scientific standpoint" obtained in the phenomenology of spirit . This had shown that the logical determinations ( categories ), as in classical metaphysics , can neither be understood as mere determinations of a subject-independent reality, nor as mere determinations of the subject, as in Kant's philosophy. Rather, they have to be understood from the unity of subject and object.

The task of logic is to represent pure thinking in its specific meaning. It is intended to replace the classical disciplines of philosophy, logic and metaphysics, by combining the two programs, the representation of pure thought and the idea of ​​the absolute. In Hegel's work, the logical determinations also have an ontological character: they are to be understood not only as contents of consciousness, but also as “the interior of the world”.

It is Hegel's concern to derive the categories systematically and to explain their necessity. The decisive means for this is represented by the principle of dialectic, which Hegel sees as rooted in the nature of logical determination itself. He is therefore convinced that in this way all categories can be fully derived “as a system of totality”.

The logic is divided into an "objective logic" - the doctrine of being and essence - and a "subjective logic" - the doctrine of the concept.

Doctrine of being

Terms of quality

(Being ↔ Nothing) → Becoming →
Existence →

quality

For Hegel, logic must begin with a term that is characterized by “pure immediacy”. This is expressed in the concept of being , which has no determinations. But the renunciation of any further differentiation makes the definition of "being" completely empty. Thus for being there is at least the determination of “ nothing and neither more nor less than nothing”. Not “less than nothing” means that this “nothing” is after all a determination of thought, something thought.

The pure immediacy of the beginning can only be expressed in the two opposing terms “being” and “nothing”. The two terms “merge” into one another. This “transition” of both into one another represents a new category itself, “ becoming ”. In “becoming” both determinations, “being” and “nothing”, are contained and that in their mutual merging into one another.

If a being mediated through this unity of becoming is thought, then the determination of the become being, of “ Dasein ” results . However, its genesis requires that the “nothing” in it is also recognizable. On this side, “Dasein” shows itself as a “something” that stands opposite the “other”. Something can only be grasped if it is distinguished from another - according to the sentence of Spinoza quoted by Hegel : "Omnis determinatio est negatio" (Every determination is a negation).

Every determination is a demarcation, whereby something belongs to every boundary that is beyond it. To think of a limit as such also means to think of the limitless. Likewise, with the thought of the “ finite ”, that of the “ infinite ” is given. The infinite is the “other” of the finite, just as conversely the finite is the “other” of the infinite.

But for Hegel the infinite cannot simply be contrasted with the finite. Otherwise the infinite would “border” on the finite and would be itself limited and finite. Rather, the “truly infinite” must be thought of as encompassing the finite, as the “unity of the finite and the infinite, the unity which is itself the infinite, which understands itself and finitude in itself”.

Hegel does not want this unity to be understood pantheistically , since it is not a unity without difference, but one in which the infinite allows the finite to exist. He calls this the “true” or “affirmative infinity”. It differs from the "bad infinity", which only comes about through a mere stepping on from border to border in an infinite progress and which lacks the reference back through the beyond the border.

This reference also characterizes the finite; it is the result of its mediation with the infinite and constitutes the “being-for-itself” of the finite. From the category of “being for oneself”, Hegel develops other determinations in the further course of the section on “quality”. If something is “for itself”, it is “ one ”. If this “one” is mediated by “others”, these are also to be regarded as “one”. The “one” results in the plurality of “one”. They differ from one another, but are also related to one another, which Hegel calls " repulsion " and "attraction". Their uniform plurality leads to the concept of “quantity”.

Concepts of quantity

Separation ↔ Continuity
Intense Size ↔ Extensive Size

quantity

The crucial difference between quantity and quality is that the change in quantity means that the identity of what is changed remains. A thing remains what it is, regardless of whether it is made larger or smaller.

Hegel distinguishes between pure , indefinite quantity and definite quantity (the quantum ). So space as such is an instance of pure quantity. If, on the other hand, one speaks of a certain space, then it is an instance of the certain quantity.

The two terms “attraction” and “repulsion”, which are canceled in the category of quantity, become here the moments of continuity and separation ( discretion ). These two terms also presuppose one another. Continuity means that there is a continuously continuing “something”. This "something" is necessarily a "something" separate from an "other". Conversely, the concept of separation also presupposes that of continuity; one can only separate on the assumption that there is something that is not separate and from which that which is separate is separate.

A quantum is of a certain size, which can always be expressed by a number . The concept of number therefore belongs to the category of quantum. A number has two moments: it is determined as a number and as a unit . The concept of number as a sum of units includes the concept of separation, while the concept of unity includes continuity.

A quantum can be an “intensive” or “extensive” quantity. An intense variable (e.g. color sensation, feeling of warmth) can be characterized with the help of the term degree - a degree that has more or less intensity depending on the size. Extensive quantities (e.g. length or volume) have neither degree nor intensity. About extensive quantity is decided by means of an applied scale. Intensive quantities, on the other hand, cannot be determined by any measure outside of them. The physicalist theory that every intensive quantity can be reduced to an extensive quantity is rejected by Hegel.

Measure

The doctrine of "measure" deals with the unity of "quality" and "quantity". Hegel uses clear examples to explain the character of this unit. For example, the quantitative change in the temperature of the water leads to a qualitative change in its condition. It freezes or turns into steam. This results in the determination of an underlying, indifferent “substrate” whose “states” change according to the proportions. The thought of something that is differentiated in this way into “substrate” and “states” leads to the second part of logic, the “doctrine of essence”.

Doctrine of essence

The doctrine of essence is considered the most difficult part of logic and was modified several times by Hegel. Hegel could not lean on the philosophical tradition here to the same extent as in the other two books ( Doctrine of Being , Doctrine of Concept ). The " transcendental logic " of Kant exerted the greatest influence , whose theoretical elements (modal and relational categories, concepts of reflection and antinomies) Hegel tried to derive conceptually consistent in a new context.

The concept of essence

Hegel paraphrases the concept of essence through that of “memory”, which he understands in the literal sense as “becoming inward” and “going into oneself”. It describes a sphere that lies deeper than the external immediacy of being, the surface of which must first be "pierced" in order to get to the essence. The logical determinations of being are different from that of being. In contrast to the categories based on the logic of being, they preferably appear in pairs and are determined by their relation to their respective other: essential and inessential, identity and difference, positive and negative, ground and grounded, form and matter, form and content, conditioned and unconditional etc.

Contradiction

Hegel begins with the treatise of the "reflection determinations", "identity", "difference", "contradiction" and "reason". He analyzes the determinations of reflection in their relationship to one another and shows that in their isolation from one another there is no truth in them. The most important reflection determination is that of "contradiction". Hegel attaches great importance to the fact that the contradiction should not be "pushed into subjective reflection" as in Kant. This would mean “too much tenderness” for things. Rather, the contradiction belongs to the things themselves. It is "the principle of all self-movement" and therefore also present in all movement.

The principle of contradiction does not only apply to external movement, but is the basic principle of all living things: "Something is therefore alive, only insofar as it contains the contradiction in itself, namely this power is to grasp the contradiction in itself and to endure it" - otherwise it “dies in the contradiction”. This principle is particularly valid for the sphere of thought: "Speculative thinking consists only in the fact that thinking holds on to the contradiction and in itself". For Hegel, the contradiction is the structure of logical, natural, and spiritual reality in general.

Appearance

In the second section of the essence logic, “The Appearance”, Hegel explicitly deals with Kant and the problem of the “ thing in itself ”. His intention is not only to eliminate the difference between “thing in itself” and “appearance”, but also to declare “appearance” to be the truth of the “thing in itself”: “Appearance is what the thing is about is itself, or its truth ”.

What something is in itself is nowhere to be seen for Hegel but in its appearance and it is therefore pointless to build up a realm of the “in-itself” “behind it”. The "appearance" is the "higher truth" both against the "thing in itself" and against immediate existence, because it is the "essential, whereas the [immediate] existence is still unsubstantial appearance".

Reality

In the third section, “The Reality”, Hegel discusses key lessons of the logical and metaphysical tradition. A central theme is the examination of Spinoza's concept of the absolute .

On the one hand, Hegel sees in the absolute “all determinateness of essence and existence or of being in general as well as of reflection dissolved”, since otherwise it could not be understood as the absolutely unconditional. But if it were only thought of as the negation of all predicates, then it would only be emptiness - although it should be thought of as its opposite, namely as fullness per se. But thinking cannot confront this absolute as an external reflection, because this would suspend the concept of the absolute. The interpretation of the Absolute cannot therefore fall into an external reflection, but must rather be its own interpretation: "In fact, however, the interpretation of the Absolute is his own doing, and that begins with itself as it comes with itself".

Doctrine of the concept

The third book of the science of logic develops a logic of the "concept", which is divided into the three sections "subjectivity", "objectivity" and "idea".

The subjectivity

In the section “Subjectivity”, Hegel deals with the classic doctrine of concept, judgment and conclusion.

To explain the “concept of the concept ”, Hegel recalls the “nature of the ego”. There is a structural analogy between the concept and the ego: Like the concept, the ego is “a self-related unity, and this not directly, but by abstracting from all determinateness and content and into freedom of unlimited equality with itself goes back ".

Hegel's use of the term “term” differs from what is commonly understood by a term. For him the concept is not an abstraction disregarding empirical content, but the concrete. An essential aspect of the concept is its “negativity”. Hegel rejects the concept of absolute identity on which the usual conceptual understanding is based, since for him the concept of identity necessarily includes the concept of difference.

Hegel's “concept” has three elements: generality, particularity (separation) and particularity (individuality). To negate means to determine and limit. The result of the negation of the general is that which is separate (particularity), which as a result of the negation of this negation (i.e. the negation of the particularity) is identical with the general, since the particularity returns to the original unity and becomes individuality.

For Hegel the concept is the unity of the general and the individual. This unity is explicated in the judgment “S is P”, where “S” is the subject, the individual, and “P” the predicate, the general.

According to Hegel, a sentence can very well have the grammatical form of a judgment without being a judgment. The sentence “Aristotle died in the 73rd year of his age, in the 4th year of the 115th Olympiad” is not a judgment. Although it shows the syntax of the judgment, it does not combine a general concept with the individual and thus does not meet the logical requirements of the judgment. Nevertheless, the above sentence can be a judgment, namely, if the sentence is used in a situation in which one doubted what year Aristotle died or how old he was, and the ending of the doubt is expressed in the sentence discussed here.

For Justus Hartnack, this means that Hegel actually - “without formulating it like that - introduces the analytical distinction between a sentence and its use. The same sentence can be used as an imperative, as a warning or threat, as a request, etc. ”.

In the end there is a unity of judgment and concept. Hegel considers the following example (from L II 383):

  1. All people are mortal
  2. Now Cajus is human
  3. Ergo, Cajus is mortal

The particular term (the particular) here is “people”, the individual (the particular) is Cajus, and the term “mortal” is the general. The result is a unity of the individual subject and the general or universal predicate, that is, the predicate in the judgment "Cajus is mortal".

The objectivity

For Hegel, the concept of the object can only be understood insofar as it has a necessary connection to the concept of the subject. In this respect, it is also the subject of the “science of logic”. Hegel's philosophical analysis leads step by step from a “mechanical” through a “chemical” to a “teleological” way of looking at the object. In the teleological object the processes that lead to the end and the end itself can no longer become different from each other. Subjectivity itself is objectified in it. Hegel calls this unity of subjectivity and objectivity the idea.

The idea

In the concept of the idea all determinations of the logic of being and essence as well as that of the logic of the concept are “canceled”. The idea is the real thing; it is thus identical with everything that the science of logic explains in relation to the logical structure of being. All categories are integrated in the idea; with it the so-called movement of the concept ends.

Hegel distinguishes three aspects of the idea: life, knowledge and the absolute idea.

In life , the idea can be understood as a unity of soul and body. The soul makes an organism one in the first place. The various parts of an organism are what they are solely because of their relationship to the unity of the organism.

In knowledge (of the true and the good) the knowing subject strives for knowledge of a given object. The object of knowledge is at the same time differentiated from the subject and identical with it.

Finally, in the absolute idea - as the culmination of philosophical thought - consciousness sees the identity of the subjective and the objective - of in-itself and for-itself. The subject recognizes itself as an object and the object is therefore the subject.

Schematic overview

Basic concepts of logic
logic the idea in and of itself
Be Concept in itself
Certainty (quality) inner determination
Size (quantity) external definiteness
Measure (qualitative quantity) size-dependent being
Essence Term for itself
Reflection in itself
Appearance
reality
term Concept in and of itself
subjectivity
objectivity
idea

expenditure

  • Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Science of Logic. Schrag, Nuremberg 1812-1816
  • Work edition from 1841
  • Text-critical edition by Meiner-Verlag with special orthography and punctuation:
    • Vol. 11 Science of Logic . First volume. The objective logic (1812/13). Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg 1978.
    • Vol. 12 Science of Logic . Second volume. The subjective logic (1816). Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg 1981.
    • Vol. 21 Science of Logic . First part. The objective logic. First volume. The Doctrine of Being (1832). Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg 1985.
  • Works in 20 volumes. Re-edited on the basis of the works from 1832 to 1845. Editing: Eva Moldenhauer , Karl Markus Michel . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1969–1971; to do this: Register. For the 20 works created by Helmut Reinicke . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1986, ISBN 3-518-28221-2 . Here: Volumes 5 and 6.

literature

  • David Gray Carlson: A Commentary on Hegel's Science of Logic . Palgrave Macmillian, New York 2007, ISBN 978-1-4039-8628-3 .
  • Lothar Eley : Hegel's Science of Logic. Guide and commentary . Munich 1976.
  • Frank-Peter Hansen : GWF Hegel: "Science of Logic". A comment. Ferdinand Schöningh, Würzburg 1997.
  • Justus Hartnack: Hegel's logic. An introduction. Peter Lang. European Science Publishing House, Frankfurt am Main 1995.
  • Errol E. Harris: An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel . London 1983.
  • Dieter Henrich , Friedhelm Nicolin, Otto Pöggeler (eds.): The science of logic and the logic of reflection . (Hegel Days Chantilly 1971. Hegel Studies Supplement 18). Bonn 1978.
  • Dieter Henrich (Ed.): Hegel's Science of Logic: Formation and Reconstruction (Publications of the International Hegel Association, Vol. 16). Stuttgart 1986.
  • Anton Friedrich Koch , Friedrike Schick (eds.): GWF Hegel. Science of logic. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2002, ISBN 3-05-003711-3 .
  • Anton Friedrich Koch, Friedrike Schick, Klaus Vieweg , Claudia Wirsing (eds.): German Yearbook Philosophy, Volume 5. Hegel - 200 Years of Science of Logic , Meiner, Hamburg 2014, ISBN 978-3-7873-2526-9
  • John McTaggart : A Commentary on Hegel's Logic (1910). New York 1964.
  • Michael Quante , Nadine Mooren (Ed.): Commentary on Hegel's Science of Logic . Meiner, Hamburg 2018, ISBN 978-3-7873-3186-4 .
  • Hans Rademaker: Hegel's science of logic: a descriptive and explanatory introduction . Wiesbaden 2nd edition 1979.
  • Hermann Schmitz : Hegel's logic . Bonn 1992
  • Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer : Hegel's Analytical Philosophy. The science of logic as a critical theory of meaning. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 1992, ISBN 3-506-78750-0 .
  • Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Hegel's Science of Logic. A dialogical comment . 3 Bde. Volume 1 The doctrine of being . Volume 2 The Doctrine of Being , Meiner, Hamburg 2019, ISBN 978-3-7873-2975-5 .

Web links

Texts

literature

Individual evidence

The science of logic Hegel is quoted on the basis of the theory work edition by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel , Frankfurt am Main .: Suhrkamp, ​​1979.

  1. ↑ Encyclopedia I 81, Z 1
  2. ^ LI 569
  3. ^ LI 83
  4. ↑ LI 83 f.
  5. ↑ LI 113 ff.
  6. ↑ LI 121
  7. ^ LI 145
  8. ↑ LI 139ff.
  9. ^ LI 158
  10. ^ LI 156
  11. ^ LI 149
  12. ^ LI 166
  13. ↑ LI 190ff.
  14. ^ Justus Hartnack: Hegel's logic. An introduction . Peter Lang. European publishing house of the sciences, Frankfurt am Main 1995., p. 31f.
  15. ↑ LI 440
  16. ↑ On the following cf. Walter Jaeschke : Hegel manual. Life - work - effect . Metzler, Stuttgart 2003, p. 238 ff.
  17. ↑ L II 75
  18. ^ LI 276
  19. ↑ L II 76
  20. ↑ L II 76
  21. ↑ L II 124-125
  22. ↑ L II 148
  23. ↑ L II 187
  24. ↑ L II 190
  25. ↑ L II 253
  26. ↑ L II 305
  27. ^ Justus Hartnack: Hegel's logic. An introduction . Peter Lang. European Science Publishing House, Frankfurt am Main 1995., p. 86.
  28. ↑ L II 367