Otto von Bismarck's alliance policy
Otto von Bismarck's alliance policy is the name given to the foreign policy of the German Chancellor Bismarck since 1871, after the war against France, the last of the three wars of unification, led to the establishment of the German Empire .
With the successful formation of the nation state, the framework conditions of Bismarck's foreign policy had fundamentally changed. With the German Empire , a new major European power had arisen through the warlike expansion of the Kingdom of Prussia . Bismarck realized that fear of further German expansion had to be taken away from Europe, and he declared the empire to be saturated. H. Germany refrained from further territorial claims. This was confirmed by a draft address that was submitted to the Reichstag for approval in March 1871. According to this, the “new empire [...] had sprung from the self-rising spirit of the people, which, armed only for defense, is invariably devoted to the works of peace. [...] The days of interference in the inner life of other peoples will, we hope, not return under any pretext or in any form ”. With the help of alliances, the case of war should be excluded as far as possible.
Bismarck's foreign policy is often referred to as a game with the five balls, whereby the balls are supposed to symbolize the major European powers with which Bismarck wanted to associate Germany without being too tightly bound to one of them.
Beginnings
After the victory over France in 1871, Bismarck wanted to secure the German Reich in terms of foreign policy and isolate France . There was concern among European countries that the German Reich wanted to expand further. Bismarck tried to dispel this fear through strategic alliances.
Three emperor agreement
Meeting of three emperors
Bismarck's first step in this direction was the Three Emperor Agreement between Austria-Hungary , Russia and the German Reich . This agreement was prepared at the three emperor meeting in Berlin. The hosts Wilhelm I and Bismarck welcomed Tsar Alexander II of Russia accompanied by Chancellor Gorchakov and the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I accompanied by his Foreign Minister Andrassy in the young imperial capital . For Bismarck, the system of order on a monarchical basis was endangered by the idea of a social republic. It was therefore important for the three states to agree closer cooperation.
Military convention between Russia and the German Reich
At the end of April 1873, Bismarck traveled to St. Petersburg with Kaiser Wilhelm I and Field Marshal von Moltke . On May 6th, they reached the conclusion of a German-Russian military convention with Tsar Alexander II. They mutually secured support with an auxiliary army of 200,000 in the event that one of the two monarchies falls victim to a military attack by a third power to. In the additional protocol that Moltke and the Russian General Field Marshal von Berg had signed, it was agreed that the side that receives aid is responsible for the food and medical supplies of this relief army.
Bismarck only considered this convention to be valid if the Danube monarchy also acceded to it. This was to prevent Austria-Hungary from forming an alliance with the Western powers.
Schönbrunn Convention between Russia and Austria-Hungary
Then Alexander II and Gorchakov went to Vienna in June 1873, where they met Franz Joseph I and Andrassy. On June 6, Alexander II and Franz Joseph I signed a convention on cooperation between Russia and Austria-Hungary in Schönbrunn Palace in Vienna. The tsarist empire and the Danube monarchy committed themselves to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and a common stance in European disputes.
Conclusion of the agreement
The three emperor agreement was concluded on October 22nd, 1873, also in Schönbrunn Palace. As agreed in the conventions, the three monarchies committed themselves to mutual understanding in the event of military attacks and to provide solidarity in the event of revolutionary unrest. In addition, European peace should be defended against all shocks. Indeed, the agreement had contributed to peace and stability across Europe. On the German side, however, Russia in particular was to be kept from an alliance with France. Bismarck found this crucial in order to avoid a two-front war .
War-in-sight crisis
Such a two-front war became a realistic scenario , given the behavior of Russia and Britain towards an impending German preemptive strike against France during the War-in-Sight Crisis of 1875. Gorchakov came to Berlin in 1875 and made it clear to Bismarck that in the event of a German attack on France, Russia would rush to France militarily this time, despite the Three Emperor Agreement.
Kissinger dictation
Bismarck recognized that mutual understanding alone was not enough in the event of military attacks, and he had firmly resolved to commit the German Reich, Russia and Austria-Hungary to mutual neutrality. However, he only achieved this goal in 1881, when the Three Emperor League was concluded.
The insights into this crisis resulted in a shift in foreign policy focus to diplomacy . In the Kissinger Diktat in 1877, Bismarck formulated an overall political situation "in which all powers except France need us and are prevented from coalitions against us through their relationships with one another" .
Berlin Congress
In February 1878, Bismarck agreed to open as an "honest broker" peace negotiations between the contending parties of from 1875 began Balkan crisis caused the Russian-Turkish war preside.
These negotiations, known as the Berlin Congress , took place in Germany in the middle of 1878 on the initiative of the Russian diplomat Pyotr Andreevich Shuvalov , because the German Empire in the Balkans supposedly did not pursue its own interest, “which only [...] the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian Musketeers would be worth ” , as Bismarck had said in his Reichstag speech on December 5, 1876. Germany thus appeared to be a suitable mediator for all the European powers involved.
Equilibrium politics
According to the new policy, Bismarck wanted to lay the foundations of equilibrium politics at the Berlin Congress. However, it was initially difficult to involve Russia in this policy, as Russia had to give up access to the Aegean as a result of the Berlin Congress, despite the victorious war . Tsar Alexander II blamed Bismarck for this and believed that Bismarck had not behaved neutrally in the negotiations; he expressed his anger in a so-called slap letter.
Dual Alliance
In 1879, Bismarck concluded the “ two alliance” with Austria-Hungary , the first of further alliances that were to follow. The dual alliance stipulated that in the event of an attack by Russia on a contracting party, the other should come to the rescue with the entire force, but not in the event of an attack by Germany or Austria; if another power is attacked, at least benevolent neutrality should be exercised. The relationship between Austria-Hungary and Russia was tense due to the crises in the Balkans and the Pan-Slavism of the Russian-orientated Slavic inhabitants of Austria-Hungary.
Three Emperor's Alliance
When the dual alliance between Germany and the Danube Monarchy was concluded, Bismarck tried to re-establish closer ties between Berlin and St. Petersburg. This rapprochement was favored and motivated by Gorchakov's retreat due to advanced age from Russian foreign policy in 1880, when the leadership of Russian foreign policy was taken over by War Minister Milyutin and later by de Giers . Formally, the last Russian chancellor was still foreign minister until March 1882. Bismarck wanted to ease the tensions between Russia and Germany resulting from the war-in-sight crisis and the Berlin Congress. The three emperors' union was primarily intended to ensure peace between the three powers, but it also gained importance.
Since the new Russian Tsar Alexander III. Realized that the dual alliance was narrowing its room for maneuver and that it would be useful to come to an understanding with the two powers, he agreed to a secret neutrality agreement between Russia and Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the three emperors' union signed in June 1881, it was agreed that if one of the three states were to become involved in a war with a power not belonging to the alliance, the other two contracting parties had to adopt benevolent neutrality towards it. In addition, Germany and Austria would not support Great Britain in a war against Russia, conversely, Russia and Austria-Hungary had to grant Germany benevolent neutrality in a war against France. At the same time, this excluded a Russian-French alliance against Germany and / or Austria-Hungary.
Furthermore, this treaty stipulates that agreements will be made on future changes in power politics in the Balkans. After the Bulgarian Crisis in 1885 and Austria's intervention on the part of Serbia without consultation with Russia, there had been disagreements between Austria and Russia, the three emperors broke up in 1885/86.
Triple Alliance
Italy came into conflict with France, which had strong North African interests , because of its colonial interests in Libya . The result was that Italy came closer to the dual powers. In 1882 Italy entered into a defensive alliance against France with the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, the so-called Triple Alliance . A year later Romania joined the Triple Alliance. The Triple Alliance was renewed every five years until it was dissolved when Italy joined the war on the Entente side.
Mediterranean duck (Orient Triple Alliance)
In 1887, Bismarck promoted the completion of the Mediterranean Entente between Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Austria-Hungary. This provided for maintaining the status quo in the Mediterranean area. British expansion in Egypt and Italian expansion in Libya were tolerated . The German Empire promoted the emergence of the Mediterranean ducks in order to introduce Great Britain to the Triple Alliance. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire should be protected from Russian expansion efforts.
Reinsurance contract
The reinsurance contract formed the conclusion of the Bismarck alliance system . This 1887, d. H. After the secret three emperors' union broke up in the Bulgarian crisis of 1885/86 , an equally secret treaty concluded between the German Reich and Russia contained a neutrality agreement in the event of an unprovoked attack by Austria-Hungary on Russia or France on the German Empire and recognized Russia's interests on the Turkish straits and Bulgaria. Thus the treaty was actually in contradiction to the Mediterranean Entente .
After Bismarck's release
With the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, his alliance system disintegrated in a short time. In contrast to the conservative “realpolitician” Bismarck, the young Kaiser Wilhelm II led a provocative “ free hand policy ” in order to bring Germany to the stage of world politics as planned.
When the reinsurance contract was not renewed in 1890, despite great Russian interest, a Russian-French agreement was reached in 1894, the dual association . Bismarck's “nightmare”, who had tried to keep these two powers apart during his term in office, had thus come true, and Germany was threatened with a two-front war .
The relationship with Great Britain deteriorated further and further through Wilhelm's naval policy and led to British rapprochement with the former arch enemy France, which was sealed on April 8, 1904 by the British-French alliance Entente cordiale . After Russia joined this alliance ( Triple Entente ) there was an isolation of the German Reich in the power structure of the major European powers instead of the isolation of France achieved by Bismarck.
Another ally of the Reich, Italy, initially remained neutral during World War I and switched sides in 1915.
Individual evidence
- ↑ quoted from Karl Buchheim: Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918. Kösel, Munich 1969, p. 87; see. Marcus Thomsen: "A fiery gentleman from the beginning ...". Emperor Friedrich II. In the view of posterity. Thorbecke, Ostfildern 2005, ISBN 3-7995-5942-6 , p. 152.
- ↑ Klaus Hildebrand : German Foreign Policy 1871-1918. Encyclopedia of German History, Volume 2, Oldenbourg, Munich 1994, p. 12.
- ^ Nils Freytag: On the status of Bismarck research. In Nils Freytag, Dominik Petzold: The 'long' 19th century. Old questions and new perspectives. Herbert Utz Verlag, Munich 2007, p. 158.
- ↑ Otto von Bismarck: Thoughts and Memories . Berlin edition 2013 by Michael Holzinger, Book Two, Chapter 18, p. 403
- ^ A b c Ernst Engelberg: Bismarck: Storm over Europe. Biography . P. 518.
- ↑ quoted from Otto Plant: Bismarck. Volume 2: The Reich Chancellor. Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-54823-9 , p. 159.
- ↑ Friedrich Benninghoven: Berlin Congress 1878. Secret State Archives Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Das Staatsarchiv 1978, p. 13.
- ↑ Prince Bismarck's speeches. Volume 6: Reich Chancellor, 1873–1877. Reclam, 1877, p. 237 . The formulation became well known and often quoted; z. B. Gregor Schöllgen : Imperialism and balance. Germany, England and the Oriental Question 1871–1914. Verlag Oldenbourg, Munich 2000, p. 16.
swell
- The Grand Politics of the European Cabinets 1871-1914. Collection of the Foreign Office's diplomatic files. On behalf of the Foreign Office, ed. by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme. Volume 1 - 40 [with commentary], series 1 - 5, Berlin 1922–1927, 2nd edition 1924–1927. Overview of the individual volumes
literature
- Konrad Canis : Bismarck's Foreign Policy 1870-1890. Ascent and endangerment. Paderborn / Vienna / Munich / Zurich 2004 (Scientific series of the Otto von Bismarck Foundation, edited by Lothar Gall, Volume 6).
- Sebastian Fischer-Fabian: Glorious Times The Germans and their Empire. tosa-Verlag, Vienna, 2006 (popular science)
- Klaus Hildebrand : The past Reich, German foreign policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871-1945. Stuttgart 1995. (Standard work on German foreign policy)
- Andreas Hillgruber : Bismarck's Foreign Policy. Freiburg 1993 (Rombach Wissenschaft - Historiae, Volume 3).
- Sigrid Wegner-Korfes : Otto von Bismarck and Russia. The Reich Chancellor's policy on Russia and his realpolitical legacy as interpreted by bourgeois politicians (1918-1945). Berlin 1990. (Interpretation of Bismarck's foreign policy in terms of Marxist history)
- Friedrich Scherer: Eagle and Crescent. Bismarck and the Orient 1878-1890. Paderborn / Vienna / Munich / Zurich 2001 (Scientific series of the Otto von Bismarck Foundation, edited by Lothar Gall, Volume 2).