Federal budget (Germany)
The federal budget in Germany, according to Art. 110 Basic Law (GG) under the Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz an annex to the Federal Budget Act annually or every two years (double household ) from the German Bundestag for the coming financial year or the next two financial years decided and divided the revenue and expenditure of the Federal according to departments and case groups ( § 1 to § 4 BHO ).
task
The budget is used for political and administrative control. To do this, the federal government's expected financial needs must be determined ( Section 2 BHO). The budget is therefore based on projections of actual future conditions. This explains the appearance of budget holes . Often, lower tax and administrative income is offset by additional borrowing. Despite the forecast uncertainties inherent in the budget, it is a binding plan. However, budget law has designed the binding effect as an authorization of the administration, which has repeatedly been the subject of budget criticism.
Planning the budget and drawing up a draft budget are particularly important in financial policy . The state budget is usually disputed in parliament between the ruling party and the opposition, because the expenditures usually require new borrowing.
The budget allows the Federal Government to make expenditures and enter into commitments ( Section 3 (1) BHO). It therefore does not have any direct external impact that would enable third parties to derive claims from the federal budget ( Section 3 (2) BHO). Claims can only be derived from the relevant laws with external impact (such as in the Social Security Code).
There is a separate budget point in the budget for each type of expenditure and income of each federal agency. This specifies how high the expenditure for the budgetary office will be in the financial year and how high the expected income will be. This makes it easy to determine how much money the agency (for example the department of a ministry) has available in the current budget year (for example for the purchase of new office supplies).
A household item is a ten-digit number separated by a hyphen after the fourth digit. The tenth digit is a check digit and is not included in the budget. There is also a function code (FKZ). The first two positions represent the section plan. Together with the two following positions, they form the so-called chapter , the budget position of the authority. The following five characters form the so-called title and describe the type of expenditure and income and form the accounting point . Household items can be divided into objects by the manager (clerk or department that manages this budget point). For example, the cost of office supplies can be broken down into “paper”, “pens” or the like. This division is not noted in the budget.
Each manager has his own manager number and the respective general ledger account is derived from the manager number and budget. It is quite possible for several managers to manage one budget point. In this case, you will be provided with partial amounts. In this way, the consumption of ballpoint pens for each department can theoretically be read from the budget (only theoretically, in practice office supplies are procured centrally).
- Expenditures of the federal budget 2020
- Meaning of the first digit of the title according to the grouping plan
- 0. Income from taxes and parafiscal charges as well as EU own resources
- 1. Administrative income, income from debt servicing and the like.
- 2. Income from grants and grants other than investment
- 3. Income from borrowing, from allocations and grants for investments, special financing income
- 4. Personnel expenses
- 5. Real administrative expenses, military procurement, etc., debt servicing expenses
- 6. Expenses for grants and grants other than investments
- 7. Construction work
- 8. Other expenditure for investments and investment promotion measures
- 9. Special financing expenses
- Example of a budget office
- 3006 - 683 02 -176 Building and living
- 30 stands for the Federal Ministry of Education and Research section plan .
- 30 06 stands for the chapter information and communication, new technologies .
- 683 02 stands for the title. The first digit, the main group number (6), refers to the purpose of the grant .
- 176 is a feature code.
Budget principles
When drawing up the budget at the federal, state and local levels , the statutory budget principles ( budget principles ) must be observed.
Criticism of the federal budget as a medium of parliamentary budget law
The (constitutional) legislature certainly has a lot of leeway to achieve the feedback required by the Federal Constitutional Court to the will of the people represented in parliament and to achieve a sufficient "level of legitimation" for democratic rule. With regard to the effectiveness of the positive budget law (especially Art. 110 GG) and its institutional implementation in the budget economy, however, doubts about effectiveness are often expressed. Two complexes of budget criticism can be distinguished.
The first complex deals with the preconditions for effective reconnection. The strictly representative democratic model of the Basic Law is accused of depriving the state people of their legitimate influence on concrete political decisions. In the context of budget and budget law, this criticism of the system aims to ensure that the budgetary instruments do not relate to the will of the people if the views of the people of the state are not adequately represented in parliament. In terms of the law of thought, the model of reintegration presupposes that the members of parliament have close ties to the sections of the state they represent. It is necessary in order to be able to maintain a sufficient distance from the government and to exercise effective control even in the case of similar political interests. A functional connection therefore requires that the election and mandate of the people's representatives be designed in such a way that they allow an effective substantive connection with the people of the state. In addition to the right to vote, the role of the parties, which is only vaguely regulated in Article 21.1 of the Basic Law, is thus addressed.
Karl Jaspers had already complained in the 1960s that the parties had developed from "organs of the people" to "organs of the state" and were helping to minimize the "effectiveness of the people" in a way that counteracts democracy. In particular, the people themselves seem to be of the opinion that they have no significant influence on politics: In a Forsa survey, 79% of those questioned were of the opinion that the people in Germany did not really have "something to say". The extent to which the weal and woe, election and re-election of members of parliament instead of the people depend on their conformity with their own party or even with the government influences their functionality in the representation and enforcement of specific interests vis-à-vis the government.
The second complex of budget criticism deals with the institutional and procedural design of the authority. The implementation of the functions ascribed to the budget is classified by a strong current in literature as deficient and for political undesirable developments, such as. B. expressed in the national debt, made jointly responsible. With regard to the control purpose of the federal budget, it is stated that the objective scope of budget control as well as the budgetary freedom of resolution are massively restricted, which reduces the material content of budget law beyond recognition. In addition, the continuation of the deformed constitutionalist world of ideas on the quality of ties and the dysfunctional design of the budget specialty in federal budget law help to largely spill the remaining potential for political-administrative control. The overriding informational basis of the federal budget, the cameral budgeting and accounting, is fundamentally accused of being unsuitable in the meantime to function as a technical basis for the control of a modern, complex democratic community. With regard to the budgetary control instruments, it is stated that they are also not fully developed due to the inadequate processing of information and the limited scope of information of the cameralistic accounting system. In addition, the audit function performed by the Court of Auditors in current law is still not solely assigned to Parliament as a legitimate principal and is given excessive autonomy instead of functional independence.
Overall, the current budget law and instruments are blamed for having largely stunted their functional potential. Measured against the actual development of the budget functionality, the budget process appeared to be a pompous ritual. The budget deliberations are therefore described in the literature as a staging that is not in line with expectations about the actual decision-making possibilities of the parliamentarians. Budget criticism characterizes the constitutional state of parliamentary budget law by a significant "expectation gap" between appearance and functional reality.
Key figures in the federal budget
| Key figures in the federal budget, all figures in million euros
|
|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Individual plans | No. | 2008 |
2009 (+ / -%) |
2010 (+ / -%) |
2011 (+ / -%) |
2012 (+ / -%) |
2013 (+ / -%) |
2014 (+ / -%) |
2015 (+ / -%) |
2016 (+ / -%) |
footnote |
| Federal President and Federal President's Office | 01 | 24.88 |
27.63 (+11.0) |
28.72 (+4.0) |
29.88 (+4.0) |
30.74 (+2.9) |
32.45 (+5.6) |
33.11 (+2.0) |
33.73 (+1.9) |
34.32 (+1.7) |
|
| German Bundestag | 02 | 632.50 |
677.09 (+7.0) |
681.30 (+0.6) |
681.78 (+0.1) |
693.97 (+1.8) |
731.45 (+5.4) |
765.40 (+4.6) |
801.49 (+4.7) |
856.98 (+6.9) |
|
| Federal Council | 03 | 21.70 |
21.28 (−1.9) |
21.38 (+0.4) |
21.34 (-0.2) |
21.74 (+1.9) |
22.81 (+4.9) |
23.00 (+0.8) |
23.81 (+3.5) |
25.0 (+5.0) |
|
| Federal Chancellor and Federal Chancellery | 04 | 1,749.41 |
1,809.63 (+3.4) |
1,844.15 (+1.9) |
1,841.96 (-0.1) |
1,962.41 (+6.5) |
2,053.53 (+4.6) |
2,095.55 (+2.0) |
2,234.8 (+6.6) |
2,413.1 (+8.0) |
|
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 05 | 2,858.93 |
3,028.00 (+5.9) |
3,193.82 (+5.5) |
3,103.65 (-2.8) |
3,323.72 (+7.1) |
3,485.81 ( +4.9 ) |
3,638.27 (+4.4) |
3,801.46 (+4.5) |
4,810.14 (+26.5) |
|
|
Federal Ministry of the Interior |
06 | 5,065.76 |
5,620.45 (+10.9) |
5,491.89 (−2.3) |
5,402.24 (−1.6) |
5,490.32 (+1.6) |
5,850.54 (+6.6) |
5,898.82 (+8.3) |
6,307.8 (+6.9) |
7,801.49 (+23.7) |
|
|
Federal Ministry of Justice |
07 | 468.49 |
500.50 ( +6.8 ) |
489.36 (−2.2) |
493.09 (+0.8) |
508.26 (+3.1) |
606.84 (+19.4) |
648.14 ( +6.8 ) |
695.45 (+7.3) |
745.49 (+7.2) |
|
|
Federal Ministry of Finance |
08 | 4,648.05 |
4,868.30 (+4.7) |
4,860.09 (−0.2) |
4,459.63 (−8.2) |
4,604.22 (+3.3) |
5,018.41 (+9.0) |
5,206.26 (+3.7) |
5,591.62 (+7.4) |
5,885.15 (+5.2) |
|
|
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy |
09 | 6,191.87 |
6,163.35 (−0.5) |
6,123.82 (−0.6) |
6,116.87 (−0.1) |
6,107.98 (-0.1) |
6,119.16 (+0.2) |
7,417.98 (+21.2) |
7,394.69 (-0.3) |
7,621.78 (+3.0) |
|
|
Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection |
10 | 5,280.31 |
5,290.89 (+0.2) |
5,836.06 (+10.3) |
5,491.56 (-5.9) |
5,280.07 (-3.9) |
5,269.18 (-0.2) |
5,310.54 (+0.8) |
5,350.72 (+0.8) |
5,595.17 (+4.6) |
|
|
Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs |
11 | 124,041.04 |
127,949.56 (+3.2) |
143,197.44 (+11.9) |
131,292.67 (-8.3) |
126,130.94 (-3.9) |
119,229.13 (-5.5) |
121,979.31 (+2.3) |
126,309.92 (+3.6) |
129,888.98 (+2.8) |
A. |
|
Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Development |
12 | 24,390.57 |
26,690.24 (+9.4) |
26,316.25 (−1.4) |
25,247.97 (−4.1) |
25,934.14 (+2.7) |
26,410.98 (+1.8) |
22,861.95 (-13.4) |
23,281.43 (+1.8) |
24,571.66 (+5.5) |
|
|
Federal Ministry of Defense |
14th | 29,450.47 |
31,179.48 (+5.9) |
31,110.83 (−0.2) |
31,548.95 (+1.4) |
31,871.86 (+1.0) |
33,258.10 (+4.4) |
32,435.38 (-2.5) |
32,974.18 (+1.7) |
34,287.85 (+4.0) |
|
|
Federal Ministry of Health |
15th | 2,898.60 |
11,626.36 (+301.1) |
16,126.05 (+38.7) |
15,777.25 (-2.2) |
14,485.38 (-8.2) |
11,986.86 (-17.2) |
11,052.69 (-7.8) |
12,066.92 (+9.2) |
14,572.91 (+20.8) |
B. |
|
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety |
16 | 846.97 |
1,474.45 (+74.1) |
1,590.19 (+7.8) |
1,635.88 (+2.9) |
1,590.52 (-2.8) |
1,644.09 (+3.4) |
3,667.30 (+123.1) |
3,865.2 (+5.4) |
4,544.4 (+17.6) |
|
|
Federal Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth |
17th | 6,209.53 |
6,389.23 (+2.9) |
6,543.09 (+2.4) |
6,471.04 (-1.1) |
6,789.72 (+13.9) |
6,881.75 (+1.4) |
7,959.51 (+15.7) |
8,835.56 (+11.0) |
9,103.67 (+3.0) |
|
| Federal Constitutional Court | 19th | 21.59 |
22.93 (+6.2) |
23.21 (+1.2) |
24.97 (+7.6) |
29.95 (+19.9) |
45.13 (+50.7) |
46.07 (+2.1) |
33.32 (-27.7) |
29.19 (-12.4) |
|
| Federal Audit Office | 20th | 111.22 |
116.64 ( +4.9 ) |
117.37 (+0.6) |
124.54 (+6.1) |
122.75 (-1.4) |
132.85 (+8.2) |
135.99 (+2.4) |
141.48 (+4.0) |
148.61 (+5.0) |
|
|
Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information |
21st | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 13.72 | |
|
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development |
23 | 5,134.59 |
5,813.78 (+13.2) |
6,070.12 (+4.4) |
6,219.12 (+2.5) |
6,382.91 (+2.6) |
6,296.44 (-1.4) |
6,443.63 (+2.3) |
6,543.46 (+1.5) |
7,406.75 (+13.2) |
|
|
Federal Ministry for Education and Research |
30th | 9,350.64 |
10,204.21 (+9.1) |
10,863.69 (+6.5) |
11,646.03 (+7.2) |
12,941.22 (+11.1) |
13,740.35 (+6.2) |
14,053.40 (+2.3) |
15,274.96 (+8.7) |
16,400.27 (+7.4) |
|
| Federal debt | 32 | 42,936.65 |
43,902.50 (+2.2) |
38,858.60 (−11.5) |
37,172.32 (−4.3) |
32,439.47 (-12.5) |
32,983.27 (+1.7) |
28,551.74 (-13.4) |
22,259.29 (-22.0) |
21,727.12 (-2.4) |
C. |
| General financial management | 60 | 10,866.24 |
9,930.51 (−8.6) |
10,112.60 (+1.8) |
10,997.27 (+8.7) |
24,176.19 (+119.8) |
20,200.84 (-16.4) |
16,275.97 (-19.4) |
23,078.71 (+41.8) |
18,416.26 (-20.2) |
|
| Others | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | ||
| total | 283.200 |
303,307 (+7.1) |
319,500 (+5.3) |
305,800 (-4.3) |
311,600 (+1.9) |
302,000 (-3.1) |
296,500 (-4.4) |
306,900 (+3.5) |
316,900 (+3.3) |
||
| Development of the federal budget from 1969 to 2015 | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| year | Editions A | Income A | Financial balance A | Personnel expenses A | Interest expenses A | Investing expenses A | Tax revenue A | Net Borrowing A | for information: debt level (federal government) A | Interest rate in% B |
| 1969 | 42.1 | 42.6 | 0.6 | 6.6 | 1.1 | 7.2 | 40.2 | -0.4 | 23.1 | 4.7 |
| 1975 | 80.2 | 63.3 | -16.9 | 13.0 | 2.7 | 13.1 | 61.0 | -15.3 | 54.8 | 4.9 |
| 1980 | 110.3 | 96.2 | -14.1 | 16.4 | 7.1 | 16.1 | 90.1 | -13.9 | 120.0 | 5.9 |
| 1985 | 131.5 | 119.8 | -11.6 | 18.7 | 14.9 | 17.1 | 105.5 | -11.4 | 204.0 | 7.3 |
| 1990 | 194.4 | 169.8 | -24.6 | 22.1 | 17.5 | 20.1 | 132.3 | -23.9 | 306.3 | 5.7 |
| 1995 | 237.6 | 211.7 | -25.8 | 27.1 | 25.4 | 34.0 | 187.2 | -25.6 | 658.3 | 3.9 |
| 2000 | 244.4 | 220.5 | -23.9 | 26.5 | 39.1 | 28.1 | 198.8 | -23.8 | 774.8 | 5.0 |
| 2005 | 259.8 | 228.4 | -31.4 | 26.4 | 37.4 | 23.8 | 190.1 | -31.2 | 903.3 | 4.1 |
| 2010 | 303.7 | 259.3 | -44.3 | 28.2 | 33.1 | 26.1 | 226.2 | -44.0 | 1,287.5 | 2.6 |
| 2013 | 307.8 | 285.5 | -22.3 | 28.6 | 31.3 | 33.5 | 259.8 | -22.1 | 1,282.7 | 2.4 |
| 2014 | 295.5 | 295.1 | - 0.3 | 29.2 | 25.9 | 29.3 | 270.8 | 0 | 1,289.9 | 2.0 |
| 2015 | 299.3 | 311.1 | 11.8 | 29.9 | 21.1 | 29.6 | 281.7 | 0 | 1,265.0 | 1.7 |
Web links
- The public budget system (PDF; 572 kB)
- Formation of the federal budget , tasks of the German Bundestag
- Law on the adoption of the federal budget for the 2017 budget year (2017 budget law) (PDF; 31.5 MB)
- Federal budget info : An interactive application by the Federal Ministry of Finance to visualize the federal budget
Individual evidence
- ↑ Grouping plan with general regulations and allocation information. Federal Ministry of Finance, accessed on December 12, 2014 .
- ↑ Federal budget 2007 - individual plans. (No longer available online.) Federal Ministry of Finance, archived from the original on February 16, 2009 ; Retrieved March 7, 2009 .
- ↑ Ulrich Bergmoser, Purposeful Vitalization of the Legislative Budget Law, 2011, p. 4ff. u. 530
- ↑ Karl Jaspers, Where is the Federal Republic drifting? Facts, dangers, opportunities, 1966, p. 128 ff.
- ↑ Stern 2010, No. 46 of November 11, 2010, p. 42.
- ↑ Ulrich Bergmoser, Vitalization of Budget Law in Six Development Areas - Innovation Contribution of Administrative Reform Approaches in favor of a renewed parliamentary control, in: Schauer, R./Hilgers, D./Thom, N., Innovative Verwaltungen, 2011, p. 481ff. http://web.archive.org/web/20140802005925/https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sozialoekonomie/bwl/publicmanagement/PDF_Sonstiges/38_Bergmoser_A4.pdf
- ↑ Overall plan of the 2009 federal budget. (PDF) (No longer available online.) Federal Ministry of Finance, p. 4 , archived from the original on February 15, 2010 ; Retrieved March 7, 2009 .
- ↑ Consolidated overall plan of the 2009 federal budget
- ↑ Overall plan of the federal budget 2010
- ↑ Overall plan of the 2011 federal budget
- ↑ Master plan of the federal budget 2012
- ↑ Overall plan of the 2013 federal budget
- ↑ Overall plan of the 2014 federal budget
- ↑ Appendix HG 2015 Second addendum to the overall plan of the Federal Budget 2015 Budget Act 2015. Accessed on December 10, 2017 .
- ↑ Annex HG 2016 Addendum to the overall plan of the Federal Budget 2016 Budget Act 2016. Accessed on December 10, 2017 .
- ↑ 8 Complete overview of the development of the federal budget from 1969 to 2017. bundesfinanzministerium.de, October 21, 2016, accessed on August 27, 2018 .