Connecticut Compromise
The Connecticut Compromise was a 1787 developed solution for the question of how the new United States the legislative power should be organized. The compromise is a union of the Virginia Plan , which provided for parliamentary representation according to the population, with the New Jersey Plan , which required equal representation of all states .
The compromise
The content of the compromise was the creation of a bicameral system : the members of the lower house are elected in proportion to the population, while the states in the upper house are represented equally by two representatives. The compromise was implemented accordingly in today's House of Representatives and today's Senate .
At the time of the Constitutional Convention , each of the thirteen former colonies except Pennsylvania had a two-chamber parliament. This means that a consensus for a similar structure at the federal level could already be assumed. The real conflict was not whether there should be two chambers but how the states would be represented in them. The smaller states demanded equal representation, as was also contained in the unanimity clause in the articles of confederation .
In fact , none of the major authors of the constitution , including Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , Edmund Randolph, or Governor Morris , advocated equal representation of the states. Benjamin Franklin , representing Pennsylvania, also spoke out in favor of a distribution of votes according to population size. George Washington rejected equal representation out of principle because, in his view, it undermined the sovereignty of the national government.
Proponents of equivalence were mostly representatives of the smaller states, including Gunning Bedford, Jr. of Delaware and William Paterson of New Jersey . Their main argument was that small states could be taken by surprise by large states if seats were distributed by population. In particular, the three largest states would then be able to determine politics in the Senate. James Madison argued against it that the big states had no common interests and the fears of the small states were unfounded:
“Was a combination of the large ones [states] dreaded? This must arise either from some interest common to Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania and distinguishing them from the other states (of from the mere circumstance of similarity of size). Did any such common interest exist? ... In point of manners, religions, and other circimstances, which sometimes beget affection between different communities, they were not more assimilated than the other states. In point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three other States in the Union. The Staple of Massachusetts was fish, of Pennsylvania flour, of Virginia tobacco. What a combination to be apprehended from the mere circumstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger. "
“Was it feared that the large [states] would join forces? That must grow from an interest that Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania share and that is different from the other states (from the simple fact that they are similar in size). Were there such common interests? ... With regard to customs, religion and other circumstances which sometimes arouse the passion of different communities, they were not more assimilated than the other states. In terms of normal economic production, they were as little alike as any other group of three states in the federation. The main Massachusetts produce was fish, Pennsylvanias flour, and Virginia tobacco. Was an alliance then perceivable from the simple fact of similar size? Experience suggests no such danger. "
The smaller states replied that they would lose their freedom if they were outvoted by their more populous neighbors. Hamilton said that the states were artificial structures that consisted of individuals:
“It has been said that if the smaller States renounce their equality they renounce at the same time their liberty. The truth is that it is a contest for power, not for liberty ... the State of Delaware having 40,000 souls will lose power, if she has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to Pennsylvania having 400,000: but will the people of Delaware be less free, if each citizen [of Delaware] has an equal vote for each citizen of Pennsylvania? "
“It has been said that with equality, states lose their freedom at the same time. The truth is, it is a struggle for power, not for freedom ... the state of Delaware, with its 40,000 souls, will lose power if it had one-tenth the vote of Pennsylvania, with its 400,000. But are the people of Delaware less free when every citizen (Delawares) has the same number of votes as every citizen of Pennsylvania? "
Several arguments for equality between states were clearly born out of self-interest. Gunning Bedford also openly admitted this when he noted:
“Can it be expected that the small states will act from pure disinterestedness? Are we to act with greater purity than the rest of mankind? "
“Can it really be expected that the small states would act out of sheer selflessness? Are we to act out of greater purity than the rest of humanity? "
After threats from the representatives of the small states that they would join other nations if the states were not represented on an equal footing, the other representatives gave in. North Carolina changed its vote to support equality and Massachusetts abstained. In the final key vote, the five states that voted for equal voting - Delaware, North Carolina, Maryland , New Jersey, and Connecticut - represented only one-fifth of the American population.
See also
Remarks
- ^ Sizing Up The Senate , pp. 33f.
- ↑ Sizing Up the Senate , p. 33
- ↑ Sizing Up the Senate , p. 33
- ^ New Republic
literature
- Frances E. Lee, Bruce I. Oppenheimer: Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation . University Of Chicago Press, Chicago 1999, ISBN 0-226-47006-7 .