The origin of the work of art

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The origin of the work of art is a treatise by the philosopher Martin Heidegger from the years 1935–36, in which he deals with the question of what defines art as art . What art is should not be explained by scientific disciplines such as psychology , nor by sociological approaches that examine the role of art in society . Heidegger also does not want to give a traditional aesthetic theory of art that gives normative standards for what may be considered art or which art describes as an experience for a viewer or even ties it to metaphysical concepts.

Instead of these timeless explanations, Heidegger tries to determine the essence of art from itself by thinking of it in a decidedly historical manner. This is done on the basis of two theses : the first is that in the work of art “the truth has set itself at work”, the second, the essence of art consists in the “foundation of truth” which “establishes history”.

The treatise is of great importance for Heidegger's work, since here he gives his concept of the world a new dimension and, at the same time, gives it an opposite concept to earth . Gadamer recalls that this was a "philosophical sensation" back then.

background

Origin and sources

According to Heidegger's own statements, the preparatory work on the topic began in 1931 and 1932. These drafts were first published in 1989 in the “Heidegger Studies” . Other scattered records that belong in the area were also printed in the "Heidegger Studies" .

The “Second Elaboration” was presented on November 13, 1935 in the Art History Society in Freiburg under the title “From the Origin of the Artwork” and repeated in Zurich in January 1936 . The version published in the lecture collection "Holzwege" (Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5)) is the summary of three extended lectures that Heidegger gave in 1936 in Frankfurt am Main . Initially, however, the text was published by Reclam-Verlag in 1960. This edition differs slightly in some places from that of the “Holzwege” .

Since the first elaboration of the topic falls in the years 31/32, i.e. exactly the time when Heidegger's thinking took a turn , there are two possible readings of the text. One sees it as an elaboration of the conception of truth and the world presented in “ Being and Time ” , the other ascribes it to Heidegger's inverted thinking.

Thinking of being

The metaphysics or ontology existed since the beginning of the philosophy of a number of provisions of the being , for example: "Everything is matter": materialism , "everything is Spirit": idealism : "the world is created by God" ontotheology , "everything is object for a subject ”: subjectivism . These philosophical determinations also include those which are based on modern natural science, as did Neo-Kantianism . He, too, brings with him a certain prejudice about what is , and this too determines his understanding of art: By giving preference to scientific knowledge, the work of art appeared to him only as a physical object that also has a symbolic or allegorical meaning:

“That the work of art is also a thing and only means something else beyond its being, that it refers to something as a symbol or that something else can be understood as an allegory, describes the way of being of the work of art from the ontological model, which is defined by the systematic priority of scientific knowledge is given. What actually is is the thing-like, the fact, that which is given to the senses, which is directed towards objective knowledge by natural science. The meaning that [sc. the work of art], the value it has, on the other hand, are additional forms of perception that are only subjective. "

Heidegger's thinking about being represents the attempt to abstain from philosophizing all these determinations. Instead, it examines the question of how the philosophical or scientific determinations of being arise at all . Truth is thus no longer a timeless and eternal state, but an event . According to Heidegger, it is not the task of thinking to produce eternally valid determinations of being and truth, but to think about how these determinations occur historically . Being itself is then to be understood as the occurrence of truth. To this end, a certain conception must not be assumed to be true in advance, which, in retrospect, is then slipped under all historical events.

Overcoming aesthetics

According to Heidegger's view, the metaphysical determinations of the philosophical tradition have also shaped traditional aesthetics , which is why he saw in it a “metaphysical art theory”, since on the one hand it uses terms such as symbol, allegory, metaphor, parable, the Platonic separation of the sensual, material and spiritual reproduce, on the other hand, perceive all works of art as objects for a subject. Corresponding to the programmatic rejection of metaphysics, Heidegger also strove to “overcome aesthetics”. The treatise “The Origin of the Work of Art” can therefore be seen as a contribution to this program. In the "Contributions to Philosophy" ( GA 65) Heidegger notes:

“The question of the origin of the work of art does not aim at a timelessly valid determination of the essence of the work of art, which at the same time could serve as a guide for a historical, retrospective explanation of the history of art. The question stands in the innermost context of the task of overcoming aesthetics and that means at the same time with a certain conception of beings as the objectively imaginable. The overcoming of aesthetics, on the other hand, results as necessary from the historical examination of metaphysics as such. "

So that this succeeds, Heidegger develops his artistic thinking out of his thinking about being:

“If Heidegger emphasizes that the reflection on the essence of art is only determined by the question of being, then in this alone he expresses his claim that here the philosophical question of art is placed on a new ground that is being worked out the question of being is won. "

So if the thinking of being asks in this way what constitutes art in its essence, then in the case of art, too, a true determination of being cannot be set in advance. It will be shown much more that art itself represents a relationship to being (or to the world as this whole of meaning). In the work of art, therefore, not only something can be experienced that was not previously recognized , but with the work of art itself “something new comes into existence” ontologically , which cannot be described by a previously established metaphysical or scientific truth. For this reason, Heidegger also wants to get away from an art theory that describes art as an aesthetic experience and thus puts the viewer in the center: for him, it is about "understanding the ontological structure of the work regardless of the subjectivity of its creator or viewer." the primacy of the viewer and the experience is itself one that develops in modern times and parallel to the philosophy of the subject, which cannot be applied retrospectively to, for example, ancient art.

content

"In the work of art, the truth of beings has set itself in the work."

- Heidegger : Holzwege Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 21

Heidegger's interest in the “riddle” of art is no longer the ideal of the aesthetics of classicism, beauty , but the relationship between art and truth. Nevertheless, beauty proves to be one of the essential ways in which truth “gets into work.” As the title indicates, the lecture is an “origin theory”, whereby origin according to Heidegger means where a thing has its essence from. The concept of essence, in turn, encompasses what and how a thing is. For Heidegger, however, the search for the origin showed that the artist is only in that he creates works of art, but the work of art only because it was made by the artist: “The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the artist's origin. Neither is without the other. Both have their origins in art. ”Thus the question of the origin of the work of art becomes the question of the origin of art.

Heidegger developed two theses in his lecture: on the one hand, the fact that truth “goes to work”; on the other hand, that through the foundation of truth, art has a power to establish history.

For Heidegger, a work of art was not something abstract, which is why he explained the objectivity of the work of art in great detail. "The works are sent out like coal from the Ruhr area (...) Hölderlin's hymns were packed in the knapsack during the campaign, like the cleaning stuff." But the work of art seems to be something more than this thing-like thing . But first we have to understand what a thing is. Heidegger suggested three interpretations, which he criticized as inadequate:

  • An idealistic understanding of a thing, which sees in the thing something composed of substance and accidents. Here the structure of language (substance-copula-accident) is transferred to the thing, it is, as it were, "attacked".
  • A materialistic , merely sensual, understanding of a thing (the thing “moves on us”), which understands the thing as the sum of the sensory data. Heidegger criticized the fact that sensory data are never perceived, rather "[we] hear [we] the storm whistling in the chimney [...] we hear the door banging in the house and never hear acoustic sensations."
  • An understanding of things that distinguishes material and form, that is, follows the “conceptual scheme for all art theory and aesthetics”. For Heidegger, the only acceptable place for this pair of terms was stuff , that is, objects of use. Here, substance is brought into a form for the purpose of serviceability, and the use of the substance usually depends on the form to be achieved.

The first two points have in common that they lack the right distance from the thing: The first conception is too theoretical, the second is too stuck to the sensory data. In order to distinguish the work of art from the third conception and from the stuff, Heidegger does not define the work by its properties, but distinguishes it from the stuff according to its mode of being . It has its own region of being, which is determined by the process of putting truth into work. Heidegger does not make the aesthetic experience, as with Kant and Nietzsche, the basic concept, but the work.

After Heidegger has determined art in advance by setting the truth into work, the actual lecture is devoted to underpinning this view. Heidegger's argument is as follows: The essence of the work lies in the fact that it sets up a world . This is how it creates the earth . The earth and the world are in conflict, this conflict is carried out in the factory. The dispute exists between clearing and concealment and is therefore a primal dispute . As a process, this dispute takes place through the putting into action of the truth, through which it creates truth at the same time.

According to his world concept, which was already elaborated in “Being and Time” , this also describes a world here as an understood whole of meaning, the meaning of which is revealed to us above all in practical use, through execution. It is a purely formal term, which is why Heidegger could also speak of the world of the farmer or the world of the Greeks, analogous to the colloquial usage. If the work of art now opens up a world, then this means that it specifically brings into view the totality of meaning, which in the practical context of the world is always non-thematic. It shows the viewer its meaningful totality of references and references.

Vincent van Gogh: Still Life, A Pair of Shoes

How, for example, the world of a peasant woman can open up in a work of art, Heidegger demonstrates with a picture by Van Gogh , which shows the artist's well-worn shoes, which Heidegger mistakenly takes for two peasant shoes.

“The hardship of the work steps stares out of the dark opening of the worn interior of the footwear. In the crude weight of the footwear, the tenacity of the slow walk through the widely stretched and constant furrows of the field, over which there is a rough wind, is built up. The moisture and richness of the floor lie on the leather. The loneliness of the dirt road pushes itself through the sinking evening under your feet. The earth's silent call, its silent giving away of the ripening grain and its unexplained failure in the desolate fallow of the wintry field swings in the shoes. Through this stuff draws the uncomplaining fear for the security of the bread, the wordless joy of overcoming hardship again, the tremor in the arrival of birth and the trembling in the threat of death. This stuff belongs to the earth and is protected in the world of the farmer's wife. "

The world of the farmer shows itself as a meaningful relationship between fields, wind, soil, grain, dirt road and stuff (shoes). The meaningful relationship shows itself as the usefulness of the stuff. The stuff is used for something in the world . The meaning of the zu presupposes the reliability of the stuff, that is, the earthly basis of the stuff. It is what holds the world together. World and earth are only there in the stuff, only here relationships and their prerequisites are revealed. So the essence of the stuff is found - but not through a description of the stuff, but the picture of Van Gogh. You cannot walk with a painted pair of shoes. Instead, the work opens up a new relationship to the world in its own way: the work “has spoken. In the vicinity of the plant we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually use to be. ”It is“ the opening of what that stuff, the peasant shoes, really is . This being emerges into the unconcealment of being. In the work there is (...) an event of truth at work. "

What is essential for the concept of truth as a clearing is that Heidegger linked it with concealment : concealment belongs to the essence of truth. This is because our horizon of understanding is not a solid, absolute ground from which to interpret everything that is in its what: Horizons of understanding change, the world as a totality of meaning opens up in different ways. With this, however, we can no longer trace truth back solely to our understanding horizon, but are dependent on being so that it shows itself as it is. The being is therefore a condition for truth. But since it can also deceive as appearance, the condition for truth is both clearing and concealing. This is what Heidegger meant when he spoke of the original dispute between clearing and concealment. This dispute is evident in the work of art: "This denial in the manner of double concealment belongs to the essence of truth as unconcealment."

In fact, humans are always given a horizon of understanding within which beings meet as meaningful. If the primal dispute takes place in concrete terms, it does so as a dispute between world and earth. The world is now the world given to a specific people, for example the ancient Greeks.

The example of the farmer's shoes could suggest that Heidegger is building on a theory of imitation. In order to distinguish himself from this, however, Heidegger also chose the example of a Greek temple, because "with which being of which thing should a Greek temple correspond?"

Instead of imitating, the truth is in the temple as something gathering in the work. The temple opens up a place for death and birth, victory and shame, endurance and decay, that is, the sphere of the human world.

The Erechtheion on the Acropolis in Athens.

By protruding into the natural environment, the φύσις ( physis ), it also creates an openness in which only plants, animals and other natural phenomena have their place. He clears this on what and on what man bases his living: the earth . The temple only releases the whole within which the individual can encounter. Heidegger did not think of the whole as the sum of its parts, rather the other way around: "We come closer to what is when we think everything the other way around (...)" The world is not an accumulation of things, it is not a single object , it is only as a historical event (“Welt weltet”) and thus part of human affairs. Their opposite is the earth.

In keeping the world open, the work for Heidegger was at the same time producing , but not in the sense of producing: While in the stuff the material dissolves and disappears in the usefulness, the work first lets the material appear: “The rock comes into play and rest and becomes first rock (...) the sound to ring, the word to say. ”Because the work takes itself back into the earth, it allows“ the earth to be an earth. ”Only in art does the earth come as that, what it is to appear. The scientific knowledge is not able to grasp this: “For example, the color can only be experienced when it lights up: If we measure it intelligently and break it down into vibration numbers, it is gone. It only shows itself if it remains hidden and unexplained. ”This shows the interplay of concealment and clearing: Either one understands color and its meaning in the world of the farmer, or we break it down into electrodynamic oscillations, which makes it relate to the world however tears off. This closing of either-or, which is peculiar to the earth, is brought into openness by the quarrel in the factory. The stone, which is viewed as a mere mass object and whose weight is recorded, shows itself only as existing , no path of understanding leads from there to understanding it as a burden . He is only "annoying" in a meaningful world in which he stands in the way of human activity with his burden.

A work of art differs from other meaningful structures precisely in that it makes the meaning itself explicit. The meaning of a hammer is revealed precisely through the practical use of it - and thus closes at the same time, since it remains in the background in a non-thematic way. When looking at a work of art, the dispute between concealment and clearing takes place in that the viewer first has to get involved with the meaningful structures represented in the work of art, which disappear into the world, in order to understand a world at all; on the other hand, the work of art makes the world explicitly as a meaningful totality.

The work of the artist is bringing forth , but not to be confused with the manufacture of toys. As τέχνη (téchne) it makes use of the φὐσις to bring forth into the unconcealment. The essence of creation is thus determined by the essence of the work. As already mentioned, however, the truth is not something that humans could use: "Truth only happens in such a way that it settles in the dispute and leeway that it opens up." One way of this settling in is the self- the factory-set to the truth and so also is in truth a "train to the work." that being created of the work is in the form placed dispute. With this term Heidegger touched on the gestalt psychology, which was in swing at the time : the fact that truth is established is gestalt.

The creation of the work now emerges from this, but this does not mean that it is recognizable that an artist made it, but rather a “push” into being is evident. It is precisely this “that” that makes the work of art something special: “The more lonely the work, fixed in its shape, is in itself, the more purely it seems to dissolve all references to people, the easier the thrust that occurs Such work is , in the open (…) “While the being-there of the stuff mostly remains hidden from us when it is used, as it merges into the totality of facts, for Heidegger things are characterized precisely by the fact that they stand out in their being-there . This is especially true for works of art, which is why Heidegger describes their being-there as a push into being.

But the work also needs the recipient as a keeper in order to bring about the openness it opens up. Heidegger understood this - one would say aesthetic - sensation as "the ecstatic letting in of the existing human being in the unconcealedness of being." Only in this way is the work not reduced to the "stimulant of experience" by recourse to the subject and its sensations. According to Heidegger's idea, the work should also lead people to togetherness.

For Heidegger the artist was not a “genius subject”, but rather he draws on the historicity of man in his artistic creation. History gives away too much truth, it creates new things and the new is in turn the rise of history. Therein lies the history-establishing power of art as its origin. Heidegger did not see a special role for the artist, he rather takes a back seat to the work of art. The process of art production resembles a "self-destructive passage for the emergence of the work."

The artwork brings only in the execution of the application, so the fact that the viewer 's open world as a meaningful totality. Torn out of this context, it is removed from its realm of being. This is why Heidegger saw the world of existing works as disintegrated, the works are placeless and only as things that have been. Heidegger criticizes the resulting handling of works in the art business with art connoisseurs, art judges, art enjoyment, art trade and art history research. The work of art "dies" as it were when it is placed in collections and thus torn out of its essential area. Following Hegel, who had already determined the end of art, Heidegger was therefore extremely critical of the future of art if it were not possible to find access to it beyond the reception that was limited to the experience of art.

literature

expenditure

  • The origin of the work of art . (Pagination identical to the Reclam and Complete Edition) With the "Introduction" by Hans-Georg Gadamer and the first version of the text from 1935, again checked by handwriting, published by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2012, ISBN 978 -3-465-04163-4
  • The origin of the work of art . (Reclam Universal Library), Ditzingen 1986, ISBN 978-3150084465
  • Wooden paths . Klostermann, Frankfurt 2003, ISBN 978-3465032380
  • Complete edition . Volume 5

Secondary literature

  • Renate Maas, Diaphan and poetry. The artistic space with Martin Heidegger and Hans Jantzen, Kassel 2015, ISBN 978-3-86219-854-2
  • David Espinet / Tobias Keiling (eds.): Heidegger's origin of the work of art. A cooperative commentary , Frankfurt am Main 2011.
  • Gottfried Boehm: In the horizon of time. Heidegger's concept of work and modern art. In: Walter Biemel and Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (ed.): Art and technology . Frankfurt am Main 1989, pp. 255-286
  • Jacques Derrida : The Truth in Painting . Vienna 1992
  • Hans-Georg Gadamer : As an introduction. In: Martin Heidegger: The origin of the work of art . Stuttgart 1960, pp. 102-125
  • Hans-Georg Gadamer : Art as a statement . In: Collected Works , Vol. 8, Tübingen 1993
  • Friedrich Wilhelm v. Herrmann : Heidegger's philosophy of art . Frankfurt am Main 1980 (2nd revised and expanded edition 1994)
  • Andrea Kern: »The origin of the work of art«. Art and truth between foundation and dispute. in: Dieter Thomä (Ed.): Heidegger Handbook . Stuttgart, 2003, pp. 162-174
  • Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: The Fiction of the Political. Heidegger, art and politics . Stuttgart 1990
  • Tilmann Müller: Truth events and art. On the history of the determination of the work of art in Martin Heidegger's . Munich 1994
  • Otto Pöggeler : The question of art. From Hegel to Heidegger . Freiburg 1984
  • Otto Pöggeler: Heidegger and art . In: Christoph Jamme (Ed.): Art - Politics - Technology . Munich 1992
  • Richard Rorty: Heidegger against the pragmatists . In: Neue Hefte für Philosophie 23, 1984, pp. 1–22
  • Meyer Schapiro : The Still Life as a Personal Object. A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh . In: Marianne L. Simmel (Ed.): The Reach of Mind . New York 1968, pp. 203-209
  • Peter Trawny : About the ontological difference in art. An attempt to reconstruct the 'overcoming of aesthetics' by Martin Heidegger . In: Heidegger Studies 10, 1994, pp. 207-212
  • Wolfgang Ullrich: The garden of the wilderness. Martin Heidegger's event thinking . Munich 1996
  • Julian Young: Heidegger's Philosophy of Art . Cambridge 2001
  • Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann: Heidegger's philosophy of art. A systematic interpretation of the Holzwege treatise "The Origin of the Artwork". Frankfurt / M. 1980.
  • Christoph Jamme: “Thinking ahead of poetry”. Aspects of Heidegger's “Zwie-sprache” with Hölderlin in the context of his art philosophy, in: Journal for philosophical research 38 (1984) 191-218.
  • Gerhard Faden: The appearance of art. On Heidegger's Critique of Aesthetics. Würzburg 1986.
  • Eric Bolle: The art of difference. Philosophical investigations into the determination of art by Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Hölderlin, Paul Celan and Bram van Velde. Amsterdam 1988.
  • Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert: Martin Heidegger and the art history, in: Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert / Otto Pöggeler (ed.): Heidegger and the practical philosophy. Frankfurt / M. 1988, 251-285.
  • Walter Biemel: Collected writings. Volume 1: Writings on Philosophy. - Volume 2: Writings on Art. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1996.
  • Walter Biemel, Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Herrmann (ed.): Art and technology. Commemorative writing for Martin Heidegger's 100th birthday. Frankfurt / M. 1989.
  • Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: The Fiction of the Political. Heidegger, art and politics. Stuttgart 1990.
  • Günther Pöltner (ed.): Phenomenology of Art. Frankfurt / M. 2000, 87-107 (series of the Öst. Ges. F. Phenomenology; Volume 5).
  • Christoph Jamme, Karsten Harris (eds): Martin Heidegger. Art - politics - technology. Munich 1992.
  • Günter Seubold: Art as expropriation. Heidegger's path to an art that is no longer metaphysical. Bonn 1996.
  • Andreas Großmann: Heidegger readings. About art, religion and politics. Würzburg 2005.
  • From Heidegger. Effects in philosophy - art - medicine. Ed. V. Hans-Helmuth Gander. Frankfurt / M. 1991 (Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft ∙ series of publications; 1). ISBN 3-465-02520-2 .
  • Otto Pöggeler: Image and Technology. Heidegger, Klee and modern art. Munich 2002.
  • Madalina Diaconu: The principle of identity beyond tautology. Alternative identity models of the work of art in the exit of Heidegger and Lévinas, in: Helmuth Vetter (ed.): After Heidegger. Insights - outlooks. Frankfurt / M. 2003 (series of the Öst. Ges. f. Phenomenology; Vol. 7), 221–237. ISBN 3-631-39393-8 .
  • Helmuth Vetter: Art as a measure of the political? Notes on Heidegger, in: Reinhold Esterbauer (Hg.): Orte des Schönen. Phenomenological approximations. Würzburg 2003, 191-216.
  • Wilhelm Perpeet, Frank-Lothar Kroll: Heidegger's art teaching. With a foreword by Otto Pöggeler. Bonn 2005.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 21.
  2. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 65.
  3. ↑ Hans-Georg Gadamer: For the introduction . In: Martin Heidegger: The origin of the work of art. Ditzingen 1986, p. 98.
  4. ↑ Cf. Martin Heidegger / Elisabeth Blochmann, Joachim Storck (eds.): Briefwechsel 1918-1968 , Marbach 1989, p. 87.
  5. ↑ See Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Ed.): Heidegger Studies 5, 1989, pp. 5–22. Again with the pagination of the Heidegger studies reprinted in: Günter Figal (Ed.): Heidegger Reading Book . Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 149–170
  6. ↑ See Heidegger Studies 6 (1990), pp. 5-7 and Heidegger Studies 8 (1992), pp. 6-12.
  7. ↑ Christoph König (ed.): History of German Studies. Messages. Göttingen, 2004, p. 39.
  8. ↑ See Andrea Kern: "The origin of the artwork". Art and truth between foundation and dispute. in: Dieter Thomä (Ed.): Heidegger Handbook . Stuttgart, 2003, p. 162.
  9. ↑ Hans-Georg Gadamer: For the introduction . In: Martin Heidegger: The origin of the work of art. Ditzingen 1986, p. 103.
  10. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holderlin's hymn "Der Ister" . ( GA 53), p. 21.
  11. ^ Martin Heidegger: Contributions to philosophy. (From the event) ( GA 65), p. 503f.
  12. ^ Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann: Heidegger's Philosophy of Art. A systematic interpretation of the Holzweg treatise 'The Origin of the Artwork', Frankfurt am Main 1980, p. XIX.
  13. ↑ Hans-Georg Gadamer: For the introduction . In: Martin Heidegger: The origin of the work of art. Ditzingen 1986, p. 108.
  14. ↑ Hans-Georg Gadamer: For the introduction . In: Martin Heidegger: The origin of the work of art. Ditzingen 1986, p. 105.
  15. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 1.
  16. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 3.
  17. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 10.
  18. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 12.
  19. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 19.
  20. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 21.
  21. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 41.
  22. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 22.
  23. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 29.
  24. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 32.
  25. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 33.
  26. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 49.
  27. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 54.
  28. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 55.
  29. ↑ Martin Heidegger: Holzwege ( GA 5), p. 26.