German pandemic risk analysis
The German pandemic risk analysis was carried out under the technical leadership of the Robert Koch Institute and other federal authorities, which bears the title “Pandemic through Virus Modi-SARS”.
It is part of the risk analyzes carried out by the Federal Government in civil protection, which serve the precautionary and structured examination of possible federally relevant dangers and the effects that can be expected if they occur on the population, their livelihoods and public safety and order in Germany.
For the risk analysis, a scenario about an epidemic was first developed that is based on the spread of a new type of pathogen and is based on the coronavirus SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) that appeared in 2002/03 . It describes the worldwide spread of a hypothetical new virus originating from Asia, which in the analysis is referred to as Modi-SARS virus. The pandemic in Germany runs through three waves of infection until a vaccine is available after three years of the first illness.
The probability of occurrence and the expected extent of damage were determined for the scenario investigated in the risk analysis of the epidemic in Germany .
Results of the risk analysis
The frequency of occurrence was determined to be once in a period of 100 to 1000 years.
The extent of the damage was determined with 78 million people who had been infected in three waves of infection in three years. Over the period of the first wave (days 1 to 411) a total of 29 million people in Germany fell ill, in the course of the second wave (days 412 to 692) a total of 23 million and during the third wave (days 693 to 1052) a total of 26 million people in Germany. For the entire three-year period, at least 7.5 million deaths (10% of those infected) are expected as a direct result of the infection. The economic damage could not be estimated in concrete terms, but it is viewed as immense, in particular because of the 7.5 million deceased around four million are employed.
Assumptions and modeling of the scenario
The total population in Germany is assumed to be 80 million people.
The average latency period is 3 to 5 days, the infectious phase is 13.1 days. For people who have to be hospitalized, the duration is 19 days, the average intensive care care lasts 13.5 days. Mortality is assumed to be 10% of the sick (corresponding to the SARS pandemic in 2003 with 11%), which, however, is different in different age groups. Children and adolescents usually have milder disease courses with a mortality rate of around 1%, while that of over 65-year-olds is 50%.
It is believed that a person is immune for 360 days after being infected with Modi-SARS, after which that person can be re-infected by a mutated version of the virus, triggering the third wave in the analysis. The transmission of infections was modeled on the basis of population density. Factors such as different disease courses in different age groups or different mobility (of age groups or in certain regions) were not taken into account. It was assumed that, as a result of the protective measures taken, the number of new cases decreases, which leads to a decrease in individual protective measures (due to a lower subjective risk perception), which in turn increases the number of new cases. The enormous number of infected people who would have to be hospitalized or require intensive medical care in the hospital exceeds the existing hospital capacities many times over.
In the scenario, it was assumed that anti-epidemic measures will be initiated from day 48, and that each infected person will no longer infect an average of three, but 1.6 people. A vaccine is available after three years of the first illness.
The scenario on which the risk analysis is based does not contain any damaging events superimposed on the pandemic event, such as failure of vital infrastructure (e.g. drug supply) due to staff shortages.
Basics of risk analysis
The guidelines for risk analysis and risk mapping for disaster management developed by the European Commission in cooperation with the member states.
The framework concept for disaster- related risk assessment and risk financing developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) contains the risk analysis as the basis for comprehensive risk management.
Objective and evaluation of the risk results
Comments from the authors of the risk analysis:
- The purpose of the risk analysis is to use selected scenarios to check whether the existing capabilities and the state preparation for coping with the possible damage and effects identified as part of the risk analysis are appropriate and sufficient. While the analysis of the risks is a technical process, the risk assessment and the subsequent weighing and selection of e.g. B. Risk-reducing measures to a considerable extent influenced by political and social aspects. As a result, a corresponding dialogue must take place between specialist authorities, science, politics and the population.
- The annual report to the German Bundestag will present the current status of the risk analysis. Gradually, the desired overview of the risk landscape will emerge (risk register). Findings, the data used and the methodological procedure must be regularly checked, updated and, if necessary, adapted to new framework conditions. If necessary, additional scenarios for newly identified hazards are to be developed. Gaps in knowledge can be closed through targeted research projects.
In the report on the risk analysis in civil protection 2017 , the findings and recommendations for action derived from the pandemic risk analysis carried out in 2012 were summarized in the sense of a risk assessment ( selection and in abridged version ):
- The creation of a medical and pharmaceutical situation report is recommended.
- In preparation for a pandemic, appropriate measures should be planned in advance, based on the existing national pandemic plan from 2016.
- In order to maintain critical infrastructures, the particularly exposed personnel and key workplaces (key personnel concept) should be identified and kept and regular crisis management exercises should be carried out; how can this be compensated for in the event of staff absence.
- The crisis management concept should provide for measures in the event of permanent staff failure.
- It should be examined whether personnel are required to be able to continue to operate essential basic functions of the state services of general interest (e.g. health, basic services) or sensitive systems even under extreme conditions. There may be a need for legal action here. One possibility would be e.g. B. the enactment of an "Employment Provision Act", since the existing Occupational Safety and Health Act can only be applied in the event of tension / defense.
- It is recommended to check whether an increase in the number of hospital beds is necessary.
- Implementation of infection protection measures that can be implemented depending on the epidemic situation, such as contact-reducing measures, protective clothing, disinfection measures, vaccination (as soon as available), use of anti-infective drugs (taking into account the resistance situation), proactive and reactive closure of schools or kindergartens, cancellation of major events, Restriction of fundamental rights such as freedom of assembly.
Comments on risk analysis
“The 2012 pandemic risk analysis has been ignored. Unfortunately, like several others of these annual risk assessments, this report has not been discussed in the depth desired. The last, very important steps in the so-called risk management process were indeed missing. Usually these risks are initially far away for politics and are pushed back by current problems. In the future there should be a 'procedure for monitoring or controlling the results'. "
“The Modi-Sars scenario at the time was not a prediction of the development and effects of a pandemic event, but a maximum scenario, triggered by a fictitious pathogen, the theoretically conceivable extent of damage from a human-to-human disease with a highly virulent pathogen to illustrate. "
“As early as 2013, the Robert Koch Institute developed a pandemic scenario that has now largely become a reality. Slowing down the speed of the epidemic is important. This gain in time through anti-epidemic measures can be used, for example, to manufacture and distribute personal protective equipment and to provide information about its correct use. References to weak points were named in the risk analysis, such as the stocking of respiratory masks, protective suits or disinfectants in hospitals. Obviously, no political consequences were drawn from this. "
“There was a general consensus in science that a pandemic will be a problem. In the risk analysis commissioned by the federal government, a pandemic with a modified Sars virus was predicted with a probability of once every 100 years. Germany too could have been better prepared for the pandemic. It is known that we are 100% dependent on pharmaceutical companies for antibiotics in China or India. If a pandemic spreads there, then we have a problem. The probability once in 100 years is too far away for politicians to react to it to justify the effort involved in crisis prevention in front of the voters. "
“The report was not taken seriously by its clients. This risk analysis report is repeated every five years and was new in 2017. These statements in the report urge a good supply of medical protective equipment, which is exactly what is missing now. The process shown and the (disregarded) advice exactly match the current situation. Only a foreign newspaper that starts analyzing the report shows that it was a clear warning that was completely negated. Since the first SARS outbreak, there has been no doubt that this risk of pandemics in today's global world is an inevitable consequence of the globalization of economic activity and also of our travel habits. Microsoft founder Bill Gates has repeatedly pointed out the danger of global pandemics since 2010, including at the last Munich Security Conference (from 2019). "
See also
Bill Gates: The Next Epidemic - Lessons from Ebola . April 2015. (American English)
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Report on risk analysis in civil protection 2012 . In: 17th German Bundestag . Printed matter 17/12051. January 3, 2013 (PDF; 2.2 MB; 88 pages)
- ↑ a b Report on risk analysis in civil protection 2017 . In: 19th German Bundestag . Printed matter 19/9520. April 12, 2019 (PDF; 4.5 MB; 36 pages)
- ↑ a b Infection epidemiological yearbook of reportable diseases for 2003 . In: Robert Koch Institute . Berlin. 2004. (PDF; 1.3 MB; 163 pages)
- ↑ European Commission: Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management , Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2010) 1626 final of December 21, 2010.
- ↑ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Disaster Risk Assessment and Risk Financing , G20 / OECD Methodological Framework, 2012.
- ^ National Pandemic Plan Part I Structures and Measures , Robert Koch Institute, March 2, 2017.
- ↑ Civil Protection Office: In times without crises and wars, there is little understanding for disaster plans . In: Epoch Times . April 5, 2020.
- ↑ Birgit Baumann: Risk Report - The Corona Prophecy of the German Government . In: The Standard . March 25, 2020.
- ↑ Jo Goll , Torsten Mandalka, René Althammer: Analysis of the Robert Koch Institute: How a scenario from 2013 anticipated parts of today's corona pandemic . In: rbb - Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg . March 31, 2020.
- ^ Carlo Masala: Germany could have prepared better . In: The world . April 8, 2020.
- ↑ Peter Grassmann : The disregarded risk study on the pandemic . In: Telepolis . March 30, 2020.
- ^ Bill Gates : The Next Epidemic - Lessons from Ebola . In: The New England Journal of Medicine . April 9, 2015. (American English)