Europe first

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Europe First ( English Europe First ) also known as Germany First ( English Germany First ), was the key element of the Grand Strategy agreed by the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II. The strategy said that the United States and the United Kingdom would use the bulk of their resources to first defeat Nazi Germany in Europe. At the same time, Japan in the Pacific would be preoccupied with less resource use and delaying tactics . After the defeat of Germany, the greater threat to Britain, all of the allies would be able to focus on Japan.

Shortly after the United States entered the war, the Arcadia Conference was held in Washington in December 1941 between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill . The “Europe first” strategy was confirmed on it. However, US statistics show that in the early years of the war the United States used more resources to counter the Japanese advance. It was not until 1944 that the US funds earmarked for the overthrow of Germany were clearly in abundance.

Grand Strategy

Germany was the greatest threat to the United Kingdom, especially after the fall of France in 1940 when Germany overran most of the countries of Western Europe and the United Kingdom fought Germany alone. The planned invasion of Germany in Great Britain, Operation Sea Lion , was averted because Germany could not win the air superiority in the Battle of Britain and was clearly inferior as a sea power. At the same time, the war with Japan in East Asia seemed increasingly likely. Although the US was at war neither with Germany nor with Japan, the US met with Great Britain on several occasions to work out common strategies. In the report of the ABC-1 conference of March 29, 1941, the US and Great Britain agreed their strategic goals: (1) To achieve the early defeat of Germany as the predominant member of the Axis powers . The focus of the United States' military efforts should be concentrated on the Atlantic and European realms and (2) a strategic defensive in the Far East.

Thus, the United States agreed with the British in the grand strategy of "first Europe" (or "Germany First" ) in the direction of their military operations for the Second World War match. Britain feared that if the United States changed its main focus from Europe to the Pacific (Japan), Hitler could overthrow both the Soviet Union and Britain, resulting in an impregnable fortress Europe . The wound that Japan inflicted on the United States with the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, did not change American policy. Shortly after the attack, Prime Minister Churchill rushed to Washington for the Arcadia Conference , where the "Europe First" strategy was confirmed. The two countries affirmed: “Regardless of Japan's entry into the war, Germany remains the main enemy, and defeat is the key to victory. After the defeat of Germany, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow. "

United States

The "Europe first" strategy in conjunction with the "delaying tactic" against Japan was originally proposed to Roosevelt in 1940 by the US military. After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and Germany and Italy declaring war on the United States on December 11, 1941, the United States found itself not only in a two-front war but in a "two-ocean war" in the Pacific and Atlantic . The US had to decide how to divide its resources between the two theaters of war. On the one hand, Japan had attacked the United States directly at Pearl Harbor, and the Japanese Navy was threatening United States territory in ways that Germany, with its limited surface fleet , was unable to do. Germany, on the other hand, was generally seen as the stronger and more dangerous threat to Europe because only the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union fought Nazi Germany. Germany's geographical proximity to Great Britain and the Soviet Union was therefore seen as the greater threat.

Before the attack on Pearl Harbor , American planners had foreseen the possibility of a two- front war. The Chief of Naval Operations , Harold Rainsford Stark , drafted the Plan Dog memorandum in which he advocated focusing on victory in Europe. Despite US confirmation of “Europe first” strategy, the immediate concern after the Pearl Harbor attack was Japan. Major General George Marshall , Chief of Staff of the US Armed Forces, later said: “We had a clear understanding of what we should do best instead of having long discussions ... This understanding, which included recognizing the German Reich as the main enemy and the main efforts initially in Europe was obviously not applicable in the current situation. Of paramount importance now was the need to keep the Japanese in check. ”Nonetheless, Marshall and other American generals supported the plan to invade Northern Europe in 1943, which the British opposed.

After Churchill pushed for a landing in French North Africa in 1942 , Marshall proposed to President Roosevelt instead that the US abandon the “Europe first” strategy and start the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt "disapproved" of the proposal as it would weaken Russia, which at the time bore the brunt of the fight against Germany. With Roosevelt's support, and since Marshall could not convince the British to change their minds, planning began in July 1942 for the landing in French North Africa, scheduled later that year. The British-American landing in North Africa, Operation Torch , began on November 8, 1942.

The “Europe first” strategy remained in place throughout the war. However, the contents of the terms "delaying tactics" and "limited offensive" for the Pacific were changed and reinterpreted as necessary by high-ranking US commanders and at conferences with Allied leaders. The strategic location in the Pacific and the associated logistical requirements dominated the actions of the United States after entering the war and led to an initial focus on the Pacific. Even in the later phases of the war there was intense competition for resources as operations in both regions were expanded.

resistance

The “Europe first” strategy drove a wedge between the US Navy and the US Army. In contrast to the British perception, US Fleet Admiral Ernest King was a representative of the “Europe first” strategy. However, his military perspective did not allow him to leave resources in the Atlantic that could be used in the Pacific. Especially when "it was questionable when - if at all - the British would agree to a cross-channel operation." King complained that the Pacific earned 30% of the Allied resources, but received only 15%. The joint influence of King and General Douglas MacArthur increased the allocation of resources to the Pacific War, despite - or perhaps partly because of - the fact that the two men did not get along.

General Hastings Ismay , Winston Churchill's chief of staff , described King as:

hard as a nail and stiff as a stick. He was dull and steadfast, almost to the point of rudeness. At first he was intolerant and suspicious of everything British, especially the Royal Navy ; but he was almost as intolerant and suspicious of the US military . His lifelong study was devoted to the war against Japan, and he resented the idea that American resources might be used for some other purpose. He distrusted Churchill's persuasiveness and feared that President Roosevelt might neglect the war in the Pacific.

At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference , King was accused by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke of facilitating the Pacific War and the dispute escalated. The combative General Joseph Stilwell wrote: “Brooke became uncomfortable and seriously offended King. King almost jumped Brook across the table. God he was crazy. I wish he had given him one. "

The American people favored early crackdown on Japan. In February 1943, in one of the few opinion polls during the war, 53 percent of Americans thought Japan was the “main enemy,” compared with 34 percent who voted for Germany. A later poll found that 82 percent of Americans believed the Japanese were “crueler at heart” than Germans. As a result of the imminent threat and the need to curb Japan's advance across the Pacific, American funds allocated to the fight against Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe. In the first six months the US was at war, the US Army sent more than 300,000 soldiers to the Pacific while fewer than 100,000 were sent to Europe. In August 1942, the USA's first major offensive in World War II took place in the Pacific: The Battle of Guadalcanal . At the same time, Australian troops attacked the Japanese in the Kokoda Track campaign in Papua New Guinea and drove them back.

analysis

At the request of Prime Minister Churchill, four divisions of the US Army were deployed to Australia and New Zealand in February and March 1942 . So the experienced divisions from Australia and New Zealand, which were already in the Middle East, could continue with their action against the Germans. Consequently, by sending soldiers to the Pacific, the US also supported the “Europe first” strategy.

In 1943, the two allies, the United States and Great Britain, were unable to begin an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe. That is why the USA mobilized more military forces against Japan than against Germany in the first two years of the war. In December 1943, the number of US troops in the Pacific and Atlantic was almost equal. The United States deployed 1,873,023 soldiers, 7,857 aircraft and 713 warships against Japan. Against Germany there were 1,810,367 soldiers, 8,807 aircraft and 515 warships.

In early 1944, the United States shifted the focus of its military deployment to the invasion of France. The weight of the forces shifted towards the Atlantic and made “Europe First” a reality.

Although most of the American resources came to Europe in 1944, the US still had sufficient funds to carry out several major military operations in the Pacific: the Battle of Saipan in June 1944, the Battle of Guam in July 1944, the Battle of Peleliu in the September 1944 and the invasion of the Philippines in the Battle of Leyte in October 1944.

In 1944 and 1945 the balance of US resources shifted sharply towards Europe. The “Europe First” strategy had become a reality rather than just a stated goal. At the end of the war, the US Army had 47 divisions in Europe, 21 divisions and 6 marine divisions in the Pacific. Seventy-eight percent of the US Army and US Air Forces were deployed against Germany, compared to a mere 22 percent in the Pacific. The plan to invade Japan called for 15 divisions to be moved from Europe to the Pacific.

The uncritical view that the “Europe First” strategy dictated the allocation of resources for the entire war has led some scholars to underestimate the resources needed to defeat Japan. Historian Hedley Paul Willmott stated that the United States "devoted little more than a quarter of its total war effort to fighting Japan." This may be an underestimate as it ignores the state of affairs at the end of the war. According to official US statistics, when Germany surrendered in May 1945, 70 percent of the US Navy, all Marine Corps and 22 percent of the Army were deployed in the Pacific.

See also

Web links

Commons : Pacific War  - Collection of Images
Commons : World War II  album with pictures
Wiktionary: Second World War  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ James D. Hornfischer: Neptune's Inferno: The US Navy at Guadalcanal. Ed .: Bantam Books. 978-0-553-80670-0, New York 2011, pp. 151–153, 383 (English, army.mil [PDF]).
  2. ^ Louis Morton: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. The United States Army in World War II. The war in the Pacific. (PDF) In: history.army.mil. GPO, Washington, 1962, p. 88 , accessed August 17, 2018 .
  3. ^ Louis Morton: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. The United States Army in World War II. The war in the Pacific. (PDF) In: history.army.mil. GPO, Washington, 1962, p. 158 , accessed August 17, 2018 .
  4. ^ Mark A. Stoler: George C. Marshall and the “Europe-First” Strategy, 1939–1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History. (PDF) In: Marshall Foundation, Washington. April 22, 2014, accessed August 17, 2018 .
  5. ↑ James D. Hornfischer: Neptune's Inferno: The US Navy at Guadalcanal. Ed .: Bantam Books. New York 2011, ISBN 978-0-553-80670-0 , pp. 11-15, 130, 151-153, 382, ​​383 (English).
  6. ^ Louis Morton: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. The United States Army in World War II. The war in the Pacific. (PDF) In: history.army.mil. GPO, Washington, 1962, pp. 141-142 , accessed August 17, 2018 .
  7. ↑ Husen, editor, David T. Zabecki; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van: World War II in Europe: an encyclopedia. Ed .: Garland Pub. 1999, ISBN 978-0-8240-7029-8 , pp. 1270 (English).
  8. ^ SP Mackenzie: The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition. Ed .: Routledge. 2014, ISBN 1-317-86471-9 , pp. 54-55 (English).
  9. ↑ Geoffrey C. Ward, Ken Burns: The Roosevelts: An Intimate History. Ed .: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 2014, ISBN 0-385-35306-5 (English).
  10. ↑ Christos Frentzos, Antonio Thompson: Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History: 1865 to the Present. Ed .: Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. 2013, ISBN 978-1-135-07102-8 , pp. 135 (English).
  11. ^ A b c Anthony W. Gray, Jr .: Chapter 6: Joint Logistics in the Pacific Theater. In: Alan Gropman: The Big 'L' - American Logistics in World War II. National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1997, accessed August 13, 2018 .
  12. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. XI: Invasion of France & Germany: 1944-1945. Little, Brown and Company, 1957, ISBN 0-316-58311-1 , pp. 13-14 (English).
  13. ^ Forrest C. Pogue: George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943-1945. Ed .: Viking Adult. 1973, ISBN 0-670-33694-7 , pp. 305 (English).
  14. ↑ George H. Gallup: The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971 . Random House, New York 1972, p. 370, 509 .
  15. ↑ Maurice Matloff: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 . Ed .: GPO. Vol. 1, Part 4: The US Army in World War II. Washington DC 1955, p. 398 (English).
  16. ^ Richard Frank, B. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire . Ed .: Random House. New York 1999, p. 123 (English).
  17. ↑ Hedeley Paul Willmott: Empires in the Balance . Ed .: Naval Institute Press. Annapolis 1982, p. xv (English).
  18. ^ Richard M. Leighton, Robert W. Coakley: Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945, of The US Army in World War II . Ed .: GPO. Washington DC 1995, p. 834 (English).