Presence fleet
The so-called presence fleet ( English: fleet in being ) is a strategic concept in naval warfare . The presence fleet is a fleet that influences war events through its mere existence without having to leave port - the fleet "exists" but does not act. The mere possibility of this fleet leaving forces the enemy to keep sufficient armed forces ready to be able to fight the presence fleet in the event of an operation .
A skirmish with enemy armed forces should be avoided with this concept, provided that the enemy unit is not significantly weaker, as the resulting losses could reduce or even end the threat posed by the presence fleet. This concept is therefore intended for situations in which the necessary precautions against a leakage of the fleet inflict more damage on the enemy than the fleet could inflict on the enemy in a battle.
A presence fleet can deny the enemy command of the sea , but it cannot achieve it.
Mode of action
A presence fleet affects the enemy in two ways:
- Restriction of sea connections: The possibility of an attack on the enemy sea connections restricts them. In order to avoid attacks on his trading and transport ships, the enemy must either stop the sea traffic of his ships or protect them with his own warships. Since this would be too time-consuming for individual ships, he has to group his ships in convoys . However, the use of convoys reduces the available transport capacities as the ships now need longer to reach their destination ports. Instead of each ship taking the direct route from the port of departure to the port of destination at its own best possible speed, it now first has to drive to the convoy's assembly point on the edge of the endangered sea area, often a detour, and wait there for the remaining ships. Then it travels in a convoy at the speed of the slowest ship through the endangered area until the convoy is disbanded at the end. From there, the ship continues on its own again. If the convoy is disbanded near the destination port and several ships in the convoy are heading for the same port, additional waiting times may occur if the port's capacity is not sufficient for so many ships arriving at the same time.
- Binding of the fleet forces: In order to protect his convoys, the enemy must provide his own fleet forces, which are therefore not available for other tasks. These fleet forces must be at least strong enough to be able to fight the presence fleet with a chance of success in the event of an actual departure. How large this security fleet has to be compared to the strength of the presence fleet depends on various factors. So threatened z. For example, during World War II the Italian fleet was the main supply line for British troops in North Africa from Gibraltar to Alexandria from their bases in the middle of the Mediterranean . From Italy she could attack both Gibralta in the west and Alexandria in the east at any time. The British, on the other hand, were only able to cover half of the Mediterranean from their two outlying bases. This forced them to station strong combat units at both locations, each of which had to be strong enough to take on the Italian fleet on its own. In this way, a presence fleet can bind enemy forces that are many times its own strength.
history
War of the Palatinate Succession
In the Palatinate War of Succession in 1690, the British canal fleet under Lord Torrington faced a superior French fleet. He therefore suggested to his superior, except in extremely favorable situations, that they avoid fighting until reinforcements were available. Until then, his units as a fleet in being should prevent the French from deploying their ships elsewhere. This is the first known mention of the term fleet in being .
First World War
In the course of the First World War , units of the British Grand Fleet and the German deep sea fleet faced each other. Since the numerically superior British Navy withdrew heavy units overseas to fight the German cruiser war , there was an approximate equilibrium of forces in the waters of the North Sea. The German deep-sea fleet was in the waters of the German Bight, which was largely protected by extensive minefields and sandbanks, mainly the mouth of the Elbe and the Jade Bay. The English Grand Fleet was limited to a remote blockade and was located off the Orkney Islands at Scapa Flow. Both fleets succumbed to a strategic stalemate , so the British could not use the Grand Fleet for other purposes due to the presence of the German deep-sea fleet, and the German deep-sea fleet was also placed in a defensive position, as the Grand Fleet was involved in extensive operations outside the North Sea or for the continental British troop supplies strategically important English Channel was prevented. Furthermore, the German army wanted the defensively restrained fleet to deter landings on the coast and there were considerations to "save" the fleet as a trump card for peace negotiations. An open exchange of blows between the two fleets should be avoided, as a loss of naval control due to the island location would have threatened the very existence of England, and the fear of possible loss of capital ships weighed heavily, due to the long construction time and complex and costly production. Only rarely in the course of the war was the bilateral defensive concept broken, for example in the battle on the Dogger Bank and the Skagerrak Battle .
Finnish-Soviet Winter War
During the Winter War , the superior was Soviet fleet by the two Finnish coastal defense ships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen at each landing operation prevented.
Second World War
During the Second World War, the Italian fleet threatened the British sea routes in the Mediterranean, but refused a decisive battle sought by the British several times, which forced the British to station strong naval forces in the Mediterranean. With the surprise attack on Taranto on November 12, 1940, the British decimated the operational Italian battleships and were able to reduce the threat.
During the same war, the German navy threatened the Allied convoys in the North Sea with battleships and heavy cruisers stationed in Norway , especially the battleship Tirpitz . This forced the British to protect these convoys with strong forces, although the German ships seldom set sail and the few attacks actually carried out ( battle in the Barents Sea , naval battle off the North Cape ) failed with heavy German losses.
Historical classification
The prerequisite for the existence of a presence fleet is a secure base from which the fleet can operate, but in which it is at the same time safe from a superior enemy fleet. This could originally be achieved through the presence of strong coastal batteries , which prevented an attack on the base. During the attacks on Taranto and Pearl Harbor , however, it became apparent that a port could not offer reliable protection against the air forces of a superior enemy fleet. Only a sufficient distance from the combat area can still provide the necessary protection, but at the same time this distance makes it impossible to pose a real threat to the enemy. This means that the presence fleet concept can hardly be used today.
The term presence fleet is limited to naval warfare, but the underlying concept can in principle also be used in land warfare. A besieged fortress can practically bind enemy forces as an army in being by posing a threat to the supply lines. An example of this is the British fortress of Tobruk in the Africa campaign , which was bypassed and cut off by the Axis powers in 1941 . In order to prevent the troops stationed in the fortress (which could be supplied from the sea) from making a sortie , strong forces had to be stationed around the fortress. A continuation of the Axis offensive was impossible until Tobruk was captured.
Evidence
- ↑ David Stevenson: The First World War. 1914-1918. Artemis and Winkler, Düsseldorf 2006, ISBN 3-538-07214-0 , p. 115.
literature
- David Brown: The Tirpitz. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn 1998, ISBN 3-7637-5987-5 (focus: The hidden threat, p. 23 ff.).
- David Stevenson: The First World War. 1914-1918. Artemis and Winkler, Düsseldorf 2006, ISBN 3-538-07214-0 (focus: failure of the war of movement, p. 113 ff.).
- Paul Virilio : Speed and Politics. An Essay on Dromology. Semiotext (e), New York 1986, ISBN 0-936756-33-0 .