Sea battle off the North Cape

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Company Eastern Front
date December 25, 1943 to December 26, 1943
place Northern European Sea off the North Cape
output British victory
Parties to the conflict

German EmpireGerman Empire (Reichskriegsflagge) German Empire

United KingdomUnited Kingdom (Naval War Flag) United Kingdom

Commander

German EmpireGerman Empire (Reichskriegsflagge) Erich Bey  † Rolf Johannesson
German EmpireGerman Empire (Reichskriegsflagge)

United KingdomUnited Kingdom (Naval War Flag) Bruce Fraser Robert Burnett
United KingdomUnited Kingdom (Naval War Flag)

Troop strength
1 battleship
5 destroyers
1 battleship
4 cruisers
8 destroyers
losses

1 battleship

The naval battle off the North Cape was the result of the operation of the German Navy, known as Operation Eastern Front, from December 25 to 26, 1943 during the naval war of World War II . The aim of the enterprise was to intercept the British northern sea convoy JW 55B , which was on its way to Murmansk in the Soviet Union. The action ended with the sinking of the German battleship Scharnhorst on December 26, 1943 in the North Sea off the coast of Norway .

prehistory

On December 12, 1943, the convoy JW.55 A ran out of Loch Ewe , which consisted of 19 ships with a local fuse of two destroyers and three corvettes and an escort group of eight destroyers. As a further cover group, the Force 1 stayed with the cruisers HMS Belfast , HMS Sheffield and HMS Norfolk under Vice Admiral Robert Burnett in the vicinity of the convoy. Another security group, the Force 2 under the Commander-in-Chief of Home Fleet Admiral Bruce Fraser , consisting of the battleship HMS Duke of York , the cruiser HMS Jamaica and the destroyers HMS Saumarez , HMS Savage , HMS Scorpion and HNoMS Stord , was already on 16. Arrived in the Kola Fjord in December .

A convoy on its way across the Atlantic

The submarines U 638 , U 387 and U 354 reported encounters with escort vehicles in the night from 16 to 17 December without getting close to the suspected convoy. In a briefing in the driver's headquarters on 19 and 20 December then Großadmiral reached Donitz of Hitler permission to use the in Altafjorden lying battle group with the Scharnhorststraße and the destroyers Z 29 , Z 30 , Z 33 , Z 34 and Z 38 against the next convoy, if there was a chance of success.

On December 20, convoy JW.55 A, accompanied by Force 1 , entered the Kola Fjord. On the same day, convoy JW.55 B left Loch Ewe. It consisted of 19 ships, 17 of which were freighters and two tankers, with two corvettes and two minesweepers close by and two destroyers, two corvettes and one minesweeper at a distance. The latter were replaced on the afternoon of December 22nd by the eight fleet destroyers of the Escort Group coming towards Iceland , who had already secured convoy JW.55 A.

On December 22nd at 10:45 a.m. a German Ju 88 spotted the convoy. By noon on December 23, further reports were received from the aerial reconnaissance, which started in the morning and consisted of six Fw 200s , three Ju 88s and two BV 138s . This gave the German side a relatively precise picture of the size of the convoy and its course. The British noticed the German reconnaissance planes and shot them several times with flak.

Force 2 had meanwhile arrived in Akureyri , Iceland on the morning of 23 December for oiling, in order to cover the new convoy the next day, while Force 1 followed behind the empty convoy RA.55 A going west. Shortly before midnight, Fraser left the Icelandic fjord with Force 2 and ran after convoy JW.55 B at full speed after German aircraft had been reported to him from there.

On December 24, four Fw 200s and two Ju 88s took off at 9 a.m. and reported several sightings of the convoy during the day. The security groups Force 1 and Force 2 , however, as well as the westward moving convoy RA.55 A. The reconnaissance group Eisenbart, consisting of eight submarines, positioned itself between Bear Island and the North Cape in such a way that they reached the convoy at dusk on December 25th had to become.

A German
BV 138 maritime patrol aircraft

Since Admiral Fraser had to reckon with an attack due to the sighted German reconnaissance planes, he broke the radio silence at 1:25 p.m. and ordered the convoy to turn around for three hours in order to reduce the distance to his Force 2, which was following behind . Although this radio message was aligned by four German DF stations, no corresponding aerial reconnaissance was carried out.

On December 25 at 9:01 a.m., U 601 from the Eisenbart group reported its first sighting of the convoy. Although the submarine was leveled by the destroyer HMS Whitehall , despite several attacks by destroyers, it was able to transmit sensor holder signals until 2:10 p.m. and then to report listening bearings until late afternoon. Since 10:08 a.m., one of three BV 138s was also repeatedly sending visual reports despite flak fire.

At 2:33 p.m., the Northern / Fleet group issued the prepared keyword Eastern Front September 25th , which arrived at the combat group at 4:37 p.m. with the addition 5:00 p.m. At a meeting of the Naval War Command with Admiral Dönitz at 3:00 p.m. it was concluded that it would make sense to use the combat group, including the Scharnhorst, against the convoy. At 7:25 p.m. Dönitz issued a radio message to that effect, which was available to Group North / Fleet at 8:09 p.m.

At 19:01, when Admiral Erich Bey had arrived, who was replacing Oskar Kummetz , who was on vacation , the anchor was lifted, although the weather worsened and flight reconnaissance for the next day seemed unlikely. In addition, the Scharnhorst had around 80 recently assigned midshipmen and 100 untrained recruits on board as a further handicap.

The action

The German battleship Scharnhorst

At 9:16 p.m., due to transmission difficulties again at 10:15 p.m. and again around midnight, Admiral Bey gave radio messages to the Northern Group / Fleet, in which he pointed out the severe weather and the limited possible uses of the destroyer as a result. Perhaps he was hoping for the order to abort the operation, but due to the complicated transmission, his radio messages did not reach the North / Fleet group until 2:19 a.m. and did not reach the naval command until 3:56 a.m. On Z 38 there were several injuries during the stormy sea.

At 11:04 p.m., the north-westerly German unit, which grouped five destroyers of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla under Captain Rolf Johannesson in a fan shape in front of the Scharnhorst , reached “Point Lucie” in front of the Söröja Sound in heavy seas and blowing snow. Bey now swiveled to 10 ° in the direction of the pre-calculated meeting point with the convoy.

Around midnight, the radio message from Dönitz at 19:25 arrived on the Scharnhorst . At 01:37 a.m. another radio message came in: “If the destroyers cannot hold the sea, the task is to carry out the cruiser war with Scharnhorst alone. Decision by the commander. ”This radio message was probably mistakenly understood as an answer to the own radio messages sent.

At 0319, Admiral Fraser on the Duke of York received unambiguous news from the Admiralty that the Scharnhorst was leaving . The British radio reconnaissance had recorded the radio messages from the Germans, and a British agent from Norway reported the casting off of the battleship.

Fraser then had the westbound convoy RA.55 A swivel to the north at 04:01 a.m. and withdraw four of its destroyers escort to reinforce the eastbound convoy JW.55 B. He gave the order to go on the opposite course for three hours, and Force 1 should join the convoy at top speed, which was now heading northeast. This radio message was not planned by the German side.

At around 7:00 a.m. the convoy should have appeared in front of the German ships, which is why Admiral Bey had his destroyers form a wide-spread reconnaissance strip around this time. Between 8:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., the German destroyers and the convoy passed each other in the dark during storms and snowfall, undetected at a relatively short distance. The German radio measuring devices were switched off because it was feared that the enemy could use the radar waves to locate the ship. The order from Bey was therefore: "Radio measuring and radio measuring observation device only on command."

The first battle

In the meantime, Force 1 of the Scharnhorst was coming closer and closer from the southeast . At 8:40 a.m. their radars recorded the German battleship for 33 kilometers, and at 9:21 a.m. it was sighted from Sheffield . It was on the opposite course, from which it is concluded that the Scharnhorst's radio measuring device had previously been switched on and reacted accordingly.

The British cruiser Sheffield

From 9:24 a.m. to 9:29 a.m., Sheffield and Norfolk fired flares. Then the Norfolk opened fire with fire control radar despite poor visibility . The Scharnhorst turned to the west and only returned fire with the aft tower. The other two British cruisers were unable to intervene.

One Norfolk grenade struck the compartment IX battery deck without detonating, but the other destroyed the radio measuring device on the fore marshes and killed the radio personnel. This meant that radio measurements were no longer possible in a previous sector of 70 °. In addition, the range of the remaining, aft radio measuring device was only 6 nm compared to the 10 nm of the front one.

At 9:40 a.m., the Norfolk stopped fire. At 9:46 am, Bey radioed Dönitz about his battle with a cruiser. In the meantime he had gone south with the Scharnhorst on an easterly course and swiveled to the northeast at 9:55 a.m. and soon afterwards at 30 knots north in the direction of the convoy. This change of course was still recognized by the extreme range of the British radar.

Burnett headed northwest to protect the convoy there. Shortly after 10 a.m., a message from U 277 , which had accidentally discovered the convoy heading north, arrived on the Scharnhorst . At 10:27 a.m., Bey gave the order to the destroyers, marching far apart on south-westerly courses, to take a counter-course, whereupon they each turned for themselves, but these advances also failed.

At 10:30 a.m. Burnett lost radar contact with Scharnhorst , at 10:50 a.m., coming from convoy RA.55 A, the four destroyers HMS Musketeer , HMS Matchless , HMS Opportune and HMS Virago of the 36th destroyer division joined his unit. At 11:00 a.m. he located the convoy, which had been heading northeast since 10:30 a.m., at 11:25 a.m. he set out on a northeast course to protect the convoy against Scharnhorst , who was suspected to be in the east .

At 10 o'clock a German reconnaissance plane discovered Fraser's formation in the west. Nevertheless, the Scharnhorst turned south-west shortly after 12:00 to continue looking for the convoy. This went on a southeast course almost simultaneously, while Force 1 steered east to intercept the Scharnhorst .

The second battle

In still poor visibility and heavy seas, the radar discovered Belfast the Scharnhorst at 12:05 in 27.9 km away. At 12:23 p.m., the Sheffield sighted the enemy optically for 10.1 km, whereupon Burnett went north to set broad sides. On the other hand, the still intact radio measuring device of the Scharnhorst recognized the opposing formation.

The Belfast as a museum ship on the Thames

At 12:24 p.m., both sides opened fire. At 12:27 p.m. the Norfolk received a hit in the barbette of tower C, which failed. A dud amidships caused the radars to fail. The Sheffield received close hits that caused splinter damage. The reports of damage to the Scharnhorst in this section differ widely.

At 12:28 p.m. the Scharnhorst turned to the southeast with the aft tower firing. A torpedo attack by the destroyer did not take place. At 12:41 p.m. the slower cruisers in the heavy seas had to stop firing. They followed at full speed, and the Belfast radioed the Scharnhorst locations, which were still recorded by their radar, to Frasers Force 2 without the latter having to break the radio silence.

At 1:42 p.m. the German destroyer flotilla received the order from the admiral to break off their search for the convoy, and at around 2 p.m. Bey gave the destroyers the order to enter. At the same time, a break in combat was ordered on the Scharnhorst . At 2:50 p.m. Bey informed the crew about the fleet formation reported in the west and called for increased attention. Lunch was taken at 3:00 p.m.

Final battle

At 16:17, the radar-coming from the southwest recognized Duke of York , the Scharnhorst km at a distance of 41.6. At 16:32, the fire control radio measured the target from a distance of 27.2 km. At 16:42, the Scharnhorst turned a little to the southwest when her aft radio measuring device, which was still intact, detected the enemy. At 4:47 p.m. the Belfast flares fired, at 4:48 p.m. the Duke of York opened fire with its ten 35.6-cm guns over 11 km. Jamaica followed immediately afterwards .

The Scharnhorst , whose turrets had not yet pivoted, immediately turned north and then swung east. Force 1 followed in the north, Force 2 in the south. The German ship received several hits. Nevertheless, Belfast and Norfolk had to stop firing after 25 minutes, while the Sheffield had previously stayed behind due to water damage. A hit in the ammunition chamber of tower A put it out of action, a little later tower B was temporarily out of action due to the smoke development. The Duke of York , which received a few hits itself, ceased firing at 18:24 when the distance had increased to 20 km.

At 6:30 p.m. the Scharnhorst , whose speed had temporarily dropped to eight knots as a result of a hit, reached 26 knots again.

The British destroyer Saumarez

At about 18:40 the destroyers Savage and Saumarez , which were running at 30 knots, came within 9.1 km on port side , but were repulsed. On the other hand, on the starboard side, the destroyers Scorpion and Stord managed to get within 1.9 and 1.6 km respectively under cover of darkness and each shot down eight torpedoes.

The Scharnhorst went south with hard rudder so that only one torpedo hit the Scorpion . However, this maneuver brought the Savage and Saumarez into good shooting position at 18:50 . The Savage fired eight torpedoes over a distance of 2 miles, three of which hit. Despite heavy fire, Saumarez fired four torpedoes over a distance of 1.5 km, one of which hit. The Saumarez was hit, her fire control system failed, and her speed was only ten knots.

The Scharnhorst was still running about 20 knots despite the torpedo hit. At 7:01 p.m., however, the Duke of York , which had come again, was able to reopen fire over 9.7 km with its heavy artillery. The Scharnhorst received at least ten serious hits within 28 minutes . The Scharnhorst could only run ten knots at 7:11 p.m., the ship was on fire, and a little later the ammunition supply of the heavy artillery was used up.

Since the extremely tough ship still fought back with the medium artillery, Admiral Fraser carried out further torpedo attacks. At around 7:30 p.m., the cruisers Belfast fired three and Jamaica six torpedoes over 3.5 km, three of which hit. From 19:31 to 19:34, the destroyers Opportune and Virago fired eight and seven torpedoes from 2.0 and 2.6 km on the starboard side of the Scharnhorst at the ship, which was still running at about 5 knots, and scored five hits. Musketeer and Matchless came from the port side . The former fired four torpedoes over a distance of 9 km at 19:33, two of which hit, while the Matchless failed to fire due to a defect.

On board the Scharnhorst , however, the equipment was destroyed and the life jackets were put on. At 7.45 p.m. she slowly capsized to starboard and spun around before sinking into the light of the enemy flares.

At 1948 the Belfast came up for a new torpedo attack, but the Scharnhorst had already sunk. The sinking point is 72 ° 16 'north latitude and 28 ° 41' east longitude. Belfast , Norfolk and most of the destroyers were looking for survivors until 8:40 p.m. The Scorpion recovered 30 and the Matchless six survivors. The Scorpion also spotted Admiral Bey in the water. He grabbed a lifeline but went under before he could be brought on board. In total, the Scharnhorst received at least thirteen 35.6 cm hits, 14 to 15 torpedo hits and numerous hits of medium caliber before it sank with 1932 men.

The five German destroyers under Johannesson ran on the morning of 27 December in the Altafjord and anchored around 7:00 pm in Kåfjord . On December 29, the convoy entered Murmansk without losses. Two days later he went to sea as RA.55 B and reached Loch Ewe on January 8, 1944 without failures.

Naval warfare significance of the battle

The naval battle off the North Cape with the loss of the Scharnhorst also showed the decisive importance of radar in modern naval warfare on the European theater of war. Already shortly after the battle, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz realized that warships would have to have radar systems to effectively combat enemy ships. In the Pacific , the US Navy had come to this conclusion in 1942.

literature

  • Thaddeus v. Tuleja: German battleships and heavy cruisers 1939–1945. (Shortened reprint of the 1958 book Die einsamenschiff ) Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Friedberg, ISBN 3-7909-0167-9 .
  • Helmut Pemsel: Command of the Sea. Volume 2: 1850 to today. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Koblenz 1985, ISBN 3-7637-5420-2 .
  • Heinrich Bredemeier: battleship Scharnhorst. Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, Herford 1962, 4th edition 1994, ISBN 3-7822-0592-8 .
  • Elmar B. Potter, Chester w. Nimitz: Sea power. A history of naval warfare from antiquity to the present (American original edition: Sea Power. A Naval History , 1960), Manfred Pawlak Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Herrsching, 1986, ISBN 3-88199-082-8 .
  • Hans H. Hildebrand, Albert Röhr, Hans-Otto Steinmetz: The German warships. Volume 5, ISBN 3-88385-028-4 .

Remarks

  1. Thaddeus v. Tuleja: German battleships and heavy cruisers 1939–1945. P. 127
  2. ^ Heinrich Bredemeier: battleship Scharnhorst. P. 238
  3. Potter, Nimitz: Seemacht , p. 628 and Heinrich Bredemeier: Battleship Scharnhorst. P. 238.
  4. ^ Bredemeier: Battleship Scharnhorst , p. 241
  5. Tuleja reports that the Scharnhorst was hit by some 15.2 and 20.3 cm grenades and some light grenades from the destroyer Musketeer , Helmut Pemsel reports two hits, while Potter & Nimitz and Bredemeier as well as Hildebrand, Röhr and Steinmetz admit based on testimony that the British had not scored any hits.
  6. This description of the sinking of survivors at Bredemeier is in contrast to the description by Tuleja, who writes that after the explosion of the ammunition chambers the stern rose and the ship was then shot to the bottom of the sea.
  7. ^ Heinrich Bredemeier: battleship Scharnhorst. P. 258.
  8. ^ Claasen, Adam RA: Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign, 1940-1945. Lawrence (University Press of Kansas), Kansas 2001, pp. 228-233.