The given

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In philosophy , cultural studies , mathematics and psychology, as given (synonymous with Latin date = given), known variables, impartially and without any personal involvement , are the starting points and foundations of perception and knowledge that are actually experienced . These basic data either represent memory traces of previous experience or they are to be viewed as continuously experienced and therefore formative factors of the social environment or, in extreme cases, as innate states of perception and sensation. They are objective in nature and are initially understood as neutral or as simple and unquestionably perceived immediate facts or as elementary units of consciousness . (a), (a) Consciousness psychology pursues a similar goal .

However, this does not mean that a critical examination of these “given” facts has already taken place. This question arises again and again, especially through new experiences. (b) Since subjective moments of perception are initially in the foreground, a review of the given or an expert handling of this data is required so that the claim to general validity or objectivity is taken into account. This critical examination is z. Sometimes also referred to as reflection . Aristotle (approx. 384–322 BC) referred to it as a paregon , as a more achievement that is added to the immediate. The given represents the immediate, the processing the Parergon, cf. a. → apperception .

Knowing and recognizing

The term “recognition” as well as that of “perception” reveals a certain process character ( act psychology ). Knowing presupposes that there is something objective from the outside world or from within that can be recognized. According to the ideas of information theory or, in terms of communications technology, this something is a date given by an author or emanating from a sender or sender . It contains the identifiable properties of the object identified. In this way, at least rudimentary physiological theories about the functioning of the cognitive processes in the central nervous system can be obtained, which are based on given experiences. The individual and species-specific way of correlating physiological processes and experience remains open ( psychophysical relation ).

Knowledge therefore presupposes both knowledge or something already known and the sensory function of the senses.

The kinds of the given

The types of the given are identical to the types of the objective given. A distinction is to be made between: (1) that which is sensibly and specifically given by the environment (sensory data ), (2) that which is conceptually given as it occurs through rational, logical-conceptual thinking ( res cogitans ), abstraction, general, the universals , unmediated or direct knowledge as opposed to imparted knowledge (school knowledge). (3) through empathy given, either by empathy with other people through the "inner sense" (Kant), the spirit , the sense of community or by introspection into their own Zuständlichkeiten such as the vital feeling . (b), (c)

Understanding

The concept of the given in philosophy was based on the distinction of the res cogitans by René Descartes (1596–1650). - As a result of the systematic doubt about recognizing the truth ( skepticism ) and in view of new findings on the previously unclear terminology of the mind-body problem , Descartes tried to find reliable bases for a search for truth based on scientific advances. This changed the ontological conception, which had originally been oriented towards the stability of the cosmos since antiquity , according to which the universe was regarded as the model of immutability and stability. This ontological view was represented by Parmenides (around 520-460 BC). (a) Heraclitus (approx. 544–483 BC ) was already convinced, however, that an immortal being was not possible. Rather, constant change and continued becoming are included in all being (“everything flows”). The current theory of actuality also takes this point of view . (c) While the earlier deductive view was based on intuition and contemplation , in modern times since Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) the experiment became the basis of research and at the same time the inductive method became the scientific source Experience . Descartes deliberately derived his philosophy from the discoveries of Galileo. (b), (d) In that Descartes introduced new concepts such as those of the reliable and persistent substances of the body (res extensa) and the consciousness-building body and soul functions of thinking (res cogitans), an alternative to the purely ontological standpoint of body and soul was intended be created. Through the maxim “ cogito ergo sum ” (I think, therefore I am), the purely ontogological standpoint was reversed, according to which thinking, like any other activity, is to be inferred from being ( agere sequitur esse ). This was at the same time the starting point for a subjectification of the cognitive processes (“I think”). This changed the ontological conception, which had originally been oriented towards the stability of the cosmos since antiquity, according to which the universe was regarded as the model of immutability and stability (Parmenides). While this earlier deductive view was based on intuition and contemplation, in modern times since Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) the experiment became the basis of research and at the same time the inductive method became the source of scientific experience .

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) referred to the methodology of constructive geometry using the example of the construction of a triangle from given sizes such as side length or angle, in order to show that the a priori idea of a non-representational or non-empirical object is necessary for the conception of the triangle. The existence of a geometric concept such as that of a triangle is to be described as empirical ( a posteriori ), i.e. H. in the form of the perception of a very specific triangle as well as in the form of the a priori perception, in that in the reflective conceptual formation one disregards or abstracts from the difference of all possible triangles. Kant also describes this process as conceptual construction. When drawing a specific triangle determined from the assumed sizes or quantities (side lengths and angular sizes), this concept formation is essential beforehand. Only through a meaningful synthesis a priori is it possible to successfully coordinate these individual variables and thus justify the constructive process as transcendental . (KrV B 740 ff.).

Judgment

The assumption of a power of judgment, as it was assumed not only by Kant , but also by → act psychology, is based on facts. If, according to Kant, one defines the power of judgment as “the ability to subsume under rules, ie to distinguish whether something is subject to a given rule or not” (subsuming U.), then the act of judgment is circumscribed. With the power of judgment, Kant also described the ability and ability to think of the particular as contained under the general (the rule, the principle, the law) that is not yet given but can be found (reflective U.). (Kant KrV B 171 f .; KU B XXVI)

Prognostic judgments

According to Habermas, given initial conditions in the empirical-analytical sciences allow prognoses. Empirical-analytical knowledge is therefore possible prognostic knowledge. (c)

literature

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d Heinrich Schmidt : Philosophical dictionary (= Kröner's pocket edition. 13). 21st edition, revised by Georgi Schischkoff . Alfred Kröner, Stuttgart 1982, ISBN 3-520-01321-5 : (a) p. 216 on Lemma “given”; (b) p. 216 to lemma “subject”; (c) p. 10 on the lemma “actuality theory”; (d) P. 182 on Lemma "Experiment".



  2. a b c Hermann Krings et al. (Ed.): Handbook of basic philosophical concepts . A self-presentation of contemporary philosophy in 150 key words. Kösel, Munich 1973, ISBN 3-466-40055-4 : (a) pp. 397, 406 f., 436 f., 438, 1368, 1373 on stw. “The given”; (b) p. 1368 on stw. “Reflexion”; (c) p. 403 to Stw. "Types of the given".


  3. a b c Hannah Arendt : Vita activa or From active life . R. Piper, Munich 3 1983, ISBN 3-492-00517-9 ; P. 286 to chap. 41 “The eversion of theory and practice”.
  4. ^ Henri Bergson : Les données immédiates de la conscience . 1888.
  5. Hans-Georg Gadamer : The beginning of philosophy . Philipp Reclam jun. Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-15-009495-X : (1) p. 18 on head. “Development”; (2) p. 95 on head. “Reflection”.

  6. ^ Thure von Uexküll : Basic questions of psychosomatic medicine. Rowohlt Taschenbuch, Reinbek near Hamburg 1963; P. 245 f. to Stw. "Information theory, everyday language".
  7. a b Peter R. Hofstätter (Ed.): Psychology . The Fischer Lexicon, Fischer-Taschenbuch, Frankfurt a. M. 1972, ISBN 3-436-01159-2 ; P. 206 to res. “Descartes”, Lemma “body-soul problem”.
  8. a b c Jürgen Habermas : Knowledge and Interest . In: Technology and Science as »Ideology«. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt, Edition 287, 4 1970 ( 1 1968), [1965 Merkur]: (a) p. 147 on Stw. “Ontology”; (b) p. 147 as (a); (c) p. 156 f. to Stw. "Prognostic Judgments".


  9. Max Koecher, Aloys Krieg: level geometry. 3. Edition. Springer, 2007.
  10. ^ Wolf-Dieter Klix, Karla Nestler: Constructive Geometry. Hanser, 2001, ISBN 3-446-21566-2 .
  11. Immanuel Kant : Critique of Pure Reason. Published by Wilhelm Weischedel, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt / M. 1995, vol. 2 stw, text and pages identical to vol. IV work edition, ISBN 3-518-09327-4 ; P. 612 f., Concordance of the Kant editions B 740 ff.