Legislative emergency

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A legislative emergency is described in Article 81 of the German Basic Law . This is an alternative legislative procedure. Under certain circumstances, the federal government can introduce a bill that will be passed as a law by the Bundesrat . In this way, a law can also come into being if the Bundestag rejects it or does not deal with it.

A federal government can only use this procedure for six months during its term of office. She has to apply for the legislative emergency to the Federal President again for each of her disputed bills. So it is not about a period during which the Bundesrat simply replaces the Bundestag. As usual, the Bundestag can also act as legislator within the six months.

So far, no federal government has made use of the legislative emergency. This is because there has never been a crisis situation in which the application would have made sense. If a federal government has lost its majority in the Bundestag, either a new majority (a new coalition) has been formed or the Bundestag has been dissolved.

term

The term “legislative emergency” first appeared in 1948 in the discussions of the Parliamentary Council . It does not describe a state in which laws are passed alternatively. Instead, the state of emergency must be declared for individual bills.

Sometimes it is said in the literature that one should rather speak of a “government emergency”. Finally, Art. 81 provides a way out for a minority government. According to Klein, however, the term “legislative emergency” is appropriate because the Basic Law wanted to point out a weakness in parliament.

The question is also asked who will become the “substitute legislator” instead of the Bundestag. Bryde is thinking of the federal government. The procedure according to Art. 81 is an “executive emergency ordinance right ” of the federal government. The Parliamentary Council only shunned the expression, for historical reasons.

background

State of emergency in the Weimar Republic, 1919–1933

Paul von Hindenburg was the German Reich President from 1925 to 1934. From 1930 onwards he helped various governments with emergency decrees , which more and more took the place of the actual legislation. In January 1933 he appointed Adolf Hitler as Reich Chancellor. With the " Reichstag Fire Ordinance" and other ordinances, Hindenburg supported the establishment of the Nazi dictatorship .

There was Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution , which gave the Reich President powers for emergencies. If public safety was in danger, the Reich President was allowed to take the appropriate measures. In retrospect, this article was given considerable complicity in the failure of the republic.

From 1930 onwards, the Reich President took more and more of the actual legislation from the Reichstag with his measures . For many parliamentary groups in the Reichstag, this was easier than having to make difficult and unpopular decisions themselves. From 1932 the National Socialists and Communists together had more than half of the votes in the Reichstag. They could not form a government, but they could make the work of any government impossible (and on top of that overthrow the government set up by the Reich President).

Article 48 thus indirectly made it possible for the parliamentary groups in the Reichstag to discharge themselves of their responsibility. It is true that the power of the Reich President initially secured the republic. From 1933, however, the Reich President used his power to make the National Socialist dictatorship possible.

In the Parliamentary Council in 1948, the member of parliament Walter Menzel (SPD) distinguished two different types of emergency, the "real" from the "fake". A real emergency existed when internal or external security was jeopardized, for example in the event of war or civil unrest. Parliament could not then meet without endangering the life and limb of the MPs. The Weimar constitutionalists had thought of such an emergency in Article 48.

A fake or political emergency, on the other hand, is more likely to be described as a “constitutional disorder”. In the event of such a "malfunction" of the political system, the government and parliament cannot work together constructively, or an organ refuses to play its role. Weimar Art. 48 was misused to deal with such constitutional disturbances. Another remedy from the Weimar period was the enabling laws . The Reichstag determined by a majority that statutory ordinances could also be passed by the government.

Discussion in the Parliamentary Council

The members of the Parliamentary Council met in the Pedagogical Academy in Bonn , which later became the Federal Palace . Despite the name, the council was a constituent assembly , not an actual parliament, which passed laws and controlled a government.

The fathers and mothers of the Basic Law, the new German constitution, therefore faced a difficult task. On the one hand, provision should be made in the event that Parliament cannot pass laws. The state should remain governable. On the other hand, no organ should become so powerful that the path to a dictatorship is made possible. The discussions in the Parliamentary Council, which drafted the Basic Law, were correspondingly confusing.

The Herrenchiemsee draft was an important basis for the discussion . This draft constitution provided for Article 111, which followed the Weimar model. In the event of a real emergency, a threat to public safety and order, the federal government should be able to issue emergency ordinances with the force of law. The approval of the Federal Council was necessary for this. The main difference to the Weimar Constitution was that it was no longer the head of state that issued the emergency ordinances, but the government.

On October 15, 1948, a subcommittee of the Parliamentary Council made the following proposal: It provided for the case that force majeure would render parliament inoperable, that the existence of the Federation and the Constitution would be jeopardized. The federal government should then be able to issue emergency ordinances with the force of law. The approval of the Bundesrat would be necessary, but also that of the President of the Bundestag. After four weeks, the emergency ordinances lose their validity unless the Bundestag and Bundesrat confirm them. If the Bundestag and Bundesrat cannot meet due to force majeure, it should be possible to extend the emergency ordinances by a further four weeks. The Federal Council and the President of the Bundestag would have to agree to this once again. The emergency ordinances were not allowed to change the constitution, but restrict certain rights such as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly .

The General Editorial Committee expanded the draft: Art. 111a described the possibility of the Bundestag being dissolved without a legislative emergency having been declared. Then the federal government could have proposed laws that the Federal Council would have passed. The term “legislative emergency” appears here for the first time, but for a “real” emergency. The Organizing Committee, in December 1948, then linked the legislative emergency to individual bills.

The later Art. 81 GG arose from Art. 111a of the amended Herrenchiemsee Draft. The original Art. 111, however, has been dropped. The General Editorial Committee proposed this on May 2, 1949, without justification. The Main Committee joined him on May 5, 1949 and amended Art. 111a, which eventually became today's Art. 81.

One possible reason for the cancellation of the "real" emergency was a warning from the occupying powers . In any case, it was easy for the Parliamentary Council to delete it. At that time, the occupying powers still had exceptional powers in the event of a crisis. A regulation of the “real” emergency only came about with the “ emergency legislation ” in the 1960s.

In the constitutions of many other countries, there are no corresponding provisions on disruption of the constitution. At most it is dealt with in the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic . Normally, in such cases, it is assumed that Parliament will be dissolved. There are also no corresponding regulations in the constitutions of the German federal states . Abroad and in the federal states there are regulations for the external emergency, which is not identical with the legislative emergency of Art. 81 GG.

text

Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution stated:

(1) If a country does not fulfill the obligations incumbent on it according to the Reich constitution or the Reich laws, the Reich President can urge it to do so with the help of armed forces.
(2) If public security and order are significantly disrupted or endangered in the German Reich, the Reich President can take the measures necessary to restore public security and order, and if necessary intervene with the help of the armed force. To this end, he may temporarily suspend all or part of the fundamental rights set out in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153.
(3) The Reich President shall immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures taken in accordance with Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of this Article. The measures are to be suspended at the request of the Reichstag.

Art. 81 GG has remained unchanged since 1949:

(1) If, in the case of Article 68, the Bundestag is not dissolved, the Federal President may, at the request of the Federal Government and with the consent of the Bundesrat, declare a legislative emergency for a bill if the Bundestag rejects it even though the Federal Government has designated it as urgent. The same applies if a bill has been rejected even though the Federal Chancellor had linked it to the motion of Article 68.
(2) If the Bundestag rejects the draft bill again after declaring the legislative emergency or if it accepts it in a version that the Federal Government has designated as unacceptable, the law shall be deemed to have been passed, provided that the Bundesrat consents to it. The same applies if the submission is not approved by the Bundestag within four weeks of being re-introduced.
(3) During the term of office of a Federal Chancellor, any other legislative proposal rejected by the Bundestag can be passed within a period of six months after the first declaration of the legislative emergency in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2. After the deadline, a further declaration of the legislative emergency is not permitted during the term of office of the same Federal Chancellor.
(4) The Basic Law may not be amended by a law that comes into force in accordance with Paragraph 2, nor may it be wholly or partially invalid or suspended.

Description of the procedure

The substitute procedure for legislation is not in the Basic Law in the section on the federal government, but rather in the section on legislation. If it were in the section on the federal government, one would feel reminded of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. The Parliamentary Council wanted to avoid that.

Article 81 is not intended for all constitutional disturbances, but for a “specific constellation of a constitutional disturbance”, says Klein. In the Bundestag there is no majority for the government's bills, but neither is there a majority to form a new government. Art. 81 does not deal with the functional disorders of other organs such as the Federal President and cannot eliminate a crisis or its causes at all. Rather, the special legislative procedure enables a “pause for reflection” in the conflict between parliament and government. During this time, however, the government should be able to continue operating, which needs laws for its work.

Klein divides the procedure into five sections:

  • A vote of confidence by the Federal Chancellor under Article 68 fails in the Bundestag.
  • An "urgent" bill fails.
  • The legislative emergency for this bill is proposed and declared.
  • The bill is submitted to the Bundestag again and fails.
  • The law comes about anyway.

Vote of confidence

A federal government can only take the path of legislative emergency if a vote of confidence has been rejected, but the Bundestag has not been dissolved. This is clearly stated in Art. 81, Paragraph 1. The vote of confidence is described in Art. Accordingly, the Federal Chancellor can request the Bundestag to express its confidence in him. If the Bundestag does not express its trust with an absolute majority, the Chancellor can ask the Federal President to dissolve the Bundestag.

So a situation can arise in which the Federal Chancellor no longer has a majority, but the Bundestag is not dissolved. This may be because the Federal Chancellor did not apply for dissolution or the Federal President did not agree to the application. If he wants to initiate the procedure under Art. 81, the Federal Chancellor must continue to hold office - he may not only be in office in an executive position, for example after resigning. Otherwise the Bundestag could elect a new Chancellor according to Article 63, even with a relative majority. That is not in the article, but it is assumed in the sense of the word.

The Federal Chancellor can combine the question of trust with a question of fact. He may have the Bundestag vote on the vote of confidence and a bill at the same time. He may do this so that the MPs support an unpopular bill because otherwise they have to fear new elections.

For the procedure according to Art. 81 it is important that an "urgent" bill has been rejected. Either there was another vote after the failed vote of confidence, in which the bill also failed. Or the bill was introduced together with the vote of confidence and failed together. Then the further steps of the procedure follow. The second variant would be a kind of abbreviation of the procedure.

However, the following complicated situation can arise: The yes votes only correspond to a relative majority. Then the vote of confidence would be rejected, but the bill would be accepted. In any case, the federal government may not then immediately apply for a legislative emergency. It would be contrary to the meaning of Article 81 if a legislative proposal that has already been adopted should be adopted again on the legislative emergency.

Incidentally, the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court says : The vote of confidence must not be linked to any bill. The content of the bill must actually be "explosive" and controversial between the Federal Government and the Bundestag. Otherwise, the vote of confidence would become a mere instrument to dissolve the Bundestag. Later, however, when it comes to the declaration of the legislative emergency, the bill does not have to be "contentious". It could be that the Bundestag rejects proposals out of pure refusal.

Failure of an "urgent" submission

German Bundestag in Berlin

The subject of the procedure is a bill. The federal government, the Bundestag or the Bundesrat may generally introduce bills. The government may have members of the Bundestag introduce the bill for reasons of time.

The Federal Government (not only the Federal Chancellor) describes the proposal as "urgent". It is up to the government to decide what is "urgent" to it. You can also designate only parts of the template as "urgent", or several templates together. Strictly speaking, the “bill” of Article 81 does not have to be a single bill in the technical sense, apart from the fact that the government can “formally combine different legal matters in one bill” anyway.

The submission can be marked as "urgent" even before the question of trust is asked. The last point in time is shortly before the final vote on the proposal in the Bundestag. It is not enough if the submission was named "urgent" afterwards. A certain form is not prescribed - a member of the federal government could state the urgency orally in a Bundestag session.

From the perspective of the Federal Government, there is a risk that the Bundestag will postpone deliberations on the proposal. Even in normal cases, it often takes months or years before a law is passed. Or the Bundestag accepts the bill in a modified form. For both, only Art. 81 (2) provides a solution, which only describes the later repeated failure. If the template fails for the first time, one could fall back on these solutions. According to this, the Bundestag has a deadline of four weeks and the Federal Government can decide whether it finds the amended form of the bill "acceptable". For example, the deadline could start with a statement of urgency.

Application for legislative emergency and declaration

Bellevue Palace , the official seat of the German Federal President

After the bill has been rejected, the federal government can endeavor to have the legislative emergency established. She applies for this to the Federal President. To do this, it needs the approval of the Federal Council. The Federal Government should obtain this approval before submitting the application to the Federal President. The decision should be made by the Federal President at his own discretion without the Federal Council having the last word. The application relates to a specific, failed, urgent bill, which is why the declaration of legal emergency is limited to it.

As in a few other cases, the Federal President has the opportunity here to shape things politically. However, a Federal President should normally give in to the request of the Federal Government, especially if he had previously refused to dissolve the Bundestag. Stettner and Brenner then see the Federal President as “forced to act”. It could be, however, that the Federal President finds the specific bill bad. Because of its great importance, the declaration should be published in the Federal Law Gazette.

There are no deadlines for the application, the approval of the Federal Council or the decision of the Federal President. If the Federal President hesitates for a long time with an answer, this can be interpreted as a rejection of the application. If the Federal President decides to declare the legislative emergency, it must be countersigned by the Federal Chancellor . This also ensures that the Federal Chancellor welcomes the declaration (and not just a majority of the Federal Government).

Another failure of the template

The federal government can now bring the bill back. However, it must not have been changed. The Bundestag now has four weeks to deal with the bill again. The period could begin when the President of the Bundestag receives the draft or when he forwards it to the members of the Bundestag. If the Bundestag does not accept it, it is considered rejected after the four weeks have elapsed. This prevents the Bundestag from deliberately delaying the decision.

The Bundestag may accept the proposal in a modified version. The federal government can now decide whether it regards them as acceptable. This is to prevent the Bundestag from undermining the meaning of the procedure. It is up to the federal government to decide what is unacceptable to it. A change to the template does not automatically have to be interpreted as a rejection. This leaves room for negotiations between the Federal Government and the Bundestag in order to reach an agreement.

Conclusion of the law

Plenary Chamber of the Federal Council

If the Bundestag rejects the bill again, or if it accepts it in an impregnable version, the bill can still become law. The joint rules of procedure of the federal ministries explain how the approval of the Federal Council can be obtained. The Federal Chancellor would send the President of the Bundesrat a request for approval. The Federal Council then decides in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Basic Law (Art. 52).

Contrary to the misleading wording in Art. 81, Paragraph 2 (“to the extent”), the Federal Council cannot amend the law or only partially approve it. However, he could negotiate changes with the federal government. There may be some kind of mediation process. According to Art. 81, this is not provided for, but also not prohibited. Bryde thinks the question is impractical. In any case, it cannot be a real mediation procedure according to Art. 77 (between the Bundestag and Bundesrat), since the Bundestag has not passed a law.

In the event of a change, however, the Bundestag would have to be consulted again. Possibly the declaration of the legislative emergency would no longer apply to the amended bill (the Federal President must also be involved in the declaration). According to Klein, however, it would be absurd to repeat the entire procedure (including the vote of confidence). It should start at the point of resubmission (Art. 81, Para. 2).

After all, the law is made out and promulgated, just like other laws. The special procedure should be mentioned in the preaching formula. One problem remains that the Bundestag continues to be the legislator. In theory, it could pass laws that repeal the laws of the federal government and the Federal Council. But that would contradict the meaning of Art. 81, so that Klein considers such laws to be unconstitutional. In any case, they must not conflict with the will of the federal government during the “legislative emergency”. Brenner speaks of a "blocking effect" on the Bundestag.

However, the government itself could endeavor to repeal or change the law. If the government and the Bundestag have found cooperation again, they should be allowed to repeal or amend the law. The approval of the Bundesrat is not required, unless it is a real consent law , which the Bundesrat must approve because the rights of the states are affected.

Limits

Six month period

After the first declaration of a legislative emergency, the federal government still has six months to apply for a legislative emergency for a bill more times. The six months from the first declaration by the Federal President are counted. The entire procedure does not have to be repeated. A new vote of confidence is not necessary. However, the declaration by the Federal President is needed for every further bill. A bill must be passed before the deadline if it is to become law. The Federal Council must have already given its approval.

The period of six months is very short. According to the assessment of the Constitutional Reform Commission from the 1970s, it would take about eleven to twelve weeks for the legislative emergency to be declared for the first draft. It would take around 18 weeks to pass an Art. 81 law. After that, there were only about eight to eleven weeks left for another law.

Term of office of the Federal Chancellor

The Federal Chancellor must still be in office for a renewed declaration of the legislative emergency. The Chancellor could have resigned within the six months, a new Bundestag could have met. Perhaps the Chancellor is only in office in an executive position. This means that an important prerequisite for the procedure according to Art. 81 is no longer applicable. Incidentally, an executive Chancellor cannot ask a (renewed) question of confidence.

The Bundestag cannot suddenly express its confidence in the Chancellor with an absolute majority so that the government is deprived of the instrument of legislative emergency. However, the Chancellor could ask the vote of confidence again. If he is then trusted, the preconditions for a legislative emergency are no longer met. Before asking the vote of confidence, the Chancellor must assess the risk that the Bundestag will later terminate the cooperation.

During the remaining term of office of the Federal Chancellor, the legislative emergency can no longer be declared. However, it is possible that the Chancellor loses his office, someone else is Chancellor in the meantime, and he becomes Chancellor again. Then the way to a legislative emergency is clear again. All of this can happen within the same legislative period of the Bundestag.

It is more complicated when the Chancellor loses his office and is immediately re-elected as Chancellor himself. This would undoubtedly begin a new term of office. In this particular case, however, it is assumed that the Chancellor must have been elected by an absolute majority. Only then does a new term of office begin, also within the meaning of Art. 81. It would not be accepted that a Chancellor can be re-elected with a relative majority and apply for a legislative emergency again. Otherwise, with the support of the Federal President and the largest parliamentary group, the Chancellor could be re-elected more often and thus avoid the six-month deadline.

Content boundaries

Laws that come about through Art. 81 may not change or conflict with the Basic Law. This is a clarification compared to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. In Weimar times it was not clear how far the measures of the Reich President could go.

Otherwise there are no content-related limits that distinguish the laws of legislative emergency from others. Contract laws and budget laws can also be passed in this way. One could infer from the purpose of Art. 81 that they should not interfere deeply with the order of the Federal Republic. Accordingly, they are only there for a transitional period of the minority government. However, such limits can hardly be defined legally. In addition, the normal legislature can later change the laws again.

application

In 1972, Willy Brandt was the first Federal Chancellor to ask the vote of confidence under Article 68. The result was new elections.

So far, the Chancellor has repeatedly asked the Bundestag the vote of confidence. In some cases, the Chancellor was not given confidence. But then the Bundestag was always dissolved, as was the intent of the Chancellor (1972, 1982, 2005). A bill has never been designated as urgent within the meaning of Article 81, and a legislative emergency has never been declared.

Nevertheless, Art. 81 does not have to be meaningless. A "preliminary effect" is possible, according to Klein: When asked for a vote of confidence, the MPs know that the Federal Government could take the route of Art. 81 if necessary. However, the path of the legislative emergency has not been the subject of much discussion either. Even an introduction like “The Political System of the Federal Republic of Germany” by Klaus von Beyme does not mention him.

If a government loses its majority in the Bundestag, it can be replaced by a newly formed coalition. Otherwise a dissolution of the Bundestag is the feasible way so that ultimately the voters decide. A government that wants to have the legislative emergency declared may not have a majority in the Bundesrat, or the Federal President could refuse to make the declaration.

If you look at the historical example of 1932, you would have to think of the following situation: A purely opposition party suddenly received a large number of votes in parliamentary elections, and one has to fear that it would still win in new elections. The Federal President and the state governments, which have a majority in the Bundesrat, took office before that.

After all, the declaration of the legislative emergency would have repercussions outside the state organs. It may undesirably reinforce the feeling that the state is in crisis. In addition, a bill that is controversial in parliament is likely to have many opponents among the people. The declaration of the legislative emergency would give them arguments. The opponents could present the chosen procedure as legal, but inadmissible, because it ignores the elected parliament.

meaning

Art. 81 closes a gap. Art. 67 provides with the constructive vote of no confidence that the Bundestag elects a new Federal Chancellor, albeit with an absolute majority. Article 68, however, describes the dissolution of the Bundestag after a failed vote of confidence. In between there is the possibility of a minority government remaining in office. Without Article 81 it would not be viable from the outset. Klein: "In this respect, Art. 81 in conjunction with Art. 68 forms a supplement to Art. 67, albeit not a logical, that is to say compelling, yet consistent in itself."

Bryde refers to recent German history, in which a democratic opposition stood ready to take over the government. One can hardly imagine a justification for governing against a parliamentary majority. Even without a coalition, there must be enough consensus for legislative majorities. A government just has to make concessions to the opposition. Overall, he judges the process to be cumbersome and time-consuming. But it shouldn't be made any easier. Rather, it is good to force the parties to work together or to initiate new elections. The Parliamentary Council could not have foreseen the "unproblematic democratic development" and thus the redundancy of Article 81.

Stettner considers it doubtful whether Art. 81 corresponds to the system of the Basic Law. A government against the Bundestag is hardly conceivable. When a chancellor loses confidence, the normal route is to re-elect, not to legislate. Before the Bundestag is ruled by “groups not capable of forming a coalition”, anti-constitutional parties can be banned in advance . The short period of six months also makes the process of little use.

Brenner, on the other hand, emphasizes the potential of Article 81 of the Basic Law in the event of a malfunction. He also refers to the preliminary effect when the question of confidence is asked. At least in theory, he considers the solution to be useful and convincing. It may help to bridge a situation in which new elections could "fuel destructive forces". "It is neither suitable nor intended to govern in the long term."

See also

literature

  • Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte : State emergency and legislative emergency . In: Adolf Süsterhenn , Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, Willi Geiger (ed.): Constitution and administration in theory and reality. Festschrift for Wilhelm Laforet on the occasion of his 75th birthday (= publications by the Institute for State Theory and Politics . Vol. 3). Isar-Verlag, Munich 1952, pp. 59–81.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 6th
  2. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 8th.
  3. ^ Bryde, in: von Münch / Kunig, GGK III, 5th ed. 2003, Rn. 7 to Art. 81.
  4. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 1.
  5. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81. / November 1986. History, p. 4.
  6. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, second processing Art 81. / November 1986. History, p. 3.
  7. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, second processing Art 81. / November 1986. History, p. 5.
  8. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, second processing Art 81. / November 1986. History, p. 5/6.
  9. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, second processing Art 81. / November 1986. History, p. 6.
  10. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 2.
  11. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, second processing Art 81. / November 1986. History, p. 9.
  12. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 3.
  13. ^ Friedrich Karl Fromme: From the Weimar Constitution to the Bonn Basic Law. The Constitutional Consequences of the Parliamentary Council from the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist dictatorship. JCB Moohr: Tübingen 1960, p. 126.
  14. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 4/5.
  15. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 10/11.
  16. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 9.
  17. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 21st
  18. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 5-7.
  19. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 18th
  20. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 20/21.
  21. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 50.
  22. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 12.
  23. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 14th
  24. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 22nd
  25. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 23-25.
  26. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 26th
  27. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 27, 28.
  28. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 30th
  29. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 35, 39.
  30. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 7th
  31. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 38.
  32. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 39.
  33. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 44.
  34. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 54.
  35. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 58.
  36. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 59
  37. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 9.
  38. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 62.
  39. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 64.
  40. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 16.
  41. ^ Bryde, in: von Münch / Kunig, GGK III, 5th ed. 2003, Rn. 6 to Art. 81.
  42. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 65.
  43. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 69
  44. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 66.
  45. ↑ Lücke, in: Sachs, Basic Law, 2nd ed. 2002, Art 81, marginal no. 9.
  46. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 15th
  47. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 17th
  48. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 46.
  49. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 82, 86, 88.
  50. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 89.
  51. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 85.
  52. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 86.
  53. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 92.
  54. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 92.
  55. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 73.
  56. ^ Bryde, in: von Münch / Kunig, GGK III, 5th ed. 2003, Rn. 10 re Art. 81.
  57. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 73, 76.
  58. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 2/3.
  59. ↑ Klaus von Beyme: The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany . 9th edition, Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen 1999.
  60. ^ Bryde, in: von Münch / Kunig, GGK III, 5th ed. 2003, Rn. 1 to Art. 81.
  61. ↑ Klein, in: Wolfgang Kahl, Christian Waldhoff, Christian Walter (Eds.): Bonner Commentary on the Basic Law , loose-leaf collection since 1950, CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, ISBN 978-3-8114-1053-4 . 52. Delivery, secondary processing Art 81 / November 1986. No. 11.
  62. ^ Bryde, in: von Münch / Kunig, GGK III, 5th ed. 2003, Rn. 1 to Art. 81.
  63. ^ Bryde, in: von Münch / Kunig, GGK III, 5th ed. 2003, Rn. 11 re Art. 81.
  64. ↑ R. Stettner, in: H. Dreier (Ed.), Basic Law Commentary, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. 2006, Art. 81 Rn. 6th
  65. ^ Brenner, in: v. Mangoldt / Klein / Starck, GG II, Art. 81 No. 8/9.