Credibility (game theory)

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In game theory, credibility is an expression for the trust that the opponent has in the announcements made by the player, and thus a possible measure of the reputation and consistency of the player as a person. With this game theory approach, fundamental statements about credibility as a social factor can be obtained.

definition

In the context of game theory , the uncertainty about motives and options for action among the players plays a major role. In the game theory sense, credibility means the opponent's belief that the announced intentions will actually materialize. This means that unconditional moves are carried out, promises kept and threats carried out. A player is classified as implausible if their actual action does not coincide with the previously announced intention. Thus, credibility is a central element of all strategic moves and always relates to actions in the past.

The goal of strategic moves is to change the expectations of the opponents. For example, by making a threat, you try to influence the behavior of another player to your own advantage. The player consciously announces a consequence to an undesirable behavior of the opponent, which he would never show without this threat. However, the threatened player will only take this threat into account if he assumes that the threatening person will actually carry out the announced consequence.

“It is easy to announce actions; it is something completely different to do it. "

As a result, the threat can only be successful if the strategic move in the form of the threat is credibly communicated. Simply saying the consequence is not enough.

Every player is or should be aware that the opponent may not be telling the truth . The outcome of the game inevitably depends on the expectations and trustworthiness of each player. An instrument with which the expectations of the opponent can be positively influenced and one's own trustworthiness can be strengthened is credibility.

Application problems

The question of a credible move becomes problematic when verbal threats or promises indicate that action should be taken against one's own interests, because there are now incentives not to carry out the threatened or promised consequences . The threatening person would consequently harm himself if he carried out the untied threat. As a result, this strategic move has no effect.

A strategically trained opponent will recognize the weak points and look for tactical bluffs , as he knows that the announced actions will not be followed by actions .

As a result, a believable move requires more than just verbal communication. The other players "must have clear clarity that the announcement made by the active party is actually credible." This means that actions are necessary to ensure that the strategic move is carried out. Only then can the opponent assume that the announced actions will actually be carried out. A self-binding obligation serves as a supporting means , with which the withdrawal of the announced action becomes too expensive or even impossible. This also has to be communicated. The eightfold path of credibility shows which measures can be used to achieve credible self-commitment. The effective use of these combinable options depends on the general conditions of the specific situation. They are essentially based on three principles.

" Self-commitment can be tested, credibility must be earned."

Principles of credibility

1. Principle

By using reputation or written contracts , disregarding self-commitment becomes more costly than adhering to it. This means that, for example, a contractual penalty is agreed in a contract, which is applied if the announced action deviates. This penalty must be chosen in such a way that the advantages of compliance outweigh those of breach of contract, so that it is in the player's own interest to carry out the announced action. The use of reputation is particularly useful if joint activities are also planned in the future.

In any case, a threat must always be converted into a warning and a promise into an affirmation .

2nd principle

In addition, the game could be modified in such a way that getting out of self-commitment is limited or impossible. The easiest way to do this is to set yourself apart from others by cutting opportunities for communication and destroying routes to retreat. The drawing up of a will is an example of cutting off communication . In the event of death, renegotiation would be practically impossible. The strategy of destroying retreat routes is of military origin. In the case of armies that were clearly outnumbered, the task was to “break all bridges behind them” so that they had no choice but to fight and win. In the event of the conquest of Mexico by Cortéz, this ultimately led to the enemy withdrawing. Furthermore, the player can simply withdraw from the decision-making position so that he leaves the result to chance .

Furthermore, a game can be changed by breaking down a self-binding into many small parts so that each individual (small) game can be solved for itself. This tactic is particularly useful for players who only trust each other to a limited extent, but who have a major problem to overcome. One example is the craftsman-homeowner problem. The homeowner does not want to make an upfront payment as they might end up finding that the work was not done completely or poorly. On the other hand, the craftsman fears that the homeowner will refuse to pay after the work is done. In order to avoid these conflicts , payment is often agreed immediately according to the progress of work, that is, several smaller payments are made.

3rd principle

Credibility can still be maintained through the use of other people in the form of teamwork or in terms of the appointment of a representative . For example, “a team can more easily achieve credibility than an individual […]”, and peer pressure and determination in social groups or institutions can strengthen one's own self-commitment, since a violation or non-compliance with group-specific regulations leads to a loss of pride, recognition and self-respect. Institutions that have successfully implemented peer pressure to strengthen credible self-commitment are, for example, Alcoholics Anonymous or diet groups.

Commissioning a third party to act in your own name is particularly useful in negotiation-oriented matters. The negotiating partner uses the authority that has been given to him “by virtue of his office” (for example a union official ). During negotiations, the latter will react less flexibly to changes by the counterparty than the person concerned himself, since he is often dependent on the counterparty. In addition, the appointee may not have the authority to compromise . He will therefore try as best as possible to assert the interests of the client in order not to lose his status . Vending machines are also seen as commissioned negotiators, for example, as they offer little scope for discussions or price negotiations.

"In practice, every specific situation may require more than one path."

literature

  • Avinash K. Dixit , Barry J. Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners - Strategic Know-How for Winners . Schäffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart 1997, ISBN 978-3-7910-1239-1 .
  • Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath: Games of Strategy . WW Norton & Company , New York 2004, ISBN 0-393-92499-8 .
  • Eberhard Ostermann: The concept of credibility from a rhetorical perspective . In: Patrick Rössler, Werner Wirt (ed.): Credibility in the Internet. Questions, models, empirical findings . Munich 1999, ISBN 978-3-88927-242-3 , pp. 33-46 .
  • Manfred J. Holler, Gerhard Illing: Introduction to game theory . Springer Verlag, Berlin 2006, ISBN 978-3-540-27880-1 .
  • Peter-J. Jost: Strategic conflict management in organizations . Gabler, Wiesbaden 1999, ISBN 3-409-22256-1 .
  • Martin KW Schweer, Barbara Thies: Trust through credibility - possibilities of (re-) gaining trust from a psychological perspective . In: Beatrice Dernbach and Michael Meyer (eds.): Trust and Credibility - Interdisciplinary Perspectives . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2005, ISBN 978-3-531-14116-9 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Lit. Dixit, Nalebuff: Game theory for beginners . 1997, p. 135 ff .
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g lit. Jost: Strategic conflict management . 1999, p. 237 .
  3. ↑ Lit. Holler, Illing: Introduction to game theory . 2006, p. 18 .
  4. ^ Lit. Dixit, Skeath: Games of Strategy . S. 265 .
  5. ^ Lit. Schweer, Thies: Trust and Credibility . 2005, p. 55 ff .
  6. ↑ Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 124 and 139 .
  7. ↑ a b Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 140 .
  8. ↑ Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 121 .
  9. ↑ a b c Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 141 .
  10. ^ Jost: Strategic Conflict Management . 1999, p. 237 f .
  11. ^ Jost: Strategic Conflict Management . 1999, p. 238 .
  12. ↑ Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 141 f .
  13. ↑ Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 148 .
  14. ↑ Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 150 .
  15. ↑ a b Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 142 .
  16. ↑ Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 154 f .
  17. ↑ Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 155 .
  18. ↑ a b Dixit, Nalebuff: Game Theory for Beginners . 1997, p. 157 .