Goldwater-Nichols Act

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The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) was a reform law that reorganized the military command and control structure of the US armed forces . It was the most radical reform in the Department of Defense since the National Security Act of 1947. It is named after Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona (Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)) and Congressman Bill Nichols of Alabama , who introduced the bill. The bill passed the House of Representatives (383-27) and the Senate (95-0) and was ratified by President Ronald Reagan on October 1, 1986 . In addition to many other changes, the chain of military command, in particular, has been streamlined, which since then has led from the President via the Secretary of Defense directly to the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands , thereby bypassing the chairman of the United Chiefs of Staff , who was given an exclusively advisory role, although he nominally continues to do so senior soldier in the US armed forces remained.

History and background

Already in the Second World War there were coordination problems due to parallel independent chains of command between the President, the individual ministries ( Department of War and Department of the Navy , both with cabinet rank) and the two (at that time only two) existing armed forces.

After the National Security Act of 1947, there were still parallel command structures. The chiefs of staff of the individual armed forces (also after the Goldwater-Nichols Act ) together formed the committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and elected the chairman of the JCS , who was responsible to the defense minister. Both were then jointly responsible to the president in his function as commander in chief of all US armed forces.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was an attempt to counteract the rivalry between the individual branches of the armed forces for influence and budget allocation and to reduce the resulting inability to conduct joint operations (the principle of jointness ). These difficulties were already apparent during the Vietnam War , but it was not until the hostage liberation in Tehran ( Operation Eagle Claw ), which failed in 1980, and the disaster during the occupation of Grenada ( Operation Urgent Fury ) in 1983, that an urgent need for action became apparent.

This counterproductive rivalry also manifested itself in peacetime in the struggle for the distribution of funds and the non-coordination of procurement projects (needs analysis and development of weapons systems and equipment). This caused expensive and unnecessary redundancies not only in procurement, but also in the organizational structures (military facilities and commandos), which further complicated the chain of command. Even the development of combat doctrines was sometimes carried out independently and even contradictingly.

The elaboration of the AirLand Battle doctrine in the late 1970s and early 1980s exposed the difficulties in coordinating the planned improvements within the individual armed forces. The aim of this new operational concept should be a standardization of the previously different measures. The aim was to ensure that land, air and naval forces, including the space-based weapon systems, operate in a coordinated manner, i.e. in a network. This urgently needed concept was thwarted by the structural problems described. None of the armed forces was ready to compromise.

These frictional losses, which have existed for over 40 years, culminated in the distribution struggles at the beginning of the 1980s, which were exacerbated by the massive increase in the defense budget of the Reagan administration and in which each branch of the armed forces tried its best to outdo the other in the budget allocation. This, together with the clearly apparent weaknesses in the combat management of combined operations, led Congress to appeal to the Ministry of Defense to correct these structural problems through a reorganization.

Failure to comply with this recommendation ultimately led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which now forced the Department of Defense to undertake the much-needed reform in 1986.

Results of the reform

economics

Since the military must be able to fulfill its mandate even with limited budgets, the cooperation in procurement avoids expensive and superfluous duplications, such as the virtually simultaneous purchase of the EF-111A Raven by the Air Force and the EA-6B Prowler by the Navy had been the case.

Efficiency

Efficiency results directly from the elimination of redundant associations and organizations. Separate developments of weapons, material and equipment side by side are excluded. The first success was the joint development of GPS- controlled drop missiles for air and naval forces ( precision-guided ammunition ) and stealth technology .

effectiveness

Effectiveness arises from the benefit that arises from the pressure for cross-military cooperation. The typical caste thinking within the individual branches of the armed forces is overcome and mutual understanding of the peculiarities and operational requirements of the other is promoted.

The reform led to a restructuring of the command areas and their relationship to one another. The Goldwater-Nichols Act bundled military advice to the President in the role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thereby eliminating diverging and possibly conflicting opinions that might previously have come from the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces. At the same time, eight supreme command authorities were created, the Unified Combatant Commands , whose chiefs led to their military rank also the title of Commander in Chief . These command facilities are divided into regional and functional. The functional train the emergency services, make them available and equip them, while the regional commandos request and deploy them. Those who “belong” to the emergency services (functional commands) have no operational control over them, and they do not belong to those who deploy them (regional commandos). If the forces are then subordinate to a regional command (depending on requirements, also temporarily), the functional commands are nevertheless expected to guarantee replenishment, replacement and maintenance of personnel and material.

The Panama campaign ( Operation Just Cause ), in which General Maxwell R. Thurman, as commander of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), commanded all US armed forces without having to negotiate compromises with a chief of staff of the armed forces, was the reform's first visible operational success .

Changes

After the Nunn-Cohen Amendment , the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was set up in 1987, which commanded all special operations forces in the armed forces (initially with the exception of the Marine Corps ). From June 20, 2003, parts of the Marines were also subordinated to SOCOM under the command of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command .

On October 29, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld caused the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands to drop the title of Commander in Chief , as only the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces should use this designation to clarify the chain of command.

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