Inaja Fire 1956

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Cleveland National Forest

The Inaja Fire was an arson - triggered forest or bush fire in the Cleveland National Forest of California , USA , which burned from November 24th to November 28th 1956 and reached an area of ​​174 km². While fighting the fire, eleven firefighters died in the flames, making the event one of the most casualties in the US fire department.

The Inaja Fire triggered an investigation into deadly forest and bush fires in the past and led to the development of the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders .

Origin and course of the fire

The fire was started on November 24, 1956 at around 9:10 a.m. by a youth on the Inaja Indian reservation in the Cleveland National Forest . By 5 p.m. the fire had jumped the San Diego River in the west, burned over Mount Gower and then over the west side of El Capitan Reservoir to El Cajon Mountain , east of San Diego and reached an area of ​​more than 100 km². The flanks of the fire were concentrated south from Eagle Peak down to the San Diego River, north along San Diego Canyon, and east at Cedar Creek.

Conditions on site

The southern California area suffered an unprecedented drought with a prolonged period of dry Santa Ana winds . The precipitation was for four years, well below the normal value. During the afternoon and evening of November 25th, the temperature was approximately 20 ° C and the relative humidity was approximately 18 percent. Gusty east and northeast winds averaged 15 to 20 mph (24-32 km / h), with top speeds of 40 mph (64 km / h) observed in some locations .

The vegetation was approximately 90% of angiosperms the genus Chamise and about 10% from shrubs of the species Sagebrush , the highest ever measured dryness was observed for these plants. The San Diego River bed was dry. The canyon walls are steep and rugged, with gradients of up to 70%. The last fire in this area was 28 years ago.

Fire fighting tragedy

The fire was discovered around five minutes after it broke out, and the first forces arrived at 9:25 a.m. However, since the fire burned heavily and could not be brought under control immediately, additional forces had to be called in. The next day, the Forest Service had already established four fire fighting departments, led by experienced and qualified personnel from all over the California region. Headquarters was established in the Forest Service Guard Station in Pine Hills.

The task on the east side of the San Diego River Canyon was to use the tractor to clear a firebreak through the bush along the canyon rim and to create a similar trail by hand from the canyon rim down to the dry river bed. The tractor aisle was completed around 11 a.m. and was expanded by burning out vegetation, while the creation of the canyon aisle proved difficult. Two attempts were made to start the trail from the top of the rim to the bottom of the canyon. In both cases, the men were called back when it was found the aisle could not be completed before it was flanked by the main fire.

A third swath was started later that day. By 2:00 p.m. it was approximately 600 feet (183 m) towards the river bed and it was estimated that it would take three more hours of work to reach the bottom. At around 3:00 p.m., the men were ordered back because the fire conditions seemed to make work there unsafe. By then, the crew had completed almost 1,100 feet (335 m) of the aisle.

Between 4:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. the fire calmed down and the commander of the night shift was instructed to complete the aisle and burn it out. Since no useful information was available from the aerial reconnaissance, he could only get an idea of ​​the situation through the verbal statements of the commander of the day shift. A divided sector chief was supposed to burn out the tractor aisle at the canyon rim and the aisle to the river bed with 21 men, while the second sector chief was to close the aisle to the river bed with 17 men.

At around 7:45 p.m., one of the men stepped onto a ledge near the tractor line and from there discovered a strong fire development on a side ridge about 1,000 feet (305 m) below the workers on the river bed aisle. After he had warned the men, they withdrew slowly, in an orderly manner, and some of their equipment, towards the edge of the canyon. In just two minutes, the fire had accelerated rapidly, overtaking some of the men on the right and jumping over the firebreak above them, which was used as an escape route. Two men in the upper area had been able to get to safety, five others dodged to the left and climbed a ledge to the tractor line. Firefighters Albert Anderson, Carlton Lingo and Forrest Maxwell, the seven fire-fighting inmates Miles Daniels, William Fallin, George Garcia, Virgil Hamilton, Joseph O'Hara, Lonnie Shepherd and Joe Tibbitts from Viejas Honor Camp and the overseer LeRoy Defense died below this ledge by a sudden flashover caused by the ignition of gases that were driven into the canyon by the extremely fast course of the fire. All victims were found in an area within a 45 foot (14 m) radius.

The flames only crossed the tractor line in a few places and could be extinguished quickly. On November 28, around 6 p.m., the fire was under control and had only destroyed five houses by then. The largest firefighting operation in the history of San Diego County involved more than 2,000 men, supported by 9 aircraft, 27 bulldozers and 90 other vehicles. 200 of the firefighters were convicts from San Diego County and State Honor Camps. It was also one of the first fires in which fire-fighting planes were used.

Effects

The fire only destroyed five houses, but killed eleven firefighters, making it one of the wildfires with the highest casualties in the history of the US fire department. As early as 1943, 11 firefighters had died in the Hauser Creek Fire east of San Diego, followed by 13 firefighters killed in the Mann Gulch Fire in 1949 in Montana . In addition, 15 other firefighters died in the Rattlesnake Fire in 1953 in the Mendocino National Forest of California.

In 1957, the chief of forest management, Richard McArdle, assigned a task force to investigate the tragedy. The group issued a 30-page report that highlighted the need for better training, particularly in fire behavior. The disastrous flare of the Inaja Fire was caused by a critical combination of highly flammable vegetation, steep topography, and adverse weather. The low intensity of the fire before and at the time of the arrival of the night changeover had created a false sense of security. In addition, there was the lack of clarification and information transfer as well as the position in question above and next to a sloping fireplace. The weather report had also announced extreme wind turbulence on the leeward sides of ridges for the night of November 25.

The task force borrowed an idea from the military, where general orders directed soldiers, and recommended the implementation of the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders . After McArdle approved it, its use became widespread and the standard work for basic fire service training. Shortly after their introduction, the 10 rules were supplemented by 18 situations in which increased caution is required. They were last revised and adapted in 2002. Thanks to better training and modern equipment, the number of firefighters killed in forest and bush fires could be reduced by two thirds by 2013.

A memorial in the Inaja Memorial Park commemorates the victims of the tragedy.

Web links