Jeune École

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As Jeune École ( boys' school ), a fraction mainly junior officers within the French Navy in the late 19th century called who opposed traditional notions of naval armaments.

Naval armament in the second half of the 19th century

Skirmish off Hampton Roads between Monitor and Virginia on March 9, 1862

With the development of new propulsion and weapon systems - such as steam engines , armor and torpedoes - there was general uncertainty within the larger war fleets about the development of new types of ships. On the one hand, ships that had been designed according to the latest state of the art were often out of date by the time they were launched . On the other hand, there seemed to be a kind of technical stalemate at times - so the first battle between two armored ships ended in a draw, as neither ship was able to sink the other ( Battle of Hampton Roads ).

The aimlessness in the development of warships can be seen in the example of the " Aries ": In the naval battle of Lissa in 1866 between Austrian and Italian naval forces, the Austrians tried to ram the Italian ships and were able to sink an armored frigate. This event led to a "renaissance" of ancient pile driving tactics. Almost all newly built ships received ram rams and even special "ramming ships", the so-called "ram ships", were designed. However, the concept was soon abandoned and the ramming tactic remained an episode, although ram spurs continued to be installed until the First World War . Instead, a general race began between heavier and heavier guns and thicker armor, which made the newly built ships of the line bigger and more expensive.

The situation in France

But Lissa had made one thing clear: even the strongest armor is of little use if the hull is hit below the waterline . With the torpedo, a suitable weapon had been available since the 1860s, which was also continuously improved. France, which had been engaged in a costly maritime arms race with Great Britain , the greatest naval power, since about the middle of the century (without ever being able to match its strength), had to find out in the war against Prussia-Germany of 1870/71 that its naval power (that of the German was far superior) could not save it from the devastating defeat on land ( Battle of Sedan ). On the contrary, the use of a pointed privateer used Corvette Augusta on the German side, as with relatively few resources, the ocean sea lanes could be threatened despite a superior enemy fleet. After the defeat of 1871, therefore, no further expansion of the fleet was made in favor of an army reinforcement.

The strategic concept of the "young school"

Basic principles

The first armored ships of the line La Gloire from 1860 and Warrior from 1861

Younger officers of the French Navy took the opportunity to call for a radical departure from the strategic principle of heavily armored ships of the line. Vice-Admiral Philippe-Victor Touchard demanded a significant reduction in armor strength in 1873, since "... every torpedo can destroy them in one fell swoop" and compared the problem with the development from a medieval knight to a modern cuirassier who also only had a light breastplate for protection who wore vital "parts". Such lighter armored ships would be smaller and therefore also cheaper - a loss would then no longer be so difficult.

In strategic terms, the Jeune École drew the conclusion from the development of the steam engine that neither the blockade of enemy ports and coasts nor the principle of decisive battles would retain their justification:

  • Fast steamers would always be able to break through a blockade and threaten the enemy sea connections in the open sea.
  • In any case, an inferior fleet would strive to avoid a decisive battle, since it would usually lose one. So you could just as well let the superior enemy fleet take control of the sea without a fight.
  • In the event that the enemy carries his operations into their own coastal waters, an effective coastal defense would be necessary - but one does not need heavy and expensive ironclad ships for this.
  • And even in the event of a crushing defeat in a decisive battle, the defeated side would still have the above-mentioned means of pirate warfare.

“Following the principle of the division of labor, the fleet that corresponded to this theory was composed of many small, fast special units, each with one of the offensive elements concentrated in the battleship, torpedo, spur, artillery, with the small size of their dimensions and connected to the speed. " (Volkmar Bueb)

The small units of the Navy should operate like a swarm of hornets in the armed conflict through a multitude of units ( "nombre" ), rapid emergence and disappearance ( "vitesse" ) and camouflage through their small size ( "faiblesse des dimensions" ) and so on defeat large, expensive battleships.

For these reasons, the armored ship of the line had served its purpose as the backbone of the fleet, according to the Jeune École. It was too complex and too expensive to build, too slow to be able to fight privateers and too easy to destroy with a handful of small torpedo boats - so armament efforts should be concentrated on these types. Proper maritime domination, as it was later formulated by Alfred Mahan , is no longer possible for the reasons mentioned.

Anti-British thrust

The aim of this concept was undoubtedly the strongest sea power in the world, namely the British. At that time, the island kingdom was still considered a potential opponent of war, also and above all because of colonial political conflicts, and the references to a “superior enemy fleet” or “enemy sea connections” meant none other than Great Britain. In addition to the financial aspects that accompanied the Jeune École's demand for smaller ships, it was also believed that the existence of such a pirate fleet could exert pressure on the archenemy and possibly make them shy away from war. The expected loss of merchant ships by French privateers could, according to the theory, explode freight costs and insurance premiums in Great Britain to such an extent that the entire economy would collapse and possibly even cause social unrest.

The Jeune École at the head of the Navy

Representatives of the Jeune École had three times the chance to become Minister of the Navy and thereby turn the theories into reality. But Admiral Hyacinthe Laurent Théophile Aube and his successors were not able to fully implement their ideas. Even if existing ship-of-the-line building programs have been overturned in favor of cruisers , the ships of the line have never been completely abandoned. The ministers were under great pressure to succeed, initiated extensive changes, but were only able to exercise their position for a short time and then left behind a jumble of half-started measures. Their approaches to change were largely overridden by the subsequent naval ministers and the "old school" style was resumed. The Ministry of the Navy was filled almost 40 times between 1870 and 1900 alone.

With Admiral Aube , from January 7, 1886 to May 1887, one of the leading, if not radical, heads of the Jeune École took over the French Navy Ministry for the first time. Aube saw the raison d'être of a small number of armored ships in their use against third-class fleets such as the German (off Tirpitz ) or Italian. In addition, the torpedo boats could not meet the expectations placed on them. They were not suitable for the high seas and the more suitable torpedo carrier, the submarine , was not yet fully developed towards the end of the 19th century.

Camille Pelletan, French Minister of the Navy

Edouard Lockroy was Minister of the Navy from November 1, 1895 to January 1896. He implemented an exchange of all directors and filled the positions with representatives of the ideas of the "young school". The fleet was reduced by inefficient units, the submarine construction activated, the construction system reorganized, the permeability of the careers tackled and a naval academy ("École supérieure de guerre flottante") introduced for a short time.

Camille Pelletan was Minister of the Navy from 1902 to 1905. His program included fast ships, flotillas, bases, coastal defense systems, development of submarines, reducing the number of crew members of a ship, weakening the position of naval officers. He left a marina in disintegration and a jumble of boat types.

The construction of ships of the line continued even after the turn of the century .

Appreciation of the Jeune École

Inconsistent development

The forerunner of the ideas was (according to Erik J. Dahl) Captain Baron Louis-Antoine-Richild Grivel in 1869, who advocated the combination of squadron combat and cruiser combat. Another pioneer of the way of thinking was (according to Francois-Emmanuel Brézet) the sub-engineer Paul Dislère in 1873, who put the main focus on the coastal and cruiser war.

Other forerunners were (according to Volkmar Bueb) Victor Touchard , who recommended the selective de-armoring of battleships in 1873. Jurien de la Gravière , who in 1878 considered relieving the battleships with small units. As a forerunner, competitor and co-founder of the “Junge Schule” is Auguste Gougeard , who in 1884 advocated a total reform of the administration and strategy.

Admiral Hyacinthe Aube saw himself as the founding father with his publications between 1873 and 1884 . Aube was also Minister of the Navy from January 7, 1886 to May 1887 and was able to test his theories in practice and change them accordingly.

“With the development of the torpedo boats into an operational weapon, Aube founded the theory that received worldwide echo as the theory of 'jeune école'. Twenty cruisers and many 'autonomous' torpedo boats, grouped together in flotillas, were supposed to be the carriers of a state-monopolized pirate war and a ruthless war of coastal devastation, the aim of which in the preliminary phase of the war was to have a psychological influence on the public opinion of the enemy through the mere act of neglecting international law of the sea Threat, in the event of war, should be the attrition of the enemy's will to resist and the destruction of the enemy's military and economic power. To protect our own coasts, we had to set up coastal protection using defense torpedo boats. "

Aube made the acquaintance of Gabriel Charmes by chance in the military hospital and inspired him for his ideas. Charmes shortened the theory of Aubes in 1884 to a war with torpedo boats for the cruiser war and with gunboats for the "coastal devastation war". He popularized the simplified ideas through contributions in reviews and weeklies for the upper classes as well as in daily newspapers for the mass audience. In this way he succeeded in getting the simplified ideas of the “Young School” to be noted and discussed - from Madame Adam's salon to Parliament.

These founding fathers were followed in the 1890s by a generation of highly politically active students who diverged greatly from Aube's original way of thinking.

In its final phase towards the beginning of the 20th century, the "Young School" split into three wings:

  • The wing around Ernest-Francois Fournier initially advocated an organically structured fleet (flotte homogène) with armored cruisers, torpedo and submarines, but later shifted to a combination of armored cruiser and ship of the line, the ship of the line.
  • The group around H. Vignot turned imperceptibly from promoting the fast armored cruiser to recognizing the ships of the line.
  • The radical circle around Alfred Duquet campaigned for small torpedo boats ( canot automobiles ), submarines and against ships of the line and derived its demands directly from Gabriel Charmes' ideas from 1884.

After the failure of the most extreme advocate, the Minister Camille Pelletan, and after the lessons of the sea ​​battle at Tsushima , the Jeune École disbanded. Its mouthpiece, the “Marine francaise”, stopped its publication in July 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the First World War.

Positive and negative effects

The Jeune École had a negative effect on the entire fleet program, because the construction of battleships was hindered and a jumble of boat types was built. The enforcement of the upper limit of the tonnage of 12,000 tons by 1898 prevented efficient battleships. The comparison of the British and French naval strengths for the year 1898 showed that the French navy was clearly inferior.

"The comparison of the two fleets proved to the leaders of the 'Old School' as well as Admiral Fournier that the British fleet could not be defeated either according to the strategy of the 'Old School' or the concept of the 'Young School'."

The "Junge Schule" gave positive impetus through the establishment of a cruiser fleet, the idea of ​​building bases and coal stations, the construction of torpedo boats for coastal defense, the idea of ​​submarine construction, the introduction of administrative reforms and the introduction of a torpedo department in Year 1896.

Ultimately, the ideas of the Jeune École could not be implemented in concrete armament plans. When, as a result of the Faschoda crisis, a rapprochement with Great Britain became apparent, which in 1904 led to the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale , the anti-British concept of the Jeune École became finally obsolete. The entente cordiale between Great Britain and France in 1904 and the lessons from the naval battle of Tsushima on May 27, 1905, in which Japan won against Russia, showed that the preference for battleships by the "old school" was correct. On the other hand, at Tsushima the importance of torpedo boats had just been shown, on which the "Young School" relied.

The more radical members had already brought the "Young School" already discredited when she termination of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 and the associated commitment to the fight to prize regulations demanded, as this in its opinion, the losing fleet - in case of war with Great Britain So your own - being unduly disadvantaged.

"The Junge Schule arose out of its time, its guilt lies not in its existence, but in the fact that it was too slow or even unable to resolve doctrines that had turned out to be the wrong path."

Follow-up time

After the " dreadnought jump" of 1906, the French navy, like the other major naval powers, began building modern capital ships . From 1890 onwards, Mahan's strategic conception increasingly pushed that of the Jeune École into the background.

However, some of their ideas persisted. The principle of submarine warfare has its roots in the theories of the Jeune École, as does the “ armored ship concept” of the German Imperial and Navy . An exercise of the Imperial Navy, in which a torpedo boat is attacking an ironclad, is shown in the painting by Willy Stöwer (1864–1931): Torpedo boats approaching the enemy .

Case study for newer concepts

The Jeune École recognized the opportunities of new technologies, the networking of development, decision-making and command levels as well as the paralysis of the opposing economic power. The innovations used as a matter of course in the 20th century, namely torpedoes, submarines, high-explosive shells and oil as drive energy, were not adequately tested, not accepted and thus not effectively usable at the time of the Young School. The public discussion of the planned changes (by MPs, journalists and the “old school”) and the cumbersome administration blocked implementation. The Jeune École is therefore taken by Dahl as an example of how correct thinking ahead, which is to be implemented prematurely, can fail and also cloud the view of the currently required defense measures.

When comparing the theory of the French Jeune École and the more recent American concept of Network-Centric Warfares (NCW), Dahl works out the following similarities between the two approaches: consideration of technological innovations, scientific approach, emphasis on speed and precision, network-like and result-oriented approach, dissemination of Terror and intimidation as a means of avoiding war as well as adopting the recipes for success of the economy.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Volkmar Bueb: The "Young School" of the French Navy. Strategy and Politics 1875-1900. Boppard am Rhein 1971, p. 20
  2. ↑ Erik J. Dahl: Net-centric before its time: the Jeune Ecole and its lessons for today , section: Technological change and strategic uncertainty. In: Naval War College Review, Autumn 2005, Vol. 58, No. 4th
  3. ↑ François-Emmanuel Brézet: Enseignements de l'histoire et progrès technique: L'Example de l'élaboration de la doctrine de la Jeune École française , Section: Les enseignements de l'histoire.
  4. ^ Volkmar Bueb: The "Young School" of the French Navy. Strategy and Politics 1875-1900 , Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard am Rhein, 1971, pp. 7–15
  5. ↑ quoted from Volkmar Bueb: The "Young School" of the French Navy. Strategy and Politics 1875-1900 , Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard am Rhein, 1971, pp. 156–157
  6. ↑ Source Volkmar Bueb: The "Young School" of the French Navy. Strategy and Politics 1875-1900 , Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard am Rhein, 1971, p. 162
  7. ↑ quoted from: Volkmar Bueb: The "Young School" of the French Navy. Strategy and Politics 1875-1900 , Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard am Rhein, 1971, p. 164
  8. ↑ quoted from: Volkmar Bueb: The "Young School" of the French Navy. Strategy and Politics 1875-1900 , Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard am Rhein, 1971, p. 168
  9. ↑ Internationales Maritime Museum , Hamburg, Deck 5, subject area torpedo boat against ironclad.
  10. ↑ Erik J. Dahl: Net-centric before its time: the Jeune Ecole and its lessons for today , section: Rethinking the Jeune Ecole. In: Naval War College Review, Autumn 2005, Vol. 58, No. 4th
  11. ↑ Erik J. Dahl: Net-centric before its time: the Jeune Ecole and its lessons for today , section: The Parallel with network-centric warfare. In: Naval War College Review, Autumn 2005, Vol. 58, No. 4th

literature

  • (de / fr) Volkmar Bueb: The "Young School" of the French Navy. Strategy and Politics 1875-1900 , Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard am Rhein, 1971, 185 S. In: Military History Research Office (Hrsg.): Wehrwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Department Military History Studies, Volume 12. ISBN 3-7646-1552-4 . (Chronological development of the Junge Schule with supporting French quotations, summary, appraisal of the school and extensive bibliography. Out of stock in bookshops)
  • Rolf Hobson: Maritime Imperialism. Sea power ideology, sea strategy thinking and the Tirpitz Plan 1875 to 1914 , Munich 2004
  • Jörg Duppler (Ed.): Sea power and sea strategy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Mittler and Son, Berlin 1999, ISBN 3-8132-0678-5
  • (en) Theodore Ropp: The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904 . Ed .: Stephen S. Roberts, Annapolis, Md., Naval Institute Press, 1987 (Harvard University dissertation published 1937)

Web links