KLM flight 543

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KLM flight 543
Douglas DC-6A PH-TGA KLM LAP 10.10.53 edited-2.jpg

A KLM DC-6
Accident summary
Accident type Controlled flight into terrain, crash landing, propeller incident with personal injury
place Cairo-Almaza Airport , United Arab Republic , today: EgyptUnited Arab RepublicUnited Arab Republic EgyptEgypt 
date 19th February 1958
Fatalities 1
Survivors 20th
Injured 0
Aircraft
Aircraft type United StatesUnited States Douglas DC-6B
operator NetherlandsNetherlands KLM
Mark NetherlandsNetherlands PH-DFK
Surname Jan Huyghen van Linschoten
Departure airport Amsterdam Schiphol Airport , Netherlands
NetherlandsNetherlands 
1. Stopover Praga-Ruzyně Airport , CzechoslovakiaCzechoslovakiaCzechoslovakia 
2. Stopover Vienna International Airport , Austria
AustriaAustria 
3. Stopover Athens-Ellinikon Airport , Greece
Kingdom of GreeceKingdom of Greece 
4. Stopover Beirut Airport , Lebanon
LebanonLebanon 
Destination airport Cairo-Almaza Airport , United Arab Republic , today: EgyptUnited Arab RepublicUnited Arab Republic EgyptEgypt 
Passengers 13
crew 8th
Lists of aviation accidents

On February 19, 1958, a Douglas DC-6B crashed on KLM flight 543 (flight number: KL543 ) at Cairo-Almaza Airport . A crash landing on the runway occurred during a nocturnal approach. The 13 passengers and 7 of the 8 crew members survived the accident unharmed. The first officer, however, was fatally injured.

machine

The aircraft used on Flight 843 was a Douglas DC-6B, which was finally assembled at the Douglas Aircraft Company's plant in Santa Monica , California and which made its maiden flight in 1952. It was the 240th fully assembled DC-6 from ongoing production, it had the factory number 43552. The machine was one of seven aircraft of this type that were in service with KLM and was launched on April 26, 1952 at the same time as the other six DC-6B registered with the aircraft registration PH-TFK and the baptismal name Jan Huyghen van Linschoten in the Dutch Aircraft Register (No. 290). The machine was delivered to KLM on June 5, 1952. On February 23, 1954, the license plate was changed to PH-DFK .

The DC-6B was a passenger version derived from the DC-6A Liftmaster freighter. It was a very economical aircraft for the time, which KLM preferred to use on intercontinental routes. The four-engined long-haul aircraft was equipped with four radial engines of the type Pratt & Whitney R-2800 Double Wasp equipped with a capacity of 2400 horsepower. The aircraft had a cruising speed of 460 km / h, a maximum take-off weight of more than 45 tons and a range of 3600 km. The PH-DFK machine could be configured for the transport of 64 to 92 passengers and was operated in the well-known blue and white hull painting with the lettering The Flying Dutchman with red, white and blue rudder. By the time of the accident, the machine had had a cumulative operating performance of 18,492 operating hours.

Passengers and crew

There were 13 passengers and 8 crew members on board.

The captain was the 39-year-old Canadian Harold John Musselman. Musselman had 10,492 hours of flight experience, of which he had completed 3878 with the Douglas DC-6. He lived in Amstelveen . First officer was K. Moraal, second officer was 30-year-old Willem Jan Kroon from Bussum , who had 2129 hours of flight experience. The aircraft's flight engineer was 31-year-old JM de Koning, and JHM Smit, who was responsible for radio telegraphy, was the aircraft's radio operator. The cabin crew included the purser J. Schouten, the flight attendant WF Princes and the flight attendant EME Kwant.

At the time of the accident, the machine was being controlled by Second Officer Willem Jan Kroon, who was supervised by Captain Harold John Musselman. First officer K. Moraal was not involved in carrying out the approach.

Flight plan

KLM flight 543 was an intercontinental flight from Amsterdam to Cairo . Scheduled stopovers were planned in Prague , Vienna , Athens and Beirut . The flight started on February 18 and was scheduled to end in Cairo on the night of February 19. The last flight segment took off from Beirut at 11:48 p.m. local time.

Flight history

The first four flight segments were flown without any significant incidents. The accident occurred during the landing approach at the end of the fifth and last flight segment. At 01:10 that night the crew contacted air traffic control and stated that they were at an altitude of 4500 feet (approx. 1370 meters) at a distance of 15 nautical miles (approx. 28 kilometers) from the airport and that they were there have in sight. The pilots requested clearance for the approach according to visual flight rules. Air traffic control then gave them clearance to land. Second officer Kroon handled communications. The pilots received a release to land on runway 34. In order to fly to this, a right-side had under VFR traffic pattern are performed.

In order to bring the machine at the correct distance in relation to altitude and runway when passing the landing threshold with a tailwind, a course of 135 ° was flown on the opposite approach. Second Officer Kroon, who was seated in the left seat, had poor visibility of the runway from his position, so that he had to rely on instructions from Captain Musselman. When the aircraft was level with the runway threshold, he reported this to his colleague. Kroon did not think the distance to the runway was big enough and the course changed to about 150 ° as he continued his flight, which he maintained for 35 seconds. At 330 km / h the machine was too fast, Kroon then slowed it down to 250 km / h.

At the end of the counter approach with a tailwind, the speed of the machine was 230 km / h and was therefore a little too low. The chassis was lowered and Kroon flew the machine into the right turn.

the accident

At 01:13 a.m., the crew contacted air traffic control again and reported down winds. Air traffic control confirmed receipt of the report and requested the pilots to report again on the final approach.

Due to the position of the runway lighting, Captain Musselman succumbed to an optical illusion . He got the impression that the altitude was lower than necessary and that the aircraft was too far from the runway. He didn't find that problematic, but informed Kroon. He responded by leaning forward for a better view. He accidentally adjusted the height controls. The DC-6 touched a hill in landing configuration at 1:14 a.m. 4.5 kilometers southeast of the runway threshold of runway 34 at a height of 180 meters. The right main landing gear, about 1/3 of the right elevator and the propeller of engine no. 4 broke off.

Despite the collision with the hill, the machine remained airworthy. Immediately after the collision, Captain Musselman took control of the engine. One minute after the collision, air traffic control granted flight KL543 permission to land. Instead, the pilots requested clearance for an emergency landing. This message was misunderstood by the air traffic control, whereupon they repeated the clearance for the aircraft to land. The pilots repeated their radio message and again only received confirmation of clearance to land.

On landing, Captain Musselman managed to land the DC-6 on the left main landing gear and nose wheel. The machine overshot the runway and slid into sandy terrain behind the runway, whereupon the nose landing gear broke. The front area of ​​the DC-6 then slid with the underside of the fuselage over the ground, turned to the right and stopped.

Before the aircraft came to a standstill, First Officer K. Moraal opened the left cabin door to initiate the evacuation. It was torn from the engine and thrown into the running propeller of engine no. 1. Moraal was killed immediately. The other 20 occupants of the machine survived the incident unharmed.

Accident investigation

The Dutch Civil Aviation Authority investigated the incident and found that the landing had been carried out very negligently. There were course changes, the prescribed speed was exceeded and because the right turn was flown too steeply, the machine lost altitude. The flight engineer De Koning testified that Kroon had asked him to extend the flaps and that he then had to point out that he could not follow the instruction because the speed of the aircraft was unacceptably high at the time.

Kroon thought he was going to land on runway 05 and was surprised when he was assigned runway 34. Because of the flown right turn and his sitting position on the left seat, the conditions for this landing were difficult. Only after the flight to the right did he prepare for runway 34 with the map.

The accident investigators came to the conclusion that the accident would not have happened if the aircraft had flown only one meter higher. On the other hand, it was added that if the plane had flown a meter lower, the outcome of the accident would have been disastrous. The commission of inquiry praised Musselman for his very quick intervention after the hill patrol. She highlighted his exceptional achievement in safely landing the plane after hitting the hills. However, it was assumed that he was jointly responsible for the collision with the terrain on the approach, as he insufficiently monitored the operation of the third pilot, Kroon, and the position of the altimeter.

The accident investigation also found that runway 34 of Cairo-Almaza Airport was going downhill. If the starting point of the runway was at a height of 311 feet (about 95 meters in altitude), the height at the end point was 194 feet (59 meters in altitude). Due to this peculiarity, the runway looked shorter than the runways on a level plane from the same altitude. Accordingly, pilots could get the impression when approaching, even at correct altitudes, that they are flying lower than necessary.

On February 6, 1959, the Dutch Aviation Safety Authority published its final report on the accident. In it she concluded that a careless approach procedure with insufficient preparation by Kroon and insufficient vigilance and supervision by Musselman had led to the accident. Both pilots were accused of not paying enough attention to the altimeters and the height of the hills in the area.

After the accident

Personal consequences

Shortly before the accident, KLM had issued a ban on using pilots with the rank of second mate on night landings, even under the supervision of authorized captains. The letter did not reach Musselman until 2 days after the accident. The captain received a disciplinary sanction for his actions - his flight license was revoked for a period of 2 weeks. The third officer, Kroon, received a warning. When the report of the Dutch Air Council was published in early 1959, however, Kroon had meanwhile been promoted to the rank of First Officer.

Whereabouts of the aircraft

Despite its severe damage, the machine was repaired and continued to operate after the accident. On November 14, 1960, the machine was leased to the Colombian Rutas Aéreas SAM , where it was operated with the aircraft registration HK-535 . On May 19, 1961, the aircraft returned to KLM with its registration number PH-DFK . On 26 June 1962, the KLM sold the aircraft to the earlier than one year charter airline founded Adriatic Aviopromet from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . The DC-6 went into operation with its new owner with the registration YU-AFE . In October 1968 the machine was sold to the Brothers Air Service Co. , which approved the aircraft with the new registration number VR-ABJ and then operated it from June 1969 with the new, Yemeni registration number 7O-ABJ . The machine kept this when it was approved on September 3, 1971 for the new holder Grive and Irvin . In May 1973 the machine was finally taken over by Iscargo Iceland and approved as TF-ABJ . In 1974 the machine was finally decommissioned in Reykjavik and then cannibalized.

History of the airport

Cairo-Almaza Airport was partially replaced by it in 1963 after the Cairo-International Airport was expanded and has since been used as Almaza Air Base mainly for military purposes and for a few private charter flights.

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