Operation Turquoise

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Opération Turquoise ( German also Operation Turquoise ) was the name of a military mission by France during the genocide in Rwanda that lasted from June 23 to August 21, 1994 . It was based on a proposal by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe to the UN Security Council on 15 June 1994. The application received by the UN Resolution 929, which on 22 June 1994 with ten votes in favor and five abstentions by the Security Council of the United Nations was adopted, a mandate as peace enforcement intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter . The mission's goal, legitimized by the resolution, was to ensure the protection and security of displaced persons, refugees and endangered civilians in Rwanda, as well as to secure and support the distribution of relief supplies.

preparation and execution

French soldiers in August 1994 during Opération Turquoise

Preparations for Opération Turquoise began on June 19, 1994, three days before Resolution 929 was passed, with the transfer of around 3,000 soldiers to Goma and Bukavu in Zaire, which is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which borders on Rwanda . From there, the troops were stationed from June 23 in the region around the cities of Cyangugu , Kibuye and Gikongoro in southwest Rwanda. A so-called safe humanitarian zone (French: Zones Humanitaires Sures , ZHS) was established here, which later expanded to cover around 20 percent of the area of ​​Rwanda. While the number of refugees and displaced people was initially estimated at around 250,000 in the Gikongoro region and a further 100,000 in the Cyangugu and Kibuye regions, it rose to around 1.7 million people, including 600,000 in Gikongoro and 800,000 in Cyangugu and 300,000 in Kibuye. The intervention troops within the ZHS primarily took on the care and accommodation of these people.

The armed forces were mainly provided by France with a contingent of 2,555 soldiers. In addition, seven African countries took part in the mission, namely Senegal (243), Chad (132), Niger (43), Republic of the Congo (40), Guinea-Bissau (35), Mauritania (10) and Egypt (7) . So a total of 3,065 soldiers were deployed. The technical equipment included, among other things, 100 armored personnel carrier , ten helicopters , a battery of 120-mm mortar guns , four fighter-bomber type SEPECAT Jaguar and eight Mirage fighter jets for reconnaissance purposes.

France's actual motives are disputed. Before the genocide began, France had close political and economic ties with the government of Juvénal Habyarimana , President of Rwanda until his death on April 6, 1994 in a plane crash. Due to their limited mandate, the intervention troops almost completely failed to disarm the units of the government army RGF and the Hutu militias, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi , and prevent them from advancing into the ZHS. Effective protection of the people who fled to the ZHS from being murdered by Hutu extremists was therefore not possible, at least in areas where the intervention troops were not directly on site. There were several clashes between the rebel army RPF and the French armed forces . These contributed to the fact that the RPF was opposed to Opération Turquoise, since it questioned its neutrality and feared support for the RGF by the French army. On the other hand, it is considered likely that the intervention prevented a major mass exodus from Rwanda to Zaire, which would have destabilized the neighboring country of Rwanda and thus the entire region.

In accordance with UN resolution 929, Opération Turquoise ended after two months with the withdrawal of the intervention troops on August 21, 1994. It was replaced by the expanded United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), whose mandate was named UN resolution 925 UNAMIR II had been converted into a mission under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations . However, this had started with a significant delay.

Effects

The effects of Opération Turquoise have not yet been fully clarified due to contradicting representations. The operation is said to have directly saved the lives of around 13,000 to 14,000 people at immediate risk, mainly Tutsi , with the figures from the French army of 80,000 to 100,000 people being well above this estimate. In addition, the deployment increased security in the regions of the ZHS, so that increased activities by humanitarian aid organizations for the people affected became possible.

On the part of the RPF and based on testimony, there are also allegations that French soldiers participated directly and indirectly in actions by the RGF and the Hutu militias against Tutsi. It is also considered likely that Opération Turquoise made it possible for a large number of people who were partly responsible for the genocide to flee. The main reason for this was the signing of a mutual non-aggression agreement between the RPF and the intervention troops on July 6, 1994. For humanitarian reasons, the RPF refrained from advancing into the regions protected by the ZHS for the duration of the mission. However, an advance of the RPF into the ZHS immediately after the end of Opération Turquoise subsequently triggered large-scale escape movements.

Evaluation and criticism

In terms of fulfilling its mandate, Opération Turquoise is usually rated as at least partially successful. One of the biggest criticisms of the Turquoise Opération, however, is the fact that it was deployed in parallel with the United Nations Support Mission for Rwanda that already existed in Rwanda . This was conceived as a peacekeeping mission according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter and, after the beginning of the genocide in April 1994, its staffing levels were massively reduced. The decision to withdraw the UNAMIR troops as far as possible was also supported by France in the UN Security Council.

Both the Opération Turquoise and the later reinforcement from UNAMIR to UNAMIR II came much too late. Earlier intervention by the international community by increasing the number of UNAMIR troops shortly after the genocide began would most likely have largely prevented the genocide.

literature

  • Alison Des Forges : No witness is allowed to survive. The genocide in Rwanda . 1st edition. Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2002, ISBN 3-930908-80-8 , pp. 786–808 (American English: Leave none to tell the story . Translated by Jürgen Bauer).
  • Gerard Prunier: Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Political Dead End. In: Howard Adelman, Astri Suhrke: The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London 1999, pp. 281-305, ISBN 1-56-000382-0
  • Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. S / 1999/1257. Published by the United Nations on December 15, 1999, pp. 27-30 and pp. 49/50
  • Patrick de Saint-Exupéry : Complices de l'inavouable: La France au Rwanda. Les Arènes, Paris 2009, ISBN 978-2-35204-083-5

Web links