Orange army reform

The reform of the Dutch army towards the end of the 16th century is called the Orange Army Reform .

requirements

New ideas

The rediscovery of ancient writers in the Renaissance also led to occupation with the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers and military writers . In his writings, Justus Lipsius developed, among other things, the theoretical basis for a new army. His main ideas were:

• Through selection ( dilectus ) among the subjects, an army should emerge that does not have the known shortcomings of the mercenaries recruited abroad, such as infidelity, disobedience, alarm and plundering of their own country. For a small professional army, the best children of the country are selected every year through a strict selection process. This professional army is reinforced by a larger reserve army, also made up of regional children, for garrison service in fortresses and cities and in the war to supplement the line troops made up of professional soldiers.
• A new way of life for the soldiers is to be achieved through order ( disciplina ). This order is based on four pillars:

1. Daily drill (drill when using weapons and during combat movements) and practicing (entrenchment work and fortification of the camp) should lead the soldiers to obedience and a natural order.

2. A differentiated structure of the troops is established on the drill discipline. A new, clearly structured order in the camp and in combat requires an increase in the higher office positions, but also creates a well-functioning command hierarchy and makes the troops more agile for tactical use.

3. A sense of duty, willingness to take responsibility and self-control ( “not swearing, scuffling, drinking, whores” ) are the virtues that distinguish soldiers.

4. This attitude is sustained and strengthened by a well-designed system of rewards and punishments. The severe punishments of the time are by no means rejected, but the soldier should be kept from falling for them through encouragement and recognition - promotion according to merit (not according to age or favor), public praise, monetary bonuses .

• The army is financed by an annual army tax. Only a soldier adequately and properly paid will be a willing tool in the hands of a warlord.
• The position of the officers is strengthened through better training in the arms trade. Because of their greater duties, they are expected to have a greater sense of responsibility, and if they fail they receive a harsher punishment.

External pressure

In the first years of the Eighty Years' War , large parts of the northeastern Netherlands were conquered by the Spaniards and after the Spanish governor Alexander Farnese had conquered Antwerp in 1585 , the provinces of the Union of Utrecht were extremely endangered. Against the Spanish infantry , which at the time was considered the best in the world, only a new, reformed army could last.

Insightful military leaders

The new ideas could only be implemented by army commanders who were convinced of them and at the same time had great authority.

Financial resources

Overseas trade ( Dutch East India Company and Dutch West India Company ) gave the Netherlands sufficient funds to finance the costly reform. The 1596 pact of the States General with England also brought financial support.

The reform

Not all of Lipsius' ideas could prevail. Above all, the intention to enlist one's own country children into one's own standing army was still unthinkable at that time. Building on the other basic theoretical ideas and in direct imitation of the ancient models, Moritz von Oranien , Wilhelm Ludwig von Nassau and Johann Johann VII von Nassau-Siegen in particular created the new army of the States General from 1580.

Increase in firearms

The ratio of pikes and muskets had already changed in favor of the latter throughout the 16th century . While the Swiss “ Haufen ” and the Spanish “ Tercio ” still had a clear preponderance of pikemen , the Dutch had enough money to equip around half of their troops with firearms .

Smaller formations

Dutch orderly, troup

Following the Roman model, smaller but more formations were formed in order to be able to use them more flexibly in battle. The regiments were divided into two troups (half regiments), which now formed the actual tactical unit. A troup consisted of five companies , the companies consisted of 50 pikemen, 40 arquebusiers and 20 musketeers . At the same time, the depth of the troups was reduced and the square formation with up to 30 lines was pulled apart to form a formation only 10 to 12 lines deep. This meant that firearms in particular could be better used.

Dutch orderly, listing in meetings

To compensate for the shallower depth in the battle compared to the Tercios, the individual troups were set up in several lines one behind the other ( meeting ) on a gap according to the Roman example . The Dutch used this list ( Dutch orderly ) for the first time with success at the Battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600.

Gun drill and drill

The handling of the weapons was improved through constant weapon drill . Own illustrated manuals were written in which every step in handling the pike or musket was shown in order to be able to carry out uniform and effective maneuvers and to increase the firing rate of the arquebusiers and musketeers. Following the Roman model, the commands were separated into announcement and execution commands .

The closer the pikemen and firearms bearers stood together, the faster the latter could seek protection from the pikemen in the event of cavalry attacks. In order to reduce the distance, the Dutch developed the enfilade instead of the counter march . Then there was the practice of turns, swings, doubling and halving on command.

The individual soldier was reduced to a cog in the mechanism of a war machine based on military science that ran as effectively as possible.

Beginning of the standing armies

This complex training (individually and in closed formations) required a long period of training and therefore service. The soldiers were therefore no longer only recruited for a specific campaign , but for a longer period or full-time. By paying a regular wage , the costs for the now standing army increased significantly, but the secure income prevented the dreaded looting .

Training of leaders

Previously, the lower military leaders were temporary champions , but now they were also constantly on duty and responsible for the training, the movements in combat and for the “moral” behavior of the soldiers. At the same time, their number in the army increased because of the larger number of companies and they had to master all commands and their execution themselves.

In this way an officer corps with its own ethos could slowly develop.

Effects of the reform

The military virtues demanded by Lipsius and his system of rewards and punishments led to the Articuls letter of the Dutch States General , issued in 1590 by Petrus Papus von Tratzberg , which for the first time created a uniform martial law without differentiation for riders and footmen. The order achieved in the Dutch army meant that the centuries-old fear of soldiers disappeared there. The war articles themselves were the model for many others that followed, especially the Swedish from 1632, the Brandenburg from 1656 and the English New Model Army under Oliver Cromwell .

This also clearly indicates the limits of the Orange Army reform. The practical-technical part of Lipsius' ideas that were implemented through them influenced the European armies for centuries. His “political-sociological demands remained incomprehensible or at least impracticable to contemporaries [and for over 100 years their successors too]. The military system in the form of the mercenary army was still basically seen as an independent organism, which was probably brought into being and nurtured by the state for the purpose of warfare, but which stood outside the state as a foreign body. The absolutist state took over the military in the form of the standing mercenary army as an independently functioning organism that was only integrated into the state through the person of the ruler. ”“ Only the French Revolution with the complete upheaval of the state and human image created fundamental changes here which led to a new military order and a new model for the soldier. "

References

literature

• Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War, Part 2 The Modern Age , new edition of the 1962 reprint, Walter de Gruyter & Co. KG., Berlin 2000, ISBN 3-937872-42-6
• Werner Hahlweg : The army reform of the Orange. The war book of Count Johann von Nassau-Siegen (= publications of the Historical Commission for Nassau, 20). Edited by Werner Hahlweg and ed. from the Historical Commission for Nassau . Wiesbaden 1973.
• Werner Hahlweg: The army reform of the Orange and the ancient world. Studies on the history of the war in the Netherlands, Germany, France, England, Italy, Spain and Switzerland from 1589 to the Thirty Years' War (= writings of the War History Department in the Department of History of the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Berlin, volume 31, publisher: Walter Elze). Junker and Dünnhaupt, Berlin 1941 (reprint with foreword, outline of life and bibliography: (= studies on military history, military science and conflict research, volume 35). Biblio-Verlag, Osnabrück 1987, ISBN 3-7648-1727-5 ).
• Papke: `` From the Militia to the Standing Army 1648 - 1789 '' in Military History Research Office , Ed., `` Handbook on German Military History 1648 - 1939 '' 1st volume, Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen Munich, 1975
• Theodor Fuchs, History of the European Warfare, Part I , Troop Service Pocket Books Volume 19, Verlag Carl Ueberreuter, Vienna 1985
• Charles Oman: A history of the art of war in the sixteenth century . Greenhill Books, London 1991, ISBN 0-947898-69-7
• Michael Roberts: The military revolution, 1560-1660 . In: Clifford J. Rogers: The military revolution debate. Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe . Westview Press, Boulder, Colo. 1995, ISBN 0-8133-2053-4 , pp. 13-35.
• Gerhard Oestreich: Soldier Image, Army Reform and Army Formation in the Age of Absolutism , in Fateful Issues of the Present Volume I, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen 1957

Individual evidence

1. ↑ De constantia, libri II, (1584) description of the stoic duties, De militia romana libri V (1595) Roman army
2. ↑ “Theory and practice, science and army command worked closely together in the financially strong, but geographically and nationally very weak country. The educated military leaders possessed a unique energy to overcome the resistance, they also found the full support of the economic forces threatened by Spain. ”Gerhard Oestreich, p. 298
3. ↑ Jakob de Geyn: Wappenhandelinghe van Roer's Musquetten ende Spießen , Haag, 1607, with 42 figures handling the light fire tube , 43 figures handling the musket , 32 figures handling the pike . Johann Jakob von Wallhausen: The art of war on foot, for the utmost benefit and best not only for all arriving soldiers, but also for training a common country folk and committee in principalities and places , Oppenheim 1615, 2nd edition Frankfurt a. M. 1630
4. ↑ Papke, Handbuch I, p. 137
5. ^ Oestreich p. 320

Remarks

1. ↑ including Seneca
2. ↑ Polybios : Organization of the Roman Legions, Aelianus Tacticus : Tactica , Leo IV .: Tactica
3. ↑ From the report of the Venetian envoy from Amsterdam in 1620: “I do not believe that in any state the military is kept in such good order as it is here. The soldiers are paid every 10 days, and the payout is not delayed for an hour. Here the most unconditional obedience prevails because of the most measured severity against the violators ... Private individuals invite the soldiers to lodge in their houses. The advantage that the municipality gets from this is great, as almost all of its income comes from taxes on food. The soldier drinks beer and eats butter from the landlord who houses him; then the latter still has a profit from the lodging money ... If someone rents a small room with two beds, he can lodge six soldiers, since two are always on duty .. "
4. ↑ In 1617 Johann VII founded a war school in the county of Nassau-Siegen, which only existed for two years, which Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen directed and which later served as a model