Pan Am Flight 160
| Pan Am Flight 160 | |
|---|---|
.jpg) An identical Boeing 707-321C from Pan Am |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Loss of control in final flight to an emergency landing |
| place |
Logan International Airport , Boston , Massachusetts , United States
|
| date | 3rd November 1973 |
| Fatalities | 3 |
| Survivors | 0 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type |
Boeing 707-321C
|
| operator |
Pan American World Airways
|
| Mark |
N458PA
|
| Surname | Clipper Titian |
| Departure airport |
John F. Kennedy International Airport , New York , United States
|
| Stopover |
Glasgow Prestwick Airport , Scotland , United Kingdom
|
| Destination airport |
Frankfurt Airport , FR Germany
|
| Passengers | 0 |
| crew | 3 |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
Pan-Am-Flug 160 (flight number: PA160 , radio call sign: CLIPPER 160 ) was a scheduled cargo flight operated by Pan American World Airways on November 3, 1973 from New York City to Frankfurt am Main with a planned stopover in Glasgow . On the flight the Boeing 707-321C N458PA had an accident , which had turned back to Logan International Airport due to smoke development in the cockpit . On its final approach, the machine hit the runway, killing all three occupants.
plane
In the crashed plane, it was a Boeing 707-321C, the 1967 work by Boeing on the Boeing Field in the State of Washington US than the 640. Boeing 707 off the production line with the serial number 19368 was and assembled at the time of the accident six Years old. The first flight of the machine took place on October 27, 1967, on November 7, 1967 it was delivered to Pan Am, where it went into operation with the aircraft registration N458PA . The machine was given the name Clipper Titian . The four-engine long-range narrow-body aircraft was equipped with four turbofan engines of the type Pratt & Whitney Jt3d-3B equipped. By the time of the accident, the machine had completed 24,537 operating hours.
crew
There was only a three-person crew on board the machine, consisting of a flight captain, a first officer and a flight engineer:
- The 53-year-old flight captain John J. Zammett worked for Pan American World Airways since May 1, 1951. Since February 2, 1965 he was trained on the Boeing 707. On September 14, 1967, he was certified as a captain. Zammett had 16,477 hours of flight experience, of which he had completed 5,824 flight hours in the cockpit of the Boeing 707. In his medical test report of August 6, 1973, he was only required to wear glasses while performing his service as a pilot.
- The 34-year-old first officer Gene W. Ritter was hired by Pan American World Airways on February 14, 1966. He had been trained on the Boeing 707 from April 11, 1966 and received his type rating for this type of aircraft on July 7, 1969. He had 3,843 hours of flight experience, all of which he had completed in the Boeing 707.
- The 37-year-old flight engineer Davis Melvin began his employment with Pan American World Airways on June 5, 1967. He had been trained as first officer on the Boeing 707 since February 2, 1968. On August 21, 1970 he was certified as a flight engineer for this type of aircraft. Melvin had worked 7,261 hours of service, 3,260 hours of which in the cockpit of the Boeing 707.
the accident
The machine took off at 8:25 a.m. in New York. The machine had loaded 24,000 kg of cargo, 6,967 kg of which was chemicals. After take-off, the machine was brought on course to climb to FL330. At 0844, the clearance was changed and instructed to maintain FL310 as the final cruising altitude. The crew reported that they had reached this altitude at 0850. When the machine against 09:04 100 miles east Montreal , Canada the VORTAC of Sherbrooke approached, the crew of the operator center said the airline Pan American Operations (PANOP) in New York City with that in the electrical compartment "Lower 41" the machine had accumulated smoke and the flight would therefore avoid Boston. At 9:08 a.m., the crew informed air traffic control in Montréal Center that they were at FL310 and that they wanted to return to New York. The air traffic control in Montreal gave the crew a clearance to fly a right turn on a course of 180 degrees. At 09:10, the crew informed the PANOP that they would return to New York, as the smoke "seemed to be a little thicker here". At 09:11 the crew informed the PANOP that they were going back to Boston because "this smoke was getting too thick". Although the crew had not declared an air emergency , the Boeing was given priority over other machines by air traffic control on its flight to Boston. Air traffic control in Boston had issued approvals to descend to 2,000 feet by 9:26:30 a.m. so that the machine's fuel could be burned faster at lower altitudes. At 0929, the crew asked air traffic control in Boston about the flight distance to the airport and stated that the distance measuring equipment did not appear to be working. Air traffic control in Boston replied that the machine was just passing Pease Air Force Base and was about 40 to 45 miles northwest of Boston. The first communication between the aircraft and the approach control controller took place at 09:31:21. The pilots were instructed to fly directly towards Boston and maintain an altitude of 2,000 feet. The pilot asked whether the pilots wanted to explain the emergency, but they said no. They asked for clearance to land on runway 33, which was approved soon after. The master instructed the other crew members to "switch off everything that is not needed". At 09:34:20, the pilot asked about the course displayed on the radio compass , and the crew replied that it indicated 205 degrees. When asked whether the crew wanted the vectors for runway 33, the pilots replied that they wanted to land as soon as possible. At 093546 the air traffic controller instructed the crew to report as soon as they had the airport in sight. The radio message went unanswered. At 0937:04, the controller sent another radio message to the aircraft in which he informed the pilot that your transponder had just failed. He instructed them to fly to runway 33L and keep the radio frequency on. There was no answer to this radio message either. After the lift aids and spoilers had been deployed to reduce speed, the machine approached runway 33L. The yaw damper was put out of operation too early due to the uncoordinated execution of emergency measures, which made it extremely difficult to control the machine at low speeds. The pilots finally lost control of the machine, which hit the aircraft nose ahead about 80 meters from runway 33. The machine was completely destroyed in the impact, and all three crew members were killed.
root cause
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) took over the investigation after the crash. As the cause of the accident, the investigators said the presence of smoke in the cockpit. The smoke developed continuously and in an uncontrolled manner and led to an emergency situation, which ultimately led to the loss of control of the aircraft during the final approach, when the crew deactivated the yaw damper due to uncoordinated action at a time when the spoilers and buoyancy aids were in a for found such an act inappropriate. Investigators also found that the thick smoke in the cockpit had seriously affected the flight crew's view and ability to act effectively in an emergency. The source of the smoke development could not be clearly identified. The investigators were of the opinion that there had been a spontaneous chemical reaction during the flight between leaking acid, which had not been properly packaged and stowed away, and defective packaging containing sawdust . One contributing factor has been general non-compliance with applicable regulations for the transport of hazardous materials, which resulted from the complexity of the regulations, industry-wide ignorance of regulations, overlapping jurisdictions and inadequate state oversight.