Peyton Young

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Hobart Peyton Young , called Peyton Young, (born March 9, 1945 in Evanston (Illinois) ) is an American mathematician and economist who specializes in game theory.

Young graduated from Harvard University with a bachelor's degree in 1966 and received his doctorate in 1970 from the University of Michigan with Thomas Frederick Storer (Equicardinal matroids and matroid designs). In 1971 he became an Associate Professor at the City University of New York . From 1976 to 1981 he was at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg and in 1982 Professor of Economics and Political Science (Public Policy) at the University of Maryland, College Park . In 1994 he became a professor at Johns Hopkins University and from 2007 he was James Meade Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford .

He is an external member of the Santa Fe Institute and a Senior Fellow of the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics at the Brookings Institution.

He dealt with evolutionary game theory , in which he and Dean Foster introduced the concept of stochastic stability in 1990 (stochastic evolutionary game theory), with applications in social dynamics (development of social norms and institutions) and economics. Another focus of his research is learning in game theory and choice theory, partly with Michel Balinski ( Balinski and Young's impossibility theorem ).

He is a Fellow of the British Academy , the Econometric Society (1975) and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2018). In 1976 he received the Lester Randolph Ford Award .


  • with Michel Balinski: Fair Representation, 2nd edition, Brookings Institution, Washington DC 2001
  • Strategic Learning and Its Limits, Oxford University Press, 2004
  • Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions, Princeton University Press, 1998
  • Equity: In Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press 1994

Some essays:

  • with Dean Foster: Learning, Hypothesis Testing, and Nash Equilibrium, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 45, 2003, pp. 73-96
  • The Evolution of Conventions , Econometrica, Volume 61, 1993, pp. 57-84.
  • An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining , Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 59, 1993, pp. 145-168.
  • with Dean P. Foster: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics, Theoretical Population Biology, Volume 38, 1990, pp. 219-232
  • with Bary SR Pradelski: Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems , Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 75, 2012, pp. 882-897.
  • Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence and Social Learning , American Economic Review, Volume 99, 2009, pp. 1899-1924.
  • Learning by Trial and Error, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 65, 2009, pp. 626-643.
  • with Dean Foster: On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents , Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, Volume 98, 2001, pp. 12848-12853.
  • with Mary A. Burke: Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture , American Economic Review, Volume 91, 2001, pp. 559-573.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Life data according to American Men and Women of Science , Thomson Gale 2004
  2. Peyton Young in the Mathematics Genealogy Project (English)Template: MathGenealogyProject / Maintenance / id used